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MILITARY POWER AS FOREIGN POLICY INSTRUMENT: POST-1991 ETHIOPIAN PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS IN THE HORN OF AFRICA

Ph.D. DISSERTATION

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DECLARATION

Hereby I declare that **Military Power as Foreign Policy Instrument: Post-1991 Ethiopian Peace Support Operations in the Horn of Africa** is my original work and has not previously been submitted by me for a degree at another university. All primary and secondary sources used have been duly acknowledged.

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ABSTRACT

A foreign policy consists of two elements: national objectives to be achieved and the means for achieving them. Simultaneously, military power is the crucial machinery of government against internal and external security threats. The military apparatus is also vital in the formulation and implementation of foreign policy and the state's functioning in the international system. This study analyzes the juncture of foreign policy and military power in the Ethiopian peace support operation in the Horn of Africa until 2019.

The Horn of Africa is a region, where security matters the most. The region is known for protracted civil wars, interstate wars, drought, terrorism, religious fundamentalism, state collapse, political tension, large-scale human displacement, piracy, cattle rustling, militarization, and environmental degradation. One of Ethiopia's key foreign policy objectives is its national security. And the means to achieve it through vigorous peace support operations carried out in Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan, and Abyei are a manifestation to preserve its own and the region's peace and security.

The research design of this study is a mixed-method research approach that is both quantitative and qualitative. Primary and secondary data sources to address this research objective and justify the fact of conceptual issues investigated require a holistic data discussion. This study is descriptive research, based on the previous studies by Buzan and Waever and Stewart-Ingersoll and Frazier; showing in the regional security complex of Horn of Africa how Ethiopia is becoming influential in the region's security order due to its extensive peace support operations in the region.

The dissertation finds out that Ethiopia's approach to the Horn of Africa's regional security has been primarily influenced by minimizing its vulnerabilities and immediate national security threats. Its national role in peacekeeping emanates from this role and it has become the defining paradigm for its foreign policy engagement.

Moreover, Ethiopia is a crucial player in the Horn of Africa, and despite the recent internal conflict, its peace support operations have been crucial for maintaining stability in the region. Its role aided by its military's strength and active participation in regional peace and security operations; its capacity and willingness to combat terrorism; a Pan-Africanist legacy; and its effective utilization of multilateral platforms; will keep Ethiopia's regional hegemony and visibility.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

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CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTIONS

Ethiopia is the second country in the world, next to the US on the number of foreign deployed troops. This dissertation discuses and examines both the historical and conceptual matters related to Ethiopia's foreign deployment mainly with AU and UN peacekeeping missions and its rationales behind it in relations to its regional security. It also covers the security dynamics of the Horn of Africa including 23 multinational, past and present peace support operations. The first section discusses the background, statement of the problem, research questions, the dissertation's hypothesis, and the methodological tools applied in this dissertation. It gives an overview of the study's central points, the methods, and the reasons for adopting the methodological strategy used in the dissertation. It also addresses why specific methods are chosen over others, and the justification for choices made.

1.1 Background of the Study

Peacekeeping is an operation involving military personnel, undertaken especially by the United Nations or African Union or by other multinational organizations or sometimes unilaterally by single state to help maintain or restore international peace and security in conflict areas. United Nations or other organizations, which deploy troops in conflict areas, do not have their own military. Member states contributes troops for peacekeeping missions. In this regard, different states have their motives in contributing to international peace support missions[1]. This can be because of international pressure, or to exert regional influence by spreading their values and perspectives. It can also be to gain greater prestige, and international influence, to enhance national security and political gains, or to earn monetary profit for the country, and increase the size and quality of their military.

In the Horn of Africa, there have been a high presence of AU, EU, NATO, and UN peace support operations in the region. There is currently a presence of peace support operations in Darfur, Sudan; the Abyei Sudan–South Sudan border; Somalia; and South Sudan. In the past, there were missions in Somalia, in the Ethiopia-Eritrea border, in Uganda-Rwanda border, and Sudan. From the first UN mission in the region in 1992 until 2019, there were 23 multinational peace support

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[1] The terms 'peacekeeping' and 'peace support operations' will be used interchangeably in this dissertation. The detailed differences between these words will be discussed in Chapter 3.

operations by AU, EU, IGAD, NATO and UN. Among these thirteen of them are current, six in the past, and four others failed missions.

For this dissertation, the Horn of Africa consists of Ethiopia, Djibouti, Eritrea, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda, and the world's newest state South Sudan which is one of the most volatile regions in the world for almost half a century.[2] The region has been rocked by civil wars, and it is known for drought, famine, state failure, a rogue state, piracy, and migration. Ethiopia has been in a center of all conflicts and peace support operations. Especially Ethiopia is directly involved in deploying thousands of its troops in all current AU and UN peacekeeping missions. These missions include the United Nations Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) in Sudan, Darfur; United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS), in South Sudan; United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA), in Abyei; and African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) in Somalia. Besides maintaining one of the region's most effective armed forces which are battle-hardened and experienced following a history of combat operations since 2015 – 2019, Ethiopia has been the top overall troop contributor to UN peacekeeping missions. In addition to this, Ethiopia deployed its troops in Somalia through AU peacekeeping mission and unilaterally[3].

Besides all these peace support operations in the region, the Horn of Africa has become one of the world's most militarized regions. Currently, there are fifteen states with operational military bases, one under construction and two with possible existing military facilities, in Djibouti, Eritrea, Kenya, Somalia, and Somaliland. Besides, there is a high military naval presence in the nearby waters of the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, and Strait of Bab al-Mandab.

Ethiopia is positioned at the Horn of Africa's nucleus, where the turbulent political condition and political atmosphere affect its foreign policy-making and executing since the reign of Emper-

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[2] See section 4.1 for descriptions of the Horn of Africa by different scholars.

[3] The term 'Unilateral' that means 'Unilateral Intervention' here implies a 'Unilateral Invited Intervention' of Ethiopia in Somalia. Here the term 'Unilateral' infers "regardless of the number of states participating in a humanitarian intervention, the intervention remains *unilateral* so long as the operation is not supervised by the United Nations." Richemondt, Daphne. Richemond, Daphné. "Normativity in International Law: The Case of Unilateral Humanitarian Intervention." *Yale Human Rights and Development Law Journal,* 6/1. 2003. 49. More discussion on the term 'unilateral intervention' will be discussed in section 3.4.5 and 'Ethiopia's Unilateral Intervention in Somalia' will be discussed in section 6.2.4.

or Tewodros II. Even today, Ethiopia's approach to the Horn of Africa's regional security has been primarily influenced by minimizing its vulnerabilities and its immediate national security threats where its national role in peacekeeping emanates from; and this role has become the defining paradigm for its foreign policy engagement.

The study focuses on Ethiopia, and it's surrounding the Horn of Africa region. It analyses the region's security complex and analyses the rationales behind Ethiopian peacekeeping operations in its next-door neighbors. It reveals that, in post-1991 Ethiopia, the Ethiopian military is not there only fighting a war but it is also involved in humanitarian assistance where no civilian alternative exists.

As a result, this study, by analyzing the missions mentioned above, and the region's security complex, will contribute to the field of military science in a strategic level recommendation that can be used for national defense policy. It also contributes to the knowledge of the security threats of the region that are also concerns of the global community.

The study concludes that the spillover effects are felt in Ethiopia and other regions of the Horn of Africa because of conflicts in neighboring states. These make sending peacekeeping troops to neighboring states to help to create a strong and functioning government, not a matter of altruism but a matter of national security. That is why Ethiopia responded to AU and UN peacekeeping operations and sent its troops to all conflict zones in the region.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

A research problem is a statement about an area of concern, an under-explored subject in the research area, or it can be a knowledge gap. In this regard, there are quite plenty of works of literature on most countries, security dynamics, participation, and a reason behind their participation in peace support operations; however, though Ethiopia is one of the top contributor in peacekeeping operations in the world for about a decade, there is lack of comprehensive research and limited literature are available. Similarly, there are adequate studies on the security matters in the Horn of Africa region, and still, Ethiopia's extensive peace support operation involvement is lacking.

Currently, there is Ethiopia's presence in peace support missions in the Horn of Africa, in the United Nations Mission in Darfur, (UNAMID) in Sudan, Darfur, United Nations Mission in the

Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS), in South Sudan, United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA), in Abyei, and African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) in Somalia.

With all its internal security challenges, Ethiopia keeps its position of sending a large number of troops to be deployed through the African Union, United Nations, and unilaterally in the region. This is needs to be studied, and the how and why Ethiopia continues to play this role, and Ethiopian foreign policy interest regarding peacekeeping troop contribution must be answered.

1.3 Research Objectives

The research objectives of the dissertation are as follows:

* To investigate the reasons for Ethiopia's participation in peacekeeping operations.

* To analyse trends in Ethiopian peace support operations from 1952 until 2019.

* To investigate the current Ethiopian peace support operations capabilities and limitations.

* To examine the Ethiopia's foreign policy trends concerning its peacekeeping deployment.

* To analyse the Horn of Africa's security complex and Ethiopia's security interest in the region vis-à-vis the nature of Ethiopia's peace operations.

* To examine Ethiopia as a Regional Hegemon or Regional Power influence in the Horn of Africa in relation to its peace support operation in the region.

* To analyse Ethiopia's Geopolitical Interest and Security Risk Responsiveness vis-à-vis its Peace Support Operation Deployment

1.4 Research Questions

Following the identified research problems above, the following are the research questions addressed by this research;

* What is the reason for Ethiopia's participation in peacekeeping operations?

* What is the reason behind Ethiopia's peacekeeping deployment focus mostly at the Horn of Africa? And what are the security rationales behind it? What factors shape the policymakers´ choice to participate?

* What is the Security complex of the Horn of Africa and its relations with Ethiopia's participation in peacekeeping?

* What is the outlook of the Ethiopian armed forces on Ethiopia's peacekeeping participation?

* How the peacekeeping missions of Ethiopia has been undertaking in being used to promote and maintain Ethiopia's national interest, regional standing, and its contribution to peace-making efforts?

1.5 The Hypotheses of the Study

* The study's central hypothesis is that the post-1991 Ethiopian government uses its military power capability or show of force and force presence through peacekeeping operations as its foreign policy instrument to deal with its security challenges in the neighbouring Horn of African states. In addition to this, the following are also the hypotheses of the study.

* Ethiopia's security is tied up with its regional security complex of the Horn of Africa region, and the region's countries involvement in high display levels of security interdependence. It considers this when it formulates its foreign policy. This is manifested in its peace support operations which are focused on its next-door neighbouring states.

* Ethiopia's approach to the Horn of Africa regional security has been primarily influenced by minimizing its vulnerabilities and immediate national security threats. Its national role in peacekeeping emanates from, and this role becomes the defining paradigm for its foreign policy engagement.

* The Ethiopian government peacekeeping operations in the Horn of Africa were established by the Ethiopian hegemonic regional power and used as a tool of the foreign policy in the region.

* Because of the states' nature in the Horn of Africa (mostly caused by their history of nation building) and the regional security complex of the Horn states, Ethiopia's multilateral (UN and AU) and unilateral interventions are justifiable for its security and stabilizing the region.

1.6 Description of Variables

This research addressed three variables of the study, which are foreign policy, military power, and peacekeeping operation. The first two were independent variables when the last one was not.

A country's decision to participate in a peacekeeping mission is rooted on its national values, interests, its foreign policy, and the capability of its military power. Thus, this study discusses Ethiopia's foreign policy, military power and analyzes Ethiopia's peace support operations.

1.7 Research Design

As the research's overall objective is to assess the post-1991 Ethiopia's use of its military through peacekeeping operations in the Horn of Africa as its foreign policy instrument until 2019, this research is intended to be descriptive. As Kothari noted, research design makes research as well-organized as possible, hence yielding maximum evidence with a minimal outlay of struggle, time, and money.[4] Besides, the research design is the blueprint that facilitates the smooth functioning of all research operations.

1.8 Research Methodology

The research design of this study is a mixed-method research approach that is both quantitative and qualitative. Primary and secondary data sources to address this research objective and justify the fact of conceptual issues for the investigated require a holistic data discussion.

The rationale for employing the qualitative method is that the qualitative research method aims to address questions concerned with developing an understanding of the meaning and experiences of humans' lives and social worlds.[5] Qualitative research also explores attitudes, behavior, and experiences through interviews with key informants who know the issue under study.

This study is based on the previous studies by Barry Buzan[6]. It further shows how in the regional security complex of Horn of Africa Ethiopia is becoming influential in the regional security order due to its extensive peace support operations in the Horn of Africa.

This study is descriptive research, which provides an accurate portrayal of characteristics of a particular individual, situation, or group. These studies are a means of discovering new meaning,

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[4] Kothari, C.R. *Research Methodology: Methods and Techniques.* New Delhi: New Age International Limited, Publishers, 2004. 14.

[5] Creswell, J. W. and J. David Creswell. *Research design: Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Methods Approaches*. 5th Edition. Sage Publications Inc, 2009. 189.

[6] Buzan, Barry. *People, States, and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era.* 2nd Edition. Hemel Hempstead: Harvester, 1991.

describing what exists, determining the frequency with which something occurs, and categorizing information.[7]

1.8.1 Methodological Strategy (Level of Analysis)

Studies in the international political system like foreign policy or security studies have five most frequently used levels of analysis that can provide a framework: International Systems (which encompasses the entire globe), International Subsystems (International Organizations), Unites (states), Subunits (organized groups within units), and Individuals.[8] This dissertation primarily focuses on the analysis of four of them: International Systems, particularly the UN, which operates at the system level and that authorize PKO across the world. International Subsystems like AU, IGAD are chief peace and security actors in the security of Africa and in the Horn of Africa sub-region. The unites for this dissertation of analysis are the states in the sub-region Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, and Uganda; and finally, subunits of state bureaucracies like Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defense, National Armies and other armed groups or terrorist organizations are the main focus.

1.8.2 Sampling Design

The sampling method used in this study is stratified random sampling. This method is used when the population is stratified into several non-overlapping subpopulations or strata, and sample items are selected from each stratum. When the items selected from each stratum are based on simple random sampling, the entire procedure, first stratification, and then simple random sampling are stratified random sampling.[9] In this dissertation, the study population which are members of Ethiopian armed forces at Hurso Contingent Training School, were first stratified into two, those who were about to deploy and those who returned from deployment. Then it uses randomly selected population from each group. The total number surveyed were 420 men and women in uniform, 410 contingents, 210 pre-deployment, 200 post-deployments, and 10 Staff Officers.

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[7] Kothari, Research *Methodology…* 37.

[8] Buzan, Barry et al. *Security: A New Framework for Analysis.* London: Lynne Rienner Publisher Inc, 1998. 5-6.

[9] Kothari, *Research Methodology…* 16.

1.9 Source of Data for the Dissertation

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┌─────────────────────┐            ┌─────────────────────┐
│   Primary Sources   │            │  Secondary Sources  │
└─────────────────────┘            └─────────────────────┘
          │                                  │
   ┌──────────────────────────┐     ┌────────────────────────────────────┐
   │ 210, Contingent, Ready   │     │         Books, Articles,           │
   │    to be deployed        │     │ Official Documets of UN, AU,       │
   │    200, Returnees        │     │ Ethiopia & Other States, Online    │
   │     (Questioner)         │     │     News, Printed Media            │
   └──────────────────────────┘     └────────────────────────────────────┘
   ┌──────────────────────────┐
   │  10, Staff Officers and  │
   │        UNMEM             │
   │ (Questioner & Interview) │
   └──────────────────────────┘
   ┌──────────────────────────────┐
   │ 3, Military Attachés of      │
   │ Kenya and Military Attachés  │
   │ of Uganda and Former         │
   │ Assistant Secretary-         │
   │ General for Peacekeeping     │
   │ Operation United Nations     │
   │       (Interview)            │
   └──────────────────────────────┘
   ┌──────────────────────────────────────────┐
   │ 5, Ethiopian Diplomats from MOFA         │
   │ (Interview)                              │
   │ 1, Chair of FDRE's HOPR Foreign,         │
   │ Defense and Security Affairs Standing    │
   │ Committee                                │
   └──────────────────────────────────────────┘
   ┌──────────────────────────────────────────┐
   │ 10, ENDF Military Officers and           │
   │ non-commissiond Officers (Interview)     │
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Figure 1.1 Source of Data for the Dissertation

For this research, qualitative data are collected from secondary and primary sources. This dissertation gathers multiple forms of data through various means such as interviews, questionnaires, and document reviews rather than depending on a single data source. The primary data were collected using questionnaires and interviews. On the other hand, secondary data are one step removed from the actual event or experience and provide criticism or interpretation of a primary source.[10] Secondary sources like books, published and unpublished materials, relevant academic

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[10] Babbie, Earl. *The Basics of Social Science Research.* New York: Thomson Wadsworth, 2008. 306.

literature, official reports, and research documents were used to complement, strengthen, and make the data collected from primary sources reliable. The research uses Chicago Manual of Style of referencing for citing secondary resources as in the tradition of the Journal of the Hungarian Defence Forces, Defence Review.

1.10 Structure of the Dissertation

This dissertation took shape in eight chapters. The first chapter is the introduction, which covers the dissertation's background, statement of the problem, research objective, research question, the hypothesis, the variables of the dissertation, and the research methodology.

The second chapter deals with the conceptual and theoretical background. It discusses four concepts: first foreign policy and its objectives, instruments, and factors that affect foreign policy; second, military power and its purposes and ranges; third regional security complex which is the core theoretical framework; and fourth, regional hegemon or regional power theory. The third chapter is the continuation of the second chapter that deals with the peace support operations, which is the central conceptual framework of this dissertation. It also discusses the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) and African Union's peace support operations.

The fourth chapter deals with Ethiopian foreign policy and military power. It describes the historical trend of foreign policy and military capability and goals. The fifth chapter covers the regional security complex of the Horn of Africa, where Ethiopia is playing a significant role. It describes the states of the region, trends of conflict, trends of peace support operations, and finally, it reviews Lecnco Leta's peacekeeping concept[11] in the region.

The sixth chapter is about the historical and contemporary peace support operation of Ethiopia. Mainly it divides and analyses the four generations of Ethiopian peacekeeping operations and describes the trends and capabilities of Ethiopian peacekeeping operations, including reimbursement.

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[11] Leenco Lata, in his book, (Leta, Leenco. *Peacekeeping as State Building: Current Challenges for the Horn of Africa.* London: The Red Sea Press. 2012. 11-12), argues peacekeeping operations in the Horn of Africa are used as state-building mechanisms, not only for solving existing conflicts but also 'engaged in either state deconstruction or reconstruction.'

The seventh chapter discusses the nexus of national security, foreign policy, military power, and Ethiopia's peace support operations. First, it outlines four geopolitical interests and security risks of Ethiopia: the neighboring Horn of Africa region, the general African countries, the Red Sea region, and the global arena. Then it describes the Ethiopian next-door peace support operation and its justification. Next, it gives four rationales of Ethiopian peace support operations. Lastly, it analyses the justification of Ethiopia as a regional hegemon in the region.

The eighth chapter, as a supplementary chapter for chapter seven, covers as 17 survey questions of 420 ENDF members' on their deployment to peacekeeping mission and outlook on Ethiopian peacekeeping deployment. The final ninth chapter is the conclusion and recommendation of the dissertation that includes the scientific results learnt. Postscript is also included at the end of the dissertation to consider important developments in Ethiopia that occurred after the completion of this dissertation.

CHAPTER 2 – LITERATURE REVIEW: CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

"Domestic policy can only defeat us; foreign policy can kill us."

John F. Kennedy

"We must begin by acknowledging the hard truth that we will not eradicate violent conflict in our lifetimes. There will be times when nations — acting individually or in concert — will find the use of force not only necessary but morally justified."

Barack Obama

This chapter deals with two focal concepts of discussion in this dissertation – foreign policy and military power. Two principal theoretical backgrounds and frameworks are also discussed: first, regional security complex, which postulates that international security should be examined in the pattern of regionally based clusters to be precise, security complexes, second regional hegemonic theory, which is a realist approach in the dissertation of international relations.

2.1 Foreign Policy

2.1.1 Defining Foreign Policy

When we discuss any actions of a given state in global affairs, foreign policy is the very indispensable area to study because it is the 'wheels with which the process of international politics operates.'[12] Moreover, interdependence is one of the main features of international politics. Different scholars give different definitions for foreign policy from different viewpoints.

For K.R. Gupta and Vatsala Shukla, foreign policy is a 'set of goals that seek to outline how a particular country will interact with other countries of the world.'[13] K.J. Holsti defines foreign policy as 'the dealings of states with each other.'[14] Chris Alden and Amnon Aran defined foreign policy as 'the conduct and practice of relations between different actors, primarily states, in the

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[12] Srivastava, L.S. and V.P. Joshi. *International Relations: From 1914 to Present Day.* Meerut: GOEL Publishing House, 1978. Part III, 3.

[13] Gupta, K.R. and Vatsala Shukla. *Foreign Policy of India.* Volume I. New Delhi: Atlantic Publisher and Distributors Ltd, 2009. 1.

[14] Holsti, K.J. *International Politics: A Framework for Analysis.* 7th Edition. Prentice-Hall International Inc, New Jersey. 1995. 83.

international system.'[15] William Wallace defined foreign policy as 'a stable set of attitudes towards the international environment, an implicit or explicit plan about a country's relationship with the outside world.'[16] For George Modelski, foreign policy involves all activities of a nation by which that nation is trying to change other nations' behavior and adjust its behavior in the international environment.[17] These scholars see foreign policy from the point of view of state relations with other states.

Padelford and Lincoln see foreign policy as 'the key element in the process by which a state translates its broadly conceived goals and interests into a concrete course of action to attain these objectives and preserve interests.'[18] With the same approach, for Alieu S. Bojang foreign policy 'leads a state in fulfilling its national interests and acquiring rightful place among the community of nations'[19] and Cecil V. Crabb foreign policy 'consists of two elements – national objectives to be achieved, and – means for achieving them.'[20] For David Vital, Foreign policy is 'a formulation of desired outcomes which are intended (or expected) to be consequent upon decisions adopted (or made) by those who have authority (or ability) to commit the machinery of the state and a significant fraction of national resources to that end.'[21] Taye Brhanu also defined foreign policy as 'strategy or planned course of action developed by decision-makers of state vis-à-vis other states or international entities. It determines the direction upon which a country's international activity is based.'[22] Based on these definitions when we talk about foreign policy, there must be objective or interest of state, and state machinery or national resource, which will be used to get the desired outcome outside the boundary of that state. Additionally, there is a decision-making body that decides on both the outcome and the machinery used.

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[15] Alden, Chris and Amnon Aran. *Foreign Policy Analysis: New Approaches.* Routledge. New York. 2017. 1.

[16] Wallace, William. *Foreign Policy and Political Process.* London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1971. 11.

[17] George Modelski cited in Gupta, Foreign Policy … 1

[18] Padelford and Lincoln cited in Srivastava, International Relations… 3.

[19] Bojang, A. S. "The Study of Foreign Policy in International Relations." *Journal of Political Science & Public Affairs,* 6/337. 2018. 3.

[20] Cecil V. Crabb cited in Gupta, Foreign Policy … 1

[21] Vital, D. cited in Joseph Frankel. National Interest. London: Pall Mall Press Ltd, 1970. 18.

[22] Berhanu, Taye. *An Introduction to Ethiopia's Foreign Policy: Its Process and Reflections pre-1991.* Addis Ababa: Far East Trading, 2010. 1.

Another aspect of foreign policy is that it is a continuation of domestic policy. Taye Berhanu defines foreign policy as a 'reflection … continuation, or expression of the domestic policy whereby a state may achieve some aspects of its national interests through its activities in international relations.'[23]

K. J. Holsti sees foreign policy as 'ideas or actions designed by policymakers to solve a problem or promote some change in the policies, attitudes, or actions of another state or states, in non-state actors (e.g., terrorist groups), in the physical environment of the world.'[24] Here, foreign policy is used as tools of a state to peruse its national interest; whatever its national interest might be which are mostly security, economic, religious, or ideological. This leads to another important topic, national interest. What is the national interest of a state or an objective of a state's foreign policy? Ultimately, to use the words of Andrew F. Cooper et al., 'the overriding goal of foreign policy [is] the promotion, pursuit, and defense of the national interest.'[25] Furthermore, national interest' is the center of foreign policy decision making for realists.

2.1.2 Objectives of Foreign Policy

Fundamental interests of the state, which are important for the state's survival, are correlated with foreign policy. Foreign policies are designed to safeguard the state. K. J. Holsti listed the following as major foreign policy goals or objectives of states: security, autonomy (the ability to formulate and carry out domestic and external policies in terms of a government's priorities); welfare (provide their citizens with social services and promote economic growth and efficiency); status and prestige; protection of ethnic, ideological or religious colleagues; and dreams of world recognition or creating a global empire.[26]

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[23] Berhanu, An Introduction … 1.

[24] Holsti, K.J. *International Politics: A Framework for Analysis.* 7th Edition. Prentice-Hall International, Inc, New Jersey. 1995. 83.

[25] Cooper, Andrew F. et al. "Introduction: The Challenges of 21stCentury Diplomacy." In Cooper, Andrew F. et al. (eds.). *The Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy.* Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2013. 21.

[26] Holsti, *International Politics …* 84 – 112.

2.1.3 Instruments of Foreign Policy

Studying foreign policy includes both the study of national objectives and the means or the instruments used for securing the national objectives.[27] The following are instruments of foreign policy that K. J. Holsti lists.[28]

1. *Diplomacy*: Which is 'the established method of influencing the decisions and behavior of foreign governments and peoples through dialogue, negotiation, and other measures short of war or violence.'[29] Diplomacy consists of diplomats involved in the diplomatic work and mainly are the employee of the ministry of foreign affairs inside and outside of a state.

2. *Propaganda*: This means disseminating information—facts, arguments, rumors, half-truths, or lies—to influence public opinion.[30] For this case, mainly the opinion of foreign governments or the international community.

3. *Economic rewards and coercion*: The following are major techniques of rewards and coercion in the international arena: tariffs, quotas, boycott, embargo, loans, credits and currency manipulations, blacklist, licensing, freezing assets, granting or suspending aid, including military sales or grants, expropriation and withholding dues to an international organization.[31]

4. *Clandestine actions and military intervention*: Clandestine activities are 'intelligence recruitment of, or collection by, a foreign intelligence asset, and military sensitive site exploitation of, or surveillance of, a facility in a denied or hostile area'[32] or assassination of government officials, diplomats, party leaders, or economic elites.[33] Military intervention, which can be unilateral intervention or collective intervention, will be discussed in Chapter 3.

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[27] Crabb Jr., Cecil V. *American Foreign Policy in the Nuclear Age*. 3rd Edition. New York: Harper & Row, 1972. 1.

[28] Holsti, *International Politics…*130 – 239.

[29] Freeman Chas. W. and Sally Marks Article. "Diplomacy." britannica.com. 17 January 2019, https://www.britannica.com/topic/diplomacy, Accessed on 08 November 2019.

[30] Smith, B. L. "P*ropaganda*." Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc. November 07, 2019 https://www.britannica.com/topic/propaganda, Accessed on 08 November 2019

[31] Holsti, International *Politics…* 168 – 170.

[32] DeVine, M. E. "Covert Action and Clandestine Activities of the Intelligence Community: Selected Definitions in Brief." fas.org. June 14, 2019. https://fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/R45175.pdf, Accessed on 08 November 2019.

[33] Holsti, International *Politics…* 199.

5. Weapons and war: Keeping the sovereignty of a state from foreign aggression or any attack is conventionally through weapons and war. The issue of acquiring a nuclear weapon or the global arms race became a key phenomenon in global politics. Obtaining the weapons by itself sends a message to other states. As Carl von Clausewitz pointed out, it can be said that 'war is not merely a political act, but also a real political instrument, a continuation of political commerce of [foreign policy], a carrying out of the same by other means.'[34] Weapons and military force are an important instrument of a state in the institutional form.

2.1.4 Factors that Affect Foreign Policy

The formulation (of the national interest or objective) and implementation (the means and actions to achieve the objectives) of foreign policy should consider these factors or foreign policy elements. The following sixteen factors are taken from Gupta, K.R., and Vatsala Shukla, [35] though they are not limited to these.

1. Size of State Territory: Both human and non-human resources can be included in the size. Countries with large size mostly managed to be a big power in the world. For example, the USA, Russia, China, India, Brazil, and France. On the other hand, most Middle Eastern states, because of their oil recourses, able to have an important role in the international arena, or Israel and the United Kingdom, despite their small size, can influence their region and globally.

2. Geographical Factor: A geographical location of a state is the most durable factor. The landscape, the climate, being an island or landlocked, or having access to a sea, an ocean, share a navigable or non-navigable river with its neighbors are important determinants for a foreign policy.

3. Level and Nature of Economic Development: Having high or less economic power or being industrialized or agrarian highly determines the foreign policy's objective or a state.

4. Cultural and Historical Factors: The traditions of a state in each country or its religion, cultural or religious similarities with the neighboring state are important factors in formulating and setting foreign policy objectives. History is also an important factor. The historical formation of

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[34] Clausewitz, Carl von. *On War.* Hertfordshire: Wordsworth, 1997. 22.

[35] Gupta, *Foreign Policy ...* 4 – 12.

a state, the artificial borders with its neighbors (especially in Africa) are the main determinates of foreign policy.

5. *Social Structure:* The nature of the society in a state, unified, or competitive will determine the strength or weakness of a state, which is also reflected in the foreign policy of that state.

6. *Government Structure:* The structure of government, the organizational foreign policy decision-making process, and the actors involved, democratic or authoritarian, determines both the means and the objective of foreign policy.

7. *Internal Situation:* The internal environment of a state, change of government or military coup, death of a prominent political leader, revolution are always factors of a change in the course of a foreign policy of the state.

8. *Values, Talents, Experiences, and Personalities of Leaders:* The values, talents, experiences, and personalities of the states' leaders, the diplomats, are always important in foreign policy. If the leader was an academician or a military officer can impact the foreign policy of a state.

9. *Political Accountability:* The issues of a competitive multi-party system or the nature of democratic accountability or the political system are significant in what kind of foreign policy a particular state follows.

10. *Ideology:* Foreign Policy is always based on a particular principle and ideology; liberalism, socialism, or developmental state or based on religious ideology. The ideology the state determines the objectives of the foreign policy and the means. A state's foreign policy towards states that follow the same ideology and with others is different.

11. *Diplomacy:* Diplomacy is a political activity and when it is well-resourced and skillful. It has a major ingredient of power which allows states to meet the goals of their foreign policies without resort to force, propaganda, or the law.[36] Diplomacy service is carried out, directed, and administered by most states' ministry of foreign affairs. The diplomatic skills or methods of a state's diplomats (ambassadors, ministers, attaches, councilors, etc.) are a major factor for the quality of its foreign policy and its foreign policy's success or failure objectives.

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[36] Berridge, G. R. *Diplomacy Theory and Practice.* 4th Edition. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010. 1.

12. International Power Structure (Global Strategic Environment): Global power relations determine foreign policy. The bipolar world system of the Cold War-era influenced the foreign policies of states. Currently, China's rise has highly influenced the foreign policies of most African states and rival states like the USA.

13. Public Opinion: Public opinion is another important factor that foreign policy considers when they formulate their foreign policy. The public's opinion about a particular issue sways the foreign policy for a reason not to lose their political base at home.

14. Technology: 'Technological changes can alter society's military and economic capabilities and thus its status and role in the international system.'[37] The state's technological power determined its foreign policy because it is crucial to leverage in the global economic, security, or political arena.

15. External Environment: The external environment of a state or the political, security, or economic situations in its neighboring states are essential determinants of its foreign policy tools and objectives. A state's foreign policy towards a civil war-ridden neighbor or economically powerful will be very different.

16. Alliances and International Treaties (Bilateral and Multilateral): Alliances, Coalitions, International Organizations (IOs), and Regional Economic Communities (RECs between two or more countries for *ad hoc* or long-term economic or security purposes can regulate actions of foreign policy towards the member states.

2.2 Military Power

Military power is one of the most crucial tools in international relations. Military forces have many tasks, 'ranging from defending national territory to invading other states, hunting down terrorists, coercing concessions, countering insurgencies, keeping the peace, enforcing economic sanctions, showing the flag, or maintaining domestic order.'[38] Michael Howard describes the importance of military in international relations as follows:

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[37] Rosenau cited in Gupta, *Foreign Policy …* 9.

[38] Biddle, Stephen. *Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle.* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004. 5.

The power which states exercise in international affairs is compounded of many attributes, economic, diplomatic, cultural, and ideological, as well as military. But military power, the capacity to use violence for the protection, enforcement, or extension of authority, remains an instrument with which no state has yet found it possible completely to dispense. Indeed, it is not easy to see how international relations could be conducted and international order maintained if it were totally absent. The capacity of states to defend themselves, and their evident willingness to do so, provides the basic framework within which the business of international negotiation is carried on. … Attitudes towards the place of armed forces in international relations fall somewhere between two extremes. On the one hand, is the view that armed forces constitute a purely destabilizing factor on the international scene and that their abolition would lead to greater stability among nations.[39]

Military power can be defined as a state's war-making capability. Military power is one of the most significant and palpable for states in global politics. It is the key machinery of government against internal and external security threats. Military power or the army is also 'one of the most visible and powerful forms of social organization.'[40] Klaus Knorr defines military power as 'the ultimately the power to destroy and kill, or to occupy and control, and hence to coerce. In the international system, military power – like other forms of influence – is a relation among states that permits one government to induce another to behave in a way which the latter would not have chosen freely.'[41]

According to Michael Howard, war has been an indispensable aspect of societies for a long time. He said:

In most of the societies known to history, war has been an established and usually rather enjoyable social rite. In Western Europe until the first part of the seventeenth century, warfare was a way of life for considerable sections of society, its termination was for them a catastrophe, and its prolongation, official or unofficial, was the legitimate objective of every man of spirit. Even in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, war, elaborate and formal as its conduct had become, was an accepted, almost an indispensable part of the pattern of society, and it was curtailed and intermittent only because of its mounting expense.[42]

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[39] Howard, Michael. "Military Power and International Order" In Garret, John. (ed) *Theories of Peace and Security: A Reader in Contemporary Strategic Thought*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1970. 47.

[40] Watson, Cynthia and Constantine Danopoulos. "Introduction." In Danopoulos, Constantine P. and Cynthia Watson (eds.) *The Political Role of the Military: An International Handbook.* London: Greenwood Press, 1996. xi.

[41] Knorr, Klaus "The International Purposes of Military Power." In Garret, *Theories of Peace ...* 50.

[42] Howard, Michael. "Military Power and International Order" In Garret, *Theories of Peace ...* 42.

Mao Zedong said, 'every communist must grasp the truth, political power grows out of the barrel of a gun.'[43] Prakash Chandra described war as 'the use of organized force between two human groups, pursuing contradictory policies, each seeking to impose its policy upon the other.'[44] Sun Tzu said, 'The art of war is of vital importance to the state. It is a matter of life and death, a road either to safety or to ruin. Hence it is a subject of inquiry which can on no account be neglected.'[45]

The issue of military power is also related to modern states' existence, being monopolized by the state. Buzan, B. et al. puts it as follows.

> The modern state is defined by the idea of sovereignty – the claim of the exclusive right to self-government over a specified territory and its population. Because force is particularly effective as a way of acquiring and controlling territory, the fundamentally territorial nature of the state underpins the traditional primacy of its concern with the use of force. Throughout history, the right to govern has been established by the capability to assert and defend that the claim against armed challengers from within and without.[46]

> … The most extreme modern form of the state, the European or Westphalian state, has consolidated itself by a progressive disarming of the citizenry and a movement toward an ideal in which the state is the only legitimate wielder of force in society and effectively commands far greater instruments of force, both domestically and externally, than those illegitimate (mostly criminal) armed elements that remain.[47]

States can have diverse powers or forces to perpetuate their interest. Nevertheless, none can be compared to military power. The states' ability to carry out and project its violent armed forces and military machine strength is vital. International Strategic Analysis states the use of military power as follows:

> One country with a strong military typically enjoys a higher degree of security and stability than a state that is militarily weaker than its neighbors and potential rivals. … For many states, it was the development of their military power that proved to be the catalyst for their rise to great power status. For others, a lack of military power proved to be the

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[43] Tse-tung, Mao. *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung.* Vol. II. Oxford: Pregramon Press, 1965. 224

[44] Chandra, Prakash. *International Politics.* Third Revised Edition. New Delhi: BIkas Publishing House Pvt. Ltd, 1995. 125.

[45] Tzu, Sun. *Sun Tzu on the Afro of War: The Oldest Military Treatise in the World.* Leicester: Allandale Online Publishing, 2000. 1.

[46] Buzan, Barry et al. *Security: A New Framework for Analysis.* London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc, 1998. 49-50.

[47] Ibid. 51.

undoing of states that were either once-great powers or who had the capability to rise to great power status but failed to do so. History is littered with states whose ultimate downfall came on the battlefield, even if it was a decline in other aspects of power that resulted in their eventual military defeat.[48]

Joseph S. Nye compares military power as important as oxygen for the human-being. He argues as follows that without the military, there is no order in human interactions.

> A military force, along with norms and institutions, helps to provide a minimal degree of order. Metaphorically, military power provides a degree of security that is to political and economic order as oxygen is to breathing: little noticed until it begins to become scarce. Once that occurs, its absence dominates all else.[49]

For Paul D. Williams argue war is more than 'the clash of armed actors,' it is:

> An intense form of political relations that impacts upon virtually every dimension of human life. It has caused huge amounts of suffering and destruction but it has also been a major engine for social, political, economic and technological change. It has influenced many of our most enduring cultural reference points, shaped the deep meaning of masculinity and femininity, and set the contours of many of our laws, institutions and customs.[50]

For Carl von Clausewitz, War 'is an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfill our will.'[51] For him, 'war as being rational, national, and instrumental.'[52] It means 'the decision to employ the military instrument by waging war ought to be made based on a rational calculation taken by the political authority concerned to achieve some specified goal.'[53] From his experience of his lifetime (1780–1831), 'war was widely viewed as a legitimate instrument of state

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[48] International Strategic Analysis. "The Importance of Military Power in the 21st Century." isa-world.com. 9 May 2018 https://www.isa-world.com/news/?tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=411&cHash=3c3785562e7d5a836189b87d09c8182e, Accessed on 01 December 2019.

[49] Nye, Joseph S. "Is Military Power Becoming Obsolete?" belfercenter.org. January 13, 2010. https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/military-power-becoming-obsolete, Accessed on 01 December 2019.

[50] Williams, Paul D. War. In Williams, Paul D. (ed.) *Security Studies: An Introduction.* 2nd Edition. London: Routledge. 2013. 187-188.

[51] Clausewitz, Carl von. *On War.* Hertfordshire: Wordsworth Editions. 1997. 5.

[52] Williams, Paul D. War. In Williams, Paul D. (ed.) *Security Studies: An Introduction.* London: Routledge. 2008. 152-153.

[53] Ibid.

policy, albeit one that should be used only with a clear purpose in mind.'[54] In Prakash Chandra's words, 'war cannot be separated from politics [and] war is nothing but politics with violence.'[55]

Military security for states is 'universal for all states'[56] except Costa Rica, Iceland, Mauritius, Panama, and other tiny states and small islands.

> All commit a significant (1 to 30 percent) proportion of their total economic output (GNP) for arms dedicated to maintaining internal and external security. These expenses may be used to deter or to cope with crime, rebellion, secession, revolutions, and *coup d'état*. Governments also maintain armed forces to deal with the eventuality that as some time in the future, some other state or a non-state actor such as a terrorist group will present a threat. That threat can be directed against the lives of citizens or their private activities, against territorial integrity, against a country's 'way of life,' or against the independence of the state and its institutions.[57]

2.2.1 Purposes of Military Power

For Carl von Clausewitz, war is 'an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfill our will.'[58] Here its primary purpose is to impose the choice of the winner on the loser. Klaus Knorr argues that governments use war or the threat of war:

> … as an instrument of statecraft because they expect political utility from its employment. It is political utility precisely because resort to force is an allocative mechanism, because it is a major, though by no means the only, basis on which the competition of states for various objects of value is settled; it is meant to affect the international distribution of such things as territory, trade, security, diplomatic influence, prestige, and of power itself.[59]

He also goes arguing in international conflict resolutions, states use military force as a 'form of power that sustains will'[60] of warring parties. Even in any diplomatic relations between states, Knorr said:

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[54] Williams, Paul D. War. In Williams, Paul D. (ed.) *Security Studies: An Introduction.* London: Routledge. 2008. 152-153.

[55] Ibid.

[56] Holsti, K.J. International Politics: A Framework for Analysis. 7th Edition. Prentice-Hall International, Inc. New Jersey. 1995. 85.

[57] Ibid.

[58] Clausewitz, Carl von. *On War.* Hertfordshire: Wordsworth Editions Limited. 1997. 5.

[59] Knorr, Klaus "The International Purposes of Military Power." In Garret, *Theories of Peace ...* 52.

[60] Ibid.

In the absence of war, diplomacy may be the salient method for settling the conflict. But as, to begin with, the choice of foreign policy is determined by a government's perception of the external environment, including power relationships, so [military] power is often introduced into the diplomatic process.[61]

Knorr furthermore claims that military power is used in most Asian and African states as an instrument of foreign policy objectives because 'the present political boundaries-often drawn arbitrarily by former imperialist powers' so that there is a tendency to 'incorporate unassimilated ethnic groups that may aspire to independence and resort to violence in order to achieve it.'[62]

According to K.J. Holsti, governments maintain their army:

… to deal with the eventuality that at some time in the future, some other state – or a non-state actor such as terrorist groups – will present a threat. The threats can be directed against the lives of citizens or their private activities, against the territorial integrity, against a country's 'way of life,' or against the independence of the state and its institutions.[63]

Robert J. Art forwarded four primary military power purposes for states: defense, deter, compelling, and swagger.

Type	Purpose	Mode	Target	Characteristics
Defensive	Fend off attacks and/or reduce the damage of an attack	Peaceful and physical	Primarily military Secondarily industrial	Defensive preparations can have dissuasion value; Defensive preparations can look aggressive; First strikes can be taken for defense.
Deterrent	Prevent adversary from initiating an action	Peaceful	Primarily civilian; Secondarily industrial; Terriarily military	Threats of retaliation made so as not to have to be carried out; Second strike preparations can be viewed as first-strike preparations
Compellent	Get adversary to stop doing	Peaceful and physi-	All three with no	Easy to recognize but hard to achieve; Compelling

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[61] Knorr, Klaus "The International Purposes of Military Power." In Garret, *Theories of Peace* ... 52.

[62] Ibid. 57.

[63] Holsti, K.J. International Politics: A Framework for Analysis. 7th Edition. Prentice-Hall International, Inc. New Jersey. 1995. 257.

	something or start doing something	cal	clear ranking	actions can be justified on defensive grounds.
Swaggering	Enhance Prestige	Peaceful	None	Difficult to describe because of its instrumental and irrational nature; Swaggering can be threatening

Table 2.1 Robert J. Art's 'The Purposes of Force'[64]

The Military apparatus is vital in the formulation and implementation of foreign policy and the state's functioning in the international system. In the words of Alexander L. George, 'The proposition that force and threats of force are a necessary instrument of diplomacy and have a role to play in foreign policy is part of the conventional wisdom of statecraft.'[65] Thus, it is clear that military power in a hard power sense is apparent. On the other hand, besides the direct use of force, military power has a soft power role. The term 'Defense diplomacy' is widely used to describe this role. Defense diplomacy can be considered merely 'tasks and international functions completed by the armed forces and the leadership of the Ministries of National Defense.'[66] This can be sending defense attaches to foreign states, training foreign military personnel, or joint military exercises to deploying troops to peace missions and operations in a foreign state. Martin Edmonds and Greg Mills define defense diplomacy as 'the use of armed forces in operations other than war, building on their trained experience and discipline to achieve national and foreign objectives abroad.'[67] Thus, defense diplomacy or the user of military power as a foreign policy instrument in today's international relations manifests itself particularly in a peacekeeping

[64] Art, Robert J. 'The Four Functions of Force'. In Art, Robert J. and Kenneth N. Walth (Eds). *The Use of Force.* 4th Edition. Lanham; University Press of America. 1993. 11.

[65] George, Alexander L. *The Role of Force in Diplomacy: The Continuing Dilemma for U.S. Foreign Policy.* Talk at CSIS Security Strategy Symposium, Renaissance Washington DC Hotel, June 25, 1998. https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/military/force/article.html, Accessed 12 October 2019.

[66] Drab, Lech. 'Defense diplomacy – an important tool for the implementation of foreign policy and security of the state'. *Security and Defense Quarterly*, 20/3. 2018. 57.

[67] Martin Edmonds and Greg Mills cited in Winger, Gregory. 'The Velvet Gauntlet: A Theory of Defense Diplomacy'. In A. Lisiak and N. Smolenski, (ed.) *What Do Ideas Do?,* Vienna: IWM Junior Visiting Fellows' Conferences, Vol. 33. 2014. https://www.iwm.at/publications/5-junior-visiting-fellows-conferences/the-velvet-gauntlet/, Accessed on 13 March 2019.

operations.[68] In addition to this, 'developing the peacekeeping capabilities of foreign militaries so they can contribute to UN Peacekeeping Operations, the number of which has increased considerably since the end of the Cold War' is another way of defense diplomacy.'[69]

No state can be neutral from the use of force. In international relations, there are different views and ideologies about the use of force; however, in terms of its security, use of force becomes mandatory. KJ Holsti summarizes it as follows:

> The legitimacy of force as an instrument of foreign policy, although often denounced by philosophers, historians, and reformers, has rarely been questioned by those responsible for foreign policy decisions of their countries. Some states have traditionally maintained orientations on nonalignment or isolation, but no nation is 'neutral' with respect to its own security, and neutrality does not imply unconditional renunciation of force.[70]

Some countries may be more prone than others to using force as an instrument of foreign policy.[71] The international environment limits the policymakers' choices in many ways. For example, a state's geographical position is the most permanent limiting factor.[72]

Efraim Karsh stated the relations between military power and foreign policy as follows:

> For every state, there exists an interrelationship between the availability of military power and the setting of foreign policy goals. The nature and scope of the quest for military power is a direct consequence of the world view held by a state's leadership, which is in turn translated into national goals. At the same time a state's military capabilities at any given moment can determine the limits of a forceful foreign policy. Any successful pursuit of foreign policy goals depends to a considerable extent on the state's assessment of its military power in relation to its external environment. Since the assessment of military power and the perception of external threats are as much subjective as objective, any state can commit on of two errors in evaluation. It can set itself goals which are beyond its military power to achieve, or it can underestimate its power and pursue policies and goals that are narrower or more limited than its 'objective' power base might make possible.[73]

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[68] Cheyre, Juan E. 'Defense Diplomacy' In Andrew F. Cooper and et al. (eds.) *The Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy.* Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2013. 374 -375.

[69] Storey, Ian. 'China's Bilateral Defense Diplomacy in Southeast Asia', *Asian Security*, 8:3, 2012. 287-310. 289.

[70] Holsti, K.J. International Politics: A Framework for Analysis. 7th Edition. Prentice-Hall International, Inc. New Jersey. 1995. 213.

[71] Ibid.

[72] Wallace, William. *Foreign Policy and Political Process*. London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1971. 18.

[73] Karsh, Efraim. Military Power and Foreign Policy Goals: The Iran-Iraq War Revisited. Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), 64/1. Winter, 1987-1988. 83.

Advocates of Realism in international relations emphasized peacekeeping's defense diplomacy as their national interest because peacekeeping directly benefits themselves.[74]

Scott Firsing, giving the example of Nigerian peacekeeping, argues as follows:

> Nigeria has used peacekeeping as a foreign policy tool from the 20th century. The Nigerian government proclaims itself as the 'regional stabilizer, conciliator, and peacebuilder' in West Africa. For strategic reasons, Nigeria takes on this role to protect its economy, as it does not wish to be surrounded by failing states. It needs to be a secure investment destination with secure borders.[75]

2.2.2 Ranges of Military Operations

The range of military operations is a fundamental construct that helps relate military activities and operations in scope and purpose within a backdrop of the conflict continuum, from peacetime to war.[76] These ranges of operations can be classified in three groups. The first one is peacetime operations aimed to promote peace and stability. The second one is resolving conflict or deter war. The third one is in a time of war where the aim is to fight a full-fledged war and win.

Peacetime military engagements can include the followings; counter-drug support, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, civil support, and national assistance of peace building. During peacetime the army's noncombat operations can also support diplomatic initiatives of military engagement and security cooperation by giving training exercises for a friendly state's military and security assistance.

The military's activities of resolving conflict or deterring war could be operations like antiterrorism, counterterrorism, noncombatant evacuation, support insurgency, peace enforcement and show of force. Deterrence can be operated through smaller-scale contingencies and crisis response operations, as well as irregular warfare.[77] Enforcement of sanctions and maritime intercept operations, enforcing exclusion zones, ensuring freedom of navigation and passage in both maritime and aerial operations including protection of shipping and overflight, and ensuring

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[74] Firsing, Scott. 'Thinking through the role of Africa's militaries in peacekeeping: the cases of Nigeria, Ethiopia and Rwanda'. *South African Journal of International Affairs,* 21/1. 2014. 47.

[75] Ibid.

[76] US Army. *JP 3-0, Joint Operations.* Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 2018. V-1.

[77] United States Air Force. *Air Force Doctrine Publication 3-0 - Operations and Planning*. Montgomery: Curtis E. LeMay Center - Air University, 2016. 28.

freedom of action in air, space, and relevant portions of cyberspace are crises response operations of the military intended to resolve conflict or deter war.[78] The third range is large scare warfare and campaign or combat operations to achieve the national political objective against internal or external enemy.

Table 2.2 Range of Military Operations[79]

Peacekeeping operations belong to the second range of the conflict continuum, an operation to resolve conflict or deter war. On the other hand, peace enforcement is both a conflict time and wartime operation, which is conducted to resolve conflict or deter war. Also, it includes warfighting.

2.3 Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT)

"Most states historically have been concerned primarily with the capabilities and intentions of their neighbors." Aaron L. Friedber

After the end of the Cold War, the regional approach to international security has become significant. Barry Buzan first applied security complex theory in 1983 in his book 'People, States and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations.' He defined the security com-

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[78] Ibid.

[79] Source: US Army. *FM 100-5 Operations.* Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army,1993. 2-1.

plex 'as a group of states whose primary security concerns link together sufficiently closely that their national securities cannot realistically be considered apart from one another.'[80] He also identified four major types of threats and their interaction, which are:

> Balance of power contests among great powers; lingering conflicts that emerge between neighboring states; intra-state conflicts, which are usually spillovers of internal politics; and conflicts that arise from transnational threats caused, for instance, by the rise of religious fundamentalism and informal networks, state fragility, demographic explosion, environmental degradation, and resource scarcity.[81]

In 1998 Buzan with Waever and de Wilde reformulated the definition of regional security complex as a 'set of units whose major processes of securitization, de-securitization, or both are so interlinked that their security problems cannot reasonably be analyzed or resolved apart from one another.'[82]

According to Matteo Legrenzi and Fred H. Lawson, regional security complex makes it possible to clarify the emergence and impact of a wide range of threats confronting policymakers, most notably the tendency for conflicts that break out in one country to spread across the border into neighboring countries and the growing incidence of disputes over scarce water resources.[83]

Barry Buzan's contribution to international relations theory was mainly in drawing 'attention away from the extremes of national and global security and focus it on the region, where these two extremes interplay and where most of the action occurs'[84] Buzan called this, 'the territorialization of security relations' because most threats travel more easily over short distances than over long ones.'[85] Buzan underscores geographical proximity and security as follows:

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[80] Buzan, Barry. *People, States and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations.* Brighton: Wheatsheaf. 1983.106.

[81] Buzan, Barry. People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era, Hemel Hempstead, Harvester, 2nd edn, 1991. 3.

[82] Buzan, Barry et al. *Security: A New Framework for Analysis.* London: Lynne Rienner Publishers: 1998. 201.

[83] Legrenzi, Matteo and Fred H. Lawson. Regional Security Complexes and Organizations. In Gheciu, Alexandra and William C. Wohlforth. *The Oxford Handbook of International Security.* Oxford Handbooks Online. March 2018.

[84] Buzan, Barry et al. *Security: A New Framework for Analysis.* London: Lynne Rienner Publishers: 1998. 14-15.

[85] Buzan, Barry. *People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post–Cold War Era.* 2nd ed. New York: Wheatsheaf Harvester, 1991. 12.

Adjacency is potent for security because many threats travel more easily over short distances than over long ones. The impact of geographical proximity on security interaction is the strongest and most obvious in the military, political, societal, and environmental sectors.[86]

He also notes that:

A handful of states at the top of the power league play a truly global game, treating each other as a special class and projecting their power into far-flung regions. But for the great majority of states, the main game of security is defined by their near neighbors.[87]

Moreover, Buzan and Wæver argue that:

The relative autonomy of regional security constitutes a pattern of international security relations radically different from the rigid structure of superpower bipolarity that defined the Cold War. … RSCT distinguishes between the system level interplay of the global powers, whose capabilities enable them to transcend distance, and the subsystem level interplay of lesser powers whose main security environment is their local region. The central idea in RSCT is that, since most threats travel more easily over short distances than over long ones, security interdependence is normally patterned into regionally based clusters: security complexes. … Processes of securitization and thus the degree of security interdependence is more intense between the actors inside such complexes than they are between actors inside the complex and those outside it. … RSCT offers a conceptual framework that classifies security regions into a set of types, and so provides a basis for comparative studies in regional security.[88]

To be qualified as a regional security complex, 'a group of states or other entities must possess a degree of security interdependence sufficient both to establish them as a linked set and to differentiate them from surrounding security regions.'[89]

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[86] Ibid. 45.

[87] Buzan, Barry. *People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post–Cold War Era.* 2nd ed. New York: Wheatsheaf Harvester, 1991. 14.

[88] Ibid. 3-4.

[89] Buzan, Barry and Ole Wæver. *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. 48.

Map 2.1 Patterns of Regional Security Post-Cold War[90]

Buzan and Wæver list out nine regional security complexes, two proto-complex and two super-complex: namely, North American RSC, South American RSC, European RSC, post-Soviet RSC, Middle Eastern RSC, Central Africa R.S.C., Southern African RSC, South Asian RSC, and East Asian RSC; Horn proto-complex and West African proto-complex; Asian super-complex and European super-complex. They also distinguished states, which are buffers and insulators.

> Africa is likely to become the home of four RSCs. Southern Africa is the only part of Africa that qualifies without question as a longstanding RSC, and it has extended its boundaries to include a swath of Central Africa. Partly as a result of the same developments, Central Africa is also emerging as an RSC. West Africa and the Horn are proto-complexes. In Africa, the open question is about the formation and evolution of RSCs in a subcontinent dominated by state failure.[91]

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[90] Buzan, Barry and Ole Wæver. *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2003. xxvi.

[91] Ibid. 451.

Buzan and Wæver developed descriptive RSCT, which is a matrix for area studies. This matrix is a framework organizing empirical studies of regional security at four levels of analysis.[92] The four levels are:

	Levels of Analysis	Descriptions
1	Domestic (domestically generated vulnerabilities)	It is when a state is strong or weak due to the stability of the domestic order. The specific vulnerability of a state defines the kind of security fears it has and sometimes makes another state or group of states a structural threat even if it or they have no hostile intentions.
2	State-to-state Relations	It is a group of states with interaction, which generate a region.
3	The region's interaction with neighboring regions	This is theoretically limited, given that the complex is defined by interaction internally being more critical. But if significant changes in the patterns of security interdependence that define complexes are underway, this level can become significant, and in situations of gross asymmetries, a complex without global powers that neighbors one with a global power can have strong interregional links in one direction
4	The role of global powers in the region	The interplay between the global and regional security structures

Table 2.3 The Four Levels of analysis of RSCT

David A. Lake develops another study, Patrick M. Morgan, in their edited book 'Regional Orders: Building Security in a New World' they argue that 'The world has now changed. The re-

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[92] Buzan, Barry and Ole Wæver. *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2003. 51.

gional level stands more clearly on its own as the locus of conflict and cooperation for states and as the level of analysis for scholars seeking to explore contemporary security affairs.' Moreover, states are focusing 'increasingly on regional conflict and conflict management.'[93] The three of their four significant arguments of their studies are the following:

> First, regions are now more salient features of international politics. With the end of the Cold War, regional conflicts are more likely to stay regional, responding to their individual circumstances and developments. …. Second, the end of the Cold War has opened new possibilities for more cooperative regional orders. Greater responsibility now falls on local states to manage their own conflicts. …. Third, regions are not simply "little" international systems that behave in ways identical to their "larger" counterparts. Nor they *sui generis*, understandable only through unique theories. We need general theories that incorporate regional relations. Theories, concepts, and analogies based on the analysis of great-power politics cannot, in most cases, be applied to the regional level without significant amendment or even wholesale revision.[94]

Overall the book 'highlights the increasing importance in the contemporary world of regional security complexes as the loci of both violent conflict and efforts to manage such conflict more effectively.'[95]

Regions are defined in terms of the mode of security management or 'regional order.'[96] Regional orders can shift from the simple balance of power systems or concerts to more comprehensive communities or integrated polities. Lake and Morgan suggest an alternative definition of regional security complex: 'the states affected by at least one trans-border but local security externality.'[97]

For forty-five years after World War II, conflict among nations was dominated by the significant bipolar struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union. With the end of the Cold War, states in differing regions of the world are taking their affairs more into their own hands and

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[93] Lake, David A. and Patrick M. Morgan. "The New Regionalism in Security Affairs," In Lake, D. A. and Patrick Morgan, *Regional Orders: Building Security in a New World.* Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997. 6-7.

[94] Ibid.

[95] Ibid. 18.

[96] Lake, David A. and Patrick Morgan. *Regional Orders: Building Security in a New World.* Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press. 1997. 46

[97] Ibid.

working out new security arrangements that best suit their needs. This trend toward new 'regional orders.'[98]

More recently, Rodrigo Tavares suggested that its content should define the regional unit of analysis and proposed the idea of regional peace and security clusters (RPSC), defined as a set of peace and security relations that occur in a broad territory (region), driven by agents, operating at various levels of regional integration, who use various instruments to change the patterns of security, conflict, and positive peace.[99]

2.4 Regional Hegemon/ Regional Power[100]

Theoretically, it has been established that a powerful state's hegemonic presence is an ingredient for stability within a specific region.[101] In continuation from Buzan and Wæver's Regional Security Complexes (RSCs), Robert Stewart-Ingersoll and Derrick Frazier study 'the functions that regional powers play in developing and maintaining regional security orders.' [102] They also argue 'certain states, due to both their substantial relative capabilities and their unique behaviors, disproportionately influence security within their RSCs.'[103] These capabilities which crate a regional hegemon or a regional power are 'mostly regarded as an outflow of relative superior material power-in terms of the economy and the military on the global level of international politics or, regionally, in a geographically limited area of the world.'[104]

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[98] Lake, David A. and Patrick Morgan. *Regional Orders: Building Security in a New World.* Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press. 1997.

[99] Tavares, Rodrigo. "Understanding of Regional Peace and Security: A Framework of Analysis," *Contemporary Politics.* Vol. 14, No. 2. 2008, 107–127. 110.

[100] The terms 'regional hegemon' and 'regional power' in this study is used interchangeably with the same meaning. However, 'regional power' used mostly for a group of states with a common characteristics and the term 'regional hegemon' is frequently used to describe a single country in a particular region.

[101] Nye J.S. cited in Olusola Ogunnubi and Ufo Okeke-Uzodike. Can Nigeria be Africa's hegemon? *African Security Review*, 25/2. 2016. 110.

[102] Stewart-Ingersoll, Robert and Derrick Frazier. *Regional Powers and Security Orders: A Theoretical Framework.* London: Routledge, 2012. 1.

[103] Ibid.

[104] Prys, Miriam. Hegemony, Domination, Detachment: Differences in Regional Powerhood. *International Studies Review.* Vol. 12, No. 4, December 2010. 489.

Cora Wu & Moritz Hessler,[105] Detlef Nolte,[106] and Martin Beck[107] put forward some criteria that a regional power should acquire, with the implications. First, a delineated region or definable region is geographically, economically, politically self-perception, and this delimitation and own identity should be widely accepted within and beyond the region. Second, the regional power should claim its role as the only regional leading power, which is certain self-conception, aim for rulemaking, avoid foreign interference, try to keep other regions divided.

Third, the regional power should have power over outcomes in geopolitical delimitation and political-ideational construction of the region. It should be the agenda settler on activities and outcomes of the region. Forth, it should have some regional governance and regional leadership or a cooperative hegemony towards regional institutions, and there might be the likelihood of oppositional alliances within the region. Fifth, it defines the regional security agenda and takes responsibility for the regional security agenda as part of power transition theory. It stabilizes its region; it guarantees regional cooperation and provides public goods and avoids regional competitors.

Sixth, it projects power into the region in terms of military, economy, demography, and political ideology. Seventh, it creates inter-linkage or integration within the region in economic, political, and cultural; Eighth, it should be commonly accepted within and beyond the region as leader and representative for the region. Ninth, it should strive for an increased global weight of the region to protect regional cooperative hegemony, niche-specialization in a multilateral-cooperative approach.[108]

In his study, Daniel Flemes identifies and classifies regional powers in international relations into four key criteria: first, 'formulation of the claim to leadership,' means 'to have the political

[105] Wu, Cora and Moritz Hessler. *Regional Powers*. June 2, 2011. https://www.slideshare.net/Moricex/regional-powers, Accessed on 20 November 2019.

[106] Nolte, D. *Power and Power Hierarchies in International Relations. An analysis concept for the Research on regional leaders.* In GIGA Working Paper No. 29, Hamburg: GIGA, 2006. 28,

[107] Beck, Martin. *Regional Powers in Asia, Africa, Latin America, the Near and Middle East.* Conference Paper. December 11 and 12, 2006 GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies, Hamburg. https://web.archive.org/web/20090327080130/http://www.giga-ham-burg.de/content/forumregional/pdf/giga_conference_RegionalPowers_0612/giga_RegPowers0612_paper_beck.pdf, Accessed on 08 January 2018.

[108] Wu, Cora and Moritz Hessler. *Regional Powers*. June 2, 2011. https://www.slideshare.net/Moricex/regional-powers, Accessed on 20 November 2019.

will to take on the mantle of leader in both regional and global terms.'[109]; second, 'possession of the necessary power resources' can be military economic or demographical resources and capabilities; third, 'employment of foreign policy instruments,' which are mechanisms or tools that it advocates its interests with; and forth, 'acceptance of the leadership role by the third state', acceptance of its visions and actions in the states under its influence and beyond.

It has been established that a powerful state's hegemonic presence is an ingredient for stability within a specific region.[110] Stefan A. Schirm points out that, 'regional hegemons could also be considered role models and leaders within a particular region by carrying out leading activities that are generally accepted by neighboring states.'[111] Ogunnubi and Okeke-Uzodike, in their study to answer the question 'What makes a regional hegemon?', list out features that are mainly based on the state's economic, military and demographic power.[112]

Dustin Dehéz, in his study on African Hegemonies precisely states:

> Assessing African states' hegemonic capacity is a rather recent exercise, and no formula has yet emerged as the leading paradigm in doing so. … They command enough leverage and power to shape their regional environment but lack the influence to shape the broader global power distribution. Instead, their foreign policy – the means through which their hegemonic conduct is usually exercised – is characterized by the necessity to maneuver between the inescapable and oftentimes stark extra-continental and intracontinental influences and the desire to shape their respective regions to their advantage or according to their image. But their actions are also constrained by regional factors: the willingness of neighboring countries to embrace the hegemon and his role, traditional regional rivalries, the depth of regional integration, to name but a few.[113]

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[109] Flemes, Daniel. *Conceptualizing Regional Power in International Relations: Lessons from the South African Case.* Working Paper No. 53, German Institute of Global and Area Studies, Hamburg. 2007.

[110] Nye cited in Ogunnubi, Olusola and Ufo Okeke-Uzodike. Can Nigeria be Africa's hegemon? *African Security Review.* 2016. 25:2. 110-128.

[111] Schirm cited in Ogunnubi, Olusola and Ufo Okeke-Uzodike. Can Nigeria be Africa's hegemon? *African Security Review.* 2016. 25:2. 110-128.

[112] Ogunnubi, Olusola and Ufo Okeke-Uzodike. Can Nigeria be Africa's hegemon? *African Security Review.* 2016. 25:2. 110-128. 112.

[113] Dehéz, Dustin. *Ethiopia – A Hegemon in the Horn of Africa Region.* BISA Annual Conference, Exeter, December 2008. http://www.open.ac.uk/socialsciences/bisa-africa/confpapers/Dehez-exeter-08.pdf, Accessed on 23 February 2020.

2.5 Summery and Partial Conclusion

Chapter two presented the definitions of the dissertation's critical concepts: foreign policy, military power, regional security complex theory, and regional hegemon. The followings are central points covered in the chapter.

Foreign policy can be defined as the manifestation of the relationship between states as a 'set of goals that seek to outline how a particular country will interact with other countries of the world' or 'the dealings of states with each other.' In other words, it is something that involves all activities of a nation by which that nation is trying to change other nations' behavior by which that nation is trying to change other nations' behavior and adjust its behavior in the international environment.

On the other side, foreign policy can be a tool to achieve an objective or interest of the state in the international arena, state machinery or national resource or a means which will be used to get the desired outcome outside the boundary of that state. Also there is a decision making body that decides on both the outcome and the machinery used; as ideas or actions designed by policymakers to solve a problem or promote some change in the policies, attitudes, or actions of another state or states, in non-state actors (e.g., terrorist groups), in the international economy, or in the physical environment of the world.

Diplomacy, propaganda, economic rewards and coercion, clandestine actions and military intervention, and weapons and war are some of the critical instruments of foreign policy goals. The size of state's territory, geography, level and nature of economic development, cultural and historical factors, social structures, government structures, internal situations, values, talents, experiences, and personalities of leaders, political accountability in a state, ideology, diplomatic capability, international power structure, global strategic environment, public opinion, level of technology, external environment, alliances and international treaties (bilateral and multilateral) are foremost factors that affect foreign policy.

Military power is an essential tool in international relations. The capacity to use violence for the protection, enforcement, or extension of authority, remains an instrument with which no state has yet found it possible entirely to dispense. Most importantly, armed forces constitute a purely destabilizing factor on the international scene, and their abolition would lead to better stability

among nations. A military force, along with norms and institutions, helps to provide a minimal degree of order. To put it metaphorically, military power provides a degree of security to political and economic order as oxygen is to be breathing and it is little noticed until it begins to become scarce. Once that occurs, its absence dominates all affairs.

There are four primary purposes of a military power of a state: defense, deter, compelling, and swagger. Correspondingly, there are three ranges of military operations: peacetime operations to promote peace, military operation in the time of conflict is to resolve conflict or deter war, and military operation in a time of war where the aim is to fight a full-fledged war and triumph.

Regional security complex theory is a theory of Buzan and his colleagues' Waever and de Wilde. Fashioned by focusing on lingering conflicts that emerge between neighboring states; intra-state conflicts, which are usually spillovers of internal politics; and conflicts that arise from transnational threats. Generally, it is 'the territorialization of security relations' because most threats travel more easily over short distances than over long ones.' Buzan's emphasized geographical proximity is potent for security since many threats travel more easily over short distances than over long ones.

Regional hegemon or regional power is a theory of establishing a powerful state's hegemonic presence and it is an ingredient for stability within a specific region. The hegemonic presence of a powerful state is an ingredient for stability within a specific region. Furthermore, regional hegemons can also be considered as role models and leaders within a particular region by carrying out leading activities that neighboring states generally accept.

CHAPTER 3 – PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS

"Peacekeeping is not a soldier's job, but only soldiers can do it."

Dag Hammarskjold

This chapter is the continuation of the second chapter which presents the literature review, outlining conceptual framework and theoretical background. Peace support operation is the central theme of this dissertation; hence it is dealt with in a separate chapter. The chapter first looks the definitions of peace support operations. And secondly, it covers the historical development and generations of peace support operations. Thirdly, it discusses African Peace and Security Architecture and AU peace support operations in brief. Fourthly, the five concepts of military interventions: intervention by invitation, humanitarian intervention, sovereignty as responsibility, responsibility to protect, and unilateral intervention are discussed. Lastly, in a few words it covers the literature on scholars' answers the question 'why more African states are into peacekeeping?'.

3.1 Definitions

United Nations defines peacekeeping operation as 'an operation involving military personnel, but without enforcement powers, undertaken by the United Nations to help maintain or restore international peace and security in areas of conflict.'[114] Peacekeeping was not mentioned in the UN Charter. Nevertheless, peacekeeping operations can fall between Chapter 6, which refers to the techniques that the Security Council can adopt in pursuit of the peaceful settlement of disputes, such as mediation, arbitration, negotiation, and fact-finding; and Chapter 7 which gives the Security Council power to enforce decisions, including the use of armed forces, if necessary, to maintain or restore international peace and security.[115]

Peacekeeping is one of the essential functions of the United Nations. Peacekeeping has proven to be one of the most effective tools available to the UN to assist host countries in a difficult path

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[114] United Nations. *The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peacekeeping.* New York: United Nations. 1996. 4.

[115] Solà-Martín, Andreu and Tom Woodhouse. *The United Nations, Armed Conflict and Peacekeeping.* Barcelona Open University of Catalonia Foundation. 2011. 5.

from conflict to peace.[116] However, getting peacekeepers and other required resources have been a significant challenge. The former UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon said in February 2011, 'Securing the required resources and troops [for UN peacekeeping] has consumed much of my energy. I have been begging leaders to make resources available to us.'[117]

The peace support operation concept, commonly used as peacekeeping, is rapidly expanding in international relations and military science. The term 'peace support operation' (PSO) was crafted by the UK and later used by NATO and the AU. China[118] and the United States used the term Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW), and the UN uses the term peacekeeping operation (PKO).[119] All three are military interventions with almost referring to the same meaning. However, peace support operations or peace operations is an umbrella term that includes a wide range of activities, which will be discussed later. Stating a precise definition is a difficult task because various organizations have their definitions. However, the following major definitions and related terms are included to create a comprehensive picture of this broad concept.

MOOTW is used as a peacetime operation in the US army. MOOTW encompasses the use of military capabilities across the range of military operations short of war.[120] The term is used for activities like 'training exercises, peace support operations, nation assistance activities, disaster relief and humanitarian assistance, security assistance, shows of force, and support for counterdrug operations'.[121]

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[116] United Nations. 'What is Peacekeeping?' https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/what-is-peacekeeping, Accessed on 19 September 2019.

[117] Bellamy, Alex J. and Paul D. Williams. *Broadening the Base of United Nations Troop- and Police-Contributing Countries. Providing for Peacekeeping*. No. 1. August 2012. International Peace Institute. 1.

[118] Gaoyue, Fan and James Char. "Introduction to China's Military Operations Other than War." Policy Report. February 2019. https://www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/idss/introduction-to-chinas-military-operations-other-than-war/, Accessed on 12 September 2020.

[119] Fitz-Gerald, A. M. *"Military and Post-Conflict Security: Implications for American, British and Other Allied Force Planning and for Post-conflict Iraq".* In Segal, H. (ed), Geopolitical Integrity. Montreal: Institute for Research on public Policy. 2005. pp.275

[120] Joint Chief of Staff. *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War*. Joint Pub 3-07, 1995. 1.

[121] Ibid, Vii.

Some scholars consider the term 'peacekeeping' as colloquial and prefer to use 'peace support operations.'[122] Kai Michael Kenkel has the following to say stressing on the difference between 'peacekeeping and 'peace support operations' and the need to use the term 'peace support operations':

> There is much confusion over the nomenclature of blue-helmet missions. "Peace operations" is the most accurate and appropriate term to describe the global category of all types of operations across all the generations below, operated by the United Nations and other organizations. "Peacekeeping" operations refer only to a subcategory of such operations (the first generation below, which presupposes an extant peace to maintain) that now make up a very small part of overall activities and therefore is not an accurate term for the overall activity, as it does not include peace enforcement and peacebuilding. The term "operation" generally refers to a more broadly-cast endeavor than a "mission," which is a term more prevalent in the military vocabulary. It is therefore conceptually erroneous to refer to the global category as "peace*keeping* operations/missions"; rather, the adequate terminology is the more inclusive and accurate "peace operations."[123]

Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi define peacekeeping as a 'task performed by the UN or other multilateral forces in an effort to keep conflicting parties from resorting (or returning) to armed hostilities.' The same authors also perceive peacekeeping in terms of collective security stating:

> Peacekeeping can be understood as an extension of collective security thinking to cover conflicts that threaten international peace and security, particularly in the regions where these conflicts are being played out. Resolving conflicts involving states and nongovernmental parties are often decades-long projects at best, particularly when territorial issues are linked to competing national, ethnic, or tribal claims. Sometimes the most that can be achieved is to manage these conflicts—to contain and keep them from becoming violent as constructive steps are taken to address the difficult, divisive issues involved.[124]

According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) definition peacekeeping mission, it has the following objectives: to facilitate the implementation of a peace agreement; to support a peace process; to assist in conflict prevention and/or peace-building efforts.[125] However, the SIPRI definition of peacekeeping missions does not include activities of good of-

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[122] Diehl, Paul F. *Peace Operations.* Cambridge: Policy Press, 2008. 179.

[123] Kenkel, K.M. Five Generations of Peace Operations: from the "Thin Blue Line" to "Painting a Country Blue." *Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional* 56 (1) : 122-143, 2013. 122.

[124] Viotti, Paul R. and Mark V. Kauppi. *International Relations and World Politics* 5th Edition. New Jersey: Pearson Education, Inc. 283.

[125] Lijn, Jaïr van der et al. *Peacekeeping Operations in a Changing World.* The Hague: Clingendael Institute. January 2015. 6.

fices, fact-finding and supporting elections, and missions that the UN or regional organizations have not sanctioned.[126] On the other hand, the SIPRI definition includes: operations carried out by regional organizations and alliances; and operations carried out by ad hoc coalitions of states that have been authorized for the purpose by the UN Security Council resolution. Moreover, peacekeeping missions may include the following activities: monitoring and multidimensional peacekeeping operations that is carried out by the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO); including joint AU/UN hybrid operations such as the one in Darfur (UNAMID); special political and peace-building missions that are directed by the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) and meet the SIPRI definition of peacekeeping missions.[127] Others only include 'uniformed' UN presences that have military and/or police personnel and excludes civilian peace-building or political mission that has been deployed under the auspices of the UN DPA[128]

Discussions on peace support operations are known for their conceptual mix-ups because of its common terms: peacekeeping, peacebuilding, peace enforcement, peacemaking, and a host of other terms used interchangeably.[129] The following diagram defines a range of peace operations: first, the post-conflict stage conflict prevention, then, conflict period operations of the second peacemaking, and third, peace enforcement and then the post-conflict period process of peace-keeping, and lastly, peacebuilding.

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[126] Ibid.

[127] Ibid.

[128] In Koops, J. A. et al. *Introduction: The United Nations and Peacekeeping.* In Koops, J. A. et al. *The Oxford Handbook of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations.* Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2015. 1.

[129] Diehl, Paul F. *Peace Operations.* Cambridge: Policy Press, 2008. 3.

Figure 3.1 Type of Peace Operations[130]

According to William J. Durch and Tobias C. Berkaman:

> 'Peacekeeping' was the term coined to describe the tasks of UN-mandated troops deployed after the Suez Crisis of 1956. It gained official status of sorts when the UN General Assembly set up the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations in February 1965, just after UN forces finished their first operation in the former Belgian Congo. It was not defined in any UN document, however, until *An Agenda for Peace* appeared in 1992.[131]

Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations describes the following organizational type of Peacekeeping missions[132]:

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130 United Nations. *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines.* New York: United Nations. 2008. 19. & US Joint Chief of Staff. *Joint Publication 3-07.3, Peace Operations.* March 2018. I -7.

131 Durch, William J. and Tobias C. Berkaman. 'Restoring and Maintaining Peace: What We Know So Far'. In Durch, William J. *Twenty-First-Century Peace Operations.* Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace. 2006. 5.

132 Lijn, Jaïr van der et al. *Peacekeeping Operations in a Changing World. The Hague:* Clingendael Institute. January 2015. 70.

Hybrid Missions: the traditional hybrid operation in which two organizations carry out a mission together (Example, UNAMID, the AU-UN mission in Darfur).

Parallel Missions: various operations carried out in the same theatre with different, adjoining, and sometimes overlapping mandates (the UN's MINUSMA, the EU's EUTM Mali, and French troops in Mali, for example).

Modular Missions: an operation carried out under the leadership of one organization in which modules are handled by another organization or several other organizations (the EU, the OSCE, and UNHCR each handled one of the four pillars on which the UN's UNMIK was based, for example).

Follow-up Mission/Bridging Operations: operations carried out successively by various organizations. Given the allocation of tasks referred to above, various organizations usually handle different phases of an operation (the UN's UNPROFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina, for example, was succeeded by NATO's IFOR and SFOR when peace had been established, and the IFOR and SFOR missions were in turn succeeded by the EUFOR Althea operation when the country had been stabilized). An example of a traditional bridging mission is EUFOR Chad/Central African Republic, which remained active until the UN's MINURCAT could take over the tasks.

Support missions/over-the-horizon forces: an operation conducted by an organization to support an operation being carried out by a separate organization (the UN's UNSOM in Somalia is explicitly aimed at supporting the AU's AMISOM, for example). An over-the-horizon force is not actually deployed in the theatre of operations. However, it is close enough to deploy as a reserve if necessary rapidly (the EUFOR DRC troops in Gabon that had to assist the UN's MONUC if necessary, for example).

There is also 'co-deployment,' an independent strategic authority, command, and control, and 'joint (multinational) operations' to integrate operational command and control resources.[133]

Based on the ownership and responsibility of the peacekeeping operations, there are three kinds of peacekeeping operations that states are involved: first, UN-led missions that are authorized by the UN and under UN command and control; second, UN-authorized missions which are authorized by the UN but conducted by other actors; and third, non-UN missions which are neither authorized nor conducted by the UN.

According to SPIRI, there were 68 active multilateral peace operations in 2019, including UN Peacekeeping Missions, UN Special Political Missions, OSCE field operations, missions and operations conducted under the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), and multi-

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[133] Prinsloo, Barend. 'Hybrid Peacekeeping - A Deeper Understanding of Evolving Peacekeeping Practices'. 11 December 2017, https://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/blog/hybrid-peacekeeping-a-deeper-understanding-of-evolving-peacekeeping-practices, Accessed on 19 December 2019.

national military operations authorized by the AU. (See Appendix 1). Two operations started in 2019: the UN Integrated Office in Haiti, which succeeded MINUJUSTH and the UN Mission to Support the Hodeidah Agreement in Yemen. The number of personnel deployed were 137,781 on 31 December 2019.[134] There were 29 peace operations in Africa, 20 in Europe, 21 in Asia, and 3 in the Americas in 2019 by various international organizations and ad hoc.[135]

Though the word 'Peacekeeping' does not exist in the UN Charter, and the legal bases for the UN peacekeeping operation are the three chapters of the charter: Chapter VI, Pacific Settlement of Disputes (Article 33-38), Chapter VII, Action with respect of the Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the peace, and Acts of Aggregations (Article 39 - 51), and Chapter VIII, Regional Arrangements (Article 52-54), which are considered as articles which deal with peacekeeping issues.

The standard terms used to describe the Blue Helmets, the commonly termed UN Military Personnel and Police Personnel contributed to UN peacekeeping operations are the following: Staff Officer, Military Experts on Mission (which include according to their primary roles as Military Liaison Officers, Military Observers, and Military Advisers), Contingent Troops, Formed Police Unit (FPU) and Individual Police Officer (IPO)[136].

	Term	Meaning
1	**Staff Officer**	A part of military personnel, who are generated, deployed, and traveled in an individual capacity upon nomination by a Permanent Mission and selection by the Office of Military Adviser, to perform specialized functions at the Force Headquarters or integrated military, civilian, or police structure.[137]
2	**UN Military Experts on Mission (UNMEM)**	The UN typically asks the member states to nominate their officers in the rank of Captain and/or Major to serve as a UNMEM. However, depending on the nature of the task,

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[134] SIPRI. *SIPRI YEAR BOOK 2020 Armaments, Disarmament and International Security Summary.* Oxford University Press. 2020. https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2020-06/yb20_summary_en_v2.pdf, Accessed on 19 September 2020.

[135] Ibid.

[136] AU also use UN peacekeeping terminologies.

[137] United Nations. '*Troop and Police Contribution'.* https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/data-troop-and-police-contributions, Accessed on 19 September 2020.

		senior officers such as Lieutenant Colonels and Colonels may also be assigned as UNMEM.[138] Military experts are military officers who are not permitted to carry weapons. UNMEM can be UN Military Liaison Officers and UN Military Observers.
3	**UN Military Liaison Officers (UNMLOs)**	Unarmed officers responsible mainly for keeping constant liaison with the authorities appointed by the warring parties to the disengagement agreement to facilitate personnel, cargo, and supplies the mission area. UNMILos also maintains contact with the local Embassies of the Security Council and TCCs concerning queries about the operations.
4	**UN Military Observers (UNMOs)**	Unarmed officers typically provided by the Member States for 12 months and operating in small teams of between two and eight members. Their main task is to monitor and verify the cessation of the hostilities agreement signed by the two warring parties and monitor the re-deployed positions of both parties' forces.
5	**UN Military Advisers (UN MILADs)**	Responsible for providing military advice in mission areas.
6	**Contingent Troops**	Mostly the most significant number of military personnel in a mission; they may operate in the form of companies, battalions, or brigades.[139]
7	**Formed Police Unit (FPU)**	A cohesive mobile police unit that supports United Nations operations and ensures United Nations personnel and missions' safety and security, primarily in public order management.[140]
8	**Individual Police Officer (IPO)**	Police or other law enforcement personnel assigned to serve with the United Nations on secondment by the Member States at the Secretary-General's request.[141]

Table 3.1 Peacekeeping Operation Personnel Terminologies and their definitions.

[138] Sigatu, Kaleab T. 'Ethiopian Participation in UN Peacekeeping Operations since 1991'. In *'The Dynamics of Conflicts in Africa in the Early 21st Century'.* János Besenyő and Viktor Marsai (Eds). Budapest: Dialóg Campus. 2018. 203.

[139] United Nations. "e-Guide to the United Nations Departments of Peacekeeping Operations and Field Support: A Resource for New Staff at Headquarters". January, 2015. www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/DPKO-DFSe-Guide15-01-08.pdf, Accessed on 20 January 2017.

[140] United Nations. *Troop and Police Contributions.* https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/data-troop-and-police-contributions, Accessed on 19 September 2020.

[141] Ibid.

Traditionally, three basic principles continue to set UN peacekeeping operations apart as a tool for maintaining international peace and security: consent of the parties, impartiality, and non-use of force except in self-Defense and Defense of the mandate. Over time, and especially after the 1980s, encouraged by the increasing number of operations deployed into civil wars and complex internal armed conflicts, these principles, and aims evolved.[142]

In 1998, Jocelyn Coulon wrote the following about peacekeeping:

> Until very recently, Peacekeeping was a diplomatic activity full of subtleties for the governments involved and a bit of a romantic adventure for the participating soldiers. That time is past. With the end of the ideological rivalry between East and West and the proliferation of local wars, peacekeeping has become a thriving industry. It has also become a dangerous activity for the Blue Helmets, who find themselves in the midst of wars in which the rulers of the past have given way to the anarchy engendered by ethnic and nationalist passions. … their mandates have become extremely complex: intervening in civil wars, patrolling dangerous regions, organizing elections, disarming militias, rebuilding infrastructures, protecting minorities, evacuating threatened ethnic groups, exchanging prisoners, drawing borders and more.[143]
>
> As originally conceived by Pearson[[144]] has evolved …. In the beginning, the Blue Helmets were simply peacekeepers. Then, for a short time in Somalia, they were warriors of the new world order. In Bosnia and Rwanda, however, they were neither, paralyzed by the diplomacy of the great powers, who refused to grant them any power, and by ethnic conflicts that made a Somalia-style intervention hazardous.[145]

3.2 Historical Development and Generation of UN Peace Support Operations

In May 2018, the United Nations celebrated the 70th anniversary of UN peacekeeping. The first UN peacekeeping mission was established in May 1948. During which the UN Security Council authorized the deployment of a small number of UN military observers to the Middle East to form the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) to monitor the Armistice

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[142] In Koops, J. A. et al. *Introduction: The United Nations and Peacekeeping.* In Koops, J. A. et al. *The Oxford Handbook of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations.* Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2015. 2.

[143] Coulon Jocelyn. *Soldiers of Diplomacy: The United Nations, Peacekeeping, and the New World Order.* (English Translation by Phyllis Aronoff and Howard Scott) Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1998. ix-x.

[144] Lester Pearson was a Canadian scholar, statesman, soldier, prime minister, and diplomat, who won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1957 for organizing the, UN peacekeeping force (United Nations Emergency Force) to resolve the Suez Canal Crisis between Egypt and Israel.

[145] Coulon Jocelyn. *Soldiers of Diplomacy: The United Nations, Peacekeeping, and the New World Order.* (English Translation by Phyllis Aronoff and Howard Scott) Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1998. x.

Agreement between Israel and its Arab neighbors.[146] Over the past 70 years, more than 1 million men and women have served under the UN flag in more than 70 UN peacekeeping operations. More than 100,000 military, police, and civilian personnel from 125 countries serve in 14 peacekeeping operations in 2018.[147]Since 1948, more than 3,500 personnel have lost their lives serving in UN peace operations, including 943 killed by violence. Since 2013, casualties have spiked, with 195 deaths in violent attacks, more than during any other five-year period in the UN's history. [148]

Peace support operation is the most recognized activity of the UN. Department of Peace Operations (DPO), formerly known as the Department for Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), is the UN department responsible for planning, preparation, management, and direction of UN peacekeeping operations.

For the first time in its history, the UN authorized the use of force without the host state's consent for the express purposes of protecting civilians from harm.[149] As of December 2019, the UN deploys 9,124 Police, 72,967 Troops, 1,240 Military Experts on Mission, 83,331 personnel, including international civilians, local civilians, and UN volunteers in fourteen peacekeeping missions and nine special political missions.

Professor Kai Michael Kenkel[150] divided peace support operations into five generations, based on: three main factors: the level of force used by operations' military pillar; the type and depth of tasks conducted by its civilian pillar; and in the case of the latest generation, increased UN load-sharing with regional organizations.[151]

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[146] United Nations. *UN Peacekeeping: 70 Years of Service & Sacrifice.* https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/un-peacekeeping-70-years-of-service-sacrifice, Accessed on 20 December 2018

[147] Ibid.

[148] Ibid.

[149] UNSC cited in Hunt, C. T. Emerging Powers and the Responsibility to Protect: non-Linear Norm Dynamics in Complex International Society. *Cambridge Review of International Affairs.* 2016. 29:3, 870-890

[150] Kenkel, K.M. Five *Generations of Peace Operations: from the "Thin Blue Line" to "Painting a Country Blue."* Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional 56 (1): 122-143, 2013. 125.

[151] Ibid.

3.2.1 First-Generation Peace Operations

Traditional peacekeeping is based on the basic principles of peacekeeping Consent, Impartiality, and non-use of force. The troops deployed are lightly armed and operate under strictly limiting rules of engagement. Examples of traditional peacekeeping are the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, deployed in the Middle East, founded in 1948. The United Nations Monitoring and Observation Group in India and Pakistan, active in Kashmir since 1949—are still active today, as is a force, UNFICYP, deployed to Cyprus following that island's partition in 1964.[152]

Peacekeeping operations that were deployed in the Cold War period, broadly between the deployment of UNEF I in 1956 to the deployment of UNTAG in Namibia in 1988, are also described as traditional, classical, or first-generation peacekeeping.[153] The primary mechanism for such a peacekeeping deployment is the interposition or buffer force that separates the combatants following a cease-fire.[154] Such peacekeeping types took place in areas 'where there is a peace to keep, following an end to the armed conflict through a truce or ceasefire.'[155] The main objective of such a mission is to establish a political environment for peaceful conflict resolution and create a buffer zone. The core functions of the operation are monitoring borders, verifying demilitarized zones.

3.2.2 Second-Generation Peace Operations

After the end of the bipolar system resulted from the end of the Cold War, ethnic tensions and intrastate conditions increased resulted in an increasing demand for UN peacekeeping. At the time, peace operations became easier to dispatch, but they were sent to ever more complex and dangerous contexts.[156] 'More ambitious mandates and active involvement not only in "freezing" conflicts but in assisting the transition to peace.'[157] A landmark effert by the UN in this period

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[152] Ibid. 126.

[153] Solà-Martín, Andreu and Tom Woodhouse. *The United Nations, Armed Conflict and Peacekeeping*. Barcelona Open University of Catalonia Foundation. 2011. 5.

[154] Diehl, Paul F. *Peace Operations*. Cambridge: Policy Press, 2008. 4.

[155] Kenkel, K.M. Five *Generations of Peace Operations: from the "Thin Blue Line" to "Painting a Country Blue."* Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional 56 (1): 122-143, 2013. 125.

[156] John Hillen cited in Kenkel, K.M. Five *Generations ...* 127.

[157] Kenkel, K.M. Five *Generations ...*127.

was the *Agenda for Peace* document[158] written by the then Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in 1992. In the document the Secretary-General called for peacebuilding which aims to address the deepest causes of conflict: economic despair, social injustice and political oppression to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict. And most importantly he called for for the establishment of "peace enforcement units" to deal with challenges that exceed peacekeeping.[159]

According to Bellamy and Williams, second-generation missions has six distinguishing features:

> It takes place within a context of ongoing violence; in a context of "new wars"; take on new civilian tasks; must interact with an increasing number of humanitarian actors in complex emergencies; often experience creeping shifts in their mandates, and suffer from a considerable gap in the relationship between their means and ends[160]

The typical feature of the second-generation mission is civilian tasks added on top of classic first-generation military mandates. [161] These mainly includes the organization of elections, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR); humanitarian aid delivery; human rights promotion, refugee assistance, and government capacity-building.

Successful missions include the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) in Namibia, the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (UNOMOZ), and the United Nations Observer Group in El Salvador (ONUSAL).

3.2.3 Third-Generation Peace Operations

The limitations of the second-generation of peace operations and the failures of the operations in Somalia, Bosnia, and Rwanda led UN Peace operations in the third generation 'from a reactive stance that seeks to freeze or palliate conflict to one that is proactive and seeks to influence its outcome.'[162] The third generation peace operations, which are the imposition of peace or peace enforcement, were characterized by 'increased permission to use force to impose the aims of a

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[158] Boutros-Ghali, Boutros. *"An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping."* Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to the statement adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992. SC Doc. S/24111, 17 June 1992.

[159] Ibid.

[160] Bellamy and Williams cited in Kenkel, K.M. Five *Generations ...* 128.

[161] Kenkel, K.M. Five *Generations ...* 129.

[162] Ibid. 125.

mission's mandate, without significant departure like that mandate from the classic transitional tasks of second-generation mandates.'[163] According to Andreu Solà-Martín and Tom Woodhouse, the new third-generation operation doctrine aimed:

> To prevent the deployment of armed forces without adequate training or support in areas of armed conflict. These doctrines were based on the premise that the traditional notions of peacekeeping operations were no longer applicable in a world of civil wars, states in crisis, and declining respect for international law and human rights. According to this new doctrine, future peace operations must have the flexibility, strength, and military capacity to act in a wide range of situations and deal with actors who attempt to discredit the peace process through violence and intimidation or who threaten local populations and   the   staff of international organizations.[164]

The first intervention to claim purely or even predominantly humanitarian motivation was the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) action against Yugoslavia over Kosovo's conflict in 1999.

3.2.4 Fourth-Generation Peace Operations

It consists of robust peacebuilding operations that combine elevated permission to use force with enhanced civilian tasks.[165] According to Andreu Solà-Martín and Tom Woodhouse:

> UN Secretary General Boutros Ghali used the term peacebuilding in the 1990s to define post-conflict reconstruction's developmental phase that should follow peacekeeping. When, in his *Agenda for Peace* of 1992, Boutros Ghali defined the role of peacebuilding in the UN as the medium to long term process of rebuilding war-affected communities, it took another ten years before this policy commitment to peacebuilding was institutionally consolidated. The failure of the UN system to implement the prescriptions of the *Agenda for Peace*, especially in the most challenging tests faced in Somalia, Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, led to a series of investigations and proposals for reform that would eventually result in proposals to institutionalize peacebuilding in the UN system.

An extreme form of peacebuilding is the transitional administration, wherein the exercise of sovereignty over a given territory is effectively transferred to a UN peace operation, and all executive, legislative, and judicial authority temporarily rests with the head of the UN mission.[166] The

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[163] Ibid. 129.

[164]Solà-Martín, Andreu and Tom Woodhouse. *The United Nations, Armed Conflict and Peacekeeping.* Barcelona Open University of Catalonia Foundation. 2011. 28.

[165] Bellamy, et al. Cited in Kenkel, K.M. Five *Generations ...*129.

[166] Kenkel, K.M. Five *Generations ...* 130.

United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) are good examples.

3.2.5 An Emerging Fifth Generation

The UN has started sharing the burden of peacekeeping operations with regional organizations; for example, UN-mandated missions are being carried out by NATO, EU, and AU. In 2015, the former UN General Secretary, Ban Ki-moon, said, 'we have thus entered an era of partnership peacekeeping, where close cooperation among multiple multilateral actors throughout every phase of a crisis is becoming the norm – and an essential component of each organization.'[167] The fifth generation of peacekeeping is a partnership peacekeeping called Hybrid Missions. It is characterized by missions that deploy 'troops and police personnel under mixed command, with both the United Nations and various regional organizations deploying troops to the same missions under separate chains of command and distinct forms of mandate or simultaneous deployment of UN troops, and those of a regional organization.[168]

The United Nations – African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) is the first peacekeeping mission with a hybrid character. It is defined as a 'combined/joint operation in a particular area of responsibility conducted by forces from different organizations (in this case the United Nations and AU) under a common command and control arrangement, to achieve a common objective or end state, with each force retaining its organization's identity throughout the operation.'[169]

3.3 African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) and African Union Peace Support Operations

The AU is African continental organization with 55 member states. It was officially launched in 2002 as a successor to the Organization of African Unity (OAU, 1963-1999). The African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) is the umbrella term for the key AU mechanisms for promot-

[167] UN Secretary-General's Report 'Partnering for Peace: Moving towards Partnership Peacekeeping' UN Document S/2015/229, 1 April 2015.

[168] Kenkel, K.M. Five *Generations ...* 135.

[169] Prinsloo, Barend. "Hybrid Peacekeeping: A Deeper Understanding of Evolving Peacekeeping Practices.*"* 11 December 2017. https://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/blog/hybrid-peacekeeping-a-deeper-understanding-of-evolving-peacekeeping-practices, Accessed on 13 June 2019

ing peace, security and stability in the African continent. The main pillar of the APSA is the Peace and Security Council (PSC). The PSC is one of the twelve main organs of the AU which deals with peace and security matters including peace support operation.

	Name of the Organ	Task
1	**Assembly**	The supreme policy and decision-making organ. Composed of all Member State Heads of State and Government.
2	**Excutive Council**	Coordinates and takes decisions on policies in areas of common interest to Member States. It is responsible to the Assembly. Composed of foreign ministers or such other ministers or authorities as are designated by the governments of Member States
3	**The Specialised Technical Committees (STCs)**	Thematic committees on key AU projects and programmes. STCs are responsible to the Executive Council. Composed of Member State ministers or senior officials.
4	**Permanent Representatives Committee (PRC)**	Charged with preparing the work of the Executive Council. Composed of Permanent Representatives and other plenipotentiaries of Member States.
5	**Peace & Security Council (PSC)**	The AU's organ for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts. Composed of 15 elected Member States.
6	**African Union Commission (AUC)**	The AU's secretariat. Composed of a Chairperson, Deputy Chairperson and eight commissioners as well as staff.
7	**Pan-African Parliament (PAP)**	Platform for people from all African states to participate in discussions and decision-making on issues facing the continent. Members are designated by the legislatures of their Member States..
8	**Economic, Social & Cultural Council (ECOSOCC)**	Advisory organ that provides opportunity for African civil society organisations to contribute to the AU's principles, policies and programmes. Composed of social and professional groups from AU Member States
9	**Judicial, Human Rights & Legal Organs**	Organs are the: African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights (ACHPR), African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights (AfCHPR), AU Commission on International Law (AUCIL), AU Advisory Board on Corruption (AUABC) and the African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (ACERWC).
10	**Financial Institutions**	Proposed institutions are the: African Central Bank, African Investment Bank and the African Monetary Fund.

11	**African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM)**	Aims to foster the adoption of policies, values, standards and practices of political and economic governance that lead to political stability, accelerated economic integration, economic growth and sustainable development.
12	**Regional Economic Communities (RECs)**	Regional groupings of African states that facilitate regional economic integration between members and through the wider African Economic Community (AEC).

Table 3.2 African Union Structure [170]

3.3.1 The APSA Security Framework and its Strictures

Under APSA, which is the framework for promoting peace, security and stability in Africa, the PSC, which became operational since 2004, is the decision-making organ of the AU for the prevention, management, and resolution of conflicts, and it has a collective security and early warning arrangement to respond to conflict and crisis situations in Africa.

The PSC has 15 members with equal voting powers. All members are elected by the AU Executive Council and endorsed by the AU Assembly during its ordinary sessions. For continuity, five members are elected for three-year terms and 10 for two-year terms. While there are no permanent members. PSC members are elected according to their regional representation: Central Africa: three seats, Eastern Africa: three seats, Northern Africa: two seats, Southern Africa: three seats, Western Africa: four seats and the Chair shall be held in turn by the members.

PSC has subsidiary bodies, namely, (1) the Committee of Experts, (2) the Military Staff Committee and (3) PSC High-Level Panels. Currently the African Union High-Level Implementation Panel (AUHIP) for Sudan and South Sudan running while in the past it formed High-Level Panel for Egypt, AU Ad Hoc High-Level Committee on Libya, High-Level Panel on Côte d'Ivoire, and High-Level Panel on Darfur.

APSA as the foundation of interventions in peace and security in Africa is built around defined structures that include the PSC. Its main four organs are the Panel of the Wise, the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), African Standby Force (ASF) and the Peace Fund.

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[170] Source: African Union Commission and New Zealand Crown. "*African Union Handbook.*" Addis Ababa: African Union Commission and New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade. 2018, 10. https://au.int/en/documents/20180130/african-union-handbook-2018, Accessed on 12 February 2019.

3.3.1.1 The Panel of the Wise

According to article 11 of the Protocol establishing the PSC, the Panel of the Wise is a five-person panel of highly respected African personalities from various segments of society who have made outstanding contributions to the cause of peace, security, and development on the continent with the task to support the efforts of the PSC and those of the Chairperson of the Commission, particularly around conflict prevention.

3.3.1.2 Continental Early Warning System (CEWS)

CEWS established according to article 12 of the Protocol establishing the PSC with the main objective to anticipate and prevent conflicts on the continent, and to provide timely information about evolving violent conflicts, based on specifically developed indicators. CEWS consists of the: Situation Room, located in the Peace and Security Department, Addis Ababa and Observation and Monitoring Centers of the Regional Economic Communities (RECs).

3.3.1.3 African Standby Force (ASF)

ASF comprises multidisciplinary contingents with civilian, police and military components stationed in their countries of origin and ready for rapid deployment at appropriate notice. ASF was stablished according to article 13(1) and (2), the Protocol establishing the PSC to perform its responsibilities with respect to the deployment of peace support operations. Article 13(3) of the PSC Protocol provides for the ASF to perform: observation and monitoring missions, other types of peace support missions, intervention in a member State in respect of grave circumstances or at the request of a member state in order to restore peace and security, prevention of a dispute or conflict from escalating, peacebuilding, including post-conflict disarmament and demobilization, humanitarian assistance, and any other functions mandated by the PSC or AU Assembly. ASF shall be composed of military, police, and civilian components on standby in their countries of origin, ready for rapid deployment. The ASF is composed of pledged capabilities and Planning Elements (PLANELMs) in five Regional Economic Communities/Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs), a Continental Logistics Base (CLB) in Douala, Cameroon, and five Regional Logistics Depots (RLDs).

The five ASF RECs/RMs are: Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) Standby Force, Eastern Africa Standby Force (EASF)[171], North African Regional Capability (NARC) Standby Force, Southern African Development Community (SADC) Standby Force, and Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Standby Force (ESF).

EASF established by the memorandum of understanding signed in January 2011 which includes all Horn of African states except Eritrea; namely Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda, and South Sudan (Observer since April 2013). EASF attained its Full Operational Capability (FOC) in 2014 and have a Secretariat, a Standby Force Headquarters, PlANELM and Logistics Base. The Secretariat and the PLANELM are located in Nairobi while the Standby Force Headquarter and the Logistic Base located in Addis Ababa. Until now EASF did not deploy its peacekeeping troops of any kind in its region to maintain peace and security. On the other hand, it deploys an election observer mission in the Union of Comoros in March 2019 to support the democratic process, observe and asses the elections in line with the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG).[172]

3.3.1.4 The Peace Fund

According to article 21 of the Protocol establishing the PSC the Peace Fund is established with the role of providing the necessary financial resources for peace support missions and other operational activities related to peace and security. The AU Assembly decided to structure the Peace Fund around three thematic windows: Mediation and Preventive Diplomacy, Institutional Capacity and Peace Support Operations. The Peace Fund has a Board of Trustees, made up of five African members representing the 5 AU Regions, EU and UN.

3.3.2 Brief Overview of African Union Peace Support Operations

The AU Commission's Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD), also referred to as the African Standby Force Continental Planning Element is one of the four departments under Peace and Security Department which is under Peace and Security Commissioner. The PSOD puts together

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[171] Previously it was called Eastern Africa Standby Brigade (EASBRIG)

[172] EASF. "Union of Comoros officially invites EASF to Observe General Elections." https://www.easfcom.org/index.php/en/home/9-news/728-union-of-comoros-officially-invites-easf-to-observe-general-elections. Accessed on 11 December 2019.

policies, guidelines, agreements, frameworks, and mechanisms to help bring together regional peace and security mechanism to respond to peace support operations and security challenges. It also plans, launches, sustains, monitors, and liquidates all Peace Support Operations (PSOs) authorized by the African Union Policy Organs (AUPOs) inclusive of the PSC and/or the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the African Union (Assembly), as appropriate.[173]

After the adoption of the AU Act in 2000 and the PSC Protocol of 2002, AU deployed the following missions under the authorization of the PSC:

1. In Burundi, the African Mission in Burundi (AMIB) 2003 to 2004.

2. African Mission in Sudan I (AMIS I) 2004 [174]

3. African Union Mission in Sudan II (AMIS II) 2004 to 2007

4. In the Comoros, the African Union Military Observer Mission in the Comoros (MIOC) in 2006.

5. In Somalia the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) since 2007.

6. In Comoros, African Union Electoral and Security Assistance Mission to the Comoros (MAES) in 2007.

7. The hybrid mission with the UN in Darfur, Sudan, the African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) since 2007.

8. In countries affected by Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) namely: Central African Republic, DR Congo, South Sudan and Uganda, the Regional Cooperation Initiative for the Elimination of the Lord's Resistance Army (RCI-LRA) since 2011. RCI-LRA's military wing is called African Union-Led Regional Task Force (RTF).

9. In Mali, the African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA) in January 2013.[175]

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[173] African Union. "Peace Support Operations" https://au.int/en/directorates/peace-support-operations. Accessed on 17 February 2019.

[174] On 25 May 2004 PSC authorized the deployment of an AU-mandated mission to monitor the 2004 Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement between parties to the conflict in Sudan. As of 20 October 2004 the PSC transformed AMIS into a full peacekeeping mission (AMIS II). The Mission was merged with the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) in December 2007 to become the joint AU–UN Mission in Darfur (UNAMID).

[175] AFISMA transferred its authority to the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) on 1 July 2013.

10. In the Central African Republic the African Union-led International Support Mission to the Central African Republic (MISCA) 2013 to 2014.

11. In states impacted by terrorism and transnational organized crime: Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger, the Group of Five Sahel States (G5 Sahel) in 2014.

12. In Burundi, Human Rights Observers and Military Experts in Burundi in 2015.

13. In the areas affected by the activities of Boko Haram and other terrorist groups, Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) in 2015.

14. In Gambia, African Union Technical Support Team to Gambia (AUTSTG) in 2018.

3.4 Military Interventions

One of the most important concepts related to peace support operations is a military intervention or armed intervention. The militaries interlining in other countries' domestic affairs is questionable based on the principles in the Westphalia treaties, which are the foundation of contemporary international relations. Since the end of the Cold War, military force to resolve people in the suffering of genocide or extreme human rights violation is greater than before. A generation ago, the terms 'military intervention' and 'conflict resolution' would rarely have been uttered in the same breath.[176] Large-scale human tragedies that occurred in Rwanda, Somalia, and Bosnia made the military intervention necessary. K.J. Holsti describes the development as follows:

> The two great wars of the twentieth century and the development of weapons of mass distraction have changed attitudes toward the use of force. First in the League of Nations Covenant, and later in the charter of the United Nations, norms regulating the use of force were spelled out in detail. At present, force can be used in only two circumstances: (1) in self-Defense, individually or collectively; and (2) as coercive sanctions approved by the Security Council of the United Nations or some other international organizations. In the latter case, a state can use military means on behalf of *community* objectives. [177]

The AU also uses both Peace Support Operations and Interventions as a solution for Humanitarian crises. The Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, was adopted on 09 July 2002, and came into force on 26 December 2003. Article 6 (d) states that 'one of the functions of the PSC is peace support operations and interventions in

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[176] Hauss, Charles. "Military Intervention". August 2003. https://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/military_intervention, Accessed on 23 May 2019.

[177] Holsti, K.J. *International Politics: A Framework for Analysis.* 7th Edition. Prentice-Hall International, Inc. New Jersey. 1995. 72-73.

accordance with Article 4 (h) and (j) of the Constitutive Act of AU'; which states that 'the right of the Union to intervene in a Member State according to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity'; and 'the right of Member States to request intervention from the Union in order to restore peace and security.' All AU PSOs are also authorized by the UN Security Council per the UN Charter, Chapter VIII, Article 53(1).

Technically, Pearson and Baumann define military intervention as:

> The movement of troops or forces of one country into the territory or territorial waters of another country, or military action by troops already stationed by one country inside another, in the context of some political issue or dispute. … to influence either domestic disputes or political conditions in a target state. Conceptually, all wars - i.e. persistent bilateral combat - are preceded by interventions, but not all interventions become wars.[178]

Thus, based on the above definitions, governments unilaterally or multilateral interventions intervene to influence a target government or armed groups. The following five concepts of armed interventions are based on human security principles rather than political goals associated with peace support operations.

3.4.1 Intervention by Invitation

Intervention by invitation is 'a military intervention by foreign troops in an internal armed conflict at the government's invitation of the state concerned.'[179] This can be considered an exception for the article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter, which states: 'All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.' Correspondingly, the customary of international law existed for a long time, as govern-

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[178] Pearson, Frederic. S and Robert A. Baumann. International Military Interventions: Identification and Classification. *International Interactions,* Vol. 14, No. 2, 1988. 173-180

[179] Nolte, Georg. *Intervention by Invitation*. in Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2010. Available at: http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e1702?prd=EPIL, Accessed on 26 January 2019.

ments have a right to invite foreign troops to help deal with internal conflicts.[180] Katharina Coleman refers intervention by invitation as 'solidarity deployments.'[181]

Though it is not free of controversies, Uganda intervened in South Sudan with the government of South Sudan's invitation.[182] The same is true for Ethiopian intervention in Somalia in 2006. As a matter of principle, governments' invitations provide a lawful basis for intervention, and rebel groups' invitations do not.[183]

3.4.2 Humanitarian Intervention

The idea of a right to the humanitarian intervention was pioneered in the 1960s by the French humanitarian organization Médecins sans Frontières (MSF) or Doctors without Borders. When there are grave human rights violations, MSF argued, international actors have a right to intervene to stop them.[184] World leaders, notably US president Bill Clinton and UK prime minister Tony Blair, spoke of the emergence of a new world order where foreign policy decisions are motivated by a fundamental belief in universal human rights.[185]

Sean Murphy defines humanitarian intervention as 'the threat or use of force by a state, group of states, or international organization primarily to protect the nationals of the target state from widespread deprivations of internationally recognized human rights.[186] Military interventions were justified on human rights grounds to varying degrees in Iraq in 1990-1991, Somalia in

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[180] Ibid.

[181] Coleman, Katharina "Innovations in 'African Solutions to African Problems': The Evolving Practice of Regional Peacekeeping in Sub-Saharan Africa," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 49, no. 4 (2011).

[182] Mesfin, Berouk. "The full-blown political and military crisis in South Sudan has increasingly important implications for Uganda, Sudan, Ethiopia and Eritrea." 26 May 2014. https://issafrica.org/iss-today/the-crisis-in-south-sudan-a-game-of-regional-chess, Accessed on 08 February

[183] Fox, Gregory H. "Intervention by Invitation." Wayne State University Law School Legal Studies Research Paper Series No. 2014-04. 22 March 2014. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2407539, Accessed on January 15 2019.

[184] BBC World Service. "Article 28: Right to social and international order permitting these freedoms to be realized." http://www.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/people/features/ihavearightto/four_b/casestudy_art28.shtml, Accessed on 28 December.

[185] Ibid.

[186] Murphy, Sean. *Humanitarian Intervention: The United Nations in an Evolving World Order*. Pennsylvania. University of Pennsylvania Press, Inc.1996. 11-12.

1991-1993, East Timor and Sierra Leone in 1999, and the former Yugoslavia throughout the 1990s. [187]

Humanitarian intervention can be classified as multilateral intervention or collective intervention and unilateral intervention. Multilateral intervention or collective intervention is humanitarian military intervention authorized and sanctioned by the UN Security Council. On the other hand, unilateral intervention is 'a military intervention undertaken by a state (or a group of states) outside the umbrella of the United Nations in order to secure human rights in another country.'[188] 'Collective intervention by the United Nations was morally, politically, and legally acceptable where unilateral intervention was not. Because it appeared more impartial and not self-serving, the UN community was perceived as acting and speaking for the whole community of nations.'[189]

3.4.3 Sovereignty as Responsibility

The notion of sovereignty as responsibility is 'when nations do not conduct their internal affairs in ways that meet internationally recognized standards, other nations not only have the right but also have a duty, to intervene,' it means a 'government that allows its citizens to suffer in a vacuum of responsibility for moral leadership cannot claim sovereignty in an effort to keep the outside world from steeping in to offer protection and assistance.'[190]

The ideas of sovereignty have evolved since the modern nation-state was fashioned by the European Treaty of Westphalia of 1648.[191] In the post-Cold War era, sovereignty becomes an internationally shared responsibility, and national sovereignty a privilege dependent on the fulfillment

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[187] BBC World Service. Article 28: Right to social and international order permitting these freedoms to be realized. http://www.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/people/features/ihavearightto/four_b/casestudy_art28.shtml, Accessed on 28 December.

[188] Richemond, Daphné. "Normativity in International Law: The Case of Unilateral Humanitarian Intervention. *Yale Human Rights and Development Law Journal,* Vol. 6/1, 2003. 47.

[189] Doyle, Michael W. The Ethics of Multilateral Intervention. *Theoria: A Journal of Social and Political Theory.* No. 109, The Politics of War, April 2006. 30.

[190] Deng et al Cited in Etzioni, Amitai. Sovereignty as Responsibility. *Orbis, Foreign Policy Research Institute's Quarterly Journal of World Affairs,* 50/1, Winter 2006. 71-73.

[191] Ibid. 359.

of responsibility.[192]Deng et al.. affirm that to meet its responsibilities to protect its people and avoid harming its neighbors … the principles of collective security mean that the international community should take up some portion of those responsibilities. [193] Weizhun Mao and Yongguang Bu define "Sovereignty as Responsibility" as follows:

> Ensuring the safety and welfare of its own citizens, the sovereign state is obliged to take responsibility in providing security protection and development assistance to stabilize the international system, to improve the capacity and function building of weaker states, and to help citizens who are in a humanitarian emergency but cannot get the reliefs from their own government.[194]

3.4.4 Responsibility to Protect (R2P)

A new paradigm was influenced by a report by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, which introduced the notion of a 'responsibility to protect' in December 2001.[195] Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect defines responsibility to protect as follows:

> The Responsibility to Protect – known as R2P – is an international norm that seeks to ensure that the international community never again fails to halt the mass atrocity crimes of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. The concept emerged in response to the failure of the international community to adequately respond to mass atrocities committed in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia during the 1990s.[196]

The Responsibility to Protect has emerged from the 2005 UN World Summit, which was unanimously adopted the World Summit Outcome Document during the UN General Assembly's 60th session in 2005. Paragraph 138 says as follows:

> Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. This responsibility entails the pre-

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[192] Etzioni, Amitai. Sovereignty as Responsibility. *Orbis, Foreign Policy Research Institute's Quarterly Journal of World Affairs*. Volume 50, Issue 1, Winter 2006. 74.

[193] Deng et al Cited in Etzioni, Amitai. Sovereignty as Responsibility. *Orbis, Foreign Policy Research Institute's Quarterly Journal of World Affairs*. Volume 50, Issue 1, Winter 2006. 74.

[194] Mao, Weizhun and Yongguang Bu. "Sovereignty as Responsibility": Intellectual Sources, Evolving Paths, and Theoretical Debates. *Journal of International Security Studies,* 1/2, 2015. 104.

[195] International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. *The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty.* Ottawa: International Development Research Centre. 2001.

[196] Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect. globalr2p.org. "What is R2P?" https://www.globalr2p.org/what-is-r2p/, Accessed on 21 December 2020.

vention of such crimes, including their incitement, through appropriate and necessary means. We accept that responsibility and will act in accordance with it. The international community should as appropriate, encourage and help States to exercise this responsibility and support the United Nations in establishing an early warning capability.[197]

3.4.5 Unilateral Intervention

Daphne Richemondt defined unilateral humanitarian intervention as "a military intervention undertaken by a state (or a group of states) outside the umbrella of the United Nations in order to secure human rights in another country." [198] Based on this definition, what makes an intervention 'unilateral' is if it is not undertaken by the authority or endorsement of United Nations Security Council. The number of states involved are not the major concern here. A similar explanation was given by Peter Hilpold stating, "the distinction between collective and unilateral measures refers to the question whether the initiative has been authorized by the Security Council or not."[199] A single state, *ad hoc* group of states or a regional organization can make a unilateral intervention.

For Fernando R. Teson unilateral humanitarian intervention is "the proportionate transboundary help, including forcible help, provided by governments to individuals in another state who are being denied basic human rights and who themselves would be rationally willing to revolt against their oppressive government."[200] This definition is related to the R2P principle where states intervene to save societies in another country. Another point regarding unilateral intervention is 'unilateral intervention by invitation'. As it is discussed briefly in section 3.4.1, it has been a common international tradition where states have a sovereign right to invite foreign troops onto its territory. Thus, states may intervene in another states territory without the approval of United Nations Security Council. A good example of such incident is the military intervention in

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[197] United Nations. *Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 16 September 2005, 60/1. 2005 World Summit. Outcome.* A/RES/60/1. New York United Nations. 24 October 2005.

[198] Richemondt, Daphne. "Normativity in International Law: The Case of Unilateral Humanitarian Intervention." *Yale Human Rights and Development Law Journal* Volume 6/1. 2003. 47.

[199] Hilpold, Peter. "Humanitarian Intervention: Is There a Need for a Legal Reappraisal?" *European Journal of International Law* 12. 3. 2001. 437-468. 448

[200] Teson, Fernando. *Humanitarian Intervention: An Inquiry into Law and Morality.* 2nd Edition. New York: Transnational Publishers, Inc. 1997. 5.

Sierra Leone by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) led by Nigeria at the request of the exiled president of the state Ahmad Tejan Kabbah in 1998.

3.5 Why more African states are into Peacekeeping?

The traditional peacekeeping contributing states Canada, Norway, and Sweden, see their role tied to peacekeeping according to Alex Bellamy and Paul Williams, are no longer providing peace-keeping troops this is because:

> … since the beginning of the twenty-first century, all three appear to have moved away from this attitude. Today's Canadian military, for instance, is highly skeptical of UN peacekeeping, in part owing to negative and controversial experiences in Somalia and the Balkans. At the same time, Norway focuses its contributions almost entirely on the NATO-led mission in Afghanistan.[201]

> As a result of high profile failures in the 1990s, especially in Bosnia and Herzegovina, several members of the Western European and Others Group (WEOG) remain skeptical about the UN's command and control mechanisms and have decided that only in exceptional circumstances would they place anything other than token contributions under the UN chain of command.[202]

	Motivation	Explanation
1	International pressure and problems	African countries cooperate on international security issues through peacekeeping participation. By doing so, African countries assist in solving problems at the global level (e.g. war on terrorism, international crime).
2	Increase international and regional stature and influence	African countries can project a greater degree of collective African and international interest. It also assists with local morale, seeing one's military working to resolve conflict and restore democracy. Moreover, it can increase a nation's influence in the countries where deployed, in the region and the continent as a whole.

[201] Bellamy, Alex J. and Paul D. Williams. Broadening the Base of United Nations Troop- and Police-Contributing Countries. *Providing for Peacekeeping.* No. 1. International Peace Institute. August 2012.

[202] Ibid.

3	Values and perspectives	Democratic countries in Africa can show and have shown willingness to lead peacekeeping operations and over long periods of time. This shows a value basis behind foreign policy. It can also help improve the local perspective of a nation's military that can lead to greater public acceptance.
4	Greater UN prestige and influence	Participating in peacekeeping helps countries such as Nigeria who seek to become a Permanent Member of the Security Council. It also assists other African countries such as Rwanda to gain more leverage in UN bodies.
5	National security	Participation in peacekeeping helps contribute to a state's own national security (i.e., border control, refugees, etc.).
6	Political gains	Peacekeeping can be in the national interest in political spheres by building a reputation with other countries and regional organizations while improving one's leadership, culminating in political returns.
7	Profit for country	UN reimbursement helps a country remedy a lack of resources and keeps its soldiers content. Peacekeeping participation can pay for itself.
8	Increased size and quality of military	African peacekeeping participation develops expertise and experience. It is also a way for a state to grow and professionalize an army, which can be positively used in certain domestic affairs.

Table 3.3 Key motivators for African participation in peacekeeping[203]

3.6 Summery and Partial Conclusion

Peace support operation, military intervention, and the literature reviews behind the rationales of why more African states are involved in peacekeeping are the key topics covered by this chapter.

Peacekeeping operation can be defined as an operation involving military personnel, but without power enforcement, undertaken by the United Nations to help maintain or restore international peace and security in conflict areas.

Peace operations host a range of operations like first the post-conflict stage conflict prevention, then conflict period operations of the peacemaking, and third peace enforcement and then the post-conflict period process of fourth peacekeeping and lastly peacebuilding.

There are five generations of UN peacekeeping operations:

Generations	Key Features
1st Generation	Peacekeeping deployment is the interposition or buffer force that separates the combatants following a cease-fire.
2nd Generation	Civilian tasks, added on top of classic first-generation military mandates, include the organization of elections, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR); humanitarian aid delivery; human rights promotion, refugee assistance, and government capacity-building.
3rd Generation	The imposition of peace or peace enforcement was characterized by increased permission to use force to impose the aims of a mission's mandate.
4th Generation	Robust peacebuilding operations that combine elevated permission to use force with enhanced civilian tasks.
5th Generation	UN partnership in peacekeeping operations with regional organizations, for

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[203] Source: Firsing, Scott. 'Thinking through the role of Africa's militaries in peacekeeping: the cases of Nigeria, Ethiopia and Rwanda'. *South African Journal of International Affairs,* 21/1, 2014. 45-67.

	example, UN-mandated missions are being carried out by NATO, EU, and AU.

Table 3.3 Summary of Professor Kai Michael Kenkel's Generations of Peace Support Operations

The African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) is the umbrella term for the key AU mechanisms for promoting peace, security, and stability in the African continent. The main pillar of the APSA is the Peace and Security Council (PSC), which is supported, in the discharge of its mandate, by various structures, namely: the Commission, the Panel of the Wise, the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), the African Standby Force (ASF) and the Peace Fund.

Five core concepts of military interventions are related to peace support operations. First, Intervention by invitation is military intervention by foreign troops in an internal armed conflict at the state's government's invitation. Second, humanitarian intervention is a threat or use of force by a state, group of states, or international organization to protect the nationals of the target state from widespread deprivations of internationally recognized human rights. Third, sovereignty as responsibility, a notion that a government that allows its citizens to suffer in a vacuum of responsibility for moral leadership cannot claim sovereignty to keep the outside world from steeping in to offer protection and assistance. Forth, responsibility to protect – known as R2P – is an international norm that seeks to ensure that the international community never again fails to halt the mass atrocity crimes of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. Lastly, unilateral intervention is military intervention in a state outside the approval or authority of the United Nations.

The chapter's last topic points to our eight reasons behind why more African states deploy their troops to peacekeeping missions: international pressure and problems; increase international and regional stature and influence; values and perspectives; Greater UN prestige and influence; national security; and political gains.

CHAPTER 4 – REGIONAL SECURITY COMPLEX OF HORN OF AFRICA

"The defining role of any military force is the management of violence by violence."

Major R.W.J. Wenek

This chapter covers an overview of the states of the Horn of Africa and the region's security complex. It discuses in details the trends of conflicts in the region, the trends of peace support operations, and it reviews Leenco Leta's concept of peacekeeping in the Horn of Africa.

4.1 States of the Horn of Africa

The ideas of regional security and security complexes are essential as every state can put its security in relation to at least one complex. Ethiopia's security is tied up with the regional complexity of the Horn of Africa and vice versa, and how it undoubtedly takes this into consideration when considering its national security.

The Horn of Africa[204] is located in the Northeastern part of the continent consisting of eight countries: Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia,[205] South Sudan, Sudan, and Uganda.

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[204] Prominent scholars on the region have four usage of the term 'Horn of Africa.' The first group use the term Horn of Africa only Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia and Djibouti. See Clapham, Christopher. *The Horn of Africa: State Formation and Decay.* London: Hurst & Company, 2017 and Habte-Selassie, Bereket. Conflict and Intervention in the Horn of Africa. London: Monthly Review Press, 1980.

The second group include Sudan, see De Waal, Alex. *The Real Politics of the Horn of Africa: Money, War and the Business of Power.* Cambridge: Polity Press. 2015 and Lata, Leenco. *The Horn of Africa as Common Homeland: The State and Self-Determination in the Era of Heightened Globalization.* Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2004. Lemke, Douglas. Dimensions of hard power: Regional leadership and Material Capabilities. In Flemes, Daniel (ed.) Regional Leadership in the Global System: Ideas, Interests and Strategies of Regional Powers. Farnham: Ashgate. 2010. 31-50.

The third group in addition to the above states they add Uganda and Kenya. See Williams, Paul D. *Horn of Africa: Webs of Conflict and Pathways to Peace.* Washington, DC: The Wilson Center, 2011 and Mesfn, Berouk "The Horn of Africa Security Complex" in Roba Sharamo and Berouk Mesfn (eds.), Regional Security in the post-Cold War Horn of Africa. Pretoria: ISS Monograph 178, April 2011, pp.1-29.

The fourth group go further by including Burundi, Rwanda or Tanzania by using the term 'Greater Horn of Africa'. See Mengisteab, Kidane and Redie Bereketeab, (eds.) *Regional Integration, Identity and Citizenship in the Greater Horn of Africa.* Suffolk: James Currey, 2012 and Fisher, *Jonathan Mapping 'Regional Security' in the Greater Horn of Africa: Between National Interests and Regional Cooperation.* Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, April 2014.

For this study the third usage of Horn of Africa, which includes all IGAD member states is used.

[205] Somaliland is non-recognized a *de facto* independent state but internationally recognized as an autonomous region of Somalia.

These nine states are also the member of the regional bloc, Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), which make the member states to be considered as the regional complex that reflects interlinked regional security complex.[206]Ethiopia shares a border with all other member states except Uganda .

The Horn of Africa region is a place of the origin of humanity. Fossil remains of Chororapithecus Abyssinicus, lived 12 to 7 million years ago, found in the Afar Depression of Ethiopia, and the most famous of the discovery in the same area is Lucy *'Dinkenesh'*, the complete skeleton of an early hominid yet found and dating back some 3.2 million years.

Map 5.1 Political Map of Horn of Africa[207]

[206] Klosowicz, R. "The Role of Ethiopia in the regional security complex of the Horn of Africa." *Ethiopian Journal of Social Sciences and Language Studies*, Volume 2, Issue 2, 83-97, 84.

[207] Source: Sitesatlas. World Sites Atlas. https://www.sitesatlas.com/, Accessed on 2 February 2018.

The Aksumite Empire, in present-day Ethiopia and Eritrea, was the well-known empire in pre-colonial Africa. In the Middle Ages, Ifat Sultanate of present-day Djibouti, Adal Sultanate of present-day Somalia, the Zagwe dynasty of Ethiopia, the Mahdist in Sudan, the Buganda Kingdom in Uganda, and other sultanates and kingdoms existed in the region.

The European powers became more interested in occupying the region after the Suez Canal opening in 1869. The French colonized a small portion of the land at the Red Sea coast, which they named French Somaliland that later become Djibouti in 1894. The British took over northern Somalia, which they named British Somaliland in 1887, the present-day autonomous region of Somaliland. Furthermore, in the south, the Imperial British East Africa Company in 1888, which later become Kenya, and since 1894 Uganda became a British protectorate and Anglo-Egyptian colony of Sudan established in 1899. Italy took possession of Eritrea in 1890 as well as southern Somalia, Italian Somaliland, in 1889. However, Ethiopia did not fall under the colonial yoke since they defeated the Italian Empire in 1896, apart from it's brief occupation (1936 – 1941).

During the Cold War, both the USSR and the United States were involved in the region because of its strategic location. For example, in the Ogaden war between Ethiopia and Somalia in 1977 – 78, USSR supported the Ethiopians and the United States to Somalia.[208] Moreover, most recently, the region has become one of the focuses of the global war on terror.

Today the region consists of two of the nine newest states globally, Eritrea and South Sudan.[209] Moreover, Somaliland is striving to be one since 1991 by establishing the most stable state and conducting a peaceful government transition in the region by challenging the image of war and disaster that has been associated with the region.[210]

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[208] Tareke, Gebru. *The Ethiopian Revolution: War in the Horn of Africa*. New Haven: Yale University Press. 2009. 182.

Halliday, Fred. US policy in the Horn of Africa: aboulia or proxy intervention? *Review of African Political Economy*, 4/10.1977. 8-32. 20-21

[209] Taylor, Adam. The 9 newest countries in the world. September 16, 2014. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2014/09/16/the-9-newest-countries-in-the-world/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.8359404d3f26, Accessed on 22 March 2018.

[210] Bradbury, Mark. *Becoming Somaliland.* Oxford: James Carry. 2008. 1.

In Michael Sheehan's words, the Horn of Africa's security complex is 'held together not by the positive influences of shared interest, but by shared rivalries. The dynamics of security contained within these levels operate across a broad spectrum of sectors – military, political, economic, societal and environmental.'[211] Andras Hettyei and Viktor Marsai on Ethiopia and the Horn of African security complex have the following to add:

> Ethiopia is the region's leading political and military power; Ethiopia is involved in all three conflicts (Sudan and South Sudan, Somalia civil war, and Ethiopia - Eritrea). Addis Ababa commands enormous respect not only in Eastern Africa but on the entire continent. Except for Liberia – whose status remains unclear – Ethiopia, with its several thousand-year-old statehoods, was the only state on the entire continent that was able to withstand both Western and Eastern colonization attempts (save for a brief Italian occupation during World War II). What is more, the country's prestige extends beyond Africa: Ethiopia is the main ally of the United States in the region. Despite its economic difficulties and extremely low living standards, the country's leadership is able to maintain the strongest and most capable armies not only in the region but on the whole continent. Its armed force has extensive experience in both traditional and asymmetric warfare. Ethiopia uses its political and military power to contribute to the stability Eastern African proto-complex while it also serves as an insulator between the various regional conflicts – the two Sudan and Somalia.[212]

Scholars like Clapham[213], Robert Stewart-Ingersoll, and Derrick Frazier[214] consider the Horn of Africa as a regional security complex. Stewart-Ingersoll and Frazier exclude Uganda from the Horn of Africa – Regional Security Complex. Edmond J. Keller sees the Horn of Africa as one sub-regional security complex.[215] On the other hand, Buzan and also Hetteyey and Marsai view the Eastern Africa as proto-complex.[216]

[211] Sheehan, Michael. *International security: An Analytical Survey.* Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2005. 49–50.

[212] Hetteyey, Andras and Viktor Marsai. 'Africa and the Regional Security Complexes Theory'. In Hada, Bela et al. (eds.) *Regional Security Studies.* Budapest: NKE Szolgaltato Nonprofit Ltd, 2016. 235.

[213] Clapham, Christopher. *The Horn of Africa: State formation and Decay.* Hurst & Company: London, 2017. 186.

[214] Stewart-Ingersoll, Robert and Derrick Frazier. *Regional Powers and Security Orders: A Theoretical Framework.* 31.

[215] Keller, E. J. "Rethinking African Regional Security" In In Lake, D. A. and Patrick Morgan, *Regional Orders: Building Security in a New World.* Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997. 298.

[216] Hetteyey, Andras and Viktor Marsai. 'Africa and the Regional Security Complexes Theory'. In Hada, Bela et al. (eds.) *Regional Security ...* 221.

However, regarding the question, in Buzan's terminology, 'whether the Horn of Africa forms a security complex'[217] based on the security dynamics discussion in this dissertation, using Berouk Mesfin's languages, 'the answer is a definite yes.'[218] The Horn of Africa displays many of the features of a Regional Security Complex. The countries in the region display high levels of security interdependence.

4.2 Brief Overview of Individual Horn of African States Relations with Ethiopia

4.2.1 Djibouti

The Republic of Djibouti is the smallest country both in terms of population and geographical size, located in a strategic corner of the Horn of Africa with an outlet to both the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. Moreover, it has been Ethiopia's only access to the sea. The Somali and the Afar people are the two dominant ethnic groups in the country. The Afar also live in Ethiopia and Eritrea, while the Somalis live in Ethiopia, Somalia, and Kenya.

Djibouti was colonized by the French and named French Somaliland; later, its name was changed to 'The French Territory of the Afars and the Issas' in 1967, until its independence in 1977. French and Arabic are official languages of the state, and Islam is the official religion. It is also the headquarter of IGAD.

Since Djibouti's independence, France deployed an unprecedented air-sea task force for the reason to 'ensure the territorial integrity of this newly independent state' and because of fear of invasion by Ethiopia or Somalia. Both had expansionist designs on the budding country, and this has become a determinant factor in Djibouti's Defense policy, and 40 years later, Djibouti remains under the French Defense umbrella.[219] There are several foreign military bases in Djibouti, including hosting the United States's the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF–HOA) at Camp Lemonnier since 2002. Additionally, the EU, China, India, Saudi Arabia, Japan, Germany, Italy, and Spain base their troops in Djibouti.

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[217] Mesfin, Berouk. The Horn of Africa Security Complex. In Sharamo, Roba and Berouk Mesfin. *Regional Security in the Post-Cold War Horn of Africa*. Institute for Security Studies (ISS). Monograph 178. April 2011. 23.

[218] Ibid.

[219] IISS. *The Military Balance: The Annual Assessment of Global Military Capabilities and Defense Economics.* London: Routledge 2018.

The modern relations between Djibouti and Ethiopia began when the Emperor Menelik II of Ethiopia made boundary agreement with France in 1897 which started the emergence of a new state in the region and consolidated the possession of Djibouti by France. Menelik's interest was to get France's help against Italy and using Djibouti's port to import firearms. Additionally, he allowed the French to build a railway from Djibouti to Addis Ababa, the only railway line that links the two states.

Later in the 1960's Emperor Haile Selassie I forwarded a claim by stating that Djibouti belongs to Ethiopia.[220] Demographically both ethnic groups living in Djibouti, Afar and Somali also live in Ethiopia. The Emperor stressed that the boundary between the two countries was artificial and had been imposed against the will of the people.[221] However, after coming of *Derg* in 1974, Ethiopia officially renounced her claim to Djibouti and declared unconditional and full support for independence of Djibouti.[222] After Djibouti's independence both countries consolidated their relations by signing an agreement of cooperation on trade, transport, and communication.

In post 1991, the Ethiopian government strengthened its relations with Djibouti, especially after the war with Eritrean that made Djibouti the only import and export outlet for Ethiopia. Furthermore, Ethiopia began to supply hydro-electric power to Djibouti since 2011 and in 2013 agreement was signed to construct a drinking water pipeline from Ethiopia to Djibouti. According to the Ethiopian Foreign Affairs and National Security Policy and Strategy, the anchor of the relationship is that of use of port.

4.2.2 Eritrea[223]

The State of Eritrea borders Sudan and Ethiopia with a long coastline along the Red Sea. It is difficult to discuss exclusively about Eritrea without mentioning Ethiopia. Eritrea is a multi-ethnic country where the majority are Tigirigna speaking, the Tigrinya and Tigre. The language

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[220] Bowyer, Bells *Horn of Africa: Strategic Magnet in the Seventies.* New York: Crane Rusak Company. 1976. 24

[221] Gutu, Uggessa D. "The Ethio-Djibouti Relations: Implications for sub-regional Integration Schemes in the Horn of Africa." A Thesis submitted to the School of Graduate Studies of Addis Ababa University. In Partial fulfilment of the Requirements for the Award of the Degree of Master of Arts in International Relations. Addis Ababa University 2014.

[222] Ibid.

[223] Parts of this section is from the article published by the author Sigatu. K.T 'No Peace No War: The Ethiopian-Eritrean Conflict'. *AARMS.* Vol 18. No. 1, 2019. 79-91.

is also widely spoken in northern Ethiopia. Eritrea became an independent sovereign state on 24 May 1993 after a long civil war with Ethiopia. According to the Guardian's Neal Ascherson, 'the African Vietnam'[224] won a 30-year war of liberation against an Ethiopian army supported by the Americans and then by the Soviet Union.[225] On the other hand, because of historical, resource-related, and religious animosities, several Arab countries in the Middle East, including Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Syria, provided financial, diplomatic, and political support for Eritreans.[226]

After the independence, Eritrea was led by President Isaias Afwerki, with no political party allowed except the ruling People's Front for Democracy and Justice. Eritrea has no constitution or effective parliament and has held no election since its independence. Because of its conscript system and human rights violations, many Eritreans are choosing to leave the country, and in 2015 Mike Smith, Chairperson of the Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in Eritrea, told the 29th session of Council, Eritreans become the second-largest nationality after Syrians to seek refuge in Europe.[227]

In 1998 Eritrea and Ethiopia went into full-scale war. Moreover, both countries have remained in a state of war since the 1998 border conflict. Eritrea maintains a large standing army (mostly conscripted), with the primary focus of defending the border with Ethiopia.[228] However, significant numbers of conscripts choose to flee the country rather than serve. This makes Eritrea one of the world's fastest emptying nations, a country of about 4.5 million, governed by a secretive dictatorship accused of human rights violations that are playing an outsized role in the most sig-

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[224] Gérard Prunier refers Eritrea as "the African equivalent of North Korea" for it is highly centralized, militarized and authoritarian system of government on the African continent. Lecture given at Association for Study of Middle East and Africa. '*Eritrea and its Discontents'*. 2011. https://vimeo.com/18716003, Accessed on 25 November 2017. Other as 'an African 'garrison state''. Tronvoll K & D Mekonnen, *The African Garrison State: Human Rights and Political Development in Eritrea.* Oxford: James Currey, 2014.

[225] Ascherson, Neal. "When two tribes go to war, only the arms dealers win". 28 February 1999. https://www.theguardian.com/world/1999/feb/28/ethiopia.nealascherson, Accessed on 25 November 2017.

[226] Tareke, G. *Ethiopia: Power and Protest, Peasant Revolts in the Twentieth Century.* Lawrenceville: The Red Sea Press, 1996, 207–211.

[227] UN News Center. *"Thousands of civilians fleeing 'rule of fear' in Eritrea, say UN experts, warning of gross rights abuses".* 24 June 2015. http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=51239#.Whte3UqnFPZ, Accessed on 27 November 2017.

[228] IISS. *The Military Balance 2017: The Annual Assessment of Global Military Capabilities and Defense Economics.* London: Routledge: 2017. 490-491.

nificant global migration crisis since World War II.[229] Eritrea is the second-largest nationality after Syrians to resort to seaborne smugglers to cross the Mediterranean to Europe.[230] About six percent of the population has fled the country.[231]

After the appointment of a new Prime Minister in Ethiopia, Abiy Ahmed, in April 2018, and his call for peace, the two countries signed a Joint Declaration on Peace and Friendship on July 9, 2018, in the Eritrean capital, Asmara, and an Agreement on Peace, Friendship and Comprehensive Cooperation on September 16, 2018, in Saudi Arabia. This started a new chapter in the complicated relationship between the two states. It is also a considerable leap forward to build the peaceful Horn of Africa and break proxy war in the region. Similarly, the peaceful atmosphere between Eritrea and Djibouti; Eritrea and Somalia; and Eritrea and Sudan will facilitate to stabilize peace and security in the region. [232] However, Eritrea suspended its membership in IGAD in 2007.

4.2.3 Kenya

The Republic of Kenya is the regional economic powerhouse and with a relatively stable and reliable democratic government in the region. It borders Ethiopia, Uganda, Tanzania, and South Sudan and it has 536 km coastline along the Indian Ocean. Kenya's largest port is in Mombasa and there are also other smaller ports. Its second-largest commercial port is under construction in Lamu mainly to link South Sudan and Ethiopian Markets under the Lamu Port-South Sudan-Ethiopia-Transport (LAPSSET) corridor initiative, which includes oil pipelines, superhighways, and railway gauges to South Sudan and Ethiopia.

Kenya got its independence from British Colonialism in 1963. It adopted a new constitution in 2010 and was governed by a presidential system. It is a multi-ethnic state where no ethnic group

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[229] Stevis, Matina and Joe Parkinson. "African Dictatorship Fuels Migrant Crisis: Thousands flee isolated Eritrea to escape life of conscription and poverty". 2 February 2016. https://www.wsj.com/articles/eritreans-flee-conscription-and-poverty-adding-to-the-migrant-crisis-in-europe-1445391364, Accessed on 27 November 2017.

[230] UN News Center. "Thousands of civilians fleeing 'rule of fear' in Eritrea, say UN experts, warning of gross rights abuses". 24 June 2015. http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=51239#.Whte3UqnFPZ, Accessed on 27 November 2017.

[231] BBC. "Eritrea profile – Timeline". 30 October 2017. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13349395, Accessed on 27 November 2017.

[232] IISS. *The Military Balance: The Annual Assessment of Global Military Capabilities and Defense Economics.* London: Routledge 2018. 461.

constitutes more than twenty percent. The Borana Oromo people live in southern Ethiopia and in northern Kenya as well. The Somalis also live in northeastern Kenya.

The security threat from al-Shabaab remains a significant concern in Kenya. Kenya joined AMISOM in 2012, and in 2014 and 2015 only, more than 200 civilians were killed by al-Shabaab fighters inside Kenya. Kenya hosts the East African Standby Force (EASF) headquarter.

The Kenya-Ethiopian relations can be referred to the personal relationship between Jomo Kenyatta and Emperor Haile Selassie II in London while the emperor was in Britain in exile at the time of Italian occupation of Ethiopia from 1936-1941. Since then, there was strong friendship between the two. The freedom fighters of Ethiopia used Kenyan teritory to attack the Italians during the occupation. Later, Ethiopia opened a consulate in Nairobi in 1945. During the Kenyan independence movement, the emperor supported Kenya's *Mau Mau* liberation struggle against British colonial rule and surreptitiously supported the Kenyatta family.[233] After its independence of Kenya opened its consulate in Addis Ababa in 1963, and a defence pact in the same year a mutual visa abolition agreement in 1966 and a border agreement in 1970.[234] During the Somali invasion of Ethiopia, Kenya supported the Ethiopian government by forcing an Egyptian Boeing 707 plane loaded with over 20 tons of explosives and artillery shells for Somalia to land at Nairobi international airport by the Kenyan Air Force.[235] The Kenyan government gave Ethiopia an access to the port of Mombassa when the Eritrean rebels blocked the Ethiopian ports.[236]

In 1991 a Treaty of friendship and cooperation was signed between the two states. According to the Ethiopian Foreign Affairs and National Security Policy and Strategy, the concerns of Ethio-

[233] Kabukur, Wanjohi. "The Kenya-Ethiopia Defence Pact: Has Somalia become a pawn?" 26 February 2015. https://newafricanmagazine.com/10026/. Accessed on 12 January 2020.

[234] Onyango, Oduogo C. "Kenya-Ethiopia Relations: A Study of the Significance of Economic and Political Factors Contributing to co-operation 1963-1991." A Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the Degree of Master of Arts in International Relations in the Department of Government University of Nairobi, 1995. And ICMPD. *East Africa Migration Route Initiative Gaps & Needs Analysis Project Country Reports: Ethiopia, Kenya, Libya.* Vienna. 2008. https://www.icmpd.org/content/download/48680/file/FINAL_EAMRI_Country_Reports_Ethiopia_Kenya_Libya.pdf. Accessed on 12 January 2020.

[235] Mekonnen, Teferi. The Nile issue and the Somali-Ethiopian wars (1960s-78). *Annales d'Ethiopie.* Volume 32, 2018. 271-291. 280.

[236] Merhatsidk, Henok. Security Factors Affecting Ethio-Kenya Relations: Post 1991 Challenges and Prospects. A Thesis submitted to the School of Graduate Studies of Addis Ababa University, in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of the Degree of Master of Arts in International Relations. Addis Ababa University. 2011

pian government with its relations with Kenya are: cattle rustling in the border area, the Oromo Liberation Front presence in the northern part of that Kenya, and the utilization of the Omo River, which flows from Ethiopia and enters Lake Turkana, on the border with Kenya, that has been a point of difference.[237] On the other hand, the policy and strategy document emphasizes that Kenya's ports could be better options for southern Ethiopia and on the other hand Kenya can get electric power from Ethiopia, which enabling both countries to benefit substantially. The major policy direction of Ethiopia toward Kenya is to "establish a strong trade relationship with Kenya and, through Kenya, with other countries in eastern and southern Africa."[238]

4.2.4 Somalia

The Federal Republic of Somalia is the official name of the Somali Republic since 2012. The Somali Republic was formed in 1960 when the Trust Territory of Somaliland (the former Italian Somaliland) and the State of Somaliland (former British Somaliland) got their independence from Italy and the British rule respectively and got unified. Later in 1969, Major General Mohamed Siad Barre established a Marxist–Leninist military government in a *coup d'état* and formed the Somali Democratic Republic; however, in 1991, civil war broke out, and the government collapsed. In the same year, the former State of Somaliland in the north unilaterally declared its independence as the Republic of Somaliland, reinstating its pre-unification borders. Currently, Somaliland is able to conduct democratic elections and keep its relative security.

Geographically Somalia is bordered by Ethiopia, Djibouti (with Somaliland), and Kenya, where all Somalis live across the borders. Somalia has the longest coastline on the African mainland, a seacoast to the Gulf of Aden and to the Indian Ocean. Somalia is also one of the few African nations which are ethnically and religiously homogenous.

Siad Barre's regime fought two wars with Ethiopia and continued a troubled relationship with the rest of its neighbors up until its collapse. Since then, Somalia has been divided into various warlords. This statelessness has made Somalia a safe haven for violent extremist groups such as Al Ittihad Al Islamiya (AIAI) and later the Al Qaeda-associated group, al-Shabaab, which is the

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[237] Ministry of Information Press & Audiovisual Department. *The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Foreign Affairs and National Security Policy and Strategy.* Addis Ababa. 2002.

[238] Ibid.

primary terrorist threat and instability and an enigma, with far-reaching consequences for peace and stability in the Horn of Africa region.[239]

The current Federal Government of Somalia was established following the Somalia Transitional Federal Government in 2004 following a two-year peace process hosted in Kenya by IGAD. The IGAD Heads of State and Government, in their meeting on 31 January 2005 in Abuja, authorized the deployment of a Peace Support Mission in Somalia with a view to relocating the government to Mogadishu, providing security to the institutions of the TFG on the ground and sustaining the IGAD peace process.[240] However, the radical group al-Shabaab is still controlling some parts of the country and making terrorist attacks one of the deadliest ever single attacks; in October 2018, a truck bomb killed over 320 people and wounded 300 more busy intersection in the capital, Mogadishu.[241] On the other hand, Somaliland, the *de facto* independent state, was able to go out of the crisis after the civil war, establishing the Republic of Somaliland's government on 18 May 1991. Somaliland was able to conduct free and fair elections, and it is one of the only two countries with Kenya, which is Partly Free according to Freedom House report among the Horn of African states.[242] Only Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Turkey have a consulate in Somaliland.

Since its independence Somalia has intricate relationship with Ethiopia. The notion of "Greater Somalia" to unite all ethnic Somali inhabited territories in the Horn of Africa presently, Somaliland, southern Djibouti, Somali Region of Ethiopia (Ogaden) and the Northern Frontier District in Kenya (Garissa, Wajir and Mandera Counties), brought hostility and war between the two states. On the other side, though it was hardly claimed by the Ethiopian government, there was a contention of the whole territory of Somalia belong to Ethiopia. During OAU summit in 1993 President Aden Abdullah Osman of Somalia said: "Ethiopia has taken possession of a large portion of Somali territory without the consent and against the wishes of the inhabitants. The Somali government has no claims for territorial aggrandizement but is asking for the application of the

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[239] CDRC. 'Somalia's challenges in the last two decades' *CDRC DIGEST.* Vol. 2 No. 2, January 2017.

[240] Ibid.

[241] Williams, Jennifer and Kainaz Amaria. "Al-Qaeda-linked militants kill more than 320 in Somalia truck bomb attack." October 17, 2017. https://www.vox.com/world/2017/10/17/16485944/somalia-truck-bombings-mogadishu-terror-attack-shabaab, Accessed on 24 March 2018.

[242] Freedom House. "Freedom in the World 2017." https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2017. Accessed on 23 March 2018.

principle of self-determination."[243] To which the then Ethiopian Prime Minister Aklilou Habte Wolde, replied by stating:

> The statement made by the Somali leader was an outrageous and an unthinkable accusation, without any factual basis. The historical frontiers of Ethiopia stretched from the Red Sea to the Indian Ocean, including all the territory between them. That is a fact. There is no record in history either of a Somali State or a Somali nation. I regret to say it, but that too is a fact. An international treaty regulates the frontiers between the two countries. If the Somali Republic does not recognize the treaty, then it will not even exist. If he is not seeking territorial aggrandizement, then, what is he seeking? On what does he base the claim? On linguistic reasoning or on religious grounds?[244]

There was a change of regime in 1996 and in 1974 in Somalia and Ethiopia respectively, without any settlement or understanding. This led to the 1977-78 Ethio-Somalia war. After the war, the relationship between the two states is full of suspicion, spaying and enmity. Both states supported rebel forces against each other (See Table 4.6) which were operating from their territories. All Ethiopian governments have been living in continuous fear of attack from Somalia over its Ogaden region which is highly reflected on Ethiopian foreign policy.[245] Though it brought a different danger of terrorism, the collapse of the Somalian government in 1991 and the breakaway of Somaliland brought relief for Ethiopia since there is no strong government to peruse the expansionist policy of "Greater Somalia". [246] The post 1991 Ethiopian government policy towards Somalia is to have a peaceful Somalia so that strong economic, cultural and political ties between the two countries can be established and contribute for the economic development of Ethiopia (for example using not less than seven ports of Somalia).[247] In order to achieve this it follows three options: first to help those regions which are comparatively stable like Somaliland and Puntland; second create the capability to defend and halt any attack by forces of extremism and terrorism originating in Somalia; and third, work in cooperation with the Somali people and the interna-

[243] Kendie, Daniel. "Towards Resolving the Ethiopia-Somalia Disputes." International Conference on African Development Archives. 104. 2007. https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/africancenter_icad_archive/104. Accessed on 06 January 2020.

[244] Ibid.

[245] Seyoum, Henok. Junior Diplomat in MOFA, 07 June 2019. Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

[246] Ibid.

[247] Ministry of Information Press & Audiovisual Department. *The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Foreign Affairs and National Security Policy and Strategy.* Addis Ababa. 2002

tional community to neutralize those forces. The post 1991 Ethiopian involvement in Somalia is discussed in section 6.2.

4.2.5 South Sudan

The Republic of South Sudan is the newest state in the world after its independence from Sudan in 2011. It became one of the three landlocked states of the Horn of Africa with Ethiopia and Uganda. Geographically South Sudan borders with mostly troubled neighbors, Sudan, DR Congo, and CAR. Though it has abundant natural resources, it went into a civil war in 2013, turning more than 2 million of its citizen into refugees.[248] The war for independence started in 1972, upon the South Sudanese request for representation and autonomy, which lasted in 2005 with the Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the South Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) and Sudan's government, which led to democratization and later to referendum for independence. South Sudan has the third-largest oil reserves in Sub-Saharan Africa.[249] It is also a multi-ethnic state with more than sixty ethnic groups. The Dinka and the Nuer are the major once approximately 35% and 15% of the total popoulation, respectively.

Soon after the independence, the Civil War broke out in 2013 when President Salva Kiir Mayardit blamed his deputy Riek Machar and ten other officials for attempting a coup d'état on him. Then, Vice President Machar formed SPLM – In Opposition (SPLM-IO), which led to fighting between SPLM and SPLM-IO that burst into a civil war. At the time of independence, the Security Council resolution 1996 (2011) established the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) to consolidate peace and security and help establish conditions for development in the Republic of South Sudan, with a view to strengthening the capacity of the Government of South Sudan to govern effectively and democratically and establish good relations with its neighbors.[250] Later in 2103, UNMISS increased its troop and police strength of the mission due to the civil war, and in 2014, the Security Council reprioritized the mandate of UNMISS to pro-

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[248] UNHCR. "South Sudan Refugee Crisis." https://www.unrefugees.org/emergencies/south-sudan/, Accessed on March 24, 2018.

[249] Oil Review Africa. *The future of oil production in South Sudan.* 03 October 2019 https://www.oilreviewafrica.com/events/event-news/the-future-of-oil-production-in-south-sudan, Accessed on 10 January 2020.

[250] United Nations. UNMISS Background. https://unmiss.unmissions.org/background, Accessed on Accessed on 10 January 2020.

tection of civilians, human rights monitoring, and support for the delivery of humanitarian assistance; also the IGAD's Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring Mechanism in South Sudan (CTSAMM) deployed. In February 2020, Salva Kiir and Riek Machar formed a coalition government, which might lead to a wave of peace in the country.

Ethiopia's relations with South Sudan began in pre-independence days when both the previous governments of Emperor Haile Selasie I and Colonel Mengistu supported the southern Sudanese secessionist movements most importantly SPLM. Ethiopia played a very important role in the independence of South Sudan. After its independence Ethiopia has been actively involved in peace processes with Sudan in case of Abyei (See Section 6.1.4.1) and after the 2013 civil war broke out (See Section 6.1.4.2). Beside the spillover effect of the conflict to Ethiopia's Gambella region, Ethiopia has a great advantage in stable South Sudan in using South Sudan's oil and market.

Ethiopia deployed more than 40,000 peacekeeping troops in both UNMISS, UNISFA, and CTSAMM in different rotations. Moreover, Ethiopia was actively involved in efforts IGAD to bring peace in South Sudan by appointing it former foreign minister Seyoum Mesfin, to lead an international mediation process. In 2015, President Salva Kiir of South Sudan met rebel leader Riek Machar in Addis Ababa for the first time to start a peace talk. Prime Minster Abiy Ahmed also hosted both Salva Kiir and Rieck Machar in Addis Ababa to initiate the talk in 2018. During the meeting the Ethiopian Prime Minster Chief of Staff said "Faced with the continued suffering in South Sudan, Ethiopia simply can't stand by. With more work, a peaceful future is possible."[251]

4.2.6 Sudan

Sudan is the first sub-Saharan African nation to get its independence in 1956 from the British. In 1989, a military coup led by Brigadier General Omar Hassan al-Bashir, backed by the Islamist Hassan al-Turabi, removed a democratically elected government, which led to a conflict between the northern Islamic government and the Animists and Christians in the south. Moreover,

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[251] Aljazeera. "South Sudan rebel chief meets President Kiir in Ethiopia"20 June 2018.
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/6/20/south-sudan-rebel-chief-meets-president-kiir-in-ethiopia. Accessed on 14 December 2019.

the government offered support and residency to Muslim liberation movements and Jihadists and even allowed Bin Laden to live in Khartoum and facilitated the migration of large numbers of Mujahideen from Afghanistan, Pakistan, Egypt, Somalia, and Eritrea to support Sudan's war against the Sudan People's Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/M) in South Sudan.[252]

Sudan suffered two prolonged civil wars between the south and the north. The first civil war was from 1955 up to 1972 and the second one in 1983 until the North/South Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), signed in 2005, which settled in South Sudan's independence in 2011.

Sudan's military dictatorship led by Omar al-Bashir between 1989 and 2019 resulted in wide-spread human rights abuses, ethnic genocide in the Darfur region, resulting in Omar al-Bashir's indictment of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity by the International Criminal Court. He is the first sitting President to be wanted by the ICC and the first person to be charged by the ICC for the crime of genocide.[253] In late 2018, a popular uprising erupted in Sudan resulted in a coup d'état in April 2019 by a handful of military officials who were close to the president.

The conflicts in Darfur, South Kordofan, and the Blue Nile state are still affecting Sudan's stability. Moreover, Sudan and South Sudan are still in a frozen conflict on demarcating their borders, including the oil-rich Abyei region's fate.

The relationship between Sudan and Ethiopia have been both harmonious and hostile. Though there is a long history of relationship starting from the time of Axum and Merowe; in the modern history of Ethiopia, the relations goes back to during the Islamist Mahdist state (1885 - 1898)[254] and the Christian kingdom Emperor Yohannes IV of Ethiopia (reigned from 1872 – 1889). Because of Hewett treaty in 1883, in which Ethiopia assisted Egyptian troops in Sudan during the Mahdist resistance movement against the Ottoman-Egyptian administration, the Mahdists made a revenge attack against Ethiopia in 1889; burned churches and shattered the old capital Gonder.

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[252] Salih, M.A. Mohamed "Transnational Islamist (Jihadist) Movements and Inter-State Conflicts in the Horn of Africa." Policy Notes 2011/2. The Nordic Africa Institute. https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/127933/FULLTEXT01-1.pdf, Accessed on 20 April 2017.

[253] ICC. "Darfur, Sudan." https://www.icc-cpi.int/darfur, Accessed on March 24, 2018.

[254] The Mahdists, religious and political movement, which overthrew the Ottoman-Egyptian administration (1821 - 1885) and ruled Sudan from 1885 until 1898 when they removed from power by Anglo-Egyptian forces who ruled Sudan until 1956.

The emperor marched to Sudan with his army to fight back the Mahdists but died in the Battle of Metemma in 1989.

During the reign of Emperor Haile Selassie I, the Ethiopian government covertly gave aid to the Anya-Nya movement, a southern separatist rebel army formed from 1955 up to 1972.[255] On the other hand, in 1972 the emperor negotiated the Addis Ababa Agreement between the Sudanese government and the Anya-Nya. Ethiopia was the sole active black African actor to intervene in the Sudanese war, during the 1980s and early 1990s.[256] The Ethiopian *Derg* government (1974-1991) backed Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), hoping to retaliate against Sudan which served as sanctuary, rear bases, and channels for the transmittal of military, food, and medical supplies for Eritrean secessionist rebel forces fighting the government.[257] Besides having several safe houses in Addis Ababa for SPLA leadership, military training was given to SPLA fighters at military camps in Ethiopia in addition to logistic support. The overthrow of *Derg* by the Eritrean and Tigrayian rebel groups in 1991 was a fortunate development for Sudan.

However, with the arrival of Islamists in power in 1989, General Omar Hassan al-Bashir, backed by Hassan al-Turabi, and the 1995 assassination attempt of Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak on visit in Addis Ababa, which was backed by the Sudanese government, damaged the relationship. Sudan's involvement in Ethiopia to impose its Islamic ideology with the interest of creating its dominance in Ethiopia was another factor for deteriorating relationship.[258] Later, the relationship between the two states improved after the visit of Omar Hassan Al-Beshir to Addis Ababa in 1999 "to normalize the relations between Ethiopia and the Sudan after passing through a period of difficulty in their diplomatic relationship."[259] This followed by the visit of Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi to Khartoum in 2002. In the same year Ethiopia, Sudan, and Yem-

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[255] Aalen, Lovise. Ethiopian Support to South Sudan from 1962 to 1983: Local, Regional and Global Connections. *Journal of Eastern African Studies*, 8:4, 2014. 626-641. 631.

[256] Ronen, Yehudit. Ethiopia's Involvement in the Sudanese Civil War: Was It as Significant as Khartoum Claimed? *Northeast African Studies*, 9/1, 2002, 103-126. 103-104.

[257] Aalen, Lovise. Ethiopian Support to South Sudan … 631.

[258] Mengistu, Molla. "Ethio-Sudanese Relations: 1991-2001." A Thesis submitted to the School of Graduate Studies of Addis Ababa University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in International Relations. Addis Ababa University. 2002.

[259] University of Pennsylvania-African Studies Center. "Ethiopia-Sudan: Joint communique". 19 November1999. https://www.africa.upenn.edu/Hornet/irin_112299.html. Accessed on 05 January 2020.

en initiated trilateral cooperation, the Sana'a Forum for Cooperation. By 2003 Ethiopia began importing oil from Sudan, and by 2009 Sudan supplied 80% of Ethiopia's oil demand.[260]

Recently, Ethiopia played an active role in Sudan's political crisis after the military ousted Omar Hassan Al-Beshir in April 2019. Ethiopia's Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed mediated between Sudan's Transitional Military Council and the civilian opposition, emphasizing "The military and the people and the political forces need to act with bravery and responsibility in taking quick steps to a democratic, reconciliatory transitional period in the country."[261]

Currently, there is a clear tendency of Sudan supporting Egypt's stand on the issue of GERD. (It is discussed in Section 5.2.1). As the 2002 Ethiopian Foreign Affairs and National Security Policy and Strategy document indicates, the issue of Nile's water poses an unsurpassable obstacle for establishing strong ties between Ethiopia and Sudan. Thus, it can be concluded, the Ethio-Sudan relations is full of up and downs.

4.2.7 Uganda

The Republic of Uganda got independence from British rule in 1962. Its first government was of Prime Minister Milton Obote and President Edward Muteesa II. However, soon after the independence, violent conflicts arise in the country. The brutal dictator Idi Amin ruled Uganda from 1971-1979, then after Milton Obote come to power again from 1980 – 1985 which is also marked by civil war and human rights abuses that claimed thousands of lives. The current president of Uganda, Yoweri Kaguta Museveni, came to power in January 1986. He is the longest-serving government leader in the Horn of Africa, brought relative stability even though there has been a prolonged civil war against the Lord's Resistance Army led by Joseph Kony.

Uganda is a landlocked county bordering three fragile neighbors. It hosts Africa's largest refugee population at over 1.2 million people, including 950,000 from South Sudan, 227,000 from the

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[260] Shinn, David H. "Government and Politics" in Berry, Laverle (ed) *Sudan a Country Study*. Washington, DC: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress. 2015.281.

[261] The Irish Times. "Ethiopian PM tries to mediate Sudan's political crisis after bloodshed." 7 June 2019. https://www.irishtimes.com/news/world/africa/ethiopian-pm-tries-to-mediate-sudan-s-political-crisis-after-bloodshed-1.3918607. Accessed on 11 January 2020.

Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and 45,000 from Burundi,[262] which has been extreme security and economic challenge for the country. Besides troop deployment in AMISOM, Uganda contributes all 540 contingent troops to the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) under the UN Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs.

Uganda is the only IGAD member state that doesn't hares a border with Ethiopia. However, there is a positive relation with Ethiopia since its independence. Prime Minister Milton Obote worked with Emperor Haile Selassie I on the formation of OAU and with Jomo Kenyatta and Julius Nyerere, and other African leaders as well. After the coming to power, President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda, Paul Kagame of Rwanda, Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia, Isaias Afwerki of Eritrea, and Laurent Kabila of the Congo, were considered as the new generation of African leaders and a positive development for Africa.[263] In addition to that Museveni had a good personal relationship with both Meles and his successor Prime Minster HaileMariam Desalegn.

After Ethiopia commenced GERD, in 2013 President Museveni acknowledged his support to the project by stating to Ugandan parliament that the construction of a dam over the Nile River by Ethiopia would not destroy the water source as alleged by Egypt.[264] The president held an open and consistent support for Ethiopia, and in 2018 he was quoted in saying "No African wants to hurt Egypt, but Egypt cannot continue to hurt Africa and the countries of the tropics of Africa" while talking about Egypt's threat to use force to stop the GERD.[265] An instance of strong relationship between the two states was demonstrated in April 2018 when Ugandan Ambassador was among the only three African top diplomats invited to the swearing-in of new Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed. In addition to this in June Ethiopian prime minister, Abiy Ahmed has

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[262] IISS. *The Military Balance: The Annual Assessment of Global Military Capabilities and Defense Economics. Londond: Routledge 2018*. 440.

[263] Government Printing Office. "Senate Hearing 105-559: Democracy in Africa: The New Generation of African Leaders." 12 March 1998. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-105shrg48230/html/CHRG-105shrg48230.htm. Accessed on 11 December 2019.

[264] Olukya, Godfrey. "Museveni dismisses Egypt's claims over Ethiopia's Nile dam threat." 14 June 2013. https://www.theafricareport.com/5627/museveni-dismisses-egypts-claims-over-ethiopias-nile-dam-threat/. Accessed on 11 December 2019.

[265] Okello, Dickens H. "Inside Untold Uganda, Ethiopia Relations" 6 June 2018 https://chimpreports.com/inside-untold-uganda-ethiopia-relations/. Accessed on 11 December 2019.

been honored with the Most Excellent Order of the Pearl of Africa medal, Uganda's highest accolade given to a head of state at a special National Heroes Day by President Museveni.[266]

4.3 The Horn of Africa Regional Security Complex

In the words of Christopher Clapham, 'It will already be abundantly clear that the states of the Horn are deeply affected by their relationships with one another.'[267]According to Barry Buzan and Ole Waever the interstate security dynamics in Africa are often simply spillovers of domestic dynamics, mainly refugee flows, expulsions of foreigners, and civil wars and intervention by neighbors in domestic turbulence.[268] In the Horn of Africa proto-regional security complex (proto-RSC), [269] the usual interaction is cross border interventions in which the government in each state supports insurgencies in the other: Somalia and Ethiopia, Eritrea and Ethiopia, Sudan and Uganda, Sudan and Eritrea, Sudan and Ethiopia.[270] On the other hand, Robert Kłosowicz considered the IGAD the regional bloc as the regional complex that reflects an interlinked regional security complex.[271]

In the Horn of Africa, there are few incidents of states going to a conventional war with each other. However, it is more at the sub-state level and more about spillovers from domestic instabilities, which is typical almost for all states in the region.[272] Especially in the Somalian and the

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[266] Ibid.

[267] Clapham, Christopher. *The Horn of Africa: State formation and Decay.* Hurst & Company: London, 2017. p 176.

[268] Buzan, Barry and Ole Waever. *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. 229.

[269] *Proto-complexes* is when there is sufficient manifest security interdependence to delineate a region and differentiate it from its neighbors, but when the regional dynamics are still too thin and weak to think of the region as a fully-fledged RSC. (Buzan, Barry and Ole Waever. *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. 64.)

The researcher uses the term 'Regional Security Ccomplex' becouse after Barry Buzan and Ole Waever published their study in 2003 there were security developments in their region which can label it as RSC than proto-RSC. Other sholars also used RSC (See also: Klosowicz, R. The Role of Ethiopia in the regional security complex of the Horn of Africa" *Ethiopian Journal of Social Sciences and Language Studies*, Volume 2, Issue 2, 2015.)

[270] Buzan, Barry and Ole Waever. *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. 242.

[271] Klosowicz, R. The Role of Ethiopia in the regional security complex of the Horn of Africa" *Ethiopian Journal of Social Sciences and Language Studies*, Volume 2, Issue 2, 2015. 84.

[272] Buzan, Barry and Ole Waever. *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. 248.

South Sudanese civil wars, the spillover effects became excruciating for the whole states in the region.

The following table describes ten various state indicators of eight states of the Horn of Africa.

Indexes	Djibouti	Eritrea	Ethiopia	Kenya	Somalia	South Sudan	Sudan	Uganda
Failed State Index (2018)[273] Rank out of 178 countries	42	19	15	17	2	1	7	24
Human Development Index (2014)[274] Rank out of 188 Countries	171	181	174	147	-	179	165	165
Ibrahim Governance Index (Africa 2017)[275] Rank out of 54 States	38	52	36	13	54	53	50	19
Corruption Perceptions Index (2017)[276] Rank out of 180 States	122	165	107	143	180	179	175	151
World Bank - Worldwide Governance Indicators (2016)[277] (percent Ranked from 0 (Lowest) to 100 (Highest))								
Voice & Accountability[278]	12.81	0.99	8.87	41.87	2.96	5.42	3.45	27.09
Political Stability & Absence of Violence/Terrorism	23.81	17.14	7.62	9.52	2.86	1.90	2.38	21.43
Government Effectiveness	16.83	3.37	28.38	41.35	0.48	0.00	7.21	32.21
Regulatory Quality[279]	25.48	1.44	11.54	41.83	0.96	2.88	4.81	46.15

[273] Fund for Peace. Fragile States Index 2018. http://fundforpeace.org/fsi/, Accessed on 20 March 2018.

[274] UNDP. Human Development Reports. http://hdr.undp.org/en/2016-report, Accessed on 20 March 2018.

[275] Mo Ibrahim Foundation. Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG). http://iiag.online/, Accessed on 20 March 2018.

[276] Transparency International. Corruption Perceptions Index 2017. 21 February 2018. https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_perceptions_index_2017, Accessed on 20 March 2018.

[277] The World Bank Group. Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI). info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx?fileName=wgidataset.xlsx, Accessed on 20 March 2018.

[278] Reflects perceptions of the extent to which a country's citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media.

[279] Reflects perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development.

Rule of Law	17.31	5.77	37.02	32.69	0.00	2.88	9.13	45.67
Control of Corruption	30.29	11.54	39.90	16.83	0.48	1.92	1.44	12.98

Table 4.1 Different Indexes of the States of Horn of Africa.

Looking at ten various state indicators described in the table above: all Horn of Africa states are below the top 50 failed states globally. South Sudan and Somalia ranked first and second, respectively which are the most fragile states globally, and Djibouti has a relatively better-performing state in the region. Regarding UNDP Human Development Index, all Horn of Africa states perform under the last 30 states out of 188 Countries, Sudan and Uganda performing relatively better than other states and Eritrea becoming the last. On the Ibrahim Governance Index in Africa, Kenya and Uganda perform better than the rest, and Somalia ranked 54 out of the 54 African states. Regarding Transparency International' Corruption, Ethiopia performs relatively better than the others though all are under 100 out of 180 states, Somalia and South Sudan ranked 180th and 179th, respectively. Based on World Bank - Worldwide Governance Indicators first on Voice & Accountability, which is perceptions of the extent to which a country's citizens can select their government and freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media. However, all Horn of Africa states are below 50% relatively Kenya is better, and Eritrea is the worst. Second, on Political Stability & Absence of Violence/Terrorism, Djibouti and Uganda are around 20%, and the rest is less than 10%. Third, on Government Effectiveness, Somalia and South Sudan are both below 1%, and Kenya is relatively better though all the states are performing below 50%. Forth, Regulatory Quality is perceptions of the government's ability to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development. However, all Horn of Africa states are below 50%, relatively Uganda and Kenya are better than the rest. Fifth, Rule of Law all Horn of Africa states are below 50%, Uganda, Ethiopia, and Kenya ranked from first to third. Sixth, in Control over Corruption; similarly, all Horn of Africa states are below 50%, but Ethiopia and Djibouti are performing better than the rest.

On the issues of peace and security, according to the Uppsala Conflict Data Program, since 1990 the Horn of African region has suffered from 32 state-based armed conflicts where a government

is one of the belligerent parties. Moreover, 179 non-state armed conflicts fought between non-governmental groups; and 22 campaigns of one-sided violence where civilians are massacred.[280]

4.4 Trends of Conflict in the Horn of Africa

4.4.1 Intrastate Conflicts / Ethnic Conflict

Conflicts within the boundaries of a state are termed intra-state conflicts. Such conflicts are also referred to as civil wars. In the Horn of Africa, where almost all state borders in the region are non-natural and miss-drown borders, which were imposed by the colonial powers and basically ignored ethnic, cultural, historical, and religious groups.[281] As a result, it gave rise to intrastate conflicts instigated mainly from demands for autonomy of ethnic groups. This makes intrastate conflicts synonym with ethnic conflict.

The following tragic figures show the sad reality of intrastate conflicts in the region - Sudan: 2,072,000 internally displaced, 724,791 refugees, and 52,000 asylum seekers; Ethiopia: 2,137,000 internally displaced, 93,234 refugees, and 133,283 asylum seekers; South Sudan: 1,830,000 internally displaced, and 2,321, 728 refugees; Somalia: 2,648,000 internally displaced, 810,216 refugees, and 55, 864 asylum seekers.[282]

In the Horn of Africa, though the causes of conflicts are complex, one of the significant causes of conflict in the Horn of Africa studied by most scholars, ethnicity, which is related to the state formation in the region, is discussed here.

Ethnic conflicts are conflicts in which the warring parties are defined by a combination of historical, linguistic, and cultural features.[283] In most cases it is the marginalization of the poor has become a fertile ground for the elites to promote ethnic conflict, which benefits them to sustain

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[280] Williams, Paul D. *Horn of Africa: Webs of conflict & Pathways to Peace.* Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. 2011.

[281] Mesfin, Berouk. "The Horn of Africa Security Complex." In Sharamo, Roba and Berouk Mesfin. *Regional Security in the Post-Cold War Horn of Africa.* Monograph 178. ISS. April 2011. 10.

[282] Williams, Wendy. "Shifting Borders:Africa's Displacement Crisis and Its Security Implications." Research Paper No. 8. Africa Center for Strategic Studies. africacenter.org. October 2019. https://africacenter.org/publication/shifting-borders-drivers/, Accessed on 02 February 2020.

[283] Schlee and Shongolo cited in Feyissa, Tigist Kebede. *Conflicts among Pastoralists in the Borana Area of Southern Ethiopia: The case of Borana and Garri.* Master's Thesis in Peace and Conflict Transformation Faculty of Humanities, Social Sciences and Education University of Tromsø. Autumn, 2014.

their own control over power.[284] However, the root cause goes back to state formation in Africa, which was artificial where national boundaries were made by the European colonizers where the ethnic groups have no say and mainly dividing ethnic groups into two or more states.

There are more than three hundred seventy linguistic groups or ethnic groups in the Horn of Africa. Some scholars argue that because the states in the region have diverse ethnicities (in the case of Somalia clans) and religions, having a national cohesiveness or a common political identity becomes hard.[285] Having their societies divided along ethnic and religious lines also means 'political loyalties often cut across state boundaries.'[286] Secessionist wars in Ethiopia and Sudan and the irredentist war between Somalia and Ethiopia were fought for years after the independence. Also, ethnic conflicts arise during the process of state formation when a fight erupts over which people should belong to which state.[287]

The Horn of Africa is a very multi-ethnic/multi-lingual state, making it vulnerable to conflict. Ethiopia is the most diverse state in the region. (See Table 5.2)

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[284] Department for International Development. *The causes of conflict in Africa: Consultation Document*. London. March 2001.

[285] Tekle, Amare. International Relations in the Horn of Africa (1991-96). *Review of African Political Economy,* Vol. 23, No. 70 December, 1996. 385.

[286] Ibid.

[287] Wimmer cited in Jinadu, L. Adele. Explaining and Managing Ethnic Conflict in Africa: Towards a Cultural Theory of Democracy. *African Journal of Political Science,* Vol. 9, No. 1, June 2004. 11.

Country	Total Language Spoken	Extinct	Non-Indigenous	Institutional	Literacy	Principal Language
Djibouti	5	None	3	2	68	French and Arabic
Eritrea	15	None	9	5	69	Tigirigna, English, and Arabic
Ethiopia	90	2	3	43	49	Amharic
Kenya	68	1	7	13	82	English and Swahili
Somalia	13	None	3	3	38	Somali and Arabic
South Sudan	72	3	11	13	27	English
Sudan	77	2	5	15	72	English and Arabic
Uganda	43	None	None	27	73	English

Table 4.2 Languages Spoken in the Horn of African States[288]

Organization of African Union (OAU), in its First Ordinary Session in Cairo, in July 1964, recognizing the faultiness of national boundaries created by the colonialists in order to keep the stability and avoid border disputes among the new states, passed the following resolution:

> Considering that border problems constitute a grave and permanent factor of dissension; Conscious of the existence of extra-African maneuvers aimed at dividing the African States; Considering further that the borders of African States, on the day of their independence, constitute a tangible reality; …Solemnly declares that all Member States pledge themselves to respect the borders existing on their achievement of national independence.[289]

However, the resolution did not save African nations from conflict because of ethnic groups divided by the colonial border. The table below indicates a good example of conflicts caused by divided ethnic groups among Horn of Africa states.

Name of Ethnic Group	Countries of Habitation	Occurrences of Conflict

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[288] Source: Ethnologue.com. "Ethnologue: Languages of the World." https://www.ethnologue.com, Accessed on 20 April 2018.

[289] OAU Secretariat. *Resolutions Adopted by the First Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government Held in Cairo, UAR, From 17 to 21 July 1964.* Addis Ababa. https://au.int/sites/default/files/decisions/9514-1964_ahg_res_1-24_i_e.pdf, Accessed on 12 March 2019.

Afar	Djibouti*, Eritrea, and Ethiopia*	Yes
Somali	Somalia*, Djibouti*, Ethiopia*, and Kenya*	Yes
Luo	Kenya*, Uganda, Sudan*, Ethiopia, and Tanzania	Yes
Luhya	Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania	No
Beja, Rashaida, Tigre	Eritrea and Sudan*	Yes
Tigrigna, Kunama, Shaho (Irob)	Eritrea* and Ethiopia*	Yes
Oromo	Ethiopia* and Kenya	Yes
Pokot and Teso	Kenya and Uganda	No
Kakwa, Sebei, Lugbwara, Madi, Ancholi, Kaliko, Pojullo	Uganda* and South Sudan*	Yes
Anuak, Nuer, Bertha, Donyiro, Tirma, Shita, Gumuz, Murle, Kichepo, Wetawit	Ethiopia* and Sudan*	Yes
Daasanach	Ethiopia, Kenya, and Sudan	No

Table 4.3 A selected list of Ethnic groups that are spread across different counties[290] (*Countries where the conflicts have occurred.)

The absence of a nation-state and the forceful amalgamation of different ethnic groups has been a security challenge for African states. Jeffrey Herbst described it as follows:

> The majority of [African] states have difficulty creating viable symbols to attract the loyalties of their citizens. Not surprisingly, therefore, there are today very few attempts in African countries to forge a national consensus on major issues, much less a national identity. For instance, most formulas to decrease inter-ethnic tension concentrate only on ameliorating the negative aspects of ethnic conflict by accommodating it through decentralized government structures and preferential policies.[291]

In the Cold War, the post-colonial African borders were challenged, especially in the Horn of Africa and the Pandora box has been opened, and ethnic conflicts exploded throughout Africa. What Jeffrey Herbst argued in 1990 is still valid in the Horn of Africa region. The post-2013

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[290] Mengisteab, Kidane. *Critical Factors in the Horn of Africa's Raging Conflicts*. Discussion Paper 67. Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet. 2011.

[291] Herbst, Jeffrey. "War and the State in Africa". *International Security*. 14/4. Spring, 1990. 127 – 128.

conflict in South Sudan[292] and the post-2015 Oromo uprising in Ethiopia still indicate there is ethnic tension.

Also, in the Horn of Africa, rooted in the legacy of colonialism, border wars were common the Ethiopia–Somalia war of 1977, the Ethiopia–Eritrea conflict of 1998, the Djibouti-Eritrea conflicts of 1995 and 2008, and the Sudan-South and Sudan border-related wars in 2012 are the major once.

4.4.2 Interstate Conflicts

Conflicts between governments or states are referred to as interstate conflicts. In the Horn of Africa, as stated in the previous section, the miss-drown borders, which cut through ethnic, cultural, historical, and religious groups, sway states of the region to claim neighboring state territories, which lead to conflicts. This manifested mainly in Ethiopian – Somalia, and Kenya – Somalia conflicts. The following table plainly demonstrates the interstate conflicts in the region.

Year	Type of Interstate conflict	States Involved	Major Contentious issues or area	Other Issues
1964	Brief armed conflict	Ethiopia and Somalia	Control of Ethiopia's Somali-inhabited territory	-
The 1960s	Tensions	Kenya and Somalia	Control of Kenya's Northern Frontier District	-
1977-1978	Full-scale war	Ethiopia and Somalia	Control of Ethiopia's Somali-inhabited territory	US-Soviet competition
1994-1998	Tensions	Sudan and Eritrea	Islamist threat	Regional influence
1995-1998	Tensions	Sudan and Ethiopia	Sudanese link to the Mubarak assassination attempt	Support rebel movements
1995	Brief armed confrontation	Eritrea and Yemen	The territorial dispute over the strategic Hanish Islands	Control of mineral and fishing resources
1998-2000	Full-scale war	Eritrea and Ethiopia	Territorial dispute	Economic policies, regional hegemony
2006-2009	Ethiopian Intervention	Ethiopia and Somalia	Ethiopian military intervention to topple ICU	The global war on terrorism

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[292] Rolandsen, Oystein H. Another civil war in South Sudan: the failure of Guerrilla Government? *Journal of Eastern African Studies*, 9/1. 2015.165.

2008-2010	Brief armed confrontation	Eritrea and Djibouti	Territorial dispute	Ethiopian-Eritrean conflict
2009	Tensions	Kenya and Uganda	The territorial dispute over Miginigo Island	-
2011	Brief armed confrontation	Sudan and South Sudan	The territorial dispute over the oil-rich border region of the Abyei Area	Support rebel movements
2011	Intervention	Kenya and Somalia	Kenyan military operation against Al-Shabaab	The global war on terrorism
2019	Tensions	Kenya and Somalia	Drilling rights along maritime territorial waters	-

Table 4.4 Interstate conflicts in the Horn of Africa[293]

4.4.3 Religious Fundamentalism and Violence

The Horn of Africa is a religious fault line of Christianity, Islam, and traditional African beliefs. Sudan, Djibouti, and Somalia are predominantly Muslim, whereas Eritrea and Ethiopia are predominantly Christian but with a considerable number of Muslims. South Sudan, Kenya, and Uganda also have Muslim minorities. The region is also known as a breeding ground for violent religious extremism.[294]

The rise of al-Shabaab in Somalia and its terrorist attacks in Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, and Uganda and the spread of Islamic radicalism have become one of the region's central security challenges.[295] On the other hand, the Lord's Resistance Army which originated in Uganda gained an international reputation for brutality for murdering, raping and kidnapping thousands of civilians as it waged an armed rebellion seeking to remove the government of Yoweri Muse-

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[293] Source (with some modification) Mesfin, Berouk. The Horn of Africa Security Complex. In Sharamo, Roba and Berouk Mesfin. *Regional Security in the Post-Cold War Horn of Africa*. Institute for Security Studies (ISS). Monograph 178. April 2011. 8.

[294] Mulugeta, Gebrehiwot Berhe. "Economic Integration as a Peacebuilding Strategy in the Horn of Africa with Particular Focus on Ethiopia and Its Four Neighbors". *Journal of African-centered Solutions in Peace and Security*. Vol.1 (1) August 2016. 63 – 90.

[295] Hettyey, Andras and Viktor Marsai. In Bela Hada and et al. *Regional Security Studies*. Budapest, National University of Public Service, 2016. 234

veni and rule the country on the Biblical ten commandments.[296] Currently it also operates in South Sudan, the Central African Republic, and the Democratic Republic of Congo.

Concerning the spread of violent Islamic extremism, geography also plays an important role. Most of these states are located near and have longstanding ties to the Arabian Peninsula, the source of many of today's Islamic militants. It is easy to move between the Persian Gulf states and this region by air and sea.[297] More captivatingly, Osama bin Laden lived and maintained a base of operations in Sudan for several years, beginning in 1991. Besides, since the 1990s, particularly following the 1998 al-Qaeda bombings of the US embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam which claimed 224 lives,[298] the Horn of Africa has been one of the main theatres of radical terrorism.

After 1991, because of the absence of a central government, Somalia became the hub of warlords and fundamentalists. Despite some positive results (notably the expulsion of al-Shabaab from Mogadishu and Kismayo by AMISOM), the overwhelmingly military measures have recurrently triggered terrorist backlashes – such as the July 2010 suicide bombings in Kampala or the 2013 attack at the Westgate Mall in Nairobi. Also, al-Shabaab has been carrying out retaliatory attacks against AMISOM. Suicide attacks and roadside bombs showed an increasing sophistication and influence from the many hundreds of battle-experienced foreign jihadists from Afghanistan, Yemen, Pakistan, United States, Canada, United Kingdom, Kenya, & Saudi Arabia.[299]

On the other hand, LRA, a heterodox Christian cult that operates in two Horn African countries in Uganda and South Sudan also operates in the Central African Republic and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The group first operated as the United Holy Salvation Army before it

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[296] Aljazeera. "Profile: The Lord's Resistance Army." 6 May 2014. http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2011/10/2011101418364196576.html, Accessed on 25 April 2017.

[297] Kilonzo, Boniface Kivinda. "Managing Terrorism in the Horn of Africa: A Case Study of Kenya." A Research Project in partial fulfillment for the award of a Master of Arts in International Conflict Management. University of Nairobi Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies. 2013.

[298] Berman, E. Radical, Religious and Violent: The New Economics of Terrorism. Cambridge: The MIT Press. 2009. 49.

[299] Dagne, Ted. *Somalia: Current Conditions for a Lasting Peace.* Congressional Research Service,7-5700, Report for Congress. 4 February 2010, 2.

was named the Uganda Christian Army/Movement and eventually the LRA.[300] On 13 October 2005, International Criminal Court (ICC) issued arrest warrants of arrest for the leader of the group Joseph Kony and four other senior leaders for Crimes against Humanity and War Crimes committed in Uganda since July 2002.[301]

4.4.4 Change in Living Space[302]

Change in the living space or the environmental degradation or climate change also makes the region so vulnerable to conflict. IGAD described the regional ecosystem which is extremely vulnerable and clearly indicates a change in living space that can affect the security as follows.

> Only 5 percent of the original ecosystems/habitats remain intact in the region. This means that 95 percent of the original ecosystems have been either converted to other land use forms or have been degraded severely or moderately by different drivers. The main drivers of environmental and natural resources include climate change, frequent drought, high population growth, overgrazing, forest degradation, soil and land degradation, wildlife poaching and trafficking, desertification, etc. The impact of these drivers is the reduction of the capability of the different ecosystems to provide the necessary goods and services essential for the survival of living things in the region.[303]

In a region where most of the population lives in rural areas depending directly on land and nature, the study of rural security is vital. Most of the region's conflicts are fueled by the decline of agricultural or grazing land and water. Neighboring ethnic communities inside a state or across the state border clash over water use, grazing access, and cattle raiding.

Continuous fighting for land and water among the agricultural and pastoral communities were common, especially in arid and semi-arid areas. The Darfur conflict is a primary example of such

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[300] Aljazeera. "Profile: The Lord's Resistance Army". 6 May 2014. http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2011/10/2011101418364196576.html, Accessed on 25 April 2017.

[301] International Criminal Court. "Press Release: Warrant of Arrest unsealed against five LRA Commanders". 13 October 2005. web.archive.org/web/20110616142249/http://www.icc-cpi.int/menus/icc/situations and cases/situations/situation icc 0204/related cases/icc 0204 0105/press releases/warrant of arrest unsealed against five lra commanders, Accessed on 2 May 2017.

[302] Partial of this section is taken from the work of the researcher Sigatu, Kaleab T. *'Rural Security-Lesson Learnt Form Horn of Africa–Ethiopia: Conflicts Caused by Changed Living Space.'* December 2018. Accepted for publication by project titled "Rural Security" under the commission of the National University of Public Service under the priority project KÖFOP-2.1.2-VEKOP-15- 2016-00001 titled „Public Service Development Establishing Good Governance" in the Ludovika Workshop led by Professor Dr. Tivadar Szilagyi. Budapest.

[303] IGAD. "The IGAD Region". https://igad.int/about-us/the-igad-region, Accessed on 10 February 2018.

fighting for a living space.[304] Currently, the resource pressure makes millions of people in the region displaced and left them in refugee and IDP camps. The shrinking of habitable living space is the fundamental security challenge in the Horn of Africa. Abdikadir Ahmed Abdi describes the situation as follows:

> Another contextual factor that has contributed to the conflicts and instability of the Horn of Africa is the highly increasing rate of environmental degradation the region faces. Much of the region is arid or semi-arid and has, over the last five or so decades, faced rapid environmental degradation, manifested in frequent droughts and chronic food and water shortages.[305]

Especially in the northern countries like Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia, and Sudan, topography and climate are contributing factors to conflicts. The region's history includes massive population movements pushed by other groups and pulled by the search for better pasture and water sources. Pastoral migration is a common way of life in the region. The Horn contains the most extensive grouping of pastoralists globally. Sudan has the highest percentage globally and Somalia is third and Ethiopia fifth. In Djibouti, one-third of the population is pastoralist.[306]

The typical mobile way of life is becoming a problem when grazing land shrinks because of an erratic climate. Thus, access to grazing land and water becomes one of the highest causes for tension between the pastoralists, and between the pastoralist and agrarian societies of the Horn of Africa. S. Piers Simpkin describes the phenomenon as follows:

> Pastoralist communities have, in their search for acceptable grazing land, often clashed with other pastoralists seeking the same resources. More recently, however, pastoralists are impinging increasingly on fertile land cultivated by sedentary groups near waterways. This development fuels tension and conflict with new groups who do not necessarily share the same goals or needs as the pastoralists. In the past, pastoral conflict usually involved pastoralists with common interests; the causes for conflict were thus well understood and could easily be resolved. New conflicts involving members of different livelihoods are more complicated, harder to resolve, and consequently tend to reoccur and escalate.[307]

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[304] Flint, Julie and Alex De Waal. *Darfur: A New History of a Long War.* London: Zed Books. 2008. 63.

[305] Abdi, Abdikadir Ahmed. "The Impact of Conflicts in the Horn of Africa: A case study of Kenya." A Research Project Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the award of the Degree in Masters of Arts in International Studies, Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies, University of Nairobi. 2015. 43.

[306] OCHA Regional Officer for Central and East Africa. *Pastoralist Voices* Volume 1, Issue 8, October 2008. 1.

[307] Simpkin, S. Piers. *Livestock Study in the Greater Horn of Africa.* Nairobi: ICRC, 2005. 8.

In addition to this, some studies suggest that it is the pastoralists in the Horn of Africa who are likely to be the first people to be wiped out by climate change.[308] The fact that pastoralists live in a place with limited water and grazing land, loss of the existing resource will lead to a catastrophe. Taking into note that there is no difference between a civilian and armed man in pastoralist areas.

In Sudan, according to Human Rights Watch, as of 2008, because of the armed conflict since 2003, more than 200,000 people have died, and 2.5 million people have been forced from their homes in Darfur.[309] Desertification also leads to food scarcity, water scarcity, and famine, in turn leading to civil war and ethnic cleansing. There is a shrinking of living space land fueled by population increase and political grievance. Musa Abdul-Jalil and Jon D. Unruh explaining the Darfur conflict notes:

> Arab pastoralists of northern Darfur with longstanding grievances regarding their perceived lack of land and political participation (the two inseparable in Darfur) saw an opportunity to gain access to land and so were easily recruited into the Janjaweed. … The primary war-related land tenure issue in the Darfur conflict, which has driven many other aspects of the war, including perceptions of 'genocide,' is how the Arab pastoralist militias (Janjaweed) have gone about operationalizing the prospect that they would be able to keep the lands they were able to 'liberate' during the course of the conflict. Instead of pursuing and engaging the rebel militias in order to obtain such lands, the Janjaweed and its constituencies went directly to the land itself and conducted scorched earth campaigns against the civilian agriculturalist population, emptying the countryside and seizing the land.[310]

Pastoralist conflicts in the region are not strictly limited to national boundaries, although most of these communities are divided by the states' political boundaries. The impact of conflicts caused by policy failures, exacerbated by climate change and natural resource degradation, transcends national boundaries.[311]

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[308] Christian Aid Cited in Meier, Partick et al. Environmental influences on pastoral conflict in the Horn of Africa. *Political Geography* 26 (2007) 716 - 735.

[309] HRW. Crisis in Darfur: What Happened in Darfur? September 2008. https://www.hrw.org/legacy/features/darfur/fiveyearson/qanda.html, Accessed on 12 April 2008.

[310] Abdul-Jalil, Musa & Jon D Unruh. "Land Rights under Stress in Darfur: A Volatile Dynamic of the Conflict". *War & Society*, (2013) 32:2, 156-181.

[311] Berhe, Mulugeta Gebrehiwot. Economic Integration as a Peace building Strategy in the Horn of Africa with Particular Focus on Ethiopia and Its Four Neighbors. *Journal of African-Centered Solutions in Peace and Security.* Volume 1, Issue 1 August 2016. 63.

Today, the geographic belt separating the desert from the savannah in northern Africa has become a significant security concern. Terrorist groups like al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Boko Haram in north-eastern Nigeria and the Lake Chad area, and al-Shabaab in Somalia and Kenya are causing turmoil. Some scholars argue in addition to religious radicalism, the environmental conditions have also contributed to the instability.

Gunther Bachler describes the condition as follows:

> Fertile land is the basic resource of the local food supply. When it is damaged or reduced, it propels the local population into competition and conflict, especially in countries with a large agricultural sector or subsistence economies. Africa is a sad example of the increasing importance of soil degradation in war. In the 1970s and '80s, armed conflicts mainly caused by the manifold effects of decolonization and in part overshadowed by the cold war were concentrated in Southern Africa and on the Horn. Today, another and different "war belt" stretches from the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean. The single countries of this belt, Senegal, Mali, Chad, Sudan, Ethiopia, and Somalia, all belong to the Sahel Zone, which has been particularly affected by overgrazing, drought, and soil erosion. [312]

Another security threat in the region is transnational cattle rustling and banditry caused by the militarization of pastoralist communities in the region stemmed from access to modern weapons as a result of civil wars, and interstate wars or obtaining training from rebel movements are common causes of insecurity in the borders of Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan, and Uganda.[313] The following table shows how pastoralist groups are not limited to a single state but in two or more states, making the security issue regional other than limited to a single state.

Country	Pastoralist Groups	Estimated Countries of Movement	Number	percent of Population
Djibouti	Afar, Somali	Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Somalia	100,000	16%
Eritrea	Tigre, Rashaida, Hidarib, Afar	Eritrea and Djibouti	1,000,000	11%
Ethiopia	Somali, Boran, Afar + 15 others	Ethiopia, Somalia, and Kenya	7,070,000	11%
Kenya	Turkana, Pokot, Tugan, Massai,	Kenya, Ethiopia, South	7,500,000	25%

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[312] Bachler, Gunther. The Anthropogenic Transformation of the Environment: A Source of War? Historical Background, Typology and Conclusions. Proceedings of the international conference on 'Environmental Crisis: Regional Conflict and Ways of Cooperation', Ascona, Switzerland, 2-7 October1994.

[313] Wasara, Samson S. Conflict and State Security in the Horn of Africa: Militarization of Civilian Groups. *African Journal of Political Science* (2002) Vol 7 No. 2

		Sudan, and Uganda		
	Gabbra, Sakuye, Rendille, Sambora, Dassanetch, Boran, Oromo, Somali			
Somalia	Somali	Ethiopia, Kenya, and Somalia	4,800,000	55%
Sudan	East: Beja, Beni Amer, Shukriyya, Rashaida	Eritrea and Sudan	4,700,000	15%
	West: Kababish, Zaghawa, Rizeigat, Messiriya, Fallata	Sudan and South Sudan		
	South: Dinka, Nuer, Mundari, Topposa + many others	Sudan, Ethiopia, Kenya, South Sudan, and Uganda		
Uganda	Ateso, Nuer, Karamojong, Banyankore, Basongora	Kenya, South Sudan, and Uganda	1,030,000	5%

Table 4.5 Pastoralist groups in the Horn of African States[314]

Finally, it is essential to mention the expected effect of conflict over the environment where 'environmental degradation causes conflict which causes environmental degradation, creating a vicious cycle of environmental decline' and cyclical conflict. In the Horn of Africa region, except Kenya and Djibouti, there were prolonged armed conflicts that created high cost on the environment, which left the lands, mostly the rural areas, which are the theatres of military operations, unlivable. Agricultural activity ceased because of land mines which cost many lives even after the end of the armed conflict. Forests and wild animals have been affected, especially in guerrilla warfare. A typical example of this is the human-made famine in war-torn South Sudan.[315] Similarly, another social crisis is the spread of sexually transmitted diseases like AIDS by the government and guerrilla fighters. These social pressures will create another social tension, which leads to conflict.

Finally, it worth it to note the words of the renowned Ethiopian military historian Gebru Tareke which encapsulates crises of the Horn of Africa.

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[314] Source: (Before the Separation of South Sudan from Sudan) Giessen, Eric van de. *Horn of Africa: Environmental Security Assessment.* Institute for Environmental Security. Hague. 2011. www.envirosecurity.org/espa/PDF/ESA_HOA.pdf, Accessed on 12 February 2018.

[315] UN News. Famine declared in region of South Sudan – UN. 20 February 2017. https://news.un.org/en/story/2017/02/551812-famine-declared-region-south-sudan-un#.WLA6eBCaGO0, Accessed on 12 February 2018.

A volatile region, the Horn is where demography, identity, and borders intersect and overlap in limited space. Among others, three intertwined factors explain the historical infelicity and pandemic of organized violence in the region. First, there is the continuing contest for state construction and the consolidation of state power, a process that began long before the dawn of European colonialism. The tensions and conflicts that rival nationalisms and counter-hegemonic movements generate are accentuated by scarce and diminishing resources in the face of exploding populations and rising social demands. Second, following independence, the state became both the source and site of conflict because, in the absence of a dominant class with a grip on the economy, the state acts as the chief custodian and allocator of national resources. This often spurred violent competition for political power since differential access to the state meant unequal access to wealth and privilege. Third, foreign actors both fueled and sustained the bloody conflicts.[316]

4.4.5 Supporting Neighboring State Rebels

The norm of 'My enemy's enemy is my friend' has been the foremost foreign relations tradition in the Horn of Africa region. This form of relation resulted from tensions between states for a long. After the 1998 Ethiopia-Eritrean war, Eritrea starts supporting Ethiopian rebel groups, resulting in Ethiopia's reciprocal effect hosting Eritrean oppositions. The same is true between Ethiopia and Sudan, Sudan and South Sudan, Sudan and Uganda, Ethiopia and Somalia. The following table gives a clear example of how the region's states support their neighbors' rebel groups.

State	Selected rebel movements	Year of Origin	Motivation	Active regional backing
Djibouti	Front for the Restoration of Unity and Democracy	1991	Change of regime	Eritrea
Eritrea	Eritrean Islamic Jihad	1989	Chang of regime	Sudan
	Afar Red Sear Democratic Front	1989	Autonomy	Ethiopia
	Eritrean Democratic Alliance	2008	Change of regime	Ethiopia
Ethiopia	Eritrean Liberation Front	1961	Secession	Sudan, Somalia, Egypt
	Eritrean People's Liberation Front	1972	Secession	Sudan, Somalia, Egypt
	Tigray People's Liberation Front	1975	Autonomy and change of regime	Sudan
	Oromo Liberation Front	1976	Secession	Sudan, Somalia, Eritrea
	Western Somalia Liberation Front	1961, 1976	Secession	Somalia
	Ethiopian People's Patriotic Front	1998	Chang of regime	Eritrea

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[316] Tareke, Gebru. *The Ethiopian Revolution: War in the Horn of Africa.* Addis Ababa: Eclipse Printing Press, 2016. 4 – 5.

	Ginbot 7: Movement for Justice, Freedom, and Democracy	2008	Chang of regime	Eritrea
Kenya	Shifta War	1963	Secession	Somalia
Somalia	Somali Salvation Democratic Front	1979	Chang of regime	Ethiopia
	Somali National Movement	1981	Secession	Ethiopia
	Al Ittihad Al Islamiya	1983	Islamization	Sudan, Eritrea
	United Somali Congress	1989	Change of regime	Ethiopia
	Al Shabab Al Mujahedeen	2006	Change of regime	Eritrea
South Sudan	Sudan People's Liberation Army-in-Opposition (SPLA-IO)	2014	Change of regime	Sudan
	South Sudan Liberation Army	2011	Change of regime	Sudan
Sudan	Beja Congress	1957	Autonomy	Eritrea
	Anyanya	1960	Secession	Ethiopia
	Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army	1983	Secession	Ethiopia, Uganda, Eritrea
	National Democratic Alliance	1995	Change of regime	Eritrea, Ethiopia
	Justice and Equality Movement	2003	Darfur	Eritrea, South Sudan
	Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North (SPLM–N)	2011	Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile	South Sudan
Uganda	Lord's Resistance Army	1987	Autonomy	Sudan

Table 4.6 Armed Groups in the Horn of Africa and states supporting the Armed Groups [317]

Uganda provided substantial support to the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) during its armed struggle against Sudan, which reciprocated by giving support to the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA). Abdullahi Yusuf's Somali Salvation Front was provided bases and military assistance by Ethiopia after his failed coup attempt to topple Siyad Barre's government after Somalia's defeat in the (1978) war with Ethiopia over the Ogaden region.[318]

Sudan has also accused South Sudan of supporting their former comrades-in-arms of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North (SPLM–N) in the ongoing conflict in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile, while South Sudan has accused the north of supporting the rebel Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), which has a long history of committing atrocities in the south. Besides,

[317] Source (with some modification) Mesfin, Berouk. The Horn of Africa Security Complex. In Sharamo, Roba and Berouk Mesfin. *Regional Security in the Post-Cold War Horn of Africa*. Institute for Security Studies (ISS). Monograph 178. April 2011. 6-7.

[318] Barnes, Cedric & Harun Hassan. The Rise and Fall of Mogadishu's Islamic Courts. *Journal of Eastern African Studies*, 1:2, 2007. 160.

when South Sudan descended into full-scale civil war in 2013, Sudan began supplying weapons to the SPLM– in Opposition (SPLM–IO).

The Sudanese regime also periodically sees Eritrea as a threat. At various points in the past, Eritrea has supported the SPLA and the Darfur and Eastern Front rebels.[319]

4.5 Trends of Peace Support Operations and Political Missions in the Horn of Africa

There is also a high presence of UN and AU military support operations in the region. There is currently a presence of peace support missions in Darfur, Sudan; the Abyei Sudan–South Sudan border; Somalia; and South Sudan. In the past, there were missions in Somalia, in the Ethiopia-Eritrea border, in Uganda-Rwanda border, and Sudan. Also, there are thousands of foreign troops in Djibouti, which indicates the gravity of security challenges in the region. From the first UN mission in the region in 1992 until 2019, there were 23 multinational peace support operations by AU, EU, IGAD, NATO, UN and US-led MFC. Thirteen of them are current, six in the past, and four other failed missions.

4.5.1 Current Peace Support Operations

As of September 2019, the UN has 14 peacekeeping operations across the world. Seven missions were in Africa, and out of the seven, three of them are in the Horn of Africa, in Darfur (hybrid with AU), in Abyei, and South Sudan. AU has six operations, out of which, three are in the Horn of Africa; in Somalia, in Darfur (hybrid with UN), and in countries affected by LRA, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, South Sudan, and Uganda. The regional organization Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) has one ceasefire monitoring operation in South Sudan. In addition to these, the EU, the UN Department of Political Affairs, and the UN Department of Field Support also have peace support operations in Somalia (See Table 4.7).

Unlike traditional UN peacekeeping, most Troop Contributing Countries (TCC) in both UN and AU peace support operations in the Horn of Africa are from immediate neighboring states. Moreover, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda are among the top ten most significant contributors of

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[319] IISS. *The Military Balance: The Annual Assessment of Global Military Capabilities and Defense Economics.* London: Routledge 2018. 435.

uniformed personnel for multilateral peace support operations globally, Ethiopia being first, Uganda fifth, and Kenya tenth.

Some scholars argue that the UN 'breaks with a long-standing principle of not allowing a country to engage in a peace support operation in a neighboring country.'[320] The reason behind this is that neighboring countries are already involved in a conflict, or they might not be impartial. However, all current peacekeeping operations of UN and AU in the Horn of Africa are mostly comprised form neighboring countries which leads to remarkable conflict management outcomes.

There are currently 12 multinational peace operations deployed in the Horn of Africa.

	Conduction Organization	Name of the Operation	Host State	Military/ Civilian	Number of Troops
1	Ad hoc (a coalition of states)	Regional Cooperation Initiative for the Elimination of the Lord's Resistance Army (RCI-LRA)	South Sudan, Uganda CAR, and DRC	Military	1031**
2	IGAD	Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring Mechanism in South Sudan (CTSAMM)	South Sudan	Civilian	200
3	AU	African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)	Somalia	Military	22,126*
4	AU/UN Hybrid	African Union-United Nations Mission in Darfur (UNMID)	Darfur, Sudan	Military	8,341
5	EU	EU Training Mission (EUTM Somalia)	Somalia	Military	203

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[320] Fejerskov, Adam M. and et al. Regional Interests in African Peace Operations. Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies. 2017. 12

* Williams, Paul D (2018). *Fighting for Peace in Somalia: A History and Analysis of the African Union Mission (AMISOM), 2007-2017.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

6	EU	European Union Naval Force Somalia (Operation Atalanta) (EU NAVFOR Somalia)	Somalia and Gulf of Aden	Military	600
7	EU	EU Regional Maritime Capacity Building for the Horn of Africa and the Western Indian Ocean (EUCAP Somalia)	Somalia (Including Somaliland)	Civilian	108
8	UN (DPA)	United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM)	Somalia	Military and Civilian	553
9	UN (DFS)	United Nations Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS)	Somalia	Military and Civilian	49
10	UN	United Nations Interim Security Force in Abyei (UNISFA)	Abyei (South Sudan/Sudan)	Military	4,586
11	UN	United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS)	South Sudan	Military	16,682
12	UN (DPA)	Special Envoy Horn of Africa	Horn of Africa	Civilian	9
13	CMF	Combined Task Force 151	Gulf of Aden, Coasts of Somalia & the Indian Ocean	Military (Naval)	-

Table 4.7 Multinational peace support operations in the Horn of Africa as of December 2018 (* as of July 2017, ** from Williams, 2018:4)

4.5.1.1 African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)

AMISOM, created in January 2007 by AU's Peace and Security Council, is the longest and largest peace support mission run by AU. The mission's main strategic objectives are 'to enable the gradual handover of its security responsibility to Somali security forces, reduce the threat posed by Al-Shabaab and other armed opposition groups, and assist Somali security forces in providing

security for Somalia's political process and peacebuilding efforts.'[321] (Detail explanation on AMISOM will be discussed in Section 6.2.3 Joining AMISOM, 2014).

4.5.1.2 United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM)[322]

UNSOM was established on 3 June 2013 in support of the establishment of the Federal Government of Somalia.[323] Its mandates are to provide United Nations 'good offices' functions; supporting the Government's peace and reconciliation process by providing strategic policy advice on peacebuilding and state-building; assist international donor support, particularly security sector assistance and maritime security; and help to monitor violations of human rights.[324] Uganda contributed two experts on mission and 530 contingent troops, which is 96% of the whole personnel in the mission.

4.5.1.3 United Nations Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS)

UNSOS was established on 09 November 2015, replacing the United Nations Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA), which was established in 2009 as a logistical field support operation to the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) led by the United Nations Department of Field Support (DFS).[325] UNSOS is responsible for support to AMISOM, UNSOM, the Somali National Army (SNA), and the Somali Police Force (SPF) on joint operations with AMISOM.[326] From the Horn of Africa only Uganda contributed one expert on a mission for UNSOM. The mission

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[321] United Nations (2017). *SC/12972 Security Council 8034th Meeting (Night): Unanimously Adopting Resolution 2372 (2017), Security Council Extends Mandate of African Union Mission in Somalia, Authorizes Troop Reduction.* 30 August 2017. https://www.un.org/press/en/2017/sc12972.doc.htm, Accessed on 28 January 2019.

[322] UNSOM substituted the United Nations Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS), which was established by the Security Council on 15 April 1995 to assist the Secretary-General in advancing the cause of peace and reconciliation through contacts with Somali leaders, civic organizations and the states and organizations concerned. UNPOS completed its Security Council mandate on 3 June 2013 and the UN continues to provide support to the Somalia Federal Government's peace and reconciliation efforts through the UNSOM.

[323] Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs. "Mandate." https://unsom.unmissions.org/mandate, Accessed on 28 January 2019.

[324] Ibid.

[325] United Nations. b. "UNSOA Mandate." 2019. https://unsoa.unmissions.org/unsoa-mandate, Accessed on 08 February 2019.

[326] United Nations. "Resolution 2245 (2015) Adopted by the Security Council at its 7551st meeting." 9 November 2015. https://unsos.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/resolution_2245_2015.pdf, Accessed on 08 February 2019.

has 49 personnel, and the UK contributed the whole 42 contingent troops, and Ghana, Nigeria, Pakistan, Sierra Leone all send one expert on the mission and Mauritania two.[327]

4.5.1.4 European Union Training Mission in Somalia (EUTM Somalia)

European Union Training Mission in Somalia (EUTM Somalia) was launched on 7 April 2010. It initially conducted training in Uganda; then, the headquarters was relocated to Mogadishu on 16 March 2015.[328] Besides the training, EUTM has an advisory role in building the Somali Ministry of Defense (MoD) capacity and Somali National Army (SNA) General Staff focusing on three essential pillars, training, mentoring, and advising.[329]

4.5.1.5 European Union Naval Force Somalia (Operation Atalanta) (EU NAVFOR Somalia)

European Union Naval Force Somalia (Operation Atalanta) (EU NAVFOR Somalia) was started in December 2008 with the mandates of protecting vessels of the World Food Programme (WFP), African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), and other vulnerable shipping, preventing piracy and armed robbery at sea, monitors fishing activities off the coast of Somalia and supports other EU missions and international organizations working to strengthen maritime security and capacity in the region.[330] EU NAVFOR also established the Maritime Security Centre – Horn of Africa (MSCHOA), which provides 24-hour manned monitoring of vessels transiting through the Gulf of Aden.[331]

4.5.1.6 EU Regional Maritime Capacity Building for the Horn of Africa and the Western Indian Ocean (EUCAP Somalia)

EU Regional Maritime Capacity Building for the Horn of Africa and the Western Indian Ocean (EUCAP Somalia) launched in July 2012. EUCAP is a civilian mission based in Mogadishu, aiming to support regional maritime capacity-building and enhance the maritime security across

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[327] United Nations. "Troop and Police Contributors." December 2018. Retrieved from: https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/troop-and-police-contributors, Accessed on 08 February 2019.

[328] EUTM Somalia. "Mission Background. 2019." https://www.eutm-somalia.eu/, Accessed on 10 February 2019.

[329] Ibid.

[330] EUNAVFOR. "Mission." https://eunavfor.eu/mission/, Accessed on 10 February 2019.

[331] EUNAVFOR. "About MSCHOA". https://at-sea.mschoa.org/about-mschoa/, Accessed on 10 February 2019.

the Horn of Africa and the Western Indian Ocean (WIO). As of the end of 2015, it solely focused on Somalia, including Somaliland.[332]

4.5.1.7 African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNMID)

After civil war broke out between the Government of Sudan and armed rebels in Darfur in 2003, AU PSC authorized the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) deployment in 2004, an AU-mandated mission to monitor the Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement. Later, AMIS was merged with the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) in December 2007 to become the joint AU–UN Mission in Darfur (UNAMID).[333] UNAMID's mandate is to protect civilians, monitor and verify the implementation of agreements, assist the political process, and monitor and report on the situation along the borders with Chad and the Central African Republic. 14% out of the total personnel in the mission contributed from the states of Horn of Africa. Djibouti contributes 137 formed police unit; Ethiopia contributes a total of 984 personnel, 943 contingent troops, seven staff officers, five experts on mission, and 29 individual police; Kenya contribute a total of 87 personnel, 11 staff officers, one expert on a mission, and 75 contingent troops.[334]

4.5.1.8 United Nations Interim Security Force in Abyei (UNISFA)

Few weeks before South Sudan declared its independence on 9 July 2011, clashes between Sudan Armed Forces and Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLM) over disputed oil-rich border region Abyei drove more than 100,000 people from their homes. On 27 June 2011, the Security Council authorized the deployment of a peacekeeping force to the Abyei Area, which both sides claimed. UNISFA's establishment came after both reached an agreement in Addis Ababa to demilitarize Abyei and let Ethiopian troops monitor the area.[335] UNISFA has the principal mandate is monitoring the demilitarization from any forces other than UNISFA and the Abyei Police Service. Also, de-mining assistance and technical advice, facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid,

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[332] EUCAP-SOMALIA. "About us." https://www.eucap-som.eu/about-us/, Accessed on 10 February 2019.

[333] United Nations. "About UNAMID." https://unamid.unmissions.org/about-unamid-0, Accessed on 08 February 2019.

[334] United Nations. "Troop and Police Contributors." December 2018. https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/troop-and-police-contributors, Accessed on 08 February 2019.

[335] Temporary Arrangements for the Administration and Security of the Abyei Area (2011). *Temporary Arrangements for the Administration and Security of the Abyei Area*. Addis Ababa, 20 June 2011. https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Full_Report_1449.pdf, Accessed on 08 February 2019.

strengthen the Abyei Police Service's capacity by providing support, and provide security for oil infrastructure in the Abyei Area.[336]

UNISFA is a unique type of peacekeeping operation since the beginning of UN peacekeeping in 1948[337] because 100% of the contingent troops are from Ethiopia[338]. Holger Osterrieder and et al. describe the deployment as follows:

> The deployment of troops for UNISFA took place 'significantly more quickly than is usually the case [with UN peacekeeping operations].' Only one month after its authorization, almost 500 troops had been deployed to the Abyei region. Operations started on 8 August 2011, while patrols began at the end of August 2011. The fact that UNISFA troops were drawn from one country, Ethiopia, helps to explain this prompt deployment. Indeed, the Ethiopian troops were ready to be deployed even before the UN Security Council authorized the mission. The land route from Ethiopia to Abyei was used to transfer troops within a week… The Ethiopian troops did not require the living standards normally necessary for UN missions. Temporary housing in tents was an efficient way to ensure the timely deployment of troops. Only a few months after its authorization, the UN Secretary-General declared that the mission was 'in a position to secure the Abyei area' and thus able to fulfill its mandate.[339]

Ethiopia is the only Horn of Africa state which contributes to this mission. It contributes a total of 4,453, from which 4,287 are contingent troops, 78 experts on mission, 78 staff officers, and 10 police personnel, which is 97% of the total personnel and 24% of the police personnel.[340]

4.5.1.9 United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS)

On the exact same date that South Sudan became the newest county in the world, and the UNMIS operation was ended; the Security Council established UNMISS on 9 July 2011 with the mandate 'to help establish the conditions for development in the Republic of South Sudan, intending to strengthen the capacity of the Government of the Republic of South Sudan to govern

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[336] United Nations. *Resolution 1990 (2011) Adopted by the Security Council at its 6567th Meeting.* 27 June 2011. http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1990(2011), Accessed on 08 February 2019.

[337] Williams, Paul D and Thong Nguyen. *Neighborhood Dynamics in UN Peacekeeping Operations, 1990–2017.* New York: International Peace Institute. 2018, 10.

[338] United Nations. "Troop and Police Contributors." December 2018. https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/troop-and-police-contributors, Accessed on 08 February 2019.

[339] Osterrieder, H. et al. 'United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA)'. In Koops, Joachim A. et al. (eds.) *The Oxford Handbook of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations.* Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2017, 821-822.

[340] United Nations *Troop and Police Contributors.* December 2018. https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/troop-and-police-contributors, Accessed on 08 February 2019.

effectively, democratically and establish good relations with its neighbors.'[341] However, with the rise of recent political and security crisis in December 2013, which resulted in an enormous humanitarian crisis, on 27 May 2014, the Security Council reprioritized the mandate to the protection of civilians, monitoring human rights, assisting the delivery of humanitarian and supporting the implementation of the cessation of Hostilities.[342] As of November 2018, Ethiopia has 2,106 military and 26 police personnel, while Kenya contributes 23 police personnel, which is 14% of the total UN military personnel in UNMISS.[343]

4.5.1.10 Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring Mechanism in South Sudan (CTSAMM)

IGAD established the CTSAMM following the signing of the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (ARCSS) in August 2015 by warring parties in South Sudan. This body is responsible for monitoring and verifying the implementation of Permanent Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements (PCTSA) and the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities (ACoH), which is signed in December 2017. CTSAMVM is led by Maj. Gen. Desta Abiche Ageno of Ethiopia and there are over 200 personnel from 17 different countries, the majority of whom are former military officers. It is headquartered in Juba with 16 Monitoring and Verification Teams (MVTs) in the most conflict-affected areas of South Sudan.[344] CTSAMM reports to the IGAD Council of Ministers and to the Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (JMEC), which includes the warring parties that signed the agreement, South Sudanese civil societies, members of IGAD, and international partners.[345]

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[341] United Nations. *Resolution 1990 (2011) Adopted by the Security Council at its 6567th Meeting.* 27 June 2011 http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1990(2011), Accessed on 08 February 2019.

[342] United Nations. *Resolution 2155 (2014) Adopted by the Security Council at its 7182nd meeting. 27* May 2014. https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2155(2014), Accessed on 13 February 2019.

[343] United Nations *Troop and Police Contributors.* December 2018. https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/troop-and-police-contributors, Accessed on 08 February 2019.

[344] CTSAMM. *Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring Mechanism: Composition & Functions.* 2019. http://ctsamm.org/composition-functions/, Accessed on 02 February 2019.

[345] Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission. *JMEC Leadership*. 2018. https://www.jmecsouthsudan.com/index.php/about-jmec/leadership, Accessed on 02 February 2019.

4.5.1.11 Regional Cooperation Initiative for the Elimination of the Lord's Resistance Army (RCI-LRA)

African Union PSC designated the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) as a terrorist group and established Regional Cooperation Initiative for the Elimination of the LRA (RCI-LRA) in November 2011. It has three organs, the Joint Coordination Mechanism (JCM), in Addis Ababa, chaired by the AU Commissioner for Peace and Security, and comprises Ministers of Defense of the affected countries (Uganda, South Sudan, DRC, and CAR), the Regional Task Force (RTF), headquartered in Uganda, is the military component with a maximum of 5,000 troops to be contributed by the affected countries.[346] As of July 2017, there was 1031 uniformed personnel from DR Congo, South Sudan, and the Central Africa Republic.[347]

4.5.1.12 Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa

After the independence of South Sudan in 2011, the UN Secretary General appointed a Special Envoy for the Sudan and South Sudan to play a good office role to support the establishment and maintenance of good and peaceful neighborly relations between Sudan and South Sudan.[348] The duration of the office was from August 2011 to October 2018. In October 2018, the Secretary-General expanded the responsibility of the Special Envoy for the Sudan and South Sudan to cover the Horn of Africa region, to comprise the members of IGAD and transformed it to Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa.[349] The envoy is responsible for supporting the IGAD in line with the framework for cooperation between the United Nations and IGAD, and other relevant regional organizations in promoting peace and security across the Horn of Africa.[350]

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[346] African Union Peace and Security Department. "*The African Union-Led Regional Task Force for the elimination of the LRA.*" 23 November 2015. http://www.peaceau.org/en/page/100-au-led-rci-lra-1, Accessed on 02 February 2019.

[347] African Union Commission and New Zealand Crown. "*African Union Handbook.*" Addis Ababa: African Union Commission and New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade. 2018, 80. https://au.int/en/documents/20180130/african-union-handbook-2018, Accessed on 12 February 2019.

[348] Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs. "Special Envoy Sudan and South Sudan" https://dppa.un.org/en/mission/special-envoy-sudan-and-south-sudan, Accessed on 12 February 2019.

[349] Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs. "Special Envoy Horn of Africa." October 2018. https://dppa.un.org/en/mission/special-envoy-horn-of-africa, Accessed on 12 February 2019.

[350] Ibid.

4.5.1.13 Combined Task Force 151 (CTF 151)

CTF 151 is one of three task forces operated by Combined Maritime Forces (CMF)[351], which responds to piracy attacks in the Gulf of Aden, off the coasts of Somalia and the Indian Ocean. It was established in January 2009 with a specific piracy mission-based mandate, currently endorsed under Resolution 2500 (2019) 'On piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia' adopted by the Security Council at its 8678th meeting, on 4 December 2019. CTF 151's mission is to deter, disrupt and suppress piracy and armed robbery at sea and to engage with regional and other partners to strengthen relevant capabilities in order to protect global maritime commerce and secure freedom of navigation.[352]

4.5.2 Past Peace Support Operations

4.5.2.1 United Nations Observation Mission in Uganda and Rwanda (UNOMUR)

UNOMUR was deployed on the Ugandan side of the border between Uganda and Rwanda on 22 June 1993. The Rwandan and Ugandan governments requested the deployment of military observers along the common border to prevent the military use of the area by the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF). RPF was fighting the government of Rwanda since 1990; the Security Council decided that the mission monitor border transit at the border of lethal weapons and ammunition across the border and any other material that could be of military use. There were 81 military observers in the mission, and no state from the Horn of Africa contributed to the mission, and UNOMUR was officially closed in September 1994.

4.5.2.2 United Nations Advance Mission in Sudan (UNAMIS)

Since 1983, the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), in the south, fought over resources, power, the role of religion in the state, and self-determination. After many attempts to bring peace, the two parties signed the Agreement on

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[351] The Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) is US-led multinational 33-state maritime partnership, based in Bahrain, which exists to uphold the International Rules-Based Order (IRBO) by countering illicit non-state actors on the high seas and promoting security, stability, and prosperity across approximately 3.2 million square miles of international waters, which encompass some of the world's most important shipping lanes.

Combinedmaritimeforces.com "Combined Maritime Forces" https://combinedmaritimeforces.com/, Accessed on Accessed on 03 January 2020.

[352] Combined Maritime Forces. "CTF 151: Counter-Piracy." Combinedmaritimeforces.com. https://combinedmaritimeforces.com/ctf-151-counter-piracy/. Accessed on 03 January 2020.

Wealth Sharing in January 2004 and the Protocol on Power Sharing in May 2004 at the IGAD-led talks. To continue and strengthen the peace process, on the recommendation of the UN Secretary-General, the UN Security Council established UNAMIS. UNAMIS is a special political mission set up on 11 June 2004 mandated to facilitate contacts with the parties concerned, and to prepare for the introduction of an envisaged UN peace support operation. Later, UNAMIS was transformed into the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) on 24 March 2005.

4.5.2.3 United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS)

On 9 January 2005, the Government of the Sudan and SPLM/A signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) which includes power-sharing, autonomy for the south, and more equitable distribution of economic resources, and decided to set up a six-and-a-half-year interim period. On 24 March 2005, the Security Council established UNMIS by resolution 1590 to monitor and verify the implementation of the CPA. The mission was completed on 9 July 2011, after six years of mandated operations, on the same day South Sudan declared independence. A maximum of 10,519 military, police, and civilian components were deployed. Uganda and Kenya are the only Horn of Africa states that deployed military and civilian personnel, and Ethiopia contributes only police personnel.[353]

4.5.2.4 African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS I and AMIS II)

On 25 May 2004 AU PSC authorized the deployment of an AU-mandated mission to monitor the 2004 Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement between parties to the conflict in Darfur. AMIS was made up of an unspecified number of Military Observers with a limited mandate only to monitor the ceasefire, and to protect the monitors as well as themselves. Soon, AU realized that AMIS did not have the necessary capability fulfill its tasks, and on 20 October 2004 the PSC transformed AMIS into a full peacekeeping mission (AMIS II) by increasing its military strength and the introduction of a civilian police. AMIS II was merged with the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) in December 2007 to become the joint AU–UN Mission in Darfur (UNAMID).

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[353] United Nations. "UNMIS Facts and Figures" https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/past/unmis/facts.shtml. Accessed on 08 February 2019.

4.5.2.5 Operation Allied Provider

NATO also made a support operation in the region named Operation Allied Provider from October to December 2008, escorting UN World Food Programme (WFP) vessels transiting through the Gulf of Aden and the coast of Somalia, giving protection against piracy at the request of the then UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon.[354] Similarly, before African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) succeeded by AU-UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), NATO also provided air transport for some 37,000 AMIS personnel and trained over 250 AMIS officials.[355]

4.5.2.6 Operation Ocean Shield

NATO Operation Ocean Shield was an operation to combat piracy off the Horn of Africa that ran from August 2009 to December 2016.[356] The main purpose of the operation was to prevent and stop piracy through direct actions against pirates, by helicopter surveillance missions to trace and identify ships in the area. They also helped in preventing and disrupting hijackings and suppressing armed robbery by providing naval escorts and deterrence. This NATO operation also works with the European Union's Atalanta, the US-led Combined Task Force 151 and with independent deplorers such as China, Japan and South Korea in the region.[357]

4.5.3 Failed Peacekeeping Operations in the Horn of Africa

4.5.3.1 United Nations Operation in Somalia I, UNOSOM I (April 1992 - March 1993)

The first UN peacekeeping mission in the Horn of Africa was in Somalia. After President Siad Barre's downfall in January 1991, the power struggle and clan clashes in Somalia resulted in widespread death and destruction and severe humanitarian crises. On 24 April 1992, the Security Council establish UNOSOM I to monitor the ceasefire in Mogadishu. At first, only 50 unarmed uniformed United Nations military observers were deployed from Pakistan in September 1992. Later, the number grew to enable it to protect humanitarian convoys and distribution centers

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[354] NATO. "Operations and Missions: Past and Present." 2018.
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_52060.htm, Accessed on 26 January 2019.

[355] Ibid.

[356] MARCOM. "Operation Ocean Shield" MARCOM. https://mc.nato.int/missions/operation-ocean-shield, Accessed on 19 December 2019

[357] NATO. "Counter-piracy operations." NATO. 19 December 2016.
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_48815.htm, Accessed on 19 December 2019

throughout Somalia. It later worked with the Unified Task Force in the effort to establish a safe environment for the delivery of humanitarian assistance.

4.5.3.2 United Nations Operation in Somalia II, UNOSOM II (March 1993 - March 1995)

UNOSOM II was established in March 1993 to take appropriate action, including enforcement measures, to establish a secure environment for humanitarian assistance throughout Somalia. To that end, UNOSOM II was to complete, through disarmament and reconciliation, the task begun by the Unified Task Force for the restoration of peace, stability, law, and order. UNOSOM II was withdrawn in early March 1995.

4.5.3.3 Unified Task Force (UNITAF)

Due to the high-security risk and looting of aid supplies, UNITAF was established to ensure the delivery of relief supplies with a more robust mandate by the leadership of the US, which was deployed in December 1992. In March 1993 the Security Council decided on a transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II, to undertake disarmament and restoration of peace and stability. However, in June 1993, 24 UNOSOM II soldiers from Pakistan were killed in an attack in Mogadishu, and 18 US soldiers of the Quick Reaction Force, which were not a part of the UN, deployed for the support lost their lives in operation in Mogadishu. Because of this US withdraw its force in 1994, followed by other stats. UNOSOM II was terminated in March 1995 due to reduced budget and troops, and lack of agreement to cease fire by warring groups in Somalia. Approximately 37,000 troops were deployed by UNITAF and 20,000 by UNOSOM. However, no states from the Horn of Africa deployed troops in Somalia.

4.5.3.4 United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE)[358]

United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) was established because of the Ethio-Eritrean war from 1998-2000 due to a border dispute. The UN Security Council established UNMEE on 31 June 2000 to monitor the Temporary Security Zone (TSZ) and the cessation of hostilities. UNMEE was terminated on 30 July 2008 due to the Eritrean government's restriction on the activities of UNMEE in its territory, which prevented the operation to carry out its mission. There were a total of 4,154 military, police, and civilian personnel was deployed, and Ken-

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[358] Parts of this section is from the article published by the author Sigatu. K.T 'No Peace No War: The Ethiopian-Eritrean Conflict'. *AARMS.* Vol 18. No. 1, 2019. 79-91

ya was the only state of the region that contributed military personnel; as of March 2004, it contributed a total of 695 personnel.

The forces or observer missions had the task of implementing cease-fire or armistice agreements. It was expected that these activities would then allow diplomacy to lead to a final peace treaty. Cease-fires have not often led to peace. War has stopped, but formal settlements between the parties have not followed it. Instead, the conflicts remain frozen without a final outcome.[359]

Following talks in Algiers, a ceasefire came in to force on 31 June 2000, under which a United Nations peacekeeping force, when the Security Council, by its resolution 1312 (2000), decided to establish the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) consisting of up to 100 military observers and the necessary civilian support staff.[360] UNMEE was deployed along a 25-kilometer wide strip between the two armies, which is agreed by the Algiers Agreement.[361] Later, UNMEE expanded to a total of 4,200 military personnel, including 220 military observers, three infantry battalions, and the necessary support units, to monitor the ceasefire and border delineation between Ethiopia and Eritrea.

However, on 30 July 2008, the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 1827, terminating the mandate of UNMEE. The Council decision came in response to crippling restrictions imposed by Eritrea on UNMEE, as well as the cutting off of fuel supplies – making it impossible for the operation to continue carrying out its mandated tasks, putting the safety and security of UN personnel at risk.[362]

4.5.4 The Lesson Learned from Failed Peacekeeping Operations in the Horn of Africa

In Somalia when UNOSOM I failed to protect the delivery and distribution of humanitarian aid, UNITAF, a non-UN multinational coalition led by the US establish to support the mission. Later

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[359] Holsti, K.J. *International Politics: A Framework for Analysis.* 7th Edition. Prentice-Hall International, Inc. New Jersey. 1995. 354.

[360] United Nations. "United Nations Mission Ethiopia and Eritrea". https://unmee.unmissions.org/background, Accessed on 2 November 2017.

[361] Lyons, Terrence. "The Ethiopia-Eritrea Conflict and the Search for Peace in the Horn of Africa". Review of African Political Economy, 36.120, 2009. 168.

[362] United Nations. "United Nations Mission Ethiopia and Eritrea". https://unmee.unmissions.org/background, Accessed on 2 November 2017.

UNOSOM I and UNITAF transformed to UNOSOM II. All three missions faced massive challenges, while the last mission ended in a fiasco, with dead and mutilated Pakistani and American soldiers. All were unable to end the civil war or win the cooperation of the Somali warlords.

The following are lessons learned from the three missions in Somalia.

* The major lesson learned from UNOSOM I was the need to consider traditional UN peace-keeping. Where there was no peace to keep in a state which was in a total anarchy, the way of traditional peacekeeping could not be carried out. Conflict reconciliation should be on the ground.

* During the deployment of UNITAF and UNOSOM II, the mission transformed to peace enforcement, however the deployment of two separate forces on UNITAF under the leadership of US and UNSOM II under UN complicated the peacekeeping operation.

* Peacekeepers resorted to excessive use of force especially in the case of murders and tortures committed by Canadian troops on Somalian civilians who broke into Canadian base camp and stole supplies. This resulted a frantic hatred against the peacekeeping troops by the Somalian public and later became a national scandal that led to the resignation of Canadian chief of the defence staff.

* UN did not obtain consent for operations from any of the warring parties because of the absence of central of regional government and the existence of anarchy. Little attention was given to promote stable cease-fires, which brought the failure of the peacekeeping operation.

* The intervention in Somalia resulted speciesism to experiments in the robust peacekeeping operations by the international community to intervene in humanitarian crisis and civil war. This costed UN and the international community in 1994, when the world watched the genocide in Rwanda without intervention.

In regard to UNMEE which was launched to end a two-year war between Ethiopia and Eritrea in 2000, the major mandate was to monitor the cessation of hostilities and latter to assist the Boundary Commission in the implementation of its delimitation of the border.

* Though UNMEE was more or less successful in the cessation of hostilities (though there were few breaches of ceasefire and crossing to demilitarized zones by Eritrean troops) the stalemate on the issue of border demarcation which resulted from inflexibility and unwilling-

ness from both states' leadership to end hostility, especially Ethiopia's refusal to implement the Algiers Agreement made the work of UNMEE impossible.

* In such traditional peacekeeping, consent of both parties play an important role. The Eritrean restriction of UNMEE's movement in Eritrea, claiming that the peacekeepers were spying on Eritrean positions was a major obstacle for UNMEE. As a result, Eritrea requested all UNMEE personnel from US, Canada and Europe to leave Eritrea.

4.6 Leenco Lata's Concept of Peacekeeping in the Horn of Africa

Peace support operations or peacekeeping has become the most important and regularly used conflict management mechanism in the post-Cold War Horn of Africa region. Leenco Lata, in his book, argues peacekeeping operations in the Horn of Africa [363] are used as state-building mechanisms, not only for solving existing conflicts but also 'engaged in either state deconstruction or reconstruction.'[364] From the first UN mission in the region in 1992 until 2020, there were 23 multinational peace support operations by AU, EU, IGAD, NATO and UN, and 13 missions are still running.

For Lata, conflicts in the Horn of Africa are mainly caused by the history of state formation, which is peculiar to the region. European powers such as Britain, France, and Italy, also the regional powers Christian Abyssinia and Mahdist Sudan, were competing to dominate the region and expand their territories. The European powers divided their region; meanwhile, two local powers were able to control present-day states of Ethiopia and Sudan; the other 'victims of their conquests, on the other hand, continue to work to throw off the dominance imposed on them by force.'[365] Thus, he puts forward the following conclusion:

> It is this history of state formation that accounts for the simultaneous prevalence of expansionist and constructionist tendencies within the states of the Horn of Africa. And the ongoing peacekeeping operations in the region are, hence, attempting to resolve the con-

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[363] The Horn of Africa for Leenco Lata encompasses only Sudan, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Djibouti and Somalia. (The study covers time before the independence of South Sudan)

[364] Leta, Leenco. *Peacekeeping as State Building: Current Challenges for the Horn of Africa.* London: The Red Sea Press. 2012. 11-12.

[365] Leta, Leenco. *Peacekeeping as State Building: Current Challenges for the Horn of Africa.* London: The Red Sea Press. 2012. 6.

flicts deriving from imaginations of the state that accounts for these diametrically oppo-site tendencies.[366]

Taking the case of UNMIS, which is mandated to oversee the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA); UNMEE, which is mandated to oversee the implementation of the Algiers Peace Agreement (APA); UNAMID, mandated to oversee the implementation of Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA); and AMISOM mandated to support Transitional Federal Government (TFG), he argues all these peacekeeping operations are either state deconstruction or reconstruction.

> The mandate of UNMIS is overseeing the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), which includes conducting a referendum in 2011 to determine whether South Sudan would separate and become an independent state or not. The referendum was conducted on January 9, 2011, in which South Sudanese overwhelmingly voted for separation. Consequently, UNMIS forthrightly oversaw the deconstruction of the extant Sudanese nation-state. Since the rebel groups in Darfur tend to emulate the South Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), UNAMID also could be drawn into overseeing whether Darfur also would separate or not. The mission of AMISOM forthright concerns the reconstruction of the collapsed Somali state. Even UNMEE, which at first sight looks like a conventional interposition force, was supposed to finalize the separation of Eritrea from Ethiopia by demarcating the border between them. UNMEE, too was, hence, involved in a delayed state deconstruction exercise.[367]

Besides the above premise of his study, he asserts that 'conflict within the region's state connects and resonates with those prevailing among them. Hence, restoring peace within each state requires a concurrent resolution of the conflict and tensions prevailing between it and its neighbors.'[368]

4.7 Summery and Partial Conclusion

This chapter covers the Horn of Africa's security dynamics, its regional security complex, trends of conflicts, assessing past and present peace support operations, and discussing Leenco Lata's peacekeeping presumption in the region.

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[366] Ibid.

[367] Ibid. 14-15.

[368] Ibid. 7.

The Horn of Africa is located in the Northeastern part of the continent consisting of eight countries: Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, and Uganda. These nine states are also the regional bloc members, Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), making the member states considered as the regional complex that reflects interlinked regional security complex. Upart from Uganda, Ethiopia shares a border with all the other member states.

Today the region consists of two of the nine newest states in the world, Eritrea, and South Sudan. Furthermore, Somaliland is striving to be one since 1991 by establishing the most stable state and conducting a peaceful government transition in the region by challenging the image of war and disaster that has been associated with the region.

In Michael Sheehan's words, the security complex in the Horn of Africa is held together not by the positive influences of shared interest but by shared rivalries. The dynamics of security within these levels operate across a broad spectrum of military, political, economic, societal, and environmental sectors.

The most common trends of conflict in the region are intrastate/ethnic conflicts, resulting from the existence of more than three hundred seventy linguistic groups or ethnic groups in the region. Interstate conflicts resulted from the miss-drown borders, which cut through ethnic, cultural, historical, and religious groups which sway states of the region to claim neighboring state territories. Religious fundamentalism and violence are rife stemming from the existence of failed states and proximity to the Middle Eastern states. Conflicts caused by a change in living space due to the environmental degradation and climate change that cause scarcity of pastoral lands and water, especially among pastoralist communities, and supporting neighboring state rebels, also has been a tradition of the regimes of the region.

The Horn of Africa region is known for the high presence of UN and AU military support operations. There is currently a presence of peace support missions in Darfur, Sudan; Abyei Sudan–South Sudan border where 100% of the contingent troops are from Ethiopia; Somalia; and South Sudan. In the past, there were missions in Somalia, in the Ethiopia-Eritrea border, in the Uganda-Rwanda border, and in Sudan. From the first UN mission in the region in 1992 until 2019, there were 23 multinational peace support operations by AU, EU, IGAD, NATO and UN.

Leenco Lata, in his book, argues peacekeeping operations in the Horn of Africa are used as state-building mechanisms, not only for solving existing conflicts but also 'engaged in either state deconstruction or reconstruction.' This is because of the history of state formation in the region and the ongoing peacekeeping operations in the region which are attempting to resolve the conflicts emanated from that.

CHAPTER 5 – ETHIOPIAN FOREIGN POLICY AND MILITARY POWER

"The right of making war and peace with other nations and commonwealths; that is to say, of judging when it is for the public good, and how great forces are to be assembled, armed, and paid for that end"

— Thomas Hobbes

"A country that demands moral perfection in its foreign policy will achieve neither perfection nor security."

— Henry Kissinger

This chapter examines three major areas of Ethiopia's state development. It briefly discusses the Ethiopian state from its origin to a modern state formation. The second part gives an overview of its foreign policy, and the third part deals with the Ethiopian military from the origin of the modern army until the present day. These discussion areas are divided into pre and post 1991.

5.1 The Ethiopian State

Ethiopia is one of the oldest civilizations with a history of over three thousand years and the only country on the African continent that has never been colonized despite the paramount exertions of Italy. The ancient civilization was centered mainly in the northern Abyssinian[369] territory, with its boundaries expanding or shrinking, depending on the balance of power between the ruling elites. Though there had been earlier attempts to create a unified and centralized empire, this enterprise only became successful at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries. It started at the time of Emperor Tewodros II and finalized 'during the reign of Emperor Minilik II, in which most of the treaties that define current boundaries were signed.'[370]

Ethiopia's evolution of government structure is a distinctive culture that marks it out of most African states. The first "modern" constitution of Ethiopia of 1931, which was established by His Majesty Haile Sellasie I, refers that the Ethiopian state is 2,937 years old, starting from Minilik I's mother, Queen Sheba, and there were 225 Kings.[371] This account is based on *Kebra Nagast*

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[369] A historical name for the Ethiopian Empire, that comprised the northern half of present-day Ethiopia.

[370] Berhe, Mulugeta G. Economic Integration as a Peacebuilding Strategy in the Horn of Africa with Particular Focus on Ethiopia and Its Four Neighbors. *Journal of African-Centered Solutions in Peace and Security.* Vol. 1 (1) August 2016. 74.

[371] Sigatu, Kaleab T. *Constitution in Ethiopia: From Fitiha Negest to FDRE. [Amharic]. (Hige Menigist Be'itiopia: Ke'fitiha Negest eske Ifedri.)* Addis Ababa: Mega Publishing Plc, 2019. 53.

(Glory of Kings), a political and religious document/book. The book seeks to explain the reason for the transfer of the Kingdom of David from his Son Solomon, King of Israel, to the country of the *Negus*, Abyssinia.[372] The book has played a central role in the Ethiopian empire as a pillar of the Ethiopian state, a source of legitimacy for the government until the 1974 Revolution, and one of the essential books in the Ethiopian Orthodox Church.

The 1974 Ethiopian Revolution was carried out by the Armed Forces, the Police and Territorial Army Council that came to power. Later its official name became Provisional Military Administration Council (*Derg*) from 1974 to 1987. In 1987 the Workers Party of Ethiopia was established under the same leadership of the *Derg* and the state's official name changed to People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (PDRE). Colonel Mengistu HaileMariam became a chairman of the council in 1975. The he became the president of the country when PDRE was established in 1987 until it was overthrown in 1991.[373]

The 1987 constitution of PDRE shows that Ethiopia was a socialist state directed by the Marxism-Leninism ideology. Article 1 and 6 states as follows:

> The people's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia is a state of the working people founded on the alliance of workers and peasants and the participation of the intelligentsia, the revolutionary army, artisans, and other democratic sections of the society. (Article 1.1)

> The People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia shall, while accomplishing the national democratic revolution, lay the foundation for the construction of socialism. (Article 1.3)

> The Workers' Party of Ethiopia, which is guided by Marxism-Leninism, is a vanguard party dedicated to serve the working people and protect their interests. (Article 6.1)

> The Workers' Party of Ethiopia charts the direction for the development of the country and is the guiding force of the State and the entire society. (Article 6.2)

In 1991 the Ethiopian state underwent a significant rearrangement; the unitary state structure changed to a federal system, and in 1995 a new constitution was adopted. It established a democratic federal republic with a parliamentarian and multi-party system with nine states (ten in 2020). Since then, the ruling party is EPRDF until its reform under the new leadership of Prime

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[372] Budge, E. A. Wallis. *The Queen of Sheba and Her Only Son Menyelek (Këbra Nagast).* Ontario: Cambridge. 2000. xxxii.

[373] Commonly almost all literatures on Ethiopia refer the leadership of Ethiopia from 1974-1991 as "*Derg"* or "military government".

Minister Abiy Ahmed (Ph.D.) and change of its name to Prosperity Party (PP) in December 2019.

5.2 Ethiopian Foreign Relations/Policy

The Ethiopian Empire has a long history of foreign relations with the outside world. The illustrious stories of the powerful Solomonic monarchs of Ethiopia were told in the European legend as the Prester John of the Indies. Here it will be worth citing Edward Gibbon's words about Ethiopians traveling abroad and the perception of Ethiopia in Europe.

> For the beginning of the sixteenth century, we actually have a number of itineraries of Ethiopian monks who traveled to Europe through the Holy Land. These early pioneers set the tone of the relations between Europe and Ethiopia until the middle of the sixteenth century. Wherever they met fellow Christians from other countries, they transmitted vivid traditions about their church and its distinctive liturgical practices, about the Christian kingdom and its continuous conflicts with the neighboring Muslim areas, and about the Ethiopian interest in breaking their age-old isolation from the rest of the Christian world. Very often, these monks were too patriotic, and the stories they related about their country seem to have exaggerated the power and wealth of the Christian monarchs….
>
> In 1427 and 1450, we have reliable reports of Ethiopian delegations sent to Europe to establish friendly relations and to ask for European technicians and artisans. It is probable that some of the artisans requested in 1450 had reached Ethiopia, where some Europeans are reported as having been in the emperor's court in the early 1480s. It was, however, the Portuguese, with their remarkable success in navigating the eastern seas, who took most seriously the search for Prester John, with whom they established contact before the end of the fifteenth century. [374]

On the other hand, Matteo Salvadore asserts that the Ethiopian embassy to Venice in 1402 is the first documented visit of a sub-Saharan diplomatic mission to Europe who are the official envoys Emperor Dawit who was seeking artisans willing to travel to Ethiopia.[375] Predominant literatures on the medieval history of Ethiopia reveal that it is the Portuguese who set their feet in Abyssinia in searching of Prester John. The dramatic description of Edward Gibbon about medieval Ethiopia and its contact with the outside world reads as follows:

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[374] Edward Gibbon. *The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire.* eBookMall, Inc. 2001. Volume 4, Chapter XLVII, Part V.

[375] Salvadore, Matteo. "Encounters Between Ethiopia and Europe, 1400–1660." *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of African History.* Oxford University Press. https://oxfordre.com/africanhistory/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190277734.001.0001/acrefore-9780190277734-e-187. Accessed on 22 July 2019.

Encompassed on all sides by the enemies of their religion, the Ethiopian's slept near a thousand years, forgetful of the world, by whom they were forgotten. They were awakened by the Portuguese, who, turning the southern promontory of Africa, appeared in India and the Red Sea as if they had descended through the air from a distant planet. In the first moments of their interview, the subjects of Rome and Alexandria observed the resemblance, rather than the difference, of their faith; and each nation expected the most important benefits from an alliance with their Christian brethren. [376]

5.2.1 The Beginning of Modern Diplomacy

Ethiopia's modern diplomatic history began at the reign of Emperor Theodoros II in the mid-19th century. His foremost intention was obtaining technical expertise, mainly military from the western European states. This was due to the Ottomans control over the Red Sea region, ending Ethiopian authority there and particularly Egypt's hostility to control the Blue Nile. The concerns over the Blue Nile and the Red Sea have also been a focus and an essential feature in determining Ethiopia's foreign policy and international relations at different historical periods.[377]

Though the Emperor's aspiration to acquire professionals failed and led to war with the British, which ended with the suicide of Theodoros II when he was defeated, the tradition of contact with western powers was closely followed by his successor, Emperor Yohannes.[378]

The most important goal and the core of foreign policies of the successive three Ethiopian governments under Menelik II, Haile Selassie I, and Colonel Mengistu HaileMariam was to preserve the geographical entity of Ethiopia, and all three fought against external and internal enemies to preserve it. External threats were common in Ethiopian history. Apart from two armed encounters with Somalia in 1964 and 1977, Berouk Mesfin summaries the external threats as follows:

> In the sixteenth century, the Turks made repeated and unsuccessful attempts to conquer the northern parts of Ethiopia. Between 1820 and 1876, Egyptian invading forces carried out a series of military raids into Ethiopia from various directions. In the north, they were comprehensively defeated by Ethiopian armies at Gundet and Gura in 1875 and 1876, respectively. There was also the attempt to resist the British expedition commanded by

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[376] Edward Gibbon. *The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire.* eBookMall, Inc. 2001. Volume 4, Chapter XLVII, Part V.

[377] Berhanu, Taye. *An Introduction to Ethiopia's Foreign Policy: Its Process and Reflections pre-1991.* Addis Ababa: Far East Trading, 2010. p. i.

[378] MOFA. *Diplomatic History of Ethiopia.* http://www.mfa.gov.et/Home/TemplateI?PageName=History%20Of%20The%20Minstry&TYPE=The%20Ministry&SUBTYPE=The%20Ministry&Language=English, Accessed on 25 September 2020.

General Napier in 1868. Moreover, warfare against the Italians began in 1887 at Dogali and culminated in the decisive Ethiopian victory at Adwa in 1896. The Italians came back with a vengeance in 1935, invaded Ethiopia, and occupied it for five years.[379]

It was at the time of Emperor Menelik II that Ethiopia established modern institutions of administration. In 1900 the Emperor opted to establish a council of ministers composed of nine ministries, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Under Emperor Haile Selassie I and *Derg*, another distinctive and fundamental future of Ethiopian foreign policy is its unwavering policy of supporting liberation struggles in Africa. Two of the prominent instance of supports were the military training and an Ethiopian passport with an altered name given to Nelson Mandela[380] during his struggle against the South African Apartheid system by the government of Emperor Haile Sellassie I. Colonel Mengistu HaileMariam also given military supplies. They provided training camps in Ethiopia to the then Rhodesian (Zimbabwean) guerrillas led by Robert Mugabe against the white minority government.[381]

Ethiopian foreign policy took its more modern shape under the reign of Emperor Haile Selassie I. At this time, permanent representation has begun, and diplomatic missions opened in many countries.[382] Eighty-four ambassadors and nine consular service diplomats have been assigned to various countries during the Emperor's reign.[383]

Even before assuming his throne, his foreign policy achievement was to peruse Empress Zewditu to allow Ethiopia to be a member of the League of Nations in 1923. He noted in saying to the empress 'what Menelik successfully achieved in war, would be now accomplished by a mere

[379] Mesfin, Berouk. A Study of Decision-Making Process and the Strategies of Ethiopia's Foreing Policy (1974-1991), with Particular Emphasis on Ethio-US Relations. *Ethiopian Journal of the Soucial Sciences and Humanities.* Vol. II, No. 1. July 2004. 1-44. 16.

[380] SABC Digital News. "Mandela in Ethiopia." December 16, 2013. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RolO50qckvk, Accessed on 12 June 2019.

[381] The New York Times. "Ex-Ethiopia Chief Reaches Zimbabwe." May 23, 1991. https://www.nytimes.com/1991/05/23/world/ex-ethiopia-chief-reaches-zimbabwe.html, Accessed on 12 June 2019.

[382] Abotaa, Arka. *Ethiopia's Foreign Policy under Emperor Haile Selassie I: An Appraisal.* Thesis Submitted to the School of Graduate Studies of Addis Ababa University in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirement for the Degree of Master of Arts International Relations. December 6, 2002 Addis Ababa.

[383] Ibid.

putting signature in a piece of paper … membership to the League was, for no reason other than protecting the country from attack as per the covenant of the organization.'[384]

After he became emperor, Haile Selassie I was responsible for all matters related to foreign relations. Moreover, there was no official foreign policy or strategy, which was documented.

The Constitution in 1955 Article 30 states as follows:

> The Emperor exercises the supreme direction of the foreign relations of the Empire. The Emperor accredits and receives Ambassadors, Ministers, and Missions; He alone has the right to settle disputes with foreign powers by adjudication and other peaceful means and provides for the realization of the ends of security and common Defense. He alone has the right to ratify, on behalf of Ethiopia, treaties and other international agreements and to determine which treaties and international agreements shall be subject to ratification before becoming binding upon the Empire.[385]

Beside Ethiopia being a member of the League of Nations in 1923, the outmost Ethiopian diplomatic achievements in this period were Ethiopia's being a founding member of the UN in 1945 and establishing OAU in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia by the custodianship of emperor Haile Selassie I in 1963. The special relationship between all successive Ethiopian governments continued with the OAU/AU as Ethiopia is the seat of the AU which entails it carry a special responsibility for the organization.[386]

On the other hand, Ethiopian relation with Egypt has been challenging. The two permanent and most important elements in Ethiopian and Egyptian relations have been religion and water.[387] The first element relates to the relationship through the Orthodox churches; since the 4th century A.D. Ethiopia used to receive bishops from the Egyptian Orthodox Church of Alexandria, Egypt

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[384] Haile Selassie cited in Abotaa, Arka. *Ethiopia's Foreign Policy under Emperor Haile Selassie I: An Appraisal*. Thesis Submitted to the School of Graduate Studies of Addis Ababa University in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirement for the Degree of Master of Arts International Relations. December 6, 2002 Addis Ababa. 26.

[385] Sigatu, Kaleab T. *Constitution in Ethiopia…* 24.

[386] Ministry of Information Press & Audiovisual Department. *The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Foreign Affairs and National Security Policy and Strategy.* Addis Ababa. 2002

[387] Arisano, Yacob. "Ethiopia and the Nile: Dilemmas of National and Regional Hydropolitics". Thesis presented to for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. Faculty of Arts of the University of Zurich, 2007.

which the two sisterly Churches have shared the same rite, rituals and dogma. The only exception has been in the use of languages.[388]

The second one is the issue of the Nile River which has two major tributaries: the White Nile and the Abbay River (Blue Nile) which originated from the Ethiopian highlands and supplies about 85% of the Nile. According to the Arab historian Maqrizi a good historical example of the two elements of Ethio-Egyptian relations was a 14th century incident, during the rule of Mamluk Sultan al Nassir Muhammad Ibn Qala'un. The Sultan had oppressed his Coptic Christian subjects and demolished their churches. Consequently, Ethiopian Emperor, Amda Tsion (1312 – 1343) sent a mission to warn the Sultan that unless he did not cease to oppress the Christians in his country he would divert the direction of the course of the Nile waters, stopping them from going to Egypt.[389]

It has been documented that, Egyptian rulers and the colonial powers made it a number one priority to stop the Ethiopians from using the Nile waters to any meaningful way. Moreover, Nile water agreements express clearly that the downstream actors are firm in their positions and political-military maneuvers that Ethiopia should stay away from any substantive use of the water resources. Egypt has been supporting rebel groups against the emperor and this continued at the time of the military government and the diplomatic rivalry come to the front when Ethiopia announces its plan to build a massive hydroelectric dam, Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) on *Abbay* River in April 2011. Thus, the then president of Egypt Mohamod Mursi responded by stating "…we have very serious measures to protect every single drop of Nile water … if it diminishes by one drop then our blood is the alternative."[390]

5.2.1 Foreign Policy of the Military Government (*Derg* and PDRE)

In 1974 the Coordinating Committee of the Armed Forces (*Derg)* was formed, composed of junior officers and non-commissioned officers. After few months, it transformed itself into the Pro-

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[388] This practice continued uninterrupted until 1958, when the Coptic Church of Alexandria, upon the insistence of the Ethiopian Emperor, ordained an Ethiopian bishop as the spiritual head of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church, Haile Selassie I. Since 1958 the Church's national Holy Synod appoints the Patriarch and other church leaders of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church.

[389] Arisano, Yacob. "Ethiopia and the Nile: …. 2007.

[390]BBC. "Egyptian warning over Ethiopia Nile Dam". 10 June 2013. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-22850124. Accessed in October 9 2017.

visional Military Administrative Council. Later in 1987, it was transformed to establishing the Workers Party of Ethiopia and led the newly structured socialist government, and the official name of the state became People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia.

Ethiopia shifted its affiliation to the Soviet bloc during this time, and its foreign policy base became left-wing, proletarian internationalism. The 1987 People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia's Constitution, Foreign Policy states this as follows:

> The foreign policy of the People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia is based on the principle of proletarian internationalism, peaceful coexistence, and non-alignment. (Article 27) The People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, while safeguarding the interests of the country, shall promote relations and cooperation with all states on the basis of equality and mutual benefit. It shall respect the right of states to live under the social and economic system of their choice. (Article 2.1) The People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia shall promote all-around relations and cooperation with socialist states and strengthen its relations with the international working-class movement, revolutionary democratic forces, national liberation movements, and other democratic and peace-loving forces. (Article 2.2) The People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia shall staunchly struggle against imperialism, colonialism, neo-colonialism, racism, and other forms of oppression and exploitation. (Article 2.3)

> The People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia shall strive for cooperation among peoples, mutual development, and the strengthening of good-neighborly relation with adjoining states on the basis of respect for the inviolability of national sovereignty and territorial integrity of states, non-interference in their internal affairs, peaceful resolution of conflicts and, in general, the principles of non-alignment. (Article 29)

> The People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia shall actively participate in international and regional organizations that stand for peace and for the well-being and progress of mankind. (Article 30)[391]

Thus, until 1991 Ethiopian foreign policy was based on socialist orientations, Marxism-Leninism ideology, and unit-imperialism, unti-colonialism, unti-neo-colonialism.[392] Moreover, there were 1,200 Soviet forces, and 16-17,000 Cuban forces were stationed in Ethiopia [393]

It was during this time that the Ethiopian state developed a foreign policy document for the first time in its history. The hardly seen 297-page foreign policy document of the military govern-

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[391] Sigatu, Kaleab T. *Constitution in Ethiopia…* 130.

[392] MOFA. *Ethiopian Foreign Policy Directions and Study of Political Affairs. [Amharic] Ye'Etiyopiya Yewichi Polisi Akitachana Yepoletica Gudayoch Tinat)*. MOFA: Addis Ababa. 1984.

[393] International Institute for Strategic Studies. *The Military Balance: The Annual Assessment of Global Military Capabilities and Defense Economics.* 1980-81. London: Arms and Amour Press.

ment, *Derg* has three parts in addition to its introduction and conclusion.[394] The first part discusses the then-current world conditions and power alignment of first the imperialist domain, second the socialist domain, third the position of developing counties in the global power alignment, fourth about Africa, and fifth about Ethiopia. Part two discussed Ethiopia's foreign policy purposes, principles, and goals. It also defined twenty specific goals. These includes; seeking a lasting solution to the crisis between Ethiopia and Somalia; ensuring and enforcing Ethiopia's rights in the Red Sea; developing and implement a policy for the use of the Nile River; strengthen relations with socialist countries; promoting relationships with neighboring countries in good neighborliness spirit; enhancing Ethiopia's role in the African continent; improving Ethiopia's relations with the Arab world; enhancing Ethiopia's participation and influence in the United Nations and the African Union, the Non-Aligned Movement and other international forums; and supporting national liberation movements, and contribute to the maintenance of world peace and tranquility.

Part three of the document discusses Ethiopian foreign policy's direction and implementation with five subtopics which are; first, issues that need attention; second, sequence of focus areas for Ethiopian diplomatic effort; third, international organizations; fourth, Governmental and Non-Governmental Organizations of which Ethiopia is not a member; and fifth, various issues. The sequence of Ethiopian diplomatic focus areas begins from Socialist countries, then Africa (in order of first adjacent neighbors, then Nile valley countries, West African counties, etc.), then Middle East countries, Western Europe, North America, Latin America, and Carrabin and finally Asian countries.

5.2.3 Post 1991 Ethiopian Foreign Policy (FDRE)

After the end of the 1991 Transitional Government tenure, the 1995 Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia's constitution states the principles for external relations on Article 86 as follows:

> (1) To promote policies of foreign relations based on the protection of national interests and respect for the sovereignty of the country. (2) To promote mutual respect for national sovereignty and equality of states and non-interference in the internal affairs of other states. (3) To ensure that the foreign relation policies of the country are based on mutual interests and equality of states, as well as those international agreements, pro-

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[394] MOFA. *Ethiopian Foreign Policy Directions…1984.*

mote the interests of Ethiopia. (4) To observe international agreements that ensure respect for Ethiopia's sovereignty and are not contrary to the interests of its Peoples. (5) To forge and promote ever-growing economic union and fraternal relations of Peoples with Ethiopia's neighbors and other African countries. (6) To seek and support peaceful solutions to international disputes.[395]

Since 1991, and especially after the 2002 Ethiopian Foreign Affairs and National Security Policy and Strategy release, Ethiopia's national interests primarily focus on the country's internal political and economic vulnerabilities. Affirming as follows:

> Our foreign relations and national security policy and strategy can only have relevance if it contributes to the fight against poverty and promotes speedy economic development, democracy, and peace. If we do not realize our goals, one can predict that our country will be exposed to great instability and even collapse, and our very security, and indeed survival, will be at stake.[396]

The policy and strategy document has two parts. The first part deals with the foundations of foreign affairs and national security policy, which are: development and the building of a democratic system; national pride and prestige; and globalization. The second part lists the objectives, and the third part lists five strategies: devoting the prime focus to activities at home; strategy centered on the economy; full utilization of benefits based on proper analysis; minimizing threats based on proper analysis; reducing vulnerability to threats; building a reliable defense capability and building strong implementation capacity. The second part contains a detailed description of Ethiopia's relations with other countries, listed into seven regions: the Horn of Africa, other African countries, Middle East, Europe, USA, Asia, and international & non-governmental organizations.

Ethiopian Minister of Foreign Affairs from 2012-2016, Tedros Adhanom in his speech at the Africa Programme, Chatham House, elaborated the philosophy behind Ethiopia's foreign policy as follows:

> … Ethiopia, attaches utmost importance to its relations with its neighbors and believes that creating the economic conditions of regional integration is vital. It is accordingly taking concrete action to promote regional integration by linking the sub-region with massive infrastructure developments. In this regard, our road link with Djibouti and Sudan is creating an enabling environment for trade and people-to-people contact, and the stand-

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[395] Sigatu, Kaleab T. *Constitution in Ethiopia* …200.

[396] Ministry of Information Press & Audiovisual Department. *The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Foreign Affairs and National Security Policy and Strategy.* Addis Ababa. 2002

ard-gauge rail linking Ethiopia and Djibouti is expected to be operational next year. The Ethiopian side of the road linking Ethiopia and Kenya is already completed, and the Kenyan side is nearing its completion. The Lamu Port and Lamu South Sudan Ethiopia Transport Corridor project involving railway, road, and port infrastructure is currently underway…Ethiopia has already begun supplying Djibouti and Sudan with electric power and signed a deal with Kenya for two thousand megawatts more; that will be realized after the completion of the Ethiopian renaissance dam. That East African power pool can actually reach up to Rwanda.[397]

… We realize that the durability of the successes we have achieved as a country depends on the prevalence of peace and security in the whole of our sub-region. Ethiopia firmly believes that its peace and security are the peace and security of its neighbors and vice versa. This explains Ethiopia's commitment to peace and security, as demonstrated by our participation in the various peacekeeping operations within our sub-region in particular and our continent in general. In our sub-region, the deployment of Ethiopian troops in Darfur, Abyei, and Somalia has made a significant contribution to the maintenance of regional peace, security, and stability. Especially if you take Abyei: it is just Ethiopian troops keeping the peace of that disputed border between Sudan and South Sudan. During the last five years, we have increased our contribution to the UN peacekeeping operations fourfold. Currently, Ethiopia is the second-largest troop-contributing country to UN peacekeeping missions. If we add to this our involvement in African Union peacekeeping missions, we will find that Ethiopia is the largest contributor of peacekeeping troops in the world.[398]

The key institutions of FDRE, which are the main drivers of foreign policy, are the Office of the Prime Minister, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defense, the Ethiopian National Defense Force, and the National Intelligence and Security Services. Others like the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, and the Inland Revenue and Customs Authority are also important institutions.[399] However, in almost all governments, foreign policy is reserved to the executive branch, and effective powers are concentrated in a few men's hands.[400]

As William Wallace described it:

It is characteristic of the foreign policy process that a greater degree of secrecy, of concern for confidentiality, and the need to avoid breaches of security, is observed by those

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[397] Gebreyesus, Tedros A. "Ethiopia's Foreign Policy: Regional Integration and International Priorities." Programme, Chatham House. 23 October 2015. https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/events/20151023-ethiopia-foreign-policy-regional-integration-international-policies-qa.pdf, Accessed on 24 November 2018.

[398] Ibid.

[399] Maru, Mehari T. *A Regional Power in the Making: Ethiopian Diplomacy in the Horn of Africa.* Occasional Paper 261. South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA). June 2017.

[400] Frankel, Joseph cited in William Wallace, *Foreign Policy and Political Process.* London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1971. 10.

involved. This in itself places a peculiar barrier in the way of the would-be student of for-eign policy: that the practice of foreign policy is more shrouded in secrecy, that access to material is more difficult to obtain than in almost any other area of politics.[401]

This is the case of Ethiopia, where a single party is ruling since 1991, and few individuals control state power. However, from few primary and secondary resources, it can be concluded that most of the crucial foreign policy decisions like the Ethio-Eritrean war from 1998-2001, Ethiopia's role in the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), climate change negotiations, the appointment of the chair of the UN-supported AU High-Level Implementation Panel (AU HIP), and the deployment in 2011 of the UN Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) were solely dependent on the personal leadership of the former Prime Minister Meles Zenawi.[402]

Currently, Ethiopia has diplomatic missions in 47 countries. Focusing its regional policy issues by dividing into six; specifically, in Neighboring Countries, African Countries, Middle East Countries, Asian Countries, European Countries, and the United States of America. There are four permanent secretaries to African and Middle East Asian Countries; Europe-America-Asia and Multi-Lateral; Human Resource and Administrative; and Diaspora, Consular and Economic Diplomacy. MOFA is also organizationally divided into 29 director generals and offices, led by a minster and three states ministers for political affairs, business and diaspora affairs, and human resource and administrative affairs.

5.2.4 Ethiopia at the UN

Ethiopia, alongside Bolivia, Kazakhstan, Sweden, and Italy & the Netherlands (both agreed to split a term, taking a year apiece), started its two-year term as a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council on 1st January 2017. It ended on 31st December 2018, and

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[401] Wallace, William. *Foreign Policy and Political Process.* London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1971. 10.

[402] Maru, Mehari T. *A Regional Power in the Making: Ethiopian Diplomacy in the Horn of Africa.* Occasional Paper 261. South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA). June 2017.

Maru, Mehari T. 'Ethiopia and AU', in Gelot L & M Eriksson (eds), *The African Union in Light of the Arab Revolts: An Appraisal of the Foreign Policy and Security Objectives of South Africa, Ethiopia and Algeria*, Nordic Africa Institute & Swedish Defense Research Agency Discussion Paper, 76, May 2013, http://nai.diva-portal.org/smash/record.jsf?pid=diva2%3A622198&dswid=5970, Accessed in 6 January 2020.

Interview with Dawit Yiriga, Former FDRE's Political Coordinator of the Permanent Mission to the African Union in Addis Ababa, Former Minister Counsellor at Permanent Mission to the United Nations in New York, currently Director-General for International Organization in MOFAat the Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 26 August 2019.

South Africa joined the Security Council to represent Africa alongside Cote D'Ivoire and Equatorial Guinea. In the past, Ethiopia got non-permanent seats in the Security Council two times before in 1967-68, and in1989-90.

Ethiopia is a founding member of the United Nations and its predecessor – the League of Nations. Although it could not count on the League of Nations' support in its hour of need, Ethiopia never lost confidence in multilateralism. It remained a staunch supporter of the principle of collective security embodied in the United Nations Charter.

Ethiopia's commitment to UN peace endeavors has not been mere talk. It has been practical, concrete, and demonstrable. Its role in peacekeeping began in the early 1950s and continued during the civil war in Congo. Over the last twenty years, Ethiopia's contribution to UN peacekeeping has grown by leaps and bounds. The United Nations and the international community have publicly appreciated the discipline, professionalism, and dedication of Ethiopian peacekeepers in the effective and successful discharge of their responsibilities.

September 2017 was a month of Ethiopia's Presidency of the Security Council. One of Ethiopia's significant achievements in peace support operations in recent years was the adoption of Resolution 2378 (2017), adopted by the Security Council at its 8051st meeting, on 20 September 2017, on financing AU-led peace support operations. Other achievements were also, as Ethiopia being among the top five TCCs to United Nations Peacekeeping, Ethiopia is also a member of the UN Peace-building Commission (PBC).[403] The mandate renewal of UNISFA, maintaining UNISFA's support to the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism (JBVMM), and avoid significant cuts to the troop size would have enormous implications not only for the safety and security of Ethiopian peacekeepers but also for the lifting of the sanctions imposed on Eritrea by adopting resolution 2444 (2018), which Ethiopia requested.

The draft resolution proposed by Ethiopia was unanimously adopted by the Council at the High-Level Open Debate and co-sponsored by more than sixty UN Member States. Resolution 2378 (2017), the partnership between the United Nations and the African Union for the financing of

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[403] CDRC. 'Ethiopia's term as a non-permanent member at the Security Council'. *CDRC DIGEST.* Vol. 4 No. 2, February 2019

AU-led peace support operations, and the Security Council has decided to consider taking practical steps toward financing on a case-by-case basis.[404]

Ethiopia's achievement can be summarized as follows:

> In line with these aims and hopes, Ethiopia has tried to be a strong voice for Africa, reflecting the common position of Africa in various matters of peace and security that have arisen across the continent during this period, and with some success. In recognition of the valuable and useful role Ethiopia has been able to achieve, the AU Peace and Security Council, at its 814th meeting, held on 5 December 2018, said: "Council commended the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia for the important and exemplary role it played during its tenure, championing, promoting and defending the African common positions and concerns within the UN Security Council decision-making process."[405]

5.3 The Ethiopian Armed Forces

The idea of modern military formation in Ethiopia begins with Emperor Tewodros II (ruled 1855-1868), who reunified the Ethiopian empire. During the Emperor's time, in the words of Philip Marsden, 'War, drove the ambition and passion of every Ethiopian highlander. War was a way of life, an end in itself.'[406] However, Emperor Tewodros II planned to bring all regional forces under a single national command, the emperor. According to Bahru Zewde, 'to Tewoddros, who owed his political power more to his military prowess than to his genealogy, the army's central role must have been even more vital. He set out to remold Ethiopia's military structure in three important respects: organization, discipline, and armament.'[407]

Tewodros tried to acquire western technology to modernize his army. He made a failed attempt to get artisans from England. He wrote a letter to the Queen of England stating:

> God's creature and slave, the son of David and Solomon, King of Kings Tewodros. May this letter reach the servant of the Queen of England: What I require from you … is you should send me a cannon-maker, a gunsmith, an iron smelter, a sapper, and a gunner. By

[404] Ibid.

[405] Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. *Two years as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council (Part 1)*. December 14, 2018. https://mfaethiopiablog.wordpress.com/2018/12/14/two-years-as-a-non-permanent-member-of-the-un-security-council-part-1/, Accessed on 27 January 2019.

[406] Marsden, Philip. *The Barefoot Emperor: An Ethiopian Tragedy*. London: Harper Perennial. 2008. 5.

[407] Zewde, Bahru. *A History of Modern Ethiopia: 1855-1991*. 2nd Edition. Addis Ababa: Addis Ababa University Press. 2002. 32.

the power of God, let all these craftsmen come together with their equipment so that they may return after instructing me.[408]

However, when the queen did not send artisans, Tewodros ordered the European Protestant missionaries to establish a foundry in Gafat, insisting on modern weapons production. The missionaries were able to produce mortars, including the largest one named 'Sebastopol.'

Another important landmark in Ethiopian military history is the Italian invasion and the Battle of Adwa. It was after the death of Emperor Yohannes, Menelik of Shoa declared himself as King of Kings and became Emperor Menelik II in 1889. In the same year, the Italians signed the Treaty of Wuchale with Ethiopia, recognizing Menelik II as emperor. However, Article 17 of the Italian version states that Italy would control Ethiopia's external affairs (which aimed to make Ethiopia Italy's protectorate), and the Amharic version said that Menelik could choose to ask the Italians to act on his behalf, but not required to do so.[409] It was deemed as a ploy of the Italians, and Menelik II revoked the treaty in 1893. This was the beginning of hostility between the two states.

In 1895 the Italians defeated the ruler of Tigre, Northern Ethiopia, Ras Mangasha, and fortified Adigrat and Mekele. At the end of the same year, Emperor Menelik II mobilized his forces from all corners of the empire and marched to the north by issuing a declaration of war:

> Assemble the army, beat the drum. God in his bounty has struck down my enemies and enlarged my empire and preserved me to this day. Enemies have come who would ruin our country and change our religion. They have passed beyond the sea that God gave us for our frontier. I, aware that herds were decimated and people were exhausted, did not wish to do anything [about it] until now. These enemies have advanced, burrowing into the country like moles. With God's help, I will get rid of them. You who are strong give me your strength, and you who are weak, help me by prayer. If you refuse to follow me, look out! I shall not fail to punish you.[410]

Menelik II mobilized a force of around 100,000 troops, and the Italians sent about 25,000 troops. It was on the 1st of March 1896, the decisive battle of Adwa was fought, and the Italian army defeated, and with it, the 'Italian ambition was dead, and independent Ethiopia survived.'[411]

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[408] Rubenson cited in Henze, Paul B. *Layers of Time: A History of Ethiopia.* London: Hurst & Company. 2000. 138.

[409] McLachlan, Sean. Armies of the Adowa Campaign 1896: The Italian Disaster in Ethiopia. New York: Osprey Publishing, 2011. 6.

[410] Prouty, Chris. Empress Taytu and Menilek II: Ethiopia, 1883-1910. Trenton: Red Sea Press. 2016. 133-134.

[411] Bahru Zewde. *A History of Modern Ethiopia 1955-1991,* 2nd Edition Addis Ababa: Addis Ababa University press. 76-79.

Because of Ethiopian independence and the history of freedom from colonialism, there is special collective behavior in its foreign policy and military orientation. The Adowa victory against the Italian colonial invasion is seen as 'the epitome of African militancy, hardihood, and heroism.'[412]

In addition to the Ethiopian military victory against the colonial power, its red, yellow (gold), and green-colored flag symbolizes freedom and Pan-Africanism.[413] It inspired the flags of other African nations. That is why most African states have the three colors in a different order. The red, yellow (gold), and green Ethiopian flag had been flown in Ethiopia for decades before the military victory; however, it is in the wake of the defeat of the Italians, Emperor Menelik II commissioned the first official flag in 1897, which became the first African nation-state flag.[414]

The first African state of being independent, Ghana, in 1957, took the flag color of Ethiopia and became the first country to use the Pan-African colors of red, yellow and green, and black star in the middle from Marcus Garvey's 'Back to Africa' movement.[415] Guinea, Cameroon, the Togolese Republic, Mali, and Senegal all had variations on the theme but acknowledged that these were pan-African colors for a continent united in rejecting rule from abroad and seeking a better future.[416] At least eighteen sub-Saharan national flags are variations on the pan-African colors of red, yellow, green, and also black; likewise, many states are clearly influenced by them.[417]

Even beyond the continent, the Ethiopian flag colors inspired the Jamaican-born Marcus Mosiah Garvey, a man who promoted racial separateness and was one of the founders of the Back to Africa concept in New York.[418] In addition to this, since the 1930s, the Ethiopian flag colors became popular among the Rastafarian religious movement in Jamaica who looked to Ethiopia for political and spiritual guidance.[419]

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[412] Abraham, Kinfe. *Ethiopia from Empire to Federation.* Addis Ababa, EIIP Press. 2001. 143.

[413] Devereux, Eva. Flags of the World. New York: Crescent Books. 1992. 35.

[414] Marshall, Tim. *A Flag Worth Dying for: The Power and Politics of National Symbols.* New York. 2017. 191-193.

[415] Crampton, William. *Pocket Guide to Flags.* New York. Salamander Books Ltd. 1992. 57.

[416] Marshall, Tim. *A Flag Worth Dying for: The Power and Politics of National Symbols.* New York. 2017. 197.

[417] Ibid. 200.

[418] Marshall, Tim. *A Flag Worth Dying for: The Power and Politics of National Symbols.* New York. 2017. 195-196.

[419] DK Publishing. Complete Flags of the World. London: DK Publishing, 2008. 109.

Thus, Ethiopia's military victory against the colonial aggression created both institutional and individual behavior, which have also been reflected in all post-Adwa regimes in their recruitment of the army, indoctrination, and also peace support deployment with the motive of giving a hand for those who are fraught with menace.

5.3.1 The Beginning of Modern Military

Modernization of the Ethiopian army started in 1917 when the Imperial Bodyguard was formed as a regular standing force by Teferi Mekonne, who later became Emperor Haile Selassie I. In 1935, Ethiopia opened the first military officer's training academy at Holeta town 44 k.m from the capital Addis Ababa. Later, using the modern army ranks was adopted instead of the old traditional names for a top army officer . The following were the traditional rank naming with the modern equivalent of each: ራስ ቢትወደድ (Ras Bitewedid) – General, ራስ (Ras) – Lieutenant General, ደጃዝማች (Dejazimach) – Major General, ፊታውራሪ (Fitawirari) – Brigadier General, ቀኛዝማች (Kegnazimach) – Colonel, ግራዝማች (Girazimach) – Lieutenant Colonel.

Ethiopia's first 1931 constitution declares that the Emperor has power over all military issues and the army is loyal and obedient to the Emperor. A few of the articles from the constitutions declare as follows:

> The Emperor shall decide the organization and regulation of all administrative departments. It is the Emperor's right to appoint and dismiss officers in the army as well as civil officials and to decide their respective functions and salaries. (Article 11) The right of declaring war and concluding peace is legally reserved to the Emperor. (Article 12) It is the Emperor's right to decide what armed forces shall be maintained, both in time of peace and in time of war. (Article 13) All members of the Ethiopian army owe absolute loyalty and obedience to the Emperor, in conformity with the provisions of the law. (Article 20)[420]

In the 1955 revised constitution, the Emperor still has all the power over the military. The only difference from the previous constitution is Article 29 declares the waging of war; the parliament has to consent with the Emperor. The article reads as follows:

> The Emperor reserves the right, with the advice and consent of Parliament, to declare war. He, further, reserves the right to decide what armed forces shall be maintained both in time of peace and in time of war. As Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, He has the right to organize and command the said Forces; to commission and to confer mili-

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[420] Sigatu, Kaleab T. *Constitution in Ethiopia…* 54

tary rank upon the officers of the said Forces, and to promote, transfer, or dismiss any of the said officers. He has, further, the right to declare a state of siege, martial law, or a national emergency, and to take such measures as are necessary to meet a threat to the Defense or integrity of the Empire and to assure its Defense and integrity.[421]

The Ethiopian air force was established in 1929 after Emperor Haile Selassie decided to set up an Ethiopian air military.[422] However, the Ethiopian did not have a modern army until 1941. Emperor Haile Selassie I created a strong centralized professional regular army as part of his project to build a centralized monarchical state. The military's weakness was perceived to be a critical factor in Ethiopia's inability to prevent Italian occupation in 1935.[423]

5.3.2 The Military Government (*Derg* and PDRE)

The period of the *Derg,* which spanned from 1974 to 1991, brought about significant political crises and societal transformations for the Ethiopian state. However, between 1974 and 1991, the army grew from about 46,000 to nearly 500,000.[424] The most distinctive features of the army at this period were the "call of the motherland" to get the support of the people to fight against the Somalian invasion in 1977. At the same time the new military government was facing insurgents in most of Eritrea and Tigray. By the "call of the motherland" the government was able build up an estimated number of 100,000 regulars and 150,000 combat-ready militia men.[425] Also *Derg* set up the Supreme Military Strategic Committee (SMSC), composed of Ethiopian, Russian, and Cuban officers, to map and direct the counteroffensive campaign against the Somalian force which entered to the Ethiopian territory up to Dire Dawa.[426] Ethiopian cemented its military victory in 1978 by securing its Ogadan region. The following table shows Ethiopian military capability in 1980-81.

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[421] Ibid.

[422] Cooper, Tom. *Wings Over Ogaden: The Ethiopian-Somali War 1978-79.* Durban: Pinetown Printers. 2014. 7.

[423] Berhe, Mulugeta G. The Ethiopian post-transition Security Sector Reform Experience: Building a National Army from a Revolutionary Democratic Army. *African Security Review,* 26:2, 2017. 162.

[424] Ayele, Fantahun. *The Ethiopian Army: From Victory to Collapse, 1977-1991.* Evantson ILL.: Northwestern University Press, 2014. 27.

[425] Erlich, Haggai. The Ethiopian Army and the 1974 Revolution. *Armed Forces and Sociaty,* 9/3. Spring 1983. 455-481. 477.

[426] Tareke, Gebru. *The Ethiopian Revolution: War in the Horn of Africa.* Addis Ababa: Eclipse Printing Press, 2016. 204.

Population	31,100,000	
Military Service	Conscription	
Estimated GNP 1979	$3.bn	
Defense Expenditure	1980: $385m	
Total Armed Forces	229,500*	
	Army	225,000
	Navy	1,500 (Bases: Massawa and Assab)
	Air Force	3,000; 100+ Combat Aircrafts.
Reserves (All services)	20,000	
Para-Military Forces	169,000	
	Mobile Emergency Police Force	9,000
	People's Militia	150,000 (in 10 divisions with more, ATK guns)
	People's Protection Bodies	10,000

Table 5.1 Ethiopian Military Capability in 1980-81. [427]

After the war with Somalia, the Ethiopian army kept strong relations with Soviet Union including copying its political ideology (socialism) and military doctrine of the Soviet Red Army (the Triangular Command: Military Commander, Political Officer, and Security Officer). Beside peasant militias, the government introduced conscription to the army. According to the 1983 National Military Service Proclamation all Ethiopian men between the ages of 18 and 30 were required to undergo six months of military training followed by two years of active duty, after which they would be placed on reserve status until age 50. The following articles of the 1987 PDRE Constitution convey the status of the armed forces of Ethiopia on that time:

> The PDRE shall defend its sovereignty and territorial integrity and safeguard the revolution. *(Article 24. 1)*

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* Some 16,500 Cubans and about 300 Warsaw Pact technicians and advisers serve with the Ethiopian forces and operate aircraft and heavy equipment. Some South Yemeni troops also served.

[427] IISS. *The Military Balance: The Annual Assessment of Global Military Capabilities and Defense Economics. 1980-81.* London: Arms and Amour Press. 1980. 52.

The Defense of the country and the revolution is the historical responsibility of the entire working people. *(Article 24.2)*

The Defense force of the PDRE is an army of the working people that stands and struggles for the unity of the country, the supremacy of the working people, and for peace and socialism. *(Article 25.2)*

The PDRE shall promote the working people's spirit of patriotism and revolutionary valor, and when necessary, mobilize the entire working people for the Defense of the country and the protection of the people and the revolution. *(Article 26.2)*

The PDRE shall foster the spirit of socialist patriotism of the youth and implement the National Military Service. *(Article 26.3)*

The PDRE shall organize civil defense to withstand natural and man-made calamities. *(Article 26.4)*

National military service is the right and duty of every Ethiopian. *(Article 53.3)*

Though Ethiopia defeated the Somali invasion in the south, the civil war in the north engulfed the county in 1980. The Eritrean separatist, Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) and the ethnic autonomist, Tigrayan People Liberation Front (TPLF) were the two primary insurgent movements in the north against the government. *Derg* launched numerous operations against them, however in 1991 the two rebel groups captured the capital Addis Ababa and Eritrea seceded under the leadership of EPLF and TPLF[428] formed a Transitional Government in Ethiopia. The following table show the military capability of Ethiopia in 1990-1991.

Population	49,102,000	
Military Service	Conscription, 30 months, incl. Police, Boarder Guard	
Estimated GDP 1989	$5.97bn	
Defense Expenditure 1987/88	$471.59m	
Total Armed Forces	438,000	
	Army	430,000 (incl. People's Militia)
	Navy	3,500 (Bases: Assab) Massawa held by EPLF
	Air Force	4,500; 120 Combat Aircrafts and 20 armed hel.
Reserves (People's Militia, All citizens 18-50 do 6 mths trg. Assigned to army, Police and Boarder Guard)	-	

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[428] TPLF was able to create EPRDF in 1991, which is a coalition of ethnic parties consisting of four parties including TPLF, namely, Southern Ethiopian People's Democratic Movement (SEPDM), Oromo Peoples' Democratic Organization (OPDO), and Amhara National Democratic Movement (ANDM).

Para-Military Forces	9000	
	Boarder Guard, Mobile Emergency Police Force	9000
Opposition	**EPLF** - some 40-50,000 'regulars', 30,000 'militia'	
	TPLF - some 30-40,000 'regulars', plus 'militia'	
	Oromo Liberation Front - 7,000	
	Islamic Oromo Liberation Front - 2,000	
Foreign Forces	**Cuba** - 25 advisers	
	Israel[429] - some 125 advisers and technicians	
	North Korea - 200 advisers	
	Soviet Union - some 550 advisers and technicians	

Table 5.2 Ethiopian Military Capability in 1990-91. [430]

5.3.3 Post 1991 Ethiopian Military (FDRE)

After the defeat of the *Derg* government and dissolution of the national army, the two wining forces EPRDF and EPLF had about 65,000 (55,000 of them are members of TPLF) and 60,000 troops respectively.[431] After the 1995 FDRE's new constitution, a new national army was established in 1996. The FDRE's Constitution Article 87 "Principles for National Defense" states that:

> The composition of the national armed forces shall reflect the equitable representation of the Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples of Ethiopia. (1) The Minister of Defense shall be a civilian. (2) The armed forces shall protect the sovereignty of the country and carry out any responsibilities as may be assigned to them under any state of emergency declared in accordance with the Constitution. (3) The armed forces shall at all times obey and respect the Constitution. (4) The armed forces shall carry out their functions free of any partisanship to any political organization(s).[432]

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[429] On the other hand, Israel was giving military support to the government fearing Ethiopian government fall into being another Arab-influenced state on the Red Sea coast.

[430] Source: IISS. The Military Balance 1990-91: *The Annual Assessment of Global Military Capabilities and Defense Economics.* London: Arms and Armor Press, 1991.131-132

[431] IISS. The Military Balance 1991-1992. *The Annual Assessment of Global Military Capabilities and Defense Economics.* London: Arms and Armor Press, 1992. 131-132

[432] Proclamation No.1/1995 Proclamation of the Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia.

The Defense Forces Proclamation No. 1100/2019, Article 7.5 also asserts, 'Recruitment for military service as well as promotion for rank and position shall be merit-based, and it shall ensure the equitable representation of nation, nationalities, people, and women.' However, as in most multi-ethnic states, this remains the main challenge in the army. Most of the core of the new Ethiopian army and security apparatus remains heavily dominated (particularly at the top) by Tigrayan veterans of the liberation war.[433] Nevertheless, after the reform and change of leadership in the ruling party EPRDF in April 2018, the new leadership forced most of the veterans to retire in order to balance the ethnic composition in the army. ENDF has 247 Generals, out of which 5 are full four-star Generals. Ethiopia has 84 Generals at the time of Haile Selassie I and 209 at the time of the Military government *Derg*.

According to the Military Balance in 2014, "up to 50% if total land force personnel are deployed along the border with Eritrea, of whom one third are on the front line; between 5-8% are in Somalia; about 5% are on UN operations; and smaller numbers are deployed on internal operations." [434]

The ENDF consists of Ground Force, Air Force, Naval Force, and Special Operations Force, including, as necessary, Space and Cyber Forces.[435] Though Ethiopia does not have sea out late after Eritrea's secession in 1991, under the new Defense Forces Proclamation No. 1100/2019 it has established a Navy. Ethiopia's new Navy will be based in Djibouti, and Rear Admiral Kindu Gezu, who is leading the reestablishment process of the Ethiopian Naval Force, has been promoted to the rank of First Chief Commander of the Army. The Navy's headquarter is at the West Command of the ENDF in Bahir Dar, the lakeside regional capital of Amhara Region.[436]

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[433] Fisher, Jonathan. 'Post-liberation armies and peacekeeping: From guerrillas to securocrats?' Abstract. Presented at CFEE workshop: African Armies in Multilateral Peace Support Operations: Social and Professional Changes at Stake. Organized by CFEE & Institute for Peace and Security Studies, Addis Ababa University, Addis Ababa, 25-26 April 2016. https://cfee.hypotheses.org/1554, Accessed on 06 January, 2019.

[434] IISS. *The Military Balance 2014: The Annual Assessment of Global Military Capabilities and Defense Economics*. London: Routledge, 2014. 418.

[435] Proclamation No.1100 /2019 A Proclamation of Defence Forces of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia.

[436] Branapress. *Ethiopia: 1,000 army officers sent to Russia for training.* December 11, 2019. https://www.branapress.com/2019/12/11/ethiopia-1000-army-officers-sent-to-russia-for-training/, Accessed on 17 December 2019.

In areas of military industry, some of the existing defense industry capability are: Hibret Machine Tools, which produces medium weapons for the ENDF and civilian output, includes hand tools, hospital beds, aluminum saddles, and household and office furniture; Gafat Armament Engineering Complex which produces a wide range of infantry equipment; Homicho Ammunition Engineering Complex which produces a wide range of ammunition ranging from light weapons to heavy mortars and artillery, and various metal products that are inputs to civil industries; Bishoftu Motorization Engineering Complex which repair and overhaul center for heavy armament, tanks, and military vehicles; Dejen Aviation Engineering Complex which is a center for overhauling and upgrading military aircraft; and Nazareth Canvas and Garment Factory which produces and supplies military uniforms, canvas, leather and strap products to the Ethiopian National Defense Forces. Since 2007 management of these assets rests in the Ministry of National Defense's Defense Industry Sector.[437]

The Ethiopian government also has a National Security Council established in 2001, based on the objective to provide an additional guaranty against unforeseeable and potential threats and challenges to the country's national security.[438] The Council shall have the following ex-officio members: (a) the Prime Minister - Chairperson (b) the Deputy Prime Minister - Deputy Chairperson (c) the Foreign Affairs Minister - Member (d) the Defense Minister - Member (e) the Head of the Security, Immigration and Refugee Affairs Authority (Currently named as National Intelligence and Security Service) - Member (f) the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces - Member (g) the Head of the Office of the Prime - Member and Secretary.

Total Population	108,4386,391
GDP	$ 83.8 bn. (2018)
Military Expenditure	2015: US $ 4699 m

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[437] Griffard, Bernard F. and John F. Troxell. *Enhancing Professional Military Education in the Horn of Africa: The Ethiopian Defense Command & Staff College Initiative.* Issue Paper; U.S. Army War College Center for Strategic Leadership, Volume 13-09, August 2009.

[438] Federal Government of Ethiopia, Ethiopian National Security Council Establishment Proclamation No. 257/2001, 8th Year, No. 3, Addis Ababa, 12 October 2001, Article 4.

Active Armed Forces	**138,000** [439]
Army	135,000
Air Force	3,000
Reserve	None
Paramilitary	None

Table 5.3 Summary of Ethiopian Military Strength as of 2019[440]

The Council of Defense Commanders is one of the essential organs of ENDF, which includes the Chief of the General Staff (Chairperson), Deputy Chief of the General Staff (Member), Force Commanders (Member), Command Commanders (Member), Main Department Chiefs (Member) Inspector-General (Member).

5.3.4 Post 1991 Ethiopian Armed Forces Policy Documents

Though there is no single document available to public concerning Ethiopian defence strategy[441], there are three documents related to the Ethiopian National Defence Forces which the author of this dissertation obtained. The first document is an open government policy and strategy document that can be considered related to a defense policy: "The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Foreign Affairs and National Security Policy and Strategy" which was published by Ministry of Information in 2002 (discussed briefly in section 5.2.3). The second document titled, "Army Building in Revolutionary Democracy" was written by the late former Prime Minister Meles Zenawi in 1997. The last document was released and introduced by the Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed (Ph.D.) in 2020 titled "FDRE Defence Forces Building Strategy".

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[439] According to IISS's The Military Balance, in 1998 at the time of Ethiopia-Eritrea war active military personnel were nearly 300,000 and later in 2007 it was 152,000 (150,000 in the Army and 2,500 in the Air force); since 2008 until 2020 Ethiopia maintains it is active military personnel 138,000.

[440] IISS. *The Military Balance 2017: The Annual Assessment of Global Military Capabilities and Defense Economics.* London: Routledge. 2018. 467-468

[441] There is a document which is titled 'FDRE Army Doctrine' but author of this dissertation could not able to obtain.

5.3.4.1 Army Building in Revolutionary Democracy

This document is based on the ideology of Revolutionary Democracy.[442] According to Jean-Nicolas Bach Revolutionary democracy emerged from a Leninist interpretation of Marx's Proletariat Dictatorship thesis, which is an opposition to capitalist liberal ideology, and Lenin's revolutionary project. Lenin stressed the necessity for the ''enlighten'' elites to lead the unconscious masses to the revolution that is led by a vanguard party in a democratic centralism. Thus, revolutionary democracy has been interpreted as a bridge between pre-capitalist and socialist societies.[443]

The document has four parts. The first part is about the origin of army building in revolutionary democracy, which is mainly based on the Carl von Clausewitz's view of war as the highest manifestation of politics. Accordingly, the document stresses it is important to make it clear that the defense force Ethiopia is building is the guardian of the revolutionary democracy. It does not distinguish between protecting national security and protecting the security of the system, revolutionary democracy. This can be described as 'the army is the guard for a party and the army is the last stronghold of the system.[444]

The second part of the document explores factors that determine the capacity defence forces including, population, economy, political leadership, and international situation. The third part focuses on the political building of the army, comparing the liberal democratic thought of separation of the army and the politics with the revolutionary democracy with different approach. The document argues that in Ethiopia, until the supremacy of revolutionary democracy is fully established, the government must play a broad and rapid role in the political development of the army. In addition to this, it underlines that it is impossible to distinguish between the leading party and

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[442] The Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) the ruling party from 1991-2018 as its name indicates clearly, revolutionary democracy (abyotawi democracy in Amharic) was its core doctrine until 2010. The party officially claimed change of its ideology in 2014 to Developmental State model.

[443] Bach, Jean-Nicolas. Abyotawi democracy: neither revolutionary nor democratic, a critical review of EPRDF's conception of revolutionary democracy in post-1991Ethiopia. *Journal of Eastern African Studies* Vol. 5, No. 4, November 2011, 641-663. 641.

[444] Asres, Meles Z. *Army Building in Revolutionary Democracy.* Addis Ababa. 1997. 22 – 24

the political system. It is a case in point that the ruling EPRDF party and the revolutionary democracy should not be considered separate.[445]

The fourth part discuss the military build-up of the army, focusing on the argument of building an army which can deter war, and when that is not possible, which can defeat the enemy. And also, it stresses having abundant and various weapons and other combat equipment, as well as the skills to use, and the quality of military tactics, planning and strategy.

The last part discusses the national economy in relation to the army building. The document maintains a state's defense capacity is based on its economic potential, then only a state can build a strong defense force as long as it accelerates its economic growth. In order to meet this: it recommends four directions. First improving the quality of defence budget allocation; second building both permanent army and reserve force; here it is recommended to have militia system rather than national military service, because it provides a better opportunity to strengthen the political loyalty of the army by selecting a person or a part of the society to join the militia. The third recommendation is, enrolling the army in various development and production activities that enables the defense industry to produce products for civil consumption. The fifth direction is producing locally manufactured weapons and key supplies for the defence.

5.3.4.2 FDRE Defence Forces Building Strategy

This seventy-eight-page current working document was released by the Prime Mister Office. It begins by indicating the need to revise the previous documents (Foreign Affairs and National Security Policy and Strategy and FDRE Army Doctrine) because they are outdated, and the other military document (Army Building in Revolutionary Democracy) is in contrary to the Ethiopian Constitution.[446]

The document has five parts: the first part discusses the contemporary international situation, the geopolitics of the Horn of Africa and Ethiopian national security and strategic trends. The second part deals with distinctive purposes and principles of FDRE's army building. Accordingly, the document forwards the following purposes: to strengthen its guardianship and compliance to the constitution; to strengthen its capacity to implement the national policies; to build an effective

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[445] Ibid. 89

[446] FDRE Prime Minster Office. *FDRE Defence Forces Building Strategy.* Addis Ababa. 2018. 6

and efficient army that considers the national economy; to build an army that ensure brotherhood and mutual benefit between Ethiopians and also with neighboring countries; to build a capacity that goes beyond regional geopolitics which will be effective in diverse domains. The four principles are: first the army is part of national capability; second army building is based on the assessment and analysis of foreign threats; third in order to have a sustainable future for the army, capacity building must be free of political bias and built on professionalism; forth, the army must be under strong civil control.

The third part discuss six important elements that determine of army building. These are: the frequency and gravity of the threat or potential threat, the nation's population and composition, the range of our country's topography, Ethiopia's the history of victory and the psychology of invincibility, the national economy, and the states contemporary political and social condition.

The fourth part deals with dimensions of warfare and defensive strategies. It discusses three types of warfare, namely regular, irregular, and "gray zone" and hybrid warfare. And it forwards four defensive strategies: preventing risk, interrupt and halt, swift annihilation, and disruption of the enemy's operational capacity.

The fifth part deals with five major goals of ENDF army building: build a competent and independent institution; creating a strong organization in all dimensions, carry out sustainable human resource development, build an effective resource management system, and building an effective research center.

5.4 Summery and Partial Conclusion

Ethiopia is one of the oldest civilizations with a history of over three thousand years. The 1974 Ethiopian Revolution and the coming of *Derg*, the Armed Forces, the Police and Territorial Army Council ended thousand years of ancient Solomonic dynasty. In 1991 the Ethiopian state underwent a significant rearrangement; the unitary state structure changed to a federal system. In 1995 a new constitution was adopted that established a democratic federal republic with a parliamentarian and multi-party system.

The Ethiopian state has a long history of foreign relations with the outside world. Ethiopia's modern diplomatic history began at the reign of Emperor Theodoros II in the mid-19th century. His foremost objective was the need to obtain technical expertise, mainly military from the west-

ern European states. The most important goal and the core of foreign policies of the successive three Ethiopian governments under Menelik II, Haile Selassie I, and Colonel Mengistu HaileMariam was to preserve the geographical entity of Ethiopia, and all three fought against external and internal enemies to preserve it. Menelik II defeated the Italian invasion and kept Ethiopia independent. Under Emperor Haile Selassie I and *Derg*, another distinctive and fundamental future of Ethiopian foreign policy was, its unwavering policy of supporting liberation struggles in Africa.

Post-1991 Ethiopian foreign policy has two objectives: rapid economic development, which aims to benefit all members of society, and democratization to ensure the full participation of people in administering their own affairs. This development will be more sustainable if there are a shared vision and action for peace and development in the whole of our sub-region. Therefore, Ethiopia attaches utmost importance to its relations with its neighbors and believes in creating suitable economic conditions. Ethiopia firmly believes that its peace and security are the peace and security of its neighbors and vice versa. This explains Ethiopia's commitment to peace and security as demonstrated by participation in the various peacekeeping operations within the Horn of Africa and the continent in general; this commitment made Ethiopia the most significant contributor of peacekeeping troops in the world.

Regarding the Ethiopian defence forces, the idea of modern military formation in Ethiopia begins with Emperor Tewodros II. Tewodros II tried to acquire western technology in order to modernize his army. The 1896 Adowa victory against the Italian colonial invasion is seen as the embodiment of African militancy and heroism where Ethiopian unique collective behavior in its foreign policy and military orientation originated. Likewise, its red, yellow (gold), and green colored flag symbolizes freedom and Pan-Africanism, which inspired the flags of other African nations.

The Ethiopian army's fundamental modernization was started in 1917 as the Imperial Bodyguard was formed as a regular standing force by Teferi Mekonne, who later became Emperor Haile Selassie I. At the time of *Derg,* which spanned from 1974 to 1991, the army grew from about 46,000 to nearly 500,000. This was because of the civil war in northern Ethiopia. The Tigrayan People Liberation Front - Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democracy Front (TPLF/EPRDF) Army overthrew the *Derg* regime in 1991. A new national army was restructured based on the 1995 FDRE's new constitution.

Finally, the chapter briefly looks two post 1991 military policies of ENDF: the 1997 "Army Building in Revolutionary Democracy" which was written by the late former Prime Minister Meles Zenawi and the recent policy released and introduced by the Prime Minister Abiy in 2020 titled "FDRE Defence Forces Building Strategy".

CHAPTER 6 – TRENDS OF ETHIOPIAN PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS AND ITS GENERATIONS

"The only thing necessary for the triumph of evil is for good men to do nothing."

Edmund Burke

"People who love freedom and who are trying to fight for their freedom should be respected and helped." Emperor Haile Selassie I

This chapter looks at the four generations of Ethiopian peace support operations from the beginning of the Imperial Army's first deployment until to 2019. Secondly, it discusses the trends and capabilities of Ethiopian peace support operations, and it briefly confers about reimbursement. Lastly, it discusses the survey results and analysis from members of ENDF on their outlook towards the Ethiopian peace support operation.

6.1 Generations of Peacekeeping Operations

The categorizations of peacekeeping operations are commonly used in the study of the historical development of peacekeeping as it is discussed in section 3.2 citing the work of Kenkel, K.M. 'Five Generations of Peace Operations: from the "Thin Blue Line" to "Painting a Country Blue."' In other studies like Diehl et al.,[447] the categorization aims to provide a framework for comparison across peacekeeping operations in different times and the functions of the missions or the level of complexity according to size, the scope of mandate, and the presence or absence of a civilian component in addition to a military component.[448] For this dissertation, the method of classification for Ethiopian peacekeeping generation is based on the particular sending regime's[449] motive, the nature of the armed forces, and the focus area of deployment. Based on the three criteria mentioned, Ethiopian peacekeeping is divided into four generations of operations.

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[447] Diehl, PF et al. "International Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution: A Taxonomic Analysis with Implications." *Journal of Conflict Resolution.* 42.1. 1998.

[448] Wilde, Ralph. Taxonomies of International Peacekeeping: An Alternative Narrative. *ILSA Journal of International& Comparative Law.* 9.391. 2003.

[449] Three types of Ethiopian governments were identified First, the Imperial regime of Emperor Haile Selassie I from 1930-1974, second, the Transitional Government of Ethiopia led by President Meles Zenawi from 1991-1995, and third, the government of Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia from 1996 up to now, (led by PM Meles Zenawi (1996-2012) PM HaileMariam Desalegn (2012-2018) and PM Abiy Ahmed (2018-). Ethiopia did not deploy peacekeeping troops at the time of the military government of Colonel Mengistu HaileMariam from 1974-1991.

The first generation was the Imperial Army's peacekeeping deployment from 1950-1967. The second generation was the peacekeeping deployment of EPRDF's Rebel Army from 1994-95. The third generation was ENDF engagement in 'African Solution for African Problems' from 2003-2010. The fourth and the last generation is since 2011, where ENDF become 'the peace-keeper army.'

6.1.1 First Generation - The Imperial Army: Conviction to Collective Security (1950 - 1967)

Ethiopia's first two missions were the US-led United Nations Command in Korea and in United Nations Operation in the Congo. The Ethiopian government was led by Emperor Haile Selassie I, mostly with a firm conviction towards UN and collective security. Historically, one of the main reasons Ethiopia contributed to UN peacekeeping troops was that the League of Nations failed to defend Ethiopia from the Italian aggression in 1936. In his very famous speech appealing for the League of Nations in 1936 Emperor Haile Sellassie I stated:

> I, Haile Selassie I, Emperor of Ethiopia, am here today to claim that justice which is due to my people and the assistance promised to it eight months ago when fifty nations asserted that aggression had been committed in violation of international treaties.
>
> There is no precedent for a Head of State himself speaking in this assembly. But there is also no precedent for a people being a victim of such injustice and being at present threatened by abandonment to its aggressor. Also, there has never before been an example of any Government proceeding to the systematic extermination of a nation by barbarous means, in violation of the most solemn promises made by the nations of the earth that there should not be used against innocent human beings the terrible poison of harmful gases. It is to defend a people struggling for its age-old independence that the head of the Ethiopian Empire has come to Geneva to fulfill this supreme duty, after having himself fought at the head of his armies.
>
> … Is it necessary to remind the Assembly of the various stages of the Ethiopian drama? For 20 years past, either as Heir Apparent, Regent of the Empire, or as Emperor, I have never ceased to use all my efforts to bring my country the benefits of civilization, and in particular, to establish relations of good neighborliness with adjacent powers. In particular, I succeeded in concluding with Italy the Treaty of Friendship of 1928, which absolutely prohibited the resort, under any pretext whatsoever, to force of arms, substituting for force and pressure the conciliation and arbitration on which civilized nations have based international order.[450]

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[450] Haile Selassie II. "Appeal to the League of Nations." June 1936.
https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/selassie.htm, Accessed on 23 December 2018.

The Ethiopian government was motivated to participate in the collective security efforts of the UN because Ethiopia had been the victim of the League of Nations' ineffectiveness in its principles of collective security. Thus, the Ethiopian government did not want the same thing to happen to other states of the world under UN.[451] In addition it also demonstrated Pan-Africanism and anti-colonial struggle, which was used as integral part of the international system as a modern state. Underlining this fact, one can use the words of Skordiles that: 'This nation [Ethiopia] lost her independence for five years, because of the lack of collective security.'[452] The Emperor of Ethiopia, Haile Selassie I, in his speech at the League of Nations in 1936, clearly shows this:

> On behalf of the Ethiopian people, a member of the League of Nations, I request the Assembly to take all measures proper to ensure respect for the Covenant. I renew my protest against the violations of treaties of which the Ethiopian people has been the victim. I declare in the face of the whole world that the Emperor, the Government and the people of Ethiopia will not bow before force; that they maintain their claims that they will use all means in their power to ensure the triumph of right and the respect of the Covenant. …The great Powers who have promised the guarantee of collective security to small States on whom weighs the threat that they may one day suffer the fate of Ethiopia, I ask what measures do you intend to take?[453]

Despite this call, the League of Nations failed. This was one of the reasons why the Emperor sent Ethiopian troops to Korea in 1951 and to Congo in 1962.

6.1.1.1. The United Nations Command (UNC) in Korea

After the defeat of Japan, which occupied Korea for a long period, in World War II, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to divide the peninsula at the thirty-eighth parallel as the boundary of their respective zones of occupation, which they took from Japan. The Soviets installed a communist government in the north, and the United States reinstate the former Provisional Government in exile in the south. However, in June 1950, North Korea launched a full-scale invasion against the southern the Republic of Korea to unify the whole of Korea under Communism.

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[451] Haile, A. A. "East African Crisis Response: Shaping Ethiopian Peace for Better Participation in Future Peace Operations". Thesis presented for Masters of Science in Defense Analysis. Monterey: Naval Postgraduate School, 2006. 35.

[452] Skordiles cited in Haile. "East African Crisis Response…". 35

[453] Haile Selassie. "Appeal to the League of Nations". Astro. June 1936. http://astro.temple.edu/~rimmerma/appeal_to_the_league_of_nations_.htm, Accessed on 22 January 2016.

Under Resolution 83 (1950), the Security Council 'determined that the armed attack upon the Republic of Korea constitutes a breach of the peace.' Furthermore, it adds 'the authorities in North Korea have neither ceased hostilities nor withdrawn their armed forces to the 38th parallel, and that urgent military measures are required to restore international peace and security.' Finally, the resolution 'recommends that the Member of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area.'[454]

On July 7, under Resolution 84, the Security Council 'recommends that all Members providing military forces and other assistance pursuant to the aforesaid Security Council resolutions make such forces and other assistance available to a unified command under the United States of America; and authorizes the unified command at its discretion to use the United Nations flag in the course of operations against North Korean forces concurrently with the flags of the various nations participating.'[455]

The United Nations Command (UNC) provided the core military and strategic direction for the operation. Whereas, USA provided the UNC's high command and much of the logistics, air and naval power, artillery, and military infrastructure. Twenty-one member nations of the United Nations committed themselves to support South Korea, and sixteen UN nations supplied fighting units, and five sent military hospitals and field ambulances. Australia, Britain, Canada, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Colombia, Ethiopia, South Africa, New Zealand, Turkey, Greece, Thailand, Philippines, Luxembourg, and the United States sent fighting units. Norway, Sweden, Denmark, India, Italy contributed military hospitals and field ambulances to the cause.

Ethiopia provided a battalion made up of volunteers from Emperor Haile Selassie's Imperial Guard. At the time, the Imperial Guard was in a better passion and without any domestic duty in the country. At the time of departure from the capital Addis Ababa, the Minister of War *Ras Abebe Aregay*[456] and the Commander of the Imperial Guard Brigadier General Mulugera Buli made an introductory speech. The Emperor and Commander in Chief Haile Selassie also publi-

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[454] United Nations Security Council Resolution 83, Document No. S/1511, 27 June 1950.

[455] United Nations Security Council Resolution 84, Document No. S/1588, 7 July 1950.

[456] *Ras* is the old Ethiopian army rank equivalent to Lieutenant General. (*Ras Bitewedid* is General; *Dej'azimach* is Major General; *Fit'awirari* is Brigadier General; *Kegn'azimach* is Colonel and *Gir'azimach* is Lieutenant Colonel)

cized the name of the Peacekeeping battalion as 'Qagnew Battalion' named after the horse of the emperor's father, Prince Mekonin HaileMichael Gudisa. The Emperor also made the following speech at the farewell pared:

> ... You all know the damage we have suffered in the years of the struggle and the sacrifices we have made, at a time when Ethiopia is in the throes of grief. When our people and we defend ourselves, we do not hesitate to push. Today, Ethiopia ranks among the states in the United Nations. It is something we should all be proud of .... Therefore, looking back to what happened to us, we believe that people who love freedom and who are trying to fight for their freedom should be respected and helped. You still have a long way to go to respect and secure freedom. The spirit of our brave fathers who fought for Ethiopia's independence thousands of years ago will follow you. He will strengthen your arms on the battlefield. It strengthens your heart… Ethiopia's deployment of peacekeeping troops to Korea has a meaning beyond helping others not to suffer as much as she did in the betrayal of the principle of common security by the League of Nations, which she relied on during her ordeal, and which she was subjected to inhumane treatment. Ethiopia wanted to show to the western world that it has turned a deaf ear to her cries in times of suffering; it is possible to stand firm and be equal to others even after they have fallen. Above all, it is to put her lasting identity and honor on the world community's conscience.[457]

He also added the following addressing the departing soldiers:

> You are today on the point of leaving Ethiopia on a voyage halfway around the world in defense of the liberty and of the principles to which all members of the United Nations stand…. You are also representing and defending in far corners of the earth the most sacred principle of modern international policy, that principle of collective security with which Ethiopia's name is imperishably associated. Of all the nations of the world, the name of Ethiopia has been most closely associated with that principle.[458]

From the speech, it is clear that the emperor was talking about Ethiopia's prestige and international recognition by participating in the UN mission.

In addition to the central motive mentioned above, the Emperor's decision to send his troops with the UN operation under the leadership of the United States was due to the regional security threats he had at the time. It is noted that he was looking an arms procurement or support from

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[457] Techane, Gesit. *Yeqedmow Tor (The Former Army) 1927-1983. [Amharic]* Addis Ababa: Z. A Publishing. 2006 142 – 143.

[458] Atnafu cited in Abotaa, Arka. *Ethiopia's Foreign Policy under Emperor Haile Selassie I: An Appraisal*. Thesis Submitted to the School of Graduate Studies of Addis Ababa University in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirement for the Degree of Master of Arts International Relations. December 6, 2002 Addis Ababa. 53.

the United States, and it was an excellent opportunity to persuade the United States to dispense its negligence towards Ethiopia and value and welcome her arms request.[459]

William Stueck described the Ethiopian willingness for deployment as follows:

> When in early August Ethiopia expressed its desire to contribute a British-trained battalion with English-speaking officers, the State Department was more receptive. But the overture from Ethiopia, whose government in the 1930s had been a victim of the failure of collective security, hardly represented a selfless gesture. The fates of neighboring Eritrea and Somaliland were now in the hands of the United Nations, and Ethiopia was an interested party, especially intent on acquiring the former and thus keen on enhancing its position in the international body. Another method of enhancing its bargaining power was to strengthen its army. Exchanges between Washington and Addis Ababa soon revealed that Ethiopia hoped to receive enough equipment from the United States to arm two or three divisions.[460]

On the other hand, the selfless conviction to collective security was gestured in response to the call of the Secretary General's request to which the Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent a telegram permitting the financial contribution demanded. 'Fully aware of the incredible suffering resulting from the aggression, His Imperial Majesty has ordered the transfer to your use of one hundred thousand dollars in order to provide medical supplies for alleviating the sufferings of victims of aggression and to honor these heroic victims of aggression.'[461]

The first Qagnew Battalion reached Korea after 21 days of a sea voyage, traveling from Addis Ababa to Djibouti then from Port of Djibouti and they got on US military sheep to Korea. In their stay in Korea, the three Battalions had a crucial role in preventing any breach of the defensive zone from being broken by the enemy conducted night and day patrols to curb the enemy's movements, spy on its contents, and obtain valuable information. Hence, the Battalions gained popularity, and many of the leading officers were awarded the highest Ethiopian and American battlefield medals. After the ceasefire, Ethiopia was the only country where none of its soldiers

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[459]Techane, Gesit. *Yeqedmow Tor (The Former Army) 1927-1983. [Amharic]* Addis Ababa: Z. A Publishing. 2006 142.

[460]Stueck, William. *The Korean War: An International History.* Princeton: Princeton University Press:1995. 74.

[461] Atnafu cited in Abotaa, Arka. *Ethiopia's Foreign Policy under Emperor Haile Selassie I: An Appraisal.* Thesis Submitted to the School of Graduate Studies of Addis Ababa University in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirement for the Degree of Master of Arts International Relations. December 6, 2002 Addis Ababa. 26.

were captured to be returned during the exchange of prisoners of war. The Imperial Guard took part in 253 battles, and 120 were killed, and 536 were wounded.[462]

There were five rounds, and Colonel Kebede Kebre was the Commander in Chief for the first-round Ethiopian Army who went to Korea.

	Ethiopian Participation in UN Command Korea (UNCK) 1951 - 1956			
Rotation	Contingents	Force Commander for Ethiopian Army	Number	Duration
1st	*Qagnew* Battalion	Lt. Col. Aman Amdom/ Lt. Colonel Teshome Erigetu	1,153	June 1951 – April 1952
2nd	*Qagnew* Battalion	Lt. Col. Asfaw Andarge	1,094	April 1952 - April 1953
3rd	*Qagnew* Battalion	Lt. Col. Woldeyuhanis Shita	1,271	April 1953 - April 1954
4th	*Qagnew* Battalion	-	-	-
5th	-	-	-	-
		Total	6,037	

Table 6.1 Ethiopian 1st UN Peacekeeping Participation in Korea.[463]

The Korean Armistice Agreement is the truce signed on 27 July 1953 that brought a cessation of the Korean War hostilities. It was signed by the United Nations Command (UNC), North Korea's Korean People's Army (KPA), and the Chinese People's Volunteer Army (PVA). It was

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[462] Techane, Gesit. *Yeqedmow Tor (The Former Army) 1927-1983. [Amharic]* Addis Ababa: Z. A Publishing. 2006 168.

[463] Negash, Yitibarek. *Be'alem Akef Yeselam Masikebere Zemecha Tesarifo Yalu Michu Hunetawochina Tikuret Yemishu Gudayoch: Etiyopiyan Bemimeleket 1994-2009. (Challenges in Prospects in International Peacekeeping Operations: 1994-2009)* [Amharic]. A Paper Submitted to the Fulfilment of BA in Military Science and Leadership. Ethiopian Defense and Command College. Addis Ababa July 2009. & Ethiopian Government Communication Affairs Office. *Etiyopiya ena Selam Masikebere. (Ethiopia and Peacekeeping).* [Amharic]. Addis Ababa: B.S.P.E. September 2012.

designed to 'ensure a complete cessation of hostilities and of all acts of armed force in Korea until a final peaceful settlement is achieved.'[464]

In France, newspapers of the Right and Center lauded the UN effort in Korea. *Franctiereur* described it as 'reaffirming a principle that of preventing armed aggression. What the League of Nations could not do for Ethiopia, the United Nations did for Korea.'[465]

6.1.1.2 ONUC, United Nations Operation in the Congo (Opération des Nations Unies au Congo)

The Republic of the Congo became independent on 30 June 1960. In the days that followed, chaos broke out in the country, and Belgium, former colonial master, sent its troops to the Congo without the Congolese Government's consent. ONUC originally mandated to provide the Congolese Government with the military and technical assistance it required following the collapse of many essential services and the military intervention by Belgian troops.[466]

After 75 years of tyranny, Congo got liberated, and Patrice Lumumba, the first democratically elected Prime Minister, won the parliamentary elections. The parliament elected Joseph Kasavubu as President. However, soon after the independence, the province of Katanga, led by Moïse Tshombe and South Kasai engaged in secessionist struggles with Belgian troops' support against the new leadership. On 12 July 1960, the Congolese Government asked for United Nations military assistance. Two days later, the Security Council called upon Belgium to withdraw its troops from the Congo and authorized military assistance as deemed necessary until the national security forces are able to meet their tasks fully, through the technical assistance of the United Nations.[467]

Ethiopia was one of the 35 nations which sent peacekeeping troops. The maximum number of mission personnel as of July 1961 was 19,828 all ranks, supported by international civilian and

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[464] United States Forces Korea. "*The Korean War Armistice Agreement.*" Panmunjom, Korea, July 27, 1953. https://www.usfk.mil/Portals/105/Documents/SOFA/G_Armistice_Agreement.pdf, Accessed on 21 September 2020.

[465] Stueck, William. *The Korean War: An International History.* Princeton: Princeton University Press:1995. 345.

[466] United Nations. "Republic of Congo – UNUC Background." 2001. https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/past/onucB.htm, Accessed on 13 January 2020.

[467] Ibid.

locally recruited staff.[468] Ethiopia Contributed a total of 10, 625 of which 6,911 contingents, 2,960 Junior Officers, and 754 Officers. (201 officers and non-commissioned officers lost their lives and 133 officers and non-commissioned officers wounded.)

The *Teqil*[469] battalion for the deployment coordinated and organized by Lt. Colonel Siyum GedileGeorgis and Emperor Haile Selassie made a farewell speech at the departing pared at the Imperial Ethiopian Air Force base in Debre Zeit as follows:

> In line with the UN Security Council resolution, United Nations asked Our Imperial Government for military and air support. We sincerely respect and support the United Nations Charter's principles and the basic ideas of collective security; hence, we accepted the request. You who lined up in front of us today, Officers and Soldiers, because We decided that you would go for this great task.
>
> Whenever you go to the country we have ordered you, by avoiding embarrassing and degrading work, We are confident that you will be a pride for your country and your emperor by performing your duties in a compassionate and kind manner as a policeman ...[470]

But later UN requested a Brigade and three more Battalions were sent with the previous *Teqil* Battalion named *Tekil* Brigade.

In this mission, Ethiopia was given the position of commander in chief of UN forces. Lt. General Kebede Gebre was a force commander in the mission. He was also the commander of the three *Kagnew* Battalions deployed in Korea with the rank of Colonel at the time. Brigadier General Eyasu Menigesha was the commander of the four *Teqil* Brigades deployed in Congo.

The request for the position of commander in chief of UN forces in Congo came from the UN. The army's performance in the Korean mission was rated as excellent by the UN, a fact that motivated the UN Secretary-General to designate an Ethiopian force commander to the UN Mission in the Congo. [471] U Thant, the then Acting Secretary-General, requested the Ethiopian government to send an officer for the position of Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations Force in

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[468] United Nations. "Republic of the Congo-ONUC: Facts and Figures." No date. https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/past/onucF.html, Accessed on 06 July 2019.

[469] Named after the horse of the Emperor Haile Selassie, *Teqil.*

[470] Techane, Gesit. *The Former Army:1935-1991 [Amharic]* (*Yeqedmow Tor: 1927-1983).* Addis Ababa: Z. A Publishing. 2006 216.

[471] Berhe, Mulugeta G. The Ethiopian post-transition Security Sector Reform Experience: Building a National Army from a Revolutionary Democratic Army. *African Security Review,* 26:2, 2017, 163.

Congo. Therefore, Lt. General Kebede Gebre, was selected by Emperor Haile Selassie I and served from April 1962 to July 1963. He was one of the five force commanders of ONUC.

The Emperor's acceptance latter for the request by U Thant states the following:

> At the request of Your Excellency, we have appointed Lt. General Kebede Gebre as Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations Force in Congo. In this opportunity, when he comes to serve in his assigned place, we hope that United Nations' efforts for world peace will bear fruit.

> As one of the countries striving for peace on earth, Ethiopia has never failed to provide the necessary assistance in accordance with the organization's decision.

> Ever since the Congolese conflict broke out, to restore peace and with the hope that the divided people will be united, as Your Excellency knows, Ethiopia is playing its part and doing what it has to.[472]

Besides Lt. General Kebede Gebre, other Ethiopian officers like Major General Yacob GebreLeul were Deputy Force Commander.

Rotation	Name	Force Commander	Contingents	Force Commander for Ethiopian Army	Duration
1st	1st *Teqil* Brigade	Col. Woldeyuhanis Shita	1st Teqil Battalion	Lt. Col Siyum GedileGeorgis	
			2nd Battalion	Lt. Col. Tadesse Yigezu (Imperial Bodyguard)	July 1960 - June 1961
			3rd Battalion	Lt. Col. Kassa Wolde-Georgis (Imperial Bodyguard)	
			4th Battalion	Lt. Col. Worku GebreMariam (Ground Force)	
2nd	2nd *Teqil* Brigade	Col. Teshome Yirigetu	25th Battalion	Lt. Colonel Alemu Weldeyes (Ground Force)	June 1961 – June 1962
			8th Battalion	Lt. Col. Tezera Gorfe (Ground Force)	

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[472] Lema, Shibeshi. *The Zealous Solder: Lt. General Kebede Gebere 1918 - 1974. (Koftanaw Wetader Letena General Kebede Gebre 1910 - 1967.) [Amharic]* Addis Ababa: Far East Trading PLC. 2015. 135.

			26th Battalion	Lt. Col. GebreMeskel Gundo (Emperial Body Guard)	
			35th Battalion	Lt. Col. Gesses Reta (Ground Force)	
3rd	3rd *Teqil* Brigade	Col. Woriqu Metaferiya	4th Battalion	Lt. Col. Tilahun Belihu	June 1962 - April 1963
			6th Battalion	Lt. Col. Qedida Guri-mesa	
			27th Battalion	Lt. Col. GebreWahid	
			28th Battalion	Lt. Col Alemayehu Manyahile	
4th	4th *Teqil* Brigade	Col. Abebe Teferi	7th Battalion	Lt. Col Tadesse WoldeKidan	April 1963 – June 1964
			21st Battalion	Lt. Colonel Yiriga Yesuf	

Table 6.2 Ethiopian UN Deployment in Congo[473]

Starting from July 1960 ONUC was commissioned to ensure the withdrawal of Belgian forces and to assist the Government in maintaining law and order by preventing the occurrence of civil war, and securing the removal of all foreign military, paramilitary and advisory personnel which were not under the United Nations Command, and all mercenaries. In 1963, after Katanga had been reintegrated into the Congo's national territory, the General Assembly authorized the stay of a reduced number of troops for a further six months. The Force was withdrawn entirely by 30 June 1964. [474]

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[473] Negash, Yitibarek. *Be'alem Akef Yeselam Masikebere Zemecha Tesarifo Yalu Michu Hunetawochina Tikuret Yemishu Gudayoch: Etiyopiyan Bemimeleket 1994-2009. (Challenges in Prospects in International Peacekeeping Operations: 1994-2009)* [Amharic]. A Paper Submitted to the Fulfilment of BA in Military Science and Leadership. Ethiopian Defense and Command College. Addis Ababa July 2009.

[474] United Nations. *Republic of Congo – UNUC Background.* 2001. https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/past/onucB.htm, Accessed on 13 January 2020.

At the time of the first generation of peacekeeping in Ethiopian history, the unswerving support for the principle of collective security was practically translated into action during the Korean and the Congo wars.[475]

According to Mulugeta Berehe:

> Ethiopia's participation in these peace missions had historically-rooted motivations. The nation had itself been a victim of failed multilateralism when its appeal to the League of Nations in 1936 fell on deaf ears. Ethiopia's willingness to deploy its young army for international peacekeeping was therefore driven by its commitment to the founding idea of the UN – that collective security can only be promoted by collectively taking action to protect the weak from the strong.[476]

6.1.2 Second Generation – The EPRDF's Rebel Army: Rebels Solidarity (1994 – 1995)

In 1991 EPRDF, a coalition of four parties led by TPLF, controlled government power removing the military government, which controlled power since 1974. EPRDF won the 17 years of guerilla fight with the government and formed a transitional government in 1991, which lasted upto1995, dismantling the former national army, where EPRDF's rebel army become *de facto* national army.

In Rwanda, fighting between the Armed Forces of the mainly Hutu-led government and the Tutsi-led RPF broke out first in October 1990 across the border between Rwanda and its northern neighbor, Uganda. During this time, the Ethiopian transitional government, led by Meles Zenawi, was supporting the liberation struggle of the RPF/Army.[477] The UN established two missions, UNOMUR and UNAMIR, where Ethiopia participated in the second one, even though it has not established a constitutional-based national army, with the main motive of showing solidarity to a similar new government led by liberation army.

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[475] Abotaa, Arka. *Ethiopia's Foreign Policy under Emperor Haile Selassie I: An Appraisal*. Thesis Submitted to the School of Graduate Studies of Addis Ababa University in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirement for the Degree of Master of Arts International Relations. December 6, 2002 Addis Ababa.

[476] Berhe, Mulugeta G. The Ethiopian post-transition Security Sector Reform Experience: Building a National Army from a Revolutionary Democratic Army. *African Security Review,* 26:2, 2017, 163.

[477] Musoni, Edwin "Zenawi was a gallant leader - Kagame." 22 August 2012. https://www.newtimes.co.rw/section/read/56467, Accessed on 22 September 2020.

6.1.2.1. UNAMIR, United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda

UNOMUR was deployed on the Ugandan side of the border between Uganda and Rwanda in 1993 to observe along the common border of Uganda and Rwanda and to prevent the military use of the area by RPF. There were 81 military observers in the mission, and it was officially closed in September 1994. [478]

Following the Arusha peace talks' conclusion between the government of Rwanda and RPF in August 1993, the Secretary-General recommended that the Security Council should establish another peacekeeping operation, UNAMIR, which was established on 5 October by the Security Council resolution 872 (1993).

On 6 April 1994, an aircraft carrying President Juvénal Habyarimana of Rwanda and President Cyprien Ntaryamira of Burundi crashed at Kigali airport, killing all those on board. The crash was followed by the horror that engulfed Rwanda. Genocide claimed the lives of members of the Tutsi minority and moderate Hutus.

On 4 May, the Secretary-General warned that the United Nations might later be accused of passivity if it did not act quickly. On 13 May 1994, the Secretary-General recommended a new mandate for UNAMIR, including 5,500 troops. UNAMIR would support and provide safe conditions for displaced persons and other groups, to help humanitarian organizations' assistance, and monitor border-crossing points and the two parties' deployment.[479] Its rules of engagement included acting in self-Defense against those who threatened protected sites, populations, the means of delivery, and distribution of humanitarian relief.[480]

On 8 March 1996, UNAMIR's mandate to protect the personnel and premises of the International Tribunal, which was established to prosecute persons responsible for genocide and other violations of international humanitarian law committed in Rwanda, came to an end.

Rounds	Contingents	Commander	Workforce	Duration

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[478] United Nations. "Uganda-Rwanda – UNOMUR: Background."
https://peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/unomurbackgr.html, Accessed on 04 February 2019

[479] United Nations. "Rwanda – UNAMIR Background." peacekeeping.un.org.
https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/past/unamirFT.htm, Accessed on 15 January 2017.

[480] Ibid.

1st	*Guna* Batalion	Col. Tadele GebreSilassie	836	August 1994 – April 1995
2nd	*Wigagen* Battalion	Col. Alemishet Degife	858	April 1995 – July 1995
		Total	1,694	

Table 6.3 Ethiopian Participation in UNAMIR 1994-1995

The main reason for deployment was that by the early 1990s, the spirit of liberation had not yet cooled, and the new EPRDF government leaders were young and revolutionary and what happened in Rwanda was very poignant for them. In addition to this, the Transitional Government president, the later prime minister, Meles Zenawi, had a profound interest in peacekeeping.[481] He personally visited the Ethiopian peacekeepers in Rwanda during their deployment.

It was observed that it was ambitious for a new government that just came out of a long civil war, to respond to the UN call for the peacekeeping and humanitarian operation in Rwanda following the genocide.[482] However, Roméo Dallaire, Force Commander of UNAMIR, reported that 'despite their lack of equipment, the Ethiopian contingent were incredibly resourceful on being able to do their job effectively with minimum equipment and had no reluctance to help local farmers harvest their fields.'[483]

Moreover, on the 4th of July 2009, on the Rwandan Liberation Day, President Paul Kagame of Rwanda presented Meles Zenawi with "Uruti" (National Liberation Medal) and "Umurinzi" (Campaign against Genocide Medal). The first medal was given to recognize Meles's contribution in toppling down the former regime and bringing peace and socio-economic development to

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[481] Prime Minister Melez Zenawi has an important role in ENDF's peacekeeping deployment until his death in September 2012. Almost all deployments were made based on his assessment and decision. (Interview with Anonymous Ethiopia MOFA official in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 3 August 2019)

[482] HaileMariam, Z. "Africa: Ethiopia's Contribution Toward Peacekeeping Mission". allafrica.com. 8 January 2016. http://allafrica.com/stories/201601081051.html, Accessed on 10 January 2017.

[483] Djinnit, Dalil. "Ethiopia's Contribution to Global and African Peacekeeping Operations." April 7, 2016. https://ippjournal.wordpress.com/2016/04/07/ethiopias-contribution-to-global-and-african-peacekeeping-operations-2/, Accessed on 20 January 2017.

Ethiopia. The second medal was given in recognition of Ethiopia's contribution in deploying peacekeepers to help Rwanda.[484]

The Ethiopian Army being chosen by the UN to operate in the region has created two sentiments in Rwanda. On the one hand, the Ethiopian peacekeepers, who knew that the ethnic Tutsis have East African origin, may support the Tutsi. On the other hand, they may take an act of revenge on the Hutus. This view poses a challenge for the first round of the Ethiopian peacekeeping forces. However, the assumption was proofed to be untrue.[485]

The army was able to open a new history of peace and partisanship, completing all their missions. Though the long-standing UN Peacekeeping principles advocate, a peacekeeper should not respond in fire even if he shot at, instead of retreat. Even though the Ethiopian army respected this principle, it also firmly believed that 'retreating while there is a clear attack against civilians is not a virtue.'[486]

As a result, the army has won the love of the people by protecting the lives of innocent civilians, as well as working with the Rwandan army to ensure the country's security. The Ethiopian troops have a conviction of defending civilians later lead to the 'Kigali Principles on the Protection of Civilians', a non-binding set of eighteen pledges for the effective and thorough implementation of civilians' protection in UN peacekeeping.[487]

In 2004, when Rwanda deployed its first peacekeepers in Sudan's troubled Darfur region, Rwandan President Paul Kagame affirmed that Rwandan troops would use force to defend civilians. The Sudan Tribune transcribed the speech as follows:

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[484] Rwanda News Agency. "After Ethiopia, Eritrea will also be honored for Rwanda Liberation". 04 July 2010. http://rnanews.com/politics/3724-afer-ethiopia-eritrea-will-also-be-honored-for-rwanda-liberation, Accessed on 20 January 2017.

[485] Ethiopian Government Communication Affairs Office. *Ethiopia and Peacekeeping.* [Amharic]. (*Etiyopiya ena Selam Masikebere.)* Addis Ababa: B.S.P.E. September 2012. 16.

[486] Ibid. 17

[487] The principles on the Protection of Civilians emanated from the High-level International Conference on the Protection of Civilians held in Rwanda on 28-29 May 2015. The Republic of Rwanda, the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the United States of America initiated the Principles, bringing together the first nine signatories: Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Italy, Netherlands, Rwanda, Senegal, Sri Lanka, Uganda, and Uruguay. And Global Center for Responsibility to Protect. "The Kigali Principles on the Protection of Civilians." 29 May 2015 http://s156658.gridserver.com/resources/985, Accessed on 25 September 2019.)

'Our forces will not stand by and watch innocent civilians being hacked to death like the case was here in 1994,' Kagame said, referring to United Nations troops who did not intervene as a genocide unfolded in Rwanda in 1994 because they didn't have a mandate to stop the slaughter of at least 500,000 minority Tutsis and political moderates from the Hutu majority.

'If it was established that the civilians are in danger, then our forces would certainly intervene and use force to protect civilians...I have no doubt that they certainly will intervene forcefully to protect civilians,' Kagame said. 'In my view, it does not make sense to give security to peace observers while the local population is left to die.'

'If the local population is continued to be killed, and we are prevented from intervening, then (we) will withdraw our troops from this mission,' Kagame said. 'The size of the forces asked for in my view is too small. One hundred and fifty people cannot go to bring peace to a country many times bigger than Rwanda.'[488]

This idea of giving peacekeepers a formal mandate to use force to stop attacks on civilians, commenced by the Rwandan government, later became successful. More than 96% of all UN peacekeepers are currently deployed to missions with Protection of Civilians mandates (POC), where Ethiopia contributes the most personnel (7,499) to UN peacekeeping missions with POC mandates. Ethiopia, Rwanda, and Bangladesh are the top three contributors of uniformed personnel to UN peacekeeping operations with the protection of civilians mandates as of April 2019.[489]

6.1.3 Third Generation – ENDF Engagement in 'African Solution for African Problems' (2003 - 2010)

In 1997, Salim Ahmed Salim, then Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), said:

The OAU Member States can no longer afford to stand aloof and expect the International Community to care more for our problems than we do, or indeed to find solutions to those problems which in many instances have been of our own making. The simple truth that we must confront today is that the world does not owe us a living, and we must re-

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[488] Sudan Tribune. "Rwandan president: Troops will use force if necessary in Darfur." 14 August 2004, https://www.sudantribune.com/Rwandan-president-Troops-will-use,4722, Accessed on 19 December 2019.

[489] Center for Civilians in Conflict. "Trends in the Protection of Civilians through UN Peacekeeping Operations. #POC20 Series." May 29, 2019. https://civiliansinconflict.org/blog/international-peacekeepers-day/, Accessed on 02 January 2020.

main at the forefront of efforts to act and act speedily to prevent conflicts from getting out of control.[490]

African Heads of States decided to establish a mechanism to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts in Africa at the 1993 Summit in Cairo. However, just one year later, the Rwandan tragedy showed the weakness of OAU's conflict prevention and management.[491] UN also acknowledged its failure in its 1999 report.[492] After OAU changed to AU in 2002, it established the Peace and Security Council (PSC), a standing body of the AU with core functions to conduct early warning and preventive diplomacy, facilitate peace-making, and establish peace-support operations. Moreover, in certain circumstances, recommend intervention in the Member States to promote peace, security, and stability.[493] After the establishment of PSC, AU started peacekeeping missions in Africa. In 2003, the first mission wholly initiated, planned, and executed by AU members, the African Union Mission in Burundi (AMIB), was deployed to Burundi.[494] In 2004, the UN Security Council decided to establish UN Peace Operations in Burundi (ONUB), and AMIB troops were incorporated into the ONUB.[495]

In September 2003, the UN established UNMIL in Liberia. Likewise, after the Darfur crisis in Sudan, AU set up a peacekeeping operation in 2004, the African Union Mission in Sudan. By 2007 the AU/UN Hybrid operation in Darfur was established by the Security Council and incor-

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[490] Address by Salim Ahmed Salim, then Secretary-General of the OAU, at the Second Meeting of the Chiefs of Defense Staff of Member States of the OAU Central Organ, Harare, October 25, 1997. Cited in Malan, M. "Africa: Building Institutions on the Run". In Daniel, D. C. et al. (eds), *Peace Operations: Trends, Progress, and Prospects.* Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2008. 90.

[491] Murithi, T. "The African Union's Evolving Role in Peace Operations: the African Union Mission in Burundi, the African Union Mission in Sudan and the African Union Mission in Somalia". *African Security Review* 17/1. 2008. 72.

[492] United Nations. "Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda". New York, UN. 1999.
http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B%E2%80%A6/POC%20S19991257.pdf, Accessed on 30 January 2017.

[493] African Union Commission "Peace and Security Council (PSC)". 2017. https://au.int/web/en/organs/psc, Accessed on 23 January 2017.

[494] Murithi, T. "The African Union's Evolving Role in Peace Operations: the African Union Mission in Burundi, the African Union Mission in Sudan and the African Union Mission in Somalia". *African Security Review* 17/1. 2008. 75.

[495] Murithi, T. "The African Union's Evolving Role in Peace Operations: the African Union Mission in Burundi, the African Union Mission in Sudan and the African Union Mission in Somalia". *African Security Review* 17/1. 2008. 76.

porated AMIS personnel.[496] Furthermore, AMISOM[497] was created by the African Union's Peace and Security Council on 19 January 2007 with the approval of the United Nations. These trends of assuming the responsibility of securing peace and ensuring stability on the African continent by African states is the idea of African solutions for African problems, which is taken earnestly by Ethiopia, especially in the East African region.

6.1.3.1. The African Union Mission in Burundi (AMIB) and United Nations Peace Operations in Burundi (ONUB)

AMIB was mandated in 2003 by the OAU Central Organ of the Mechanism for conflict prevention, management, and resolution, which operated pending the creation of the AU PSC. The mission was to support and help the implementation of the efforts undertaken by Burundians to restore lasting peace and bring national reconciliation as provided under the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi[498] signed in Arusha in August 2000.[499] From June 2004, AMIB was succeeded by UN mission ONUB. ONUB successfully completed its mandate on 31 December 2006 and was succeeded by the United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB). Ethiopia sent a total of 2,747contingents and five military observers. Brigadier General Gebre Ayele was the Deputy Force Commander of ONUB.

Rounds	Contingents	Commander	Manpower	Duration
1st	*Wigagen* Battalion	Col. Meley Amare	864	August 2003 – August 2004
2nd	109th Battalion	Col. Gebre GebreMariam	850	August 2004 – June 2005

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[496] United Nations Security Council. "Security Council Authorizes deployment of United Nations African Union 'Hybrid' peace operation in Bid to resolve Darfur Conflict". Press Release, SC/9089, 31 July 2007. http://www.un.org/press/en/2007/sc9089.doc.htm, Accessed on 22 January 2017.

[497] Though AMISOM is considered as a third generation Ethiopian peacekeeping deployment, it will be covered under Ethiopian Hegemonic peacekeeping in section 6.1.

[498] The agreement was facilitated by former Presidents Julius Nyerere of Tanzania and Nelson Mandela of South Africa and it ended 12 years of civil war dating back to Burundi's independence in 1960. The conflict was between Hutu rebels and the successive Tutsi-dominated regimes. The agreement was signed between the warring parties for power sharing formula to establish a more representative government and military.

[499] United Nations. "Burundi – ONUB – Background". 2006. http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/onub/background.html, Accessed on 21 January 2017.

3rd	33rd Battalion	Col. Negash Hiluf	841	June 2005 – March 2006	
4th	1st Company	Col. Yiridaw GebreAnaniya	192	March 2006 – 2007	
		Total	**2,747**		

Table 6.4 Ethiopian Participation in ONUB 2003-2007

6.1.3.2. United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL)

UNMIL was established in September 2003 to support the implementation of the ceasefire agreement and the peace process, the humanitarian and human rights activities, as well as assist in national security reform, including national police training and formation of a new, restructured military force.[500]

A civil war broke out in Liberia in late 1989 between government forces and fighters of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), led by a former government official, Charles Taylor. In 1993 the Security Council established the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL). Later, in August 1997, Charles Taylor formed a new Government and announced a reconciliation and national unity policy. UNOMIL's principal objective was achieved, and its mission ceased. However, the Government and opposition party leaders failed to resolve their differences, and abuses of human rights continued, which contributed to the intensification of the civil war again.

In September 2003, the UN established UNMIL with 15,000 United Nations military personnel, including up to 250 military observers, 160 staff officers, and 1,115 UN police officers, aimed to assist in the maintenance of law and order throughout Liberia.[501] Ethiopia contributed a total of 17,453 contingents and 17 military observers since December 2003, which necessitated eight brigades in nine shifts and one battalion.[502]

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[500] United Nations. "Support for the implementation of the Peace Process". 2016. http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unmil/index.shtml, Accessed on 21 January 2017.

[501] United Nations. "UNAMIL – Background". 2016. http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unmil/background.shtml, Accessed on 22 January 2017.

[502] FDRE Peace Support Training Center Graduation booklet. Addis Ababa: Brana Publishing Co., 2015. 14.

Rounds	Contingents	Sector Commander	Manpower	Duration
1st	87th Brigade	Brd. General Kemal Ge-lichu	1,784	December 2003 – September 2004
2nd	137th Brigade	Brd. General Tsegaye Tesema	2,548	October 2004 – June 2005
3rd	124th Brigade	Brd. General Seyoum Hefes	2,544	June 2005 – May 2006
4th	27th Brigade	Brd. General Berhanu Jula	2,511	May 2006 – October 2006
5th	23rd Brigade	Brd. General Alhadi Mo-hamed	1,798	October 2006 – June 2007
6th	20th Brigade	Brd. General Mulugeta Berihe	1,798	June 2007 – December 2007
7th	29th Brigade	Brd. General Temesgen Abebe	1,779	Decemebr 2007 – June 2008
8th	30th Brigade	Brd. General Abraha Are-fe	1,779	June 2008 – January 2009
9th	20th Battalion	L. Col. Kiros WeldeSilas-sie	872	January 2009 -
		Total	**17,453**	

Table 6.5 Ethiopian Participation in UNMIL

6.1.3.3. African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID)

A civil war erupted in Darfur in 2003 between the Government of Sudan, its allied militias, and other armed rebel groups. In 2006, the African Union deployed a peacekeeping mission to Sudan, which was replaced in 2008 by the African Union/UN Hybrid operation in Darfur, referred to by its acronym UNAMID, the second-largest UN Peacekeeping operation in the world. Though the protection of civilians was its core mandate, it was also involved in humanitarian assistance and monitoring and reporting on the situation along the borders with Chad and the Central African Republic.[503]

Ethiopia began its mission in UNAMID in February 2008 by sending 11 troops and one military observer, and an entire battalion starting from 2009. Since 2017 Ethiopia became one of the top three countries of the largest contributor to the mission. As of September 2019, Ethiopia contributed six experts on Mission, 821 contingent troops, 19 police, and five staff Officers; and a total of 18,901 personnel were deployed between 2009 and 2019.

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[503] United Nations. "Protecting civilians, facilitating humanitarian aid and helping political process in Darfur". 2016. http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unamid/index.shtml, Accessed on 22 January 2017.

Year	Division	Military			Civil			Others[504]			Total
		Male	Fem.	Total	Male	Fem.	Total	Male	Fem.	Total	
2009	1st Battalion	822	6	828	8	6	14	3	-	3	845
2010	2nd Battalion	766	4	770	8	14	22	11	2	13	805
	3rd Battalion	758	8	766	18	15	33	3	1	4	803
	4th Battalion	764	10	774	17	15	32	2	10	12	818
2011	5th Battalion	772	3	775	8	17	25	-	-	-	800
	6th Battalion	778	1	775	4	17	21	-	-	-	796
2012	7th Battalion	736	28	764	15	20	35	1	-	1	800
	8th Battalion	768	8	776	-	11	11	6	6	12	799
2013	9th Battalion	788	11	799	16	27	43	22	-	22	864
	10th Battalion	747	23	770	5	2	7	13	7	20	797
	11th Battalion	699	9	708	-	-	-	15	15	30	738
2014	1st Round QRF	173	-	173	1	1	2	1	1	2	177
	12 Battalion 12th Round	688	35	723	1	18	19	38	9	47	789
	13 Battalion 13th Round	689	9	698	11	4	15	11	78	87	800
	4th Round Water drilling (26)	90	5	95	3	5	8	8	21	29	132
	14th Battalion 14th Round	685	16	701	-	15	15	61	23	84	800
2015	15th Battalion 15th Round	668	4	672	1	7	8	68	12	70	750
	16th Battalion 16th Round	597	9	606	-	1	1	149	45	193	800
	17th Battalion 17th Round	624	21	645	1	17	18	118	16	134	797
	5th Battalion Water drilling (26)	76	7	83	6	3	9	14	-	14	106
	18th Battalion 18th Round	712	8	720	5	9	14	41	21	62	796

[504] Others means Police Personnel and other Military and Civil Personnel of ENDF who are not under the payroll of EDRE-PSTC.

2016 - 2017	6th Round Water drill-ing (26)	81	2	83	-	-	-	38	3	41	124
2017 - 2018	19th Battalion 19th Round	688	26	714	-	-	-	54	30	84	798
2017 - 2018	20th Battalion 20th Round	665	22	687	3	12	15	74	23	97	799
2017 - 2018	21st Battalion 21st Round	616	10	626	2	2	4	125	42	167	797
2018 - 2019	22nd Battalion 22nd Round	730	10	740	-	1	1	13	21	34	775
	23rd Battalion 23rd Round	722	12	734	13	4	17	37	14	51	800
	Total			**17,208**			**389**			**1,304**	**18,901**

Table 6.6 Ethiopian Participation in UNAMID until 2019[505]

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[505] Source: FDRE Ministry of Defence, Main Department for Peace Support Operation.

Map 6.1 Map Showing the Deployment in UNAMID[506]

6.1.3.4. United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI)

Ethiopia also participated in missions in Côte d'Ivoire since 2006. The Security Council established UNOCI in April 2004 with a mandate to facilitate the implementation of the peace agreement signed by the Ivorian parties in January 2003.[507] However, following the 2010 presidential election and political crisis, UNOCI has remained on the ground to protect civilians; provide good offices or mediation; support the Ivorian Government in disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of former combatants. As well as partaking in the security sector reform to monitor

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[506] OCHA. "UNAMID Deployment Map, September 2019." https://reliefweb.int/map/sudan/unamid-deployment-map-september-2019, Accessed on 07 January 2020.

[507] United Nations. "Protecting civilians and supporting the Government in DDR and security sector reform". 2016. http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unoci/index.shtml, Accessed on 22 January 2017.

and promote human rights. Ethiopia's two military observers served in Côte d'Ivoire until December 2016.

6.1.3.5. United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT)

The Security Council authorize the deployment of a UN civilian and police operation, MINUR-CAT, on 25 September 2007, with a European Union military force (EUFOR), in order to contribute to the protection of civilians; promote human rights and the rule of law, and promote regional peace.[508] This is for the reason that more than 240,000 Sudanese refugees have fled to eastern Chad from the conflict in Darfur since 2003, joined by approximately 45,000 refugees from the Central African Republic (CAR). With the additional 180,000 Chadians displaced by the civil war in the east of the country, it created a tension among the region's communities.[509] In January 2009, the Security Council authorized the deployment of a military component where Ethiopia deployed are nine males, four female Staff Officers, and two civilians total of 15 personnel. MINURCAT's mission completed in December 2010,

6.1.4 Fourth Generation – The Peacekeeper Army (Since 2011)

The two most significant developments in this post-2011 are the founding of the Ethiopian ENDF Peacekeeping Main Department which oversees the International Peacekeeping Training Center (EIPKTC), currently named (FRDE-PSTC), and the exceptional deployment of ENDF to Abyei under UNISFA. Moreover, since 2011 Ethiopia has participated in six missions. In the Caribbean, MINUSTAH, in Mali MINUSMA and Continued missions Liberia UNMIL, two ongoing missions in South Sudan and Sudan, UNMISS and UNAMID respectively, and in Yemen, which is an essential geopolitical state for Ethiopia and the Horn. Additionally, the establishment of EASF in 2011 which reached its full operational capability in December 2014 contributed to the role of ENDF in the regional peacekeeping capability. It also enhanced

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[508] United Nations. "MINURCAT Background."
https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/past/minurcat/background.shtml, Accessed on 12 December 2019.

[509] Ibid.

the regional standard with training and experience gained through previous international peace-keeping deployments.[510]

Mission	Type of Deployment	Number
MINUSMA	Staff Officer	1
UNAMID	Contingent	864
	Expert on Mission	4
	Individual Police	27
	Staff Officer	5
UNISFA	Contingent	3,905
	Expert on Mission	55
	Individual Police	10
	Staff Officer	55
UNMISS	Contingent	1,976
	Expert on Mission	14
	Individual Police	24
	Staff Officer	23
UNMHA	Expert on Mission	1
	Total	**7,571**

Table 6.7 Ethiopian Contributors to UN Peacekeeping Operations under DPO and to Political Missions under DPPA as of January 2019

Type of Deployment	Police	UN Military Experts on Mission (UNMEM)	Troops	Staff Officers	Total
Number	66	99	7,294	112	7,571

Table 6.8 Ethiopian Contributors to UN Peacekeeping Operations as of January 2019

Though Ethiopia has a long experience of deployment in peacekeeping, there was a gap and a need for specific knowledge and training and strengthening the capacity of middle and sen-ior-level military, police, and civilian officers to effectively deliver complete their AU and

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[510] Interview with El Ghassim Wane, Former Director African Union Commission Peace and Security Department, Former Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operation United Nations, and Former African Union Chief of Staff. 07 June 2019 Bishoftu (Debre Zeit), Ethiopia

UN peacekeeping mandates. The EIPKTC objectives are: improving institutional capacity for applied research, conflict analysis, and trainings that are designed to address regional Peace Support Operations (PSO) needs as well as peace and security policy development at the regional level; improving regional, multi-national, and multi-dimensional PSO capability of civilian personnel to address the evolving peace and security situations; increasing capacity of regional police deployed in PSO in Eastern Africa or wider Africa; enhancing regional standby capacity of civilian experts for peacekeeping missions and peacebuilding elements of the East African security forces.[511] The center offers 28 courses on a range of topics including protection of civilians, conflict management, civil-military coordination and mediation. Since its inception, it has trained more than 6,000 people, and about 32% of which are from other African countries.

The center was established with the support of UNDP with finance received from the Government of Japan. Besides organizing international peace support forums, the center regularly provides training on peace and security for military officers around and beyond the Horn of Africa states.[512] The Ethiopian troop deployment in AMISOM is also considered as the Fourth Generation Peacekeeping which will be discussed in the next subtopic, 'Hegemonic-Peacekeeping: Ethiopia in Somalia'.

FRDE-PSTC has also Contingent Training School in Hurso in the Somali Regional state about 400 kilometers east of the capital Addis Ababa. The training school offers pre-deployment classroom and field training for three months, including special courses such as logistics or combat medicine; and mission-specific courses for the unique circumstances of Somalia, South Sudan, or Darfur.[513]

According to Christopher Clapham's assessment of the peacekeeping operations in the Horn of Africa and the role of Ethiopia:

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[511] UNDP Ethiopia. "Ethiopian International Peace Keeping Training Centre." https://www.et.undp.org/content/ethiopia/en/home/operations/projects/democratic_governance/project_EIPKTCentre.html, Accessed on 23 January 2020.

[512] Interview with the Commandant of the EIPKTC, Brigadier General Habtamu Tilahun, Addis Ababa, 09 August, 2017.

[513] Interview with Colonel Alemayehu Abera Deputy Commandant and Head of Training at Hurso Peacekeeping Training School, Hurso, Somali Regional State, Ethiopia, 01 October 2019.

One key element in the new politics of regional conflict management has been supporting peacekeeping forces, both in Somalia and Sudan. In Somalia, such forces have proved extremely problematic and as likely to promote conflict as to resolve it. In the two Sudan, they have been rather more beneficial, though without being able to create the bases for any lasting settlement to the conflict in South Sudan. Ethiopia's principal contribution has been to provide the vast majority of peacekeepers patrolling the Abyei frontier zone between Sudan and South Sudan, where its disciplined and efficient armed forces appear to have done a very competent job.[514]

6.1.4.1. UNISFA, United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei

It took the United Nations Security Council just five minutes to unanimously agree to send 4,200 Ethiopian troops to Abyei as a peacekeeping force.[515] UNISFA's establishment came in June 2011, after the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) reached an agreement in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, to demilitarize Abyei. Both sides claimed the region and allowed Ethiopian troops monitor the area under the 'Temporary Arrangements for the Administration and Security of the Abyei Area.'[516] Under that deal, brokered by former South African President Thabo Mbeki, the two sides agreed on the need for a third party to monitor the flashpoint border between the North and South. UNISFA's mandate is monitoring the border between the two countries and facilitating humanitarian aid delivery; moreover, it is authorized to use force in protecting civilians and humanitarian workers in Abyei. Security Council Resolution 1990 states "authorizing the use of force to protect civilians and humanitarian workers in Abyei."

UNISFA is exceptional for the reason that, unlike most peacekeeping missions in the world, it is almost entirely composed of Ethiopian peace troops. As of January 2020, 35 countries sent their military and police personnel a total of 3,772 to the mission. Ethiopia contributed a total of 3,642 personnel, 79 experts, 5 police officers, 69 staff, and 3,489 contingents, which made up 96.5 % of the peacekeepers in the mission. The 35 other states contributed only 130 military and police

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[514] Clapham, Christopher. *The Horn of Africa: State formation and Decay.* Hurst & Company: London, 2017. p. 182.

[515] McConnell, Tristan. "UN clears Ethiopia for Abyei deployment." 28 June 2011. https://www.pri.org/stories/2011-06-28/un-clears-ethiopia-abyei-deployment, Accessed on 10 January 2019.

[516] United Nations. "UNISFA – Background". 2016. http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unisfa/background.shtml, Accessed on 22 January 2017.

personal.[517] Besides, the fact that both parties requested the Ethiopian forces at the Addis Ababa Agreement on Abyei expressed the trust which Ethiopia earned in both Khartoum and Juba. The highest-ranking female officer in the UN Peacekeeping was Brigadier General Zewdu Kiros Gebrekidan, an Ethiopian who was appointed as Deputy Force Commander of UNISFA in 2016. Both Head of Mission and Force Commander and Deputy Force Commander are Ethiopians. As of September 2019, 3871 Contingent troops, 80 Experts on Mission, 5 Police, and 80 Staff Of-

No.	Name	Time	Note
1	Lieutenant-General Tadesse Werede Tesfay	July 2011 – January 2013	-
2	Major-General Yohannes Gebremeskel Tesfamariam	March 2013 – June 2014	Former FDRE's Commissioner for the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE). Also Force Commander at UNMISS in June 2014 - June 2016)
3	Lieutenant-General Birhanu Jula Gelalcha	November 2014 – January 2016	In 2005, he was a Sector Commander in the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL). Currently General and Deputy Chief of Staff & military operations division head of (ENDF)
4	Major-General Hassen Ebrahim Mussa,	January 2016 – January 2017	Sector Commander North in the African Union-UN Mission in Darfur, UNAMID
5	Major-General Tesfay Gidey Hailemichael	February 2017 – April 2018	-
6	Major General Gebre Adhana Woldezgu	April 2018 –April 2019	-
7	Major General Mehari Zewde Gebremariam	February 2019 – July 2020	-
8	Maj Gen. Kefyalew Amde Tessema	June 2020 – Present	In 2015, he served as an African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) Sector Commander in Somalia.

ficers; are deployed with a total number of 4,036.[518]

[517] United Nations. "Troop and Police Contribution."
https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/3_country_and_mission_16.pdf, Accessed on 20 March 2020.

[518] United Nations. "Contributions by country and mission." September 2019.
https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/4_mission_and_country.pdf. Accessed on 12 January 2020.

Table 6.9 UNISFA's Force Commanders since the beginning of the Mission

UNISFA is run by a Head of Mission and a Force Commander. In the operation's initial years, these positions were held by the same person, but since 2014 they have been split between two people.

No.	Head of Mission Name	Time	Note
1	Lieutenant-General Tadesse Werede Tesfay	July 2011 – January 2013	
2	Lieutenant-General Yohannes Gebremeskel Tesfamariam	March 2013 – June 2014	
3	Major-General Halefom Ejigu Moges	2014 – 2015	Acting Head of Mission
4	Haile Tilahun Gebremariam (Brigadier-General Retired)	January 2015 – 2020	
6	Maj Gen. Kefyalew Amde Tessema	2020 – Present	Acting Head of Mission

Table 6.10 UNISFA's Head of Mission since the beginning of the Mission

Map 6.2 Map Showing the Deployment in UNISFA[519]

[519] OCHA. "UNISFA, May 2019." 17 May 2019 https://reliefweb.int/map/south-sudan/unisfa-may-2019, Accessed on 20 December 2019.

Year	Division	Military			Civilian			Others[520]			Total
		Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	
2011	1st Battalion	827	5	832	8	19	27	6	8	14	873
2012	2nd Battalion	813	8	821	8	15	23	12	6	18	862
	3rd Battalion	808	14	822	4	17	21	15	4	19	862
	4th Battalion	786	10	796	4	12	16	23	11	34	846
	5th Battalion	764	13	777	5	12	17	57	11	68	862
	6th Battalion	803	9	812	1	18	19	23	9	32	863
	Armored 1st Round	130	2	132	-	6	6	-		-	138
	Artillery 1st Round	136	-	136	-	3	3	-	1	1	140
	Staff Officer & Signal	88	2	90	4	5	9	37	16	53	152
	Light Engineer	79	4	83	3	2	5	-	2	2	90
	De-Mining	51	1	52	-	-	-	4	4	8	60
	Level II Hospital	37	13	50	4	9	13	-	-	-	63
	QRF	173	-	173	-	1	1	-	1	1	175
	Utility Helicopter	75	3	78	3	4	7	-	1	1	86
	Multi Role Logistics	207	9	216	11	10	21	9	4	13	250
	2nd Round Light Engineer	111	1	112	3	4	7	-	-	-	119
	2nd Round Armored	66	-	66	-	-	-	1	1	2	68
	2nd Round Artillery	66	-	66	-	-	-	-	-	-	66
2013	2nd Round Staff Officer and Signal	138	11	149	5	6	11	2	7	9	169
	2nd Round Level II Hospital	35	13	48	5	8	13	-	-	-	61

[520] Others means Police Personnel and other Military and Civil Personnel of ENDF who are not under the payroll of EDRE-PSTC.

Year	Unit										
	2nd Round Multi Role Logistics	207	5	212	3	5	8	18	1	19	239
	2nd Round QRF	168	1	169	1	1	2	1	1	2	173
	2nd Round Utility Helicopter	73	1	74	-	-	-	7	5	12	86
	3rd Round Multi Role Logistics	177	13	190	11	14	25	28	2	30	245
	3rd Round Staff Officer and Signal	52	3	55	-	7	7	9	1	10	72
	3rd Round Level II Hospital	32	13	45	4	9	13	2	1	3	61
	3rd Round Armored	136	-	136	-	2	2	-	2	2	140
	3rd Round Artillery	128	-	128	-	3	3	-	3	3	134
	3rd Round Light Engineer	105	7	112	2	2	4	-	5	5	121
2014	7th Battalion 3rd Round	775	5	780	-	9	9	34	25	59	848
	3rd Round QRF	166	1	167	1	1	2	6	1	7	176
	8th Battalion 3rd Round	749	10	759	-	2	2	33	28	61	822
	9th Battalion 3rd Round	821	27	848	6	7	13	28	4	32	893
2015	3rd Round Utility Helicopter	70	5	75	5	2	7	2	0	2	84
	Border Security (402) 1st Round	100	3	103	-	5	5	-	-	-	108
	Border Security (402) 2nd Round	10	483	493	6	16	22	16	27	43	558
	10th Battalion 4th Round	689	12	701	-	3	3	69	11	80	784
	4th Round Armored	103	1	104	-	1	1	5	-	5	110
	4th Round Multi Role Logistics	49	7	56	12	14	26	40	-	40	122
	4th Round Artillery	123	-	123	-	-	-	7	-	7	130
	4th Round Level 2 Hospital	23	16	39	9	10	19	-	-	-	58
	4th Round Light Engineer	143	3	146	2	-	2	22	-	22	170
	4th Round Quick Reaction For-	146	1	147	-	2	2	13	-	13	162

Year	Unit										
	ce (QRF)										
	4th Round Utility Helicopter	67	2	67	8	6	14	-	1	1	82
	Staff and Signal 4th Round	140	9	149	1	4	5	18	4	22	176
	11th Battalion 4th Round	749	15	764	10	4	14	46	21	67	845
	12th Battalion 4th Round	654	4	658	-	3	3	181	20	201	862
2016	5th Round Artillery	136	1	137	-	-	-	1	2	3	140
	5th Round Armored	129	-	129	-	-	-	2	5	7	136
	5th Round Light Engineer	113	3	116	-	-	-	2	2	4	120
	5th Round Multi Role Logistics	132	15	147	12	11	23	54	6	60	230
	Staff Officers & Signal 5th Round	54	9	63	-	-	-	3	4	7	70
2017	13 Battalion 5th Round	764	5	769	1	6	7	52	19	71	847
	14 Battalion 5th Round	753	20	773	4	14	18	72	11	83	874
	QRF 5th Round	134	1	135	2	4	6	33	-	33	174
	Level II Hospital 5th Round	29	18	47	5	7	12	2	1	3	62
	15 Battalion 5th Round	854	14	868	1	6	7	64	22	86	961
	16 Battalion 5th Round	707	30	737	1	4	5	81	29	110	852
	Border Security (402) 3rd Round	479	14	493	2	14	16	36	15	51	560
	17 Battalion 6th Round	596	16	613	-	4	4	224	42	266	883
2017 - 2018	18 Battalion 6th Round	687	5	692	2	6	8	134	33	167	867
	6h Round Artillery	127	2	129	-	-	-	6	4	10	139
	6th Round Armored	120	2	122	-	-	-	9	2	11	133
	6th Round Multi Role Logistics	163	16	179	9	10	19	36	10	46	244

	6th Round Light Engineer	93	4	97	-	2	2	20	1	21	120
	QRF 6th Round	93	-	93	-	-	-	76	6	82	175
2017/18 - 2019	6th Round Utility Helicopter	75	1	76	4	6	10				86
	Level II Hospital 6th Round	30	14	44	1	6	7	4	5	9	60
	Staff & Signal 6th Round	145	11	156	1	3	4	6	12	17	177
	Border Security (402) 3rd Round	487	22	509	1	5	6	18	24	42	557
	7th Round Artillery	134	-	134	2	1	3	-	3	3	140
	7th Round Armored	131	3	134				-	4		138
	7th Light Engineer	104	5	109	3	1	4	5	2	7	120
	7th Round Multi Role Logistics	164	18	182	7	5	12	29	16	45	239
	19 Battalion 6th Round	304	5	309	-	1	1	7	5	12	322
	Total			**21,110**			**590**			**2,226**	**23,930**

Table 6.11 Military and Civilian Personnel who were deployed and Finished their Deployment in UNISFA up to 2019 [521]

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[521] Source: FDRE Ministry of Defence, Main Department for Peace Support Operation.

Since the deployment of UNISFA, the condition in Abyei remained calm, and no major violent clashes had happened. This showed that a UN mission could quickly establish security in its mandated area if it has sufficient strength and leadership. Unlike other missions in the region, in UNISFA's case, the task is made easier as the force is entirely Ethiopian with a single line of command.[522] Using the words of Chris Johnson to conclude:

> The involvement of Ethiopian troops in UNISFA is unprecedented; a neighboring power invited by both Sudan and South Sudan to provide an interposition force to keep the peace between them. This is seen as evidence of Ethiopia's good relations with both states and its neutral position in the conflict, and Ethiopia takes pride in this regional role. UNISFA is viewed as a success story and has shown Ethiopia that it is not only possible but 'a good thing' to contribute troops to a peace operation in a neighboring country.[523]

6.1.4.2 UNMISS, United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan

South Sudan became the newest country in the world on 9 July 2011 after a six-year peace process, which began with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in January 2005 between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), which ended more than 20 years of war. The United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) supported the implementation of the CPA.

The Security Council established UNMISS to consolidate peace and security and to help to establish conditions for development in the new country. However, in December 2013, violence broke out in South Sudan's capital, Juba, and quickly spread to other locations in the country, which led to a deep nation-wide political and security crisis. Following the crisis that broke out in May 2014, the Security Council decided to reinforce UNMISS and reprioritized its mandate towards protecting civilians, human rights monitoring, and support for the delivery of humanitarian assistance and the implementation of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement.

Ethiopia has contributed fifteen police officers since December 2008, which was the first Police deployment for Ethiopia for UNMIS, and when UNMIS was deployed in South Sudan, it also began sending its police officers. By February 2017, it sent 23 police officers, 11 military experts, and 1,277 contingent troops, becoming the second-largest contributor, only behind India.

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[522] Johnson, C. Peacemaking and Peacekeeping: Reflections from Abyei. *International Peacekeeping,* 19/5. 2012. 640–654. 653.

[523] Ibid.

As of September 2019, 2,091 Contingent Troops, 17 Experts on Mission, 20 Police, and 30 Staff Officers; a total of 2,158.

Year	Division	Military			Civil			Others[524]			Total
		Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	
2006	1st Battalion 1st Round	507	5	512	5	7	12	37	29	66	590
	2st Battalion 1st Round	593	6	599	3	12	15	1	8	9	623
2008 - 2009	3rd Battalion 2nd Round	538	1	539	4	12	16	22	6	28	583
	4th Battalion 2nd Round	514	14	528	6	4	10	67	21	88	626
2008 - 2009	5th Battalion 3rd Round	494	29	523	1	11	12	44	24	68	603
	6th Battalion 3rd Round	545	10	555	4	5	9	47	29	76	640
2010 - 2011	7th Battalion 4th Round										
	8th Battalion 4th Round	566	5	571	3	6	9	9	14	23	604
	9th Battalion 5th Round	579	19	598	1	1	2	11	24	35	635
	Total			4425			85			393	4,904

Table 6.12 Military and Civilian Personnel who were deployed and Finished their Deployment in UN-MISS[525]

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[524] Others means Police Personnel and other Military and Civil Personnel of ENDF who are not under the payroll of EDRE-PSTC.

[525] Source: FDRE Ministry of Defence, Main Department for Peace Support Operation.

Map 6.3 Map Showing the Deployment in UNMISS[526]

6.1.4.3 MINUSMA, United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali

The Security Council established MINUSMA in April 2013 to support political processes and assist the re-establishment of state authority, the rebuilding of the security sector, and the promotion and protection of human rights in Mali.[527] As of January 2020, Ethiopia has only one Staff Officer in MINUSMA. This is basically due to the luck of military and police personnel who can speak French language.

6.1.4.4 MINUSTAH, United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti

MINUSTAH was established in June 2004 after an armed conflict that forced President Aristide to exile. Its original mandate was to support the Transitional Government in ensuring a secure and stable environment, to assist in monitoring, restructuring, and reforming the Haitian

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[526] OCHA. "South Sudan: UNMISS, September 20193." September 2019. https://reliefweb.int/map/south-sudan/south-sudan-unmiss-september-2019, Accessed on 20 December 2019.

[527] United Nations. "Supporting political process and helping stabilize Mali". 2016.
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minusma/index.shtml, Accessed on 22 January 2017

National Police and demobilization and reintegration programs. However, the devastating earthquake of January 2010 forced MINUSTAH to increase its commitment. Ethiopia has been deploying police officers since 2015, and currently, eight of them are still serving in MINUSTAH.

6.1.4.5 UNMHA, United Nations Mission to Support the Hudaydah Agreement

Ethiopia has only one Expert on a Mission since June 2019 like the other 30 nations that sent a single expert or police to the mission with a total of 37 personnel. Only Police and Experts are present in the mission.[528] Under the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, following the Stockholm Agreement, reached in Sweden on 13 December 2018, between the Government of Yemen and the Houthis, the Security Council in its resolution 2451 (2018), authorized the establishment and deployment of an advance team to monitor and support the immediate implementation of the ceasefire and redeployment of forces from the city of Hudaydah and the ports of Hudaydah, Saleef, and Ras Isa.[529] On 16 January 2019, the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution S/2019/2452, authorizing the establishment of a new Special Political Mission, the United Nations Mission, to support the Hudaydah Agreement (UNMHA).[530]

6.2 Hegemonic Peacekeeping: Ethiopia in Somalia and its Unilateral Interventions

Ethiopia is undoubtedly the hegemonic state in the Horn of Africa, especially concerning its role in Somalia.[531] Ethiopia's first unilateral action in Somalia was in 1995 to remove the Islamic insurgent, Al-Ittihad Al-Islamiya (AIAI). In 1998 Ethiopia launched a second military intervention at the time of the Ethio-Eritrean war, following Eritrea's effort–in collaboration with a Baidoa-based Somali warlord Hussein Aideed and involving the OLF and the ONLF to open a second front.[532] Ethiopia's third intervention was in 2006, against the threat from the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) and supporting the Somali Transitional Federal Government. Lastly, Ethiopia

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[528] United Nations. *Troop and Police Contribution.*
https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/3_country_and_mission_16.pdf, Accessed on 20 March 2020.

[529] UNDPPA. "UNMHA, Hudaydah Agreement." 16 January 2019. https://dppa.un.org/en/mission/unmha-hudaydah-agreement, Accessed on 11 November 2019.

[530] Ibid.

[531] Malito, D. *The Persistence of State Disintegration in Somalia Between Regional and Global Intervention.* Doctoral Thesis. Università degli studi di Milano, 18 March 2013.

[532] Beyene, Abdeta D. and Seyoum Mesfin. The Practicalities of Living with Failed States. *The American Academy of Arts & Sciences*. 147 (1) Winter 2018. 129.

joined AMISOM in 2014, simultaneously deploying troops outside the AMISOM command to support its troops under AMISOM.

Nevertheless, Ethiopian intervention in Somalia has been contentious. Napoleon A. Bamfo described it as 'Ethiopia's invasion of Somalia in late 2006 may go down in history as one of the most daring if not imprudent strategic decisions any African government has made on its neighbor.'[533] The online media in Sudan covered it as 'A US diplomatic cable published by the Wikileaks whistle-blowing organization has exposed that Ethiopia and the US government had secret agreement to invade Somalia.'[534] Commenting about Ethiopian Non-AMISOM troops in Somalia, the Somali-based Horn Observer stated, 'Ethiopia has a long and ugly history of perennially intervening in Somalia to weaken the political independence of the country and to pursue narrow political objectives'.[535] However, on the other hand, the then-sited Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, in an interview with an Aljazeera news channel, said Ethiopia 'did not invade Somalia. We were invited by the duly constituted government of Somalia, the internationally recognized government of Somalia, to assist them in averting the threat of terrorism.'[536]

Some also argued Ethiopias interventions are based on the 'the inherent right to self-defense, a terrorist threat, intervention by invitation, and the protection of the right to self-determination of the Ethiopian Somalis.'[537] Terry Mays also stated on the Somalian intervention: 'Western states were not eager to return to Somalia. If a peacekeeping mission were required to support a new national government, it would have to be one mandated and fielded by African countries.'[538]

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[533] Bamfo, Napoleon A. Ethiopia's invasion of Somalia in 2006: Motives and lessons learned. *African Journal of Political Science and International Relations* 4/2, 055-065. 2010.

[534] Sudan Tribune. "Wikileaks: US behind Ethiopia invasion in Somalia." Sudantribune.com, 6 December 2010. http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article37189, Accessed 15 July 2020.

[535] Horn Observer. *FNP Statement on the presence of Non-AMISOM troops in Somalia.* 16 June 2020. https://hornobserver.com/articles/456/FNP-Statement-on-the-presence-of-Non-AMISOM-troops-in-Somalia, Accessed 5 July 2019.

[536] Al Jazeera English. "Talk to Jazeera - Meles Zenawi - 18 March 2007 - Part 1." May 2007. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EZh3ppcedBc, Accessed 20 November 2019.

[537] Dawit, G. cited in Yihdego, Zeray W. Ethiopia's Military Action against the Union of Islamic Courts and Others in Somalia: Some Legal Implications. *The International and Comparative Law Quarterly*, Vol. 56, No. 3 July, 2007. 668.

[538] Mays, Terry. The African Union's African Mission in Somalia (AMISOM): Why did it successfully deploy following the failure of the IGAD Peace Support Mission to Somalia (IGASOM)? A Thesis Presented in Partial Com-

Generally, Ethiopia's extended involvement in Somalia in the name of intervention can be considered as 'hegemonic peacekeeping.' Carolyn M. Shaw and Julius O. Ihonvber called the Nigerian participation in the regional peacekeeping force, ECOMOG, in Liberia as 'hegemonic participation in peacekeeping.'[539] Similarly, Adekeye Adebajo asserted Nigeria's case from 1990-1998 and the United States in 1993 in their interventionists in Liberia and Somalia, respectively, as hegemonic peacekeeping. Adebajo defined hegemonic peacekeeping as follows:

> Hegemonic peacekeeping' is a situation in which a powerful state with strong global or regional interests is able to deploy a preponderance of troops in a bid to manage a conflict and is able to convince other states to accept its leadership of the mission. By shouldering a greater military and financial burden, a 'hegemonic' peacekeeper is able to exert disproportionate influence over military and political decisions regarding the mission.[540]

Since the beginning of AMISOM, peacekeepers from the region were relied on Ethiopian soldiers to provide the bulk of the security functions required to keep the Transitional Federal Government safe in its compounds and from any counter-attacks from Somali factions.[541] This shows Ethiopia's hegemonic military burden and leadership. This is because 'Ethiopian troops know the land, they are used to the temperatures, they are the only ones who have previous experience fighting both guerrilla and conventional warfare.'[542] In addition, Ethiopia was able to pursue its regional interests multilaterally, mainly through a dominant role in IGAD.[543]

Adekeye Adebajo also argues a 'major criterion for a mission to be defined as hegemonic peacekeeping is multilateral as opposed to unilateral intervention. As a sheriff, the lead state must be

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pletion of the Requirements of the Certificate-of-Training in United Nations Peace Support Operations. Peace Operation Training Institute. 2009

[539] Shaw, Carolyn M. and Julius O. Ihonvber Hegemonic Participation in Peacekeeping Operations: The Case of Nigeria and ECOMOG. *International Journal on World Peace,* Vol. 13, No. 2 June 1996. 31-66

[540] Adebajo, Adekeye. In Search of Warlords: Hegemonic Peacekeeping in Liberia and Somalia, International Peacekeeping, 10:4, 2003. 63-64. Adebajo also gave the example of Nigerian-led missions in Chad (1979-82) and Sierra Leone (1997-2000), and American-led missions in Haiti (1994), and Bosnia (post-1995), the Australian-led mission in East Timor (1999) and the South African-led mission in Burundi (2002).

[541] Mays, Terry. The African Union's African Mission in Somalia… 2009

[542] France24.com. Ethiopian troop withdrawal from Somalia exposes peacekeeping problems. 15 December 2016. https://www.france24.com/en/20161215-ethiopian-troops-withdraw-highlighting-peacekeeping-internationally-funded-peacekeeping, Accessed on 23 December 2019.

[543] Maru, Mehari T. *Ethiopia's Regional Diplomacies: A Dominant Interpretation of the Horn of Africa.* South African Foreign Policy and African Drivers Programme. South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA), Policy Briefing 112. October 2014.

able to rally a posse of allies to undertake the intervention.'[544] Hence, though Ethiopia took the first intervention action unilaterally, there was the support of the United States,[545] African Union, [546]and Ethiopian troops were fighting al-Shabaab with Kenyan, Ugandan, and Burundian troops under AMSISOM even before it joined AMISOM.[547] Also, it is Ethiopia's unilateral intervention in 2006 that transformed into a multilateral intervention in 2009. Thus, Ethiopian intervention in Somalia qualifies as hegemonic peacekeeping under Adekeye Adebajo's definition. Below are four Ethiopian interventions in Somalia.

6.2.1 The 1995 Intervention against Al-Ittihad Al-Islamiya (AIAI)

Al-Ittihad al-Islamiya (AIAI) was one of Somalia's largest militant Islamic organization rose to power in the early 1990s through established in early 1980s. AIAI began its alliance with Al-Qaida in 1993 and was getting substantial funds from Osama bin Laden.[548] It was also involved with Al-Qaida's bombing of the United States Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998.[549] Ideologically, it was a pan-Somali and pan-Islamic agenda, aiming to establish an Islamic state in the Horn of Africa, forcing the Ethiopian Somali State or Ogaden's secession.[550] AIAI also made several terrorist attacks against Ethiopia allied with the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF), a separatist group at the time.[551] The Ethiopian army mounted an attack on AIAI inside

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[544]Adebajo, Adekeye. In Search of Warlords: Hegemonic Peacekeeping in Liberia and Somalia, International Peacekeeping, 10:4, 2003. 64.

[545] Whitlock, Craig. *U.S. drone base in Ethiopia is operational.* 27 October, 2011 https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-drone-base-in-ethiopia-is-operational/2011/10/27/gIQAznKwMM_story.html, Accessed on 12 June 2020.

[546] Al Jazeera English. *Talk to Jazeera - Meles Zenawi - 18 March 2007 - Part 1.* May 2007. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EZh3ppcedBc, Accessed 20 November 2019.

[547] Kenyan Defense Forces. *War for Peace: Kenya's Military in the African Mission in Somalia, 2012-2020.* Nairobi: Kenyan Ministry of Defense. 2020. 56-57

[548] United Nations Security Council. "Al-Ittihad al-Islamiya (AIAI)." https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1267/aq_sanctions_list/summaries/entity/al-itihaad-al-islamiya/aiai, Accessed 20 November 2019.

[549] Ibid.

[550]Metaferia, Getachew. *Ethiopia and the United States: History, Diplomacy, and Analysis.* New York: Algora publishing, 2009, 93.

[551] Woldeselase, Woldemicael. *Terrorism in Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa: Threat, Impact and Response.* Addis Ababa: Rehoboth Printers, 2010, 132-135.

Somalia, killing most of its leaders and destroying its military and political infrastructures, which led to the organization's formal disintegration in 1997.[552]

6.2.2 The 2006 Intervention against Islamic Courts Union (ICU)[553]

In early 2000, a group of court leaders from Mogadishu formed the *Sharia* Implementation Council or Joint Islamic Courts Council to unify and coordinate the various courts. It started to issue a *fatwa* (religious judgments) like the celebration of New Year as an offense that is punishable by death. They started shutting down cinemas as an 'alternative means of governance to Somalia through sharia law… away from factional politics based around clan loyalty.'[554] On the other hand, in 2006, the ICU restored security in Mogadishu and south-central Somalia, where they had effective control. However, it was not accepted internationally due to close links with al-Qaida.[555]

At the same time, in 2004, IGAD set up the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) to restore peace and order in Somalia.[556] The TFG was formed in November 2004 in Kenya with the adoption of Transitional Federal Parliament, Transitional Federal Charter, and Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed's election as President of Somalia and head of the TFG and the new parliament first met inside Somalia in 2006. Also, the UN Security Council Resolution 1725 unanimously passed that characterized the TFG as 'the only route to achieving peace and stability in Somalia.'[557] Howev-

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[552] Kenyan Defense Forces. *War for Peace: Kenya's Military in the African Mission in Somalia, 2012-2020.* Nairobi: Kenyan Ministry of Defense. 2020. 39

[553] Parts of this section is from the authors article Sigatu, Kaleab T. 'Asymmetric Warfare against the Islamic Militant Group al-Shabaab in Somalia–The Ethiopian Experience'. In Álmos Peter Kiss. *Asymmetric Warfare: Conflict of the Past, the Present, and the Future*. Conference Proceeding. Hungarian Defense Forces General Staff Scientific Research Centre. Budapest, 9–10 November 2016. 235 – 247. http://hvktkh.hm.gov.hu/kiadvanyok/dokumentumok/asymmetricwar.pdf, Accessed 20 November 2019.

[554] Barnes, Cedric & Harun Hassan. The Rise and fall of Mogadishu's Islamic Courts. *Journal of Eastern African Studies*, 1:2, 2007. 160.

[555] Seifert, Matthias. "The Ethiopian Intervention in Somalia: Theoretical Perspectives". In Bruchhaus, Eva-Maria and Monika M. Sommer. *Hot Spot Horn of Africa Revisited: Approaches to Make Sense of Conflict.* London: Transaction Publishers, 2008, 29.

[556] Sabala, Kizito. "Regional and extra-regional inputs in promoting (in) security in Somalia". In Sharamo, Roba and Berouk Mesfin (eds), *Regional Security in the post-Cold War Horn of Africa*. Addis Ababa: Central Printing Press, 2011, 100.

[557] UN Security Council. "Security Council Approves African Protection, Training Mission in Somalia, Unanimously Adopting Resolution 1175 (2006)." 6 December 2006. http://www.un.org/press/en/2006/sc8887.doc.htm, Accessed 28 November 2016

er, ICU became the major challenge for the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) which was only confined to the town of Baidoa.

Islamic Courts Union then started a war against TFG. Suicide bombers attacked the weak Transitional Federal government; also, it runs terror training camps, courted foreign fighters, and released videos through al Qaeda's propaganda arm.[558] Sheikh Ahmed Sharif, the ICU leader, called for the creation of a 'greater Somalia' in the horn of Africa, saying 'we will leave no stone unturned to integrate our Somali brothers in Kenya and Ethiopia and restore their freedom to live with their ancestors in Somalia.'[559]

In the meantime, Abdullahi Yusuf, on his first foreign visit to Ethiopia, asked 20,000 Ethiopian forces to strengthen his government, which was based in Baidoa.[560] The ICU, which has already declared itself as Ethiopia's enemy by their irredentist policy, made the Ethiopian government ardently accept the invitation and launch a large-scale offensive attack. The Ethiopian Parliament also authorized the government's decision to take all legal and necessary measures against the ICU. Also, AU supported Ethiopian intervention; the deputy chairman of the AU Commission, Patrick Mazimhaka, said Ethiopia has 'given us ample warning that it feels threatened by the Union of Islamic Courts' and also the international community has the responsibility of supporting the TFG.[561] On December 28, 2006, Ethiopian and TFG forces captured the capital of Somalia, Mogadishu. The Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi said, 'Our patience was considered as a weakness, and we were forced to go to war, and the alternative left to us is to speedily bring the war to a successful and victorious end in the shortest time possible.'[562]

Cedric Barnes and Harun Hassan describe the situation as follows:

[558] Roggio, Bill. "Former Islamic Courts Leader elected president of Somalia." January 31, 2009. http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2009/01/former_islamic_court.php, Accessed on 28 November 2016.

[559] Ibid.

[560]BBC. "Somalia: Who supports who?" 28 December 2006. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/5092586.stm, Accessed on 28 November 2016.

[561] Xinhua. "AU: Ethiopia has right to intervene militarily in Somali." December 27, 2006 http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2006-12/27/content_5536553.htm, Accessed on 28 November 2016.

[562] Plaut, Martin. "Ethiopian army faces Somali test." 25 December 2006. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6208759.stm, Accessed on 28 November 2016.

On 20 December, a day after Sheikh Indha'adde's ultimatum for Ethiopian troops to leave, expired clashes began between the two sides near Baidoa….The asymmetry in numbers and capability between the combined Ethiopian and Transitional Government forces and the loosely integrated Islamic Courts' forces became clear, … On 28 December, Ethiopian and government forces marched into Mogadishu unopposed. In the face of the Alliance, the Islamic Courts' military and administrative presence seemed to collapse.[563]

On December 28, 2006, Meles Zenawi told a news conference about his plans after controlling Mogadishu and about the claim United States military support, stating:

... We will not let Mogadishu bury. We will help the transitional government to do whatever it can to make sure that Mogadishu is stabilized quickly. …Because we plan to pursue the remnants of the Eritrean troops, international Jihadists, and the hardcore elements of the Islamic Courts who are fleeing towards Kismayo and other port areas, I will continue to pursue them. That is our primary agenda. …The United States has not contributed a single bullet, a single soldier, or a piece of single military equipment to this operation. Lastly, we have with the United States longstanding arrangements to share intelligence on terrorist activities in the neighborhood. That sharing of intelligence has not been stopped during the conflict.[564]

Following the Control of Mogadishu by the TFG, on February 20, 2007, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1744, reiterating its support for the Transitional Federal Government and welcomed Ethiopia's decision to withdraw its troops from Somalia. Furthermore, it approved the African Union's plan to establish the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) to avoid the security vacuum and create the conditions for a complete withdrawal of ENDF and the lifting of emergency security measures currently in place.[565]

Though AMISOM started its peacekeeping deployment in 2007, it was in January 2009 that the Ethiopian troops started to pull out from Somalia. Colonel Gabre Yohannes Abate, the Ethiopian troop commander in Somalia, said, 'though the journey is challenging, we are happy to start the

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[563] Barnes, Cedric & Harun Hassan. The Rise and Fall of Mogadishu's Islamic Courts. *Journal of Eastern African Studies*, 1:2, 2007. 160.

[564] AP Archive. "Prime Minister says Ethiopian troops on outskirts of Somali capital." http://www.aparchive.com/metadata/youtube/9d9afd55c8a9709011701f8ad8775840, Accessed on 24 March 2019.

[565]UN Security Council. "The Situation in Somalia: Resolution 1744 (2007)." 21 February 2007. http://www.refworld.org/docid/4600f97e2.html, Accessed on 28 November 2016.

journey back to our homeland after successfully discharging the mission bestowed by the government and the people of Ethiopia.'[566]

6.2.3 Joining AMISOM, 2014

The Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahidin (Movement of Warrior Youth), commonly known as al-Shabaab, a radical militant group, was an offshoot of ICU that took over most of southern Somalia after the Ethiopian troops withdraw in 2009. The defeat of the ICU in 2006 served as the immediate context for al-Shabaab's evolution into an insurgent group.[567] US State Department, in February 2008, through its Public Notice No. 6137, officially put al-Shabaab on the black terror list.[568] In September 2009, al-Shabaab pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda for the first time in a video distributed on jihadi blogs.[569] Al-Shabaab was also able to control more territory than any other entity in Somalia. The "Talibanized" devout yet secular and tolerant Muslim society gradually imposing draconian and oppressive laws on the people, banning music, the playing of video games, and watching sports or movies.[570]

It was al-Shabaab that became a substantial challenge to ICU and later to the TFG, and also to the newly AU peacekeeping forces, AMISOM. AMISOM was the replacement of IGAD's failed attempt to deploy a peace operation. IGAD planed the IGAD Peace Support Mission in Somalia (IGASOM) in 2005; however, because of the disagreement between the three international organizations involved in the operation UN, AU, and IGAD, lack of funding, and failure to lift the UN arms embargo on Somalia made it impossible to materialize the operation.[571] The Security

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[566]Kitnan, Rajesh Babu. "Ethiopian Troops Receive Warm Farewell as They Leave Mogadishu." 16 January 2009. http://www.ssig.gov.my/blog/2009/01/16/ethiopian-troops-receive-warm-farewell-as-they-leave-mogadishu/, Accessed on 28 November 2016.

[567]Shay, Shaul. "Somalia in Transition since 2006." London: Transaction Publishers, 2014. 97.

[568] US Department of State. *Designation of al-Shabaab as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist.* February 26, 2008. https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/102448.htm, Accessed on 1 December 2016.

[569] Shay, Shaul. *Somalia in Transition since 2006.* London: Transaction Publishers, 2014. 103.

[570] Shay, Shaul. *Somalia in Transition since 2006.* London: Transaction Publishers, 2014. 129.

[571] Mays, Terry. The African Union's African Mission in Somalia (AMISOM): Why did it Successfully Deploy following the failure of the IGAD Peace Support Mission to Somalia (IGASOM)? A Thesis Presented in Partial Completion of the Requirements of the Certificate-of-Training in United Nations Peace Support Operations. Peace Operation Training Institute. 2009. 5-13.

Council authorizes AMISOM under resolution 1744 (2007) on 20th February 2007, which was set to be operated by AU.

AMISOM's first deployment was about 1,600 Ugandan soldiers who were limited to a few strategic locations in Mogadishu in March 2007. By January 2014, it had become the AU's largest-ever multinational forces, consisting of over 22,000 uniformed personnel.[572] Though, Kenya and Ethiopia signed the Memorandum of Understanding between the IGAD joint committee for the Grand Stabilization of South-Central Somalia on December 2012, it was on the 1st of January 2014 that the ENDF provided 4,395 uniformed personnel.[573] At the ceremony, when ENDF joins AMISOM, Ethiopian Ambassador to Somalia, Wondimu Asamnew gave the following remark:

> We have been on the side of the Somali people for the last 24 years, and we will continue to be on the side of our brothers until full comprehensive peace is achieved in Somalia. … Ethiopia believes that unless Somalia is in peace, Ethiopia cannot be in peace. Our life [and] our destiny is intertwined, and I am hopeful that we will jointly uproot Al-Shabaab in a very short period of time and bring Somalia into a new chapter of peace and prosperity.[574]

On the same day, the EU Envoy to Somalia, Ambassador Michele d'Urso remarked the Ethiopian Troops joining AMISOM as 'a game-changer.'[575] It was also a departure from its previous unilateral military approaches to neutralize and contain threats emerging from Somalia.[576]

AMISOM, with a multidimensional Peace Support Operation, is mandated to reduce the threat and conduct offensive operations against al-Shabaab and other armed opposition groups. Also, it was commissioned to provide security to enable the political process at all levels as well as stabi-

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[572] Williams, Paul D. *Fighting for Peace in Somalia: A History and Analysis of the African Union Mission (AMISOM), 2007-2017.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018. 160.

Williams, Paul D. *Special Report: How Many Fatalities Has the African Union Mission in Somalia Suffered?* September 10, 2015. https://theglobalobservatory.org/2015/09/amisom-african-union-somalia-peacekeeping/, Accessed on 1 December 2016.

[573] AMSOM. "Ethiopia-ENDF." http://amisom-au.org/ethiopia-endf/, Accessed on 21 September 2016.

[574] AMISOM Somalia. *Ethiopian Ambassador to Somalia Reacts to Ethiopian Troops Joining AMISOM.* January 23, 2014. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vxXraqoVbSw&t=4s, Accessed on 23 June 2019.

[575] AMISOM Somalia. *European Envoy to Somalia Reacts to Ethiopian Troops Joining AMISOM.* January 23, 2014. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Rh1Cp0X86hw, Accessed on 23 June 2019.

[576] Mulugeta, Kidist. 'Ethiopia in AMISOM'. Abstract. Presented at CFEE workshop: African Armies in Multilateral Peace Support Operations: Social and Professional Changes at Stake. Organized by CFEE & Institute for Peace and Security Studies, Addis Ababa University, Addis Ababa, 25-26 April 2016. https://cfee.hypotheses.org/1554, Accessed on 06 January, 2019.

lization efforts, reconciliation, and peacebuilding in Somalia, enabling the gradual handing over security responsibilities from AMISOM to the Somali security forces. The contingents are responsible for building the Somali security forces' capacities and providing appropriate protection to the Somali authorities to help them carry out government and security functions for critical infrastructure.[577] However, it was marked as 'the deadliest peace operation in modern history.'[578]

AMISOM troop contributors are Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Burundi, while Nigeria, Ghana, Sierra Leone, Zambia, Kenya, and Uganda contributed police personnel. Map 6.4 has the sector deployment of AMISOM contributor countries. Till 2019 there were 15,418 contingents rotated in AMISOM as indicated in Table 6.13, and until August 2020, there were 13 Ethiopian Force Commanders. Ethiopian top AMISOM officers were Maj. Gen. Mohamedesha Zeyinu, Deputy commander for Operations and Plans in 2016 and acting force in the same year; Lt. Gen. Tigabu Yilma Wondimhunegn was force commander from 2019 – 2020; Maj. Gen. Abreha Tesfay, Deputy Force Commander for Operations and Plans in 2016; and Brig. Gen. Kittila Bulti Tadesse served as AMISOM Chief of Staff in 2018.

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[577] AMISOM. "AMISOM Mandate." http://amisom-au.org/amisom-mandate/, Accessed on 1 December 2016.

[578] Williams, Paul D. *Fighting for Peace in Somalia: A History and Analysis of the African Union Mission (AMISOM), 2007-2017.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018. 1.

Map   6.4   AMISOM   Sector   [579]   Deployment   as   of   January   2015

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[579] ENDF is also deployed in Sector 4 with Djibutian Armed Forces.

Year	Division	Military			Civilian			Others[580]			Total
		M	F	Total	M	F	Total	M	F	Total	
2014 - 2015	Sector 03 1st Round	1637	10	1647	6	11	17	28	42	70	1734
	Sector 04 1st Round	1406	3	1406	-	-	-	40	20	60	1466
	Sector 03 1st Round, Multi Role Logistics	69	-	69	-	-	-	-	-	-	69
2015 - 2016	Sector 03 2nd Round	2264	14	2278	9	19	28	58	65	123	2429
	Sector 04 2nd Round	1234	8	1242	7	4	11	7	34	41	1294
	Sector 03 2nd Round Light Engineering	66	-	66	-	-	-	3	-	3	69
	Sector 03 2nd Round Multi Role Logistics	16	-	16	-	-	-	19	-	19	35
	Sector 04 2nd Round Multi Role Logistics	95	-	95	-	-	-	6	-	6	101
	Kisumayu[581] 1st Round	564	1	565	2	1	3	13	16	29	597
2016 - 2017	Sector 03 3rd Round	2175	77	2252	6	12	18	80	62	142	2412
	Sector 04 3rd Round	1177	52	1229	2	7	9	53	37	90	1328
2017/18 - 2019	Sector 04 4th Round	1127	44	1171	1	8	9	99	42	141	1321
2017 - 2018	Sector 03 4th Round	90	6	96	-	1	1	1	1	2	99
	Kisumayu 2nd Round	539	27	566	-	2	2	16	16	32	600
20108 - 2019	Kisumayu 3rd Round	514	34	548	-	-	-	3	19	22	570
	Total			13,246			98			768	15,418

Table 6.13 Ethiopian Peacekeeping Deployment thought AMISOM 2014-2019[582]

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[580] Others means Police Personnel and other Military and Civil Personnel of ENDF who are not under the payroll of EDRE-PSTC.

[581] Kisimayu is considered as Sector 6.

[582] Source: FDRE Ministry of Defence, Main Department for Peace Support Operation.

6.2.4 Unilateral Intervention in Somalia

Since ENDF set foot in Somalia in 2006, to support the TFG, it never left Somalia entirely. The former Ethiopian Foreign Affairs Minister Seyoum Mesfin and his former colleague at the ministry Dr. Abdeta Dribssa argued the necessity of Ethiopia's presence in Somalia, especially in places near the Ethiopia border, as follows:

> In fact, the government of Somalia is unable to credibly guarantee to Ethiopia that these territories will not be used to threaten Ethiopia, so Ethiopia often is blamed for interference. This criticism highlights the paradox in which Ethiopia has to infringe on Somalia's sovereignty in territories that Mogadishu is unable to control in order to ensure the fulfillment of basic obligations required of a sovereign state. Conventional tools of international relations, such as pressuring a national government to fulfill the obligations of its sovereignty, do not work when a state lacks a government with the capacity or political will to exercise even minimal control over its territory and armed forces. [583]

Their argument is based on the TFG, later the Somalia Federal Government (SFG), has no power to control its entire territory, so Ethiopia needs to keep its sovereignty inside Somalia. In this regard, Seyoum Mesfin and Abdeta Dribssa were applying the concept of a 'buffer zone.' Their argument about the need for an Ethiopian buffer zone in Somalia is as follows:

> Buffer zones play their paradoxical role while states with stronger domestic capabilities that develop their own broader dimensions of effective internal and external sovereignty, such as Ethiopia, step in to manage the effects of this extreme asymmetry of domestic control. The stronger state then violates the sovereignty of the weaker to provide the basis for the semblance of an orderly state system in the region. This hegemony can appear as domination, but to its architects, it is also the only viable alternative to manage the destabilizing regional effects of state failure and collapse. This is particularly important for states like Ethiopia, which shares a long border with Somalia, a failed state that generates violent illicit activities, cross-border insurgencies, refugee flows, and other disruptions that threaten efforts in Ethiopia to transform its domestic political economy. Disorder in the borderlands is a historical problem for state-builders, but the difference now is that stronger states no longer have the option (or are no longer inclined) to solve this problem through conquest. Instead, they have to maintain order in weak states. [584]

Furthermore, it is argued that 'Ethiopia's unilateral intervention and success were ultimately welcomed, triggering endorsement for the deployment of the AMISOM.'[585] Moreover, another

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[583] Beyene, Abdeta D. and Seyoum Mesfin. The Practicalities of Living with Failed States. *The American Academy of Arts & Sciences*. 147 (1) Winter 2018. 129.

[584] Ibid.

[585] Centre for Dialogue, Research and Cooperation (CDRC). 'Somalia's challenges in the last two decades' *CDRC DIGEST*. Vol. 2 No. 2, January 2017

argument for Ethiopian unilateral force presence in Somalia, after the establishment of AMISOM, was that the Ethiopian forces in AMISOM covers 62% of Somalia's total AMISOM mission area.[586] Moreover, it was problematic that such a small number of Ethiopian troops under AMISOM cover the extensive mission areas, Sectors 3, 4, and 6.[587] Thus, there was a need for the vast areas to be covered by ENDF troops deployed with the agreement with the SFG.[588] Specially sector 3 (Baidoa) and sector 4 (Beledweyne), the area bordering Ethiopia, were relatively easy for ENDF to cross the border to Somalia. That was why Ethiopia deployed an additional 10,000 – 15,000 troops outside the command of AMISOM.[589] Ethiopian former ambassador to Somalia Wendimagegn Asaminew affirmed that all ENDF forces in Somalia were not part of AMISOM, and in fact, the burden of defeating al-Shabaab in its strongholds was left primarily to the Ethiopian forces. Ethiopia's non-AMISOM forces were deployed on bilateral understandings with the SFG. [590]

6.3 Lessons Learned in Ethiopian Peacekeeping Engagements

Ethiopia participated in fourteen peacekeeping missions since 1950. More than 120,000 Ethiopian officers and noncommissioned officers participated in these almost half a century of PKO engagements. The Ethiopian peacekeepers were deployed in traditional UN missions serving as military observers, contingents, and police officers were deployed after a cease fire agreement to protect civilians mission like UNAMIR in Rwanda, AMIB and ONUB in Burundi, UNMIL in Liberia, AMIS and UNAMID in Darfur, UNOCI in Côte d'Ivoire, MINURCAT in CAR and Chad, UNISFA in Abyei, UNMIS and UNMISS in South Sudan, MINUSMA in Mali, and MINUSTAH in Haiti. On the other hand, Ethiopia participated in coercive and offensive peace enforcement missions like United Nations Command (UNC) in Korea, ONUC in DRC, and

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[586] FDRE-PSTC. *FDRE Peace Support Training Center Graduation Bulletin.* Brana Publishing: Addis Ababa. 2015. 20.

[587] Interview with ENDF Officer who were deployed in AMISOM, 29 October 2019, FRDE-PSTC, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

[588] Ibid.

[589] Vidija, Patrick. *Ethio-Kenya Ties, Taming al Shabaab: Lessons from Ethiopia.* 09 December 2019 https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/big-read/2019-12-09-taming-al-shabaab-lessons-from-ethiopia/, Accessed on February 2020.

[590] Asaminew, Wondimu. *Beyond the Common Knowledge: Ethiopian Political Hopes and Challenegs. (Ke'adebabay Bashager: Ye'Itiyopia Poletica Tesfana Sigatoch.)* [Amharic] Mekele 2020. 105

AMISOM in Somalia. Moreover, Ethiopia was part of a political mission in UNMHA, Yemen. Though there is no organized document on lessons learned from Ethiopian peacekeeping operations, I believe this can be a research gap that future researchers can fill. However, this dissertation briefly discusses some of the lessons learned.

* The success of the Ethiopian peacekeeping forces in general can be measured based on fulfilling mandates, reducing the conflict and violence, protecting civilians, combating or defeating the threats, and ensuring peace. Out of thirteen traditional peacekeeping operations, Ethiopia participated in seven of them which were completed in achieving their mandates; two transferred from AU to UN; three of the mission are still ongoing. Out of the three peace enforcement missions, two of them were successfully accomplished, achieving their mandates.

* The role of Ethiopia in the regional peacekeeping can be seen from an economic, political, and military point of view. In this regard Ethiopia has a notable involvement in AMIS, UNAMID, UNMIS, UNMISS, AMISOM, and UNISFA. AMIS transformed to UNAMID which came to an end in 2020 after completing its mandate. UNMIS, which is transformed in to UNIMSS, AMISOM and UNISFA are still going on. In all cases, it can be concluded that there is a positive attempt in achieving the mandates of the missions. In Somalia the federal government and its armed forces are in better position than when AMISOM started in 2007.

* Ethiopian peacekeeping operation in UNISFA began significantly more quickly than is usually the case. The UNISFA started its mission immediately without taking much time. It is taken as a lesson that the AU or UN peacekeeping missions could be deployed in a short period of time if there is good leadership and strength, and most importantly a nearby capable deployable force. In this respect, the Ethiopian peacekeeping troops did not demand well established infrastructure and accommodation, rather, it gets into its business immediately. This can be a good lesson of rapid deployment capability in humanitarian crisis for AU and UN deployment.

* Another related lesson from UNISFA peacekeeping operation is the fact that all the contingents came from a single state. Ethiopia contributed not only for the swift deployment but also for the success of the mission mandate. After the deployment of UNISFA it has

achieved its primary mandate to monitor and implement the ceasefire and demilitariza-tion of Abyei. Both states left the contested area. This is also because both states had a better diplomatic relation with Ethiopia.

∗ Ethiopian participation in peacekeeping operations gave Ethiopia and its armed forces an essential and constructive influence in the regional and international arena. Moreover, the experiences and the new methods gained during the operations transformed the attitude of men and women in uniform. One prominent example can be the growing importance of English language training and interest in perusing academic studies in areas of peace and security and among the officers.

6.4 Trends and Capabilities of Ethiopian Peace Support Operations

As discussed in the previous sections, Ethiopia is among the pioneer peacekeeping contributor in the world. Though the internal political dynamics, especially during the military government and the civil war from 1974-1991 and the Ethio-Eritrean war from 1998-2000, has a significant effect on its army on the capability and reediness for foreign deployment, it was able to maintain its international reputation in the peacekeeping.

Since the 1950's more than 130,000 Ethiopian peacekeepers were deployed to peacekeeping operations worldwide and mainly in Africa through AU and the UN missions. This by itself has a tremendous influence on the psychology and the military tradition of men and women in uni-form. Since 2010, there is a rotation of about 12,000 uniformed personnel every year under UN and AU flag.

Ethiopia is also a leading contributor of female peacekeepers since 2015; in January 2020, Ethi-opia deployed 593 female peacekeepers, followed by Rwanda. Brigadier General Zewdu Kiros Gebrekidan was the first Ethiopian woman to assume the highest position in peacekeeping as Deputy Force Commander of UNISFA from 2016-2017.

Currently, Ethiopia's deployment capability is multi-task unites in various missions. These in-clude tactical helicopter units, utility helicopter units, motorized battalions, mechanized battal-ions, artillery batteries, tank coys, quick reaction forces, level II hospital, well drilling units, sig-nal unites, multirole logistics unit, light field engineering unit, and demining unit.

Ethiopia currently contributes the highest number personnel (7,499) to UN peacekeeping missions with Protection of Civilian (POC) mandates. Ethiopia, Rwanda, and Bangladesh are the top three contributors of uniformed personnel to UN peacekeeping operations with the protection of civilians mandates as of April 2019,[591] which is based on the Kigali Principles.

The history of Ethiopian involvement in peacekeeping operations shows that Ethiopia's interest extends well beyond the regional and the African continent. However, the current peacekeeping trends primarily focuses on immediate neighbors.

Since the establishment of the UN, all consecutive Ethiopian governments deployed peacekeeping troops except the Provisional Military Administration Council, later the government of the People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia from 1974-1991. Though the government has a positive outlook towards the UN, it has never sent peacekeepers. This is because since it captured state power in 1974, the Ethiopian army was engaged in a fierce war with Mohamed Siad Barre's Somalia between July 1977 and March 1978 over the disputed Ethiopian region of Ogaden and a civil war with Eritrean and Tigrian anti-government rebels from September 1974 to June 1991. These made it impossible for the Ethiopian army to be involved in peacekeeping missions, in addition to the Cold War politics of being on the side of the Soviet Block.

	Years of Deployment	Mission	Participation
1	1951-1953	Korea	6,037
2	1959-1962	ONUC, Congo	10,625
3	1993-1995	UNAMIR, Rwanda	1,694
4	2003-2007	ONUB, Burundi	2,747
5	2003-2010	UNMIL, Liberia,	17,453
6	2007-2019*	UNAMID, Darfur, Sudan	18,901
7	2011-2019*	UNISFA, Abyei	23,930

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[591] Center for Civilians in Conflict. *Trends in the Protection of Civilians through UN Peacekeeping Operations. #POC20 Series.* May 29, 2019. https://civiliansinconflict.org/blog/international-peacekeepers-day/, Accessed on 02 January 2020.

8	2014-2019*	UNMISS, South Sudan	4,904
9	2014-2019*	AMISOM, Somalia	30,418
		Total	**116,709**

Table 6.14 Summary of Major Ethiopian Peace Support Operation Deployment (UNOCI in Côte d'Ivoire; MINUSMA in Mali; MINUSTAH in Haiti; MINURCAT in Central African Republic and Chad; and UNMHA in Yemen are missions where only few Ethiopian personnel deployed are not included in the table.) (* The data is only up to the beginning of 2019; because the missions are ongoing the actual numbers will be more)

6.3.1 Contingent

Ethiopia started contributing to UN peacekeeping missions by sending only its contingent troops. Still, a significant number of Ethiopia's UN contribution is contingent. For example, in February 2019, 96.2% of the total peacekeepers are contingents. Currently, ENDF uses Hurso Contingent Training School to train its contingents before they left to mission areas. One of the main reasons that Ethiopia mainly send its contingents is almost all missions Ethiopia participates in are peace enforcements with Protection of Civilians mandates (POC), and require more troops on the ground to keep the peace of the mission area.[592]

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[592] Interview with Colonel Alemayehu Abera, Deputy Commandant and Head of Traning at Hurso Peacekeeping Training School, 01 October 2019. Hurso, Somali Regional State.

TROOPS

Figure 6.1 Ethiopian Troop Contribution to UN Peacekeeping Operations since 1994[593]

In 1994 Ethiopia send its troops for peacekeeping mission to Rwanda. After the mission ended in 1995 until 2003 Ethiopia did not participate in peacekeeping mission because of the Ethio-Eritrean war from 1998-2000. Primarily because of the UNISFA mission opining in Abyei the Ethiopian contingent contribution increasing drastically from 2011 were 100% of the contingent troops are from Ethiopia

6.3.2 Military Experts on Mission (UNMEM)

UNMEM includes senior officers such as Lieutenant Colonels and Colonels that can work as UN Military Liaison Officers and UN Military Observers. Ethiopia started sending its Military Experts for the mission in Liberia, and its highest contribution of Military Experts is in 2011 after the opening of the mission in Abyei. Because of the high demand for UNMEM, Ethiopia established a training center for military observers in Addis Ababa in 2013.[594]

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[593] The number of troops varies from month to month in the year for this reason the graph includes the highest number of contribution in the year.

[594] Interview with Colonel Tamrat Andarge, Head of Training Division at EIPSTI, 11 November 2019, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

Military Experts on Mission (UNMEM)

Figure data (by year):
1994–2002: (no data)
2003: 6
2004: 20
2005: 22
2006: 22
2007: 23
2008: 26
2009: 30
2010: 21
2011: 159
2012: 117
2013: 114
2014: 106
2015: 113
2016: 106
2017: 100
2018: 100
2019: 99

Figure 6.2 Ethiopian UN Military Experts on Mission (UNMEM) Contribution to UN Peacekeeping Operations since 1994[595]

6.3.3 Staff Officer

Staff officers are those who perform specialized functions at the Force Headquarters or integrated military, civilian, or police structure. The post requires officers to complete their national basic military staff course. The main limitation for Ethiopian staff officers is lack of English language skills, which is the reason behind Ethiopia's less contribution of Staff Officers for UN missions.[596]

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[595] The number of military expert varies from month to month in the year for this reason the graph includes the highest number of contribution in the year.

[596] Interview with Colonel Milkesa Regasa, Commandant, Hurso Peacekeeping Traning School, 01 October 2019, Hurso, Somali Regional State, Ethiopia.

Staff Officers

Figure 6.3 Staff Officers[597]

Ethiopia also deploy Staff Officers to AMISOM, who are based at the Headquarter. However due to the nature of the mission which is peace enforcement or clear war with Al Shaabab, there are no Military Observers.

In addition to the language constraints, Ethiopia's Staff Officers, according to a study conducted by Teame G. Gebreegziabher, on Ethiopia Staff Officers and Military Observers, were deemed to have inadequate knowledge about their mission tasks generally since some army members who were working in remote areas and front lines have limited access to further education and self-development. These led to language limitation, being unable to operate computers and limited driving skills. They also lag behind when they join pre-deployment trainings.[598] This contributed highly for limited deployment of both Ethiopia Staff Officers and UNMEM.

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[597] UN data for Staff officers found only after 2017.

[598] Gebreegziabher, Teame G. "Challenges and Opportunities for Ethiopian Staff Officer's /Military Observer's Performance in United Nations Peacekeeping Mission." A Thesis Submitted in Partial fulfilment for the degree of Masters in Public Management and Policy. Addis Ababa University, 2018.

UN/AU Post	Deployment Country	Military			Civil			Others[599]			Total
		M	F	Total	M	F	Total	M	F	Total	**Total**
Military Observer	Liberia	110	10	120	-	-	-	42	1	43	163
Staff Officer	Liberia	47	2	49				15	-	15	64
Military Observer	Cot d'Ivoire	19	-	19	-	-	-	-	1	1	20
Staff Officer	Cot d'ivor	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Military Observer	Burundi	11	-	11	-	-	-	8	-	8	19
Staff Officer	Burundi	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Military Observer	Chad	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Staff Officer	Chad	9	4	13	-	-	-	2	-	2	15
Military Observer	Darfur	95	6	101	-	-	-	2	-	2	103
Staff Officer	Darfur	138+	5	143	-	-	-	9	-	9	152
Military Observer	Abyei	341	50	391	-	1	1	14	3	17	409
Staff Officer	Abyei	274	9	283	-	-	-	10	-	10	293
Staff Officer	Somalia	18	-	18	-	-	-	-	-	-	18
Military Observer	Somalia	15	1	16							16
Staff Officer	South Sudan	35	1	36	-	-		-	-	-	36
Military Observer	South Sudan	11	15	26	-	-	-	-	-	-	26
Staff Officer	Mali	-	1	1							1
Total		1,123	104	1,227	-	1	1	102	5	107	1,335

Table 6.15 Staff Officers and Military Observers who finished their deployment in 2019.

6.3.4 Police and Formed Police Unit (FPU)

One of the duties of FDRE's Federal Police commission is 'prepare a peacekeeping police force which can properly accomplish international peacekeeping call of the country.'[600] Ethiopia start- ed sending individual police in February 2008 for the first time to Liberia. Though it was mini-

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[599] Others means Police Personnel and other Military and Civil Personnel of ENDF who are not under the payroll of EDRE-PSTC. Source: FDRE Ministry of Defence, Main Department for Peace Support Operation.

[600] Proclamation No. 720/2011. Ethiopian Federal Police Commission Establishment Proclamation. 18th Year No.2 Addis Ababa. 28th November, 2011.

mal, Ethiopia has been sending individual police peacekeepers. It was in 2018 that an independent department for peacekeeping had been established under the Federal Police Commission.[601] Recently, the Center for Peacekeeping Training and Support, under the auspices of the Ethiopian Police University College, started to provide pre-deployment training, and for the first time, 180 police officers who have received Formed Police Unit training are ready to engage in peacekeeping missions.[602] This will enable Ethiopia to contribute FPUs to UN and AU missions.

Figure 6.4 Ethiopian Police Contribution to UN Peacekeeping Operations since 1994[603]

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[601] Interview with Commander Tegegne Agajiet Deferesha, Federal Police Commission. Addis Ababa, 3 October 2020.

[602] Walta. "Ethiopia is to Deploy Uniformed Police Unit to International Peacekeeping." 17 August, 2020 http://www.waltainfo.com/news/detail/57775?locale=am, Accessed on 20 August 2020.

[603] The number of police varies from month to month in the year for this reason the graph includes the highest number of contribution in the year.

As of 2017 the top 10 UN troop contributor in the world are Ethiopia, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Rwanda, Nepal, Burkina Faso, Indonesia, Senegal, and Ghana. India and Pakistan with over a million of total military personnel. They contribute mainly to MONUSCO, DRC over three thousand personnel each. Ethiopia's contribution is though limited to the Horn of Africa it is the largest in the world. All of the top 10 contributors contribute to diverse missions than Ethiopia. Whereas Ethiopia's contribution is limited to its next-door neighbor missions.

Figure 6.5 As of February 2017, the World's top ten UN peacekeeping troop, police, and military expert contributors.

As of February 2017, the top 10 African UN troop-contributing countries are Ethiopia, Rwanda, Burkina Faso, Senegal, Ghana, Egypt, Tanzania, Nigeria, Morocco, and South Africa. Egypt ranked the first in military strength in Africa, South Africa third, Nigeria fourth, Morocco fifth and Ethiopia sixth. Except Algeria, which has the second strongest military in Africa, the rest of them are among the top 10 UN peacekeeping contributors.

Figure 6.6 As of February 2017, Africa's top ten UN peacekeeping troop, police, and military expert contributors.

As of January 2020, Ethiopia is still the top contributor for UN peacekeeping mission by only deploying only to four UN Missions. Ghana is the top diverse contributor by deploying to 15 missions where Nepal is the second by deploying to 13 missions around the world.

Country	Staff	Expert	Police	Contingent	FPU	Total Personnel Deployed	In Sub-saharan Africa	Outside Sub-saharan Africa
Ethiopia	104	103	46	6,386	0	6,639	4	1
Bangladesh	109	31	44	5,625	600	6,413	6	3
Rwanda	75	34	59	3,852	913	6,292	5	0
Nepal	133	42	66	4.863	496	5,658	7	6
India	79	39	23	5,098	0	5,404	4	5
Pakistan	102	49	0	4,050	104	3,441	7	2
Egypt	70	32	54	2,180	650	3,113	6	1
Ghana	80	39	88	2,304	262	2,774	10	5

| Kenya | 48 | 20 | 13 | 75 | 0 | 156 | 6 | 2 |

Table 6.16 As of January 2020 Some of Leading Troop Contributors in Africa and the World[604]

6.3.5 Command and Control

The Ethiopian International Peacekeeping Training Centre (EIPKTC) was established under MOD Peacekeeping Coordination Center in Addis Ababa in July 2013, with the goal of becoming a regional and international center of excellence in peacekeeping, peacebuilding, and conflict resolution. The EIPKTC, being set up by the Ethiopian Federal Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Economic Development and Economic Affairs, and the UN Development Programme was funded by the Japanese government.[605]

When there is a need for peacekeepers, AU or UN presents invitation and force requirements to the Ethiopian government, and it is the Office of the Prime Minister which has been handling such requests from AU/UN until now. Then the Office of the Prime Minister passes the invitation to the Office of the Chief of the General Staff, which will be passed to the MOD Peacekeeping Coordination Center (TCC). The TCC will receive the actual demand military personnel from the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operation or AU Peace Support Operation Department through the Permanent Representative of Ethiopia to the United Nations or Ethiopian Permanent Representative to the African Union. Finally, the final Contingent Owned Equipment (COE) prepared by the TCC will be presented to all stakeholders. This is done through the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). When preparing a negotiation plan and program, the EIPKTC ensures that it clearly indicates Ethiopia's needs and goals in terms of its mission. The military will do these attaches working at the office of the Permanent Representative at AU or UN.[606]

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[604] United Nations. *Troop and Police Contribution* https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/1_summary_of_contributions_20.pdf, Accessed on 20 March 2020.

[605] Interview with Brigadier General Habtamu Tilahun, Commandant of EIPKTC, 11 November 2019, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

[606] Interview with Colonel Elias Seyoum, Head of Peace and Security Research Division at EIPSTI, 10 June 2019. Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

Figure 6.7 FDRE PSTC Organizational Structure

The members of the Foreign, Defense, and Security Affairs Standing Committee parliament standing committee are responsible after the deployment of the troops on their wellbeing and other related administrative issues. Also, the standing committee members visited the troops in the mission area.[607]

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[607] Interview with Tesfaye Dhaba Waqjira, FDRE's House of Peoples' Representative, Foreign, Defense and Security Affairs Standing Committee Chairman. 03 August, 2019, Bishoftu (Debre Zeit), Ethiopia.

Figure 6.8 Tentative Government Structure of Peacekeeping Deployment Command and Control

6.3.6 The Issue of Reimbursement

The FDRE Ministry of Defense has 'International Peacekeeping Operation Performance Guide', which is divided into six chapters, including invitation and force requirement from AU or UN; deployment and operation; and reimbursement and other regulation in ENDF PKOs.[608]

The reimbursement issue coveres all payments for personnel, materials, services, transportation, aviation, and compensations (See UN Reimbursement framework for Contingent Owned Equipment (COE)[609]). The payment for contingent military personnel deployed in mission is labeled in the guide as 'Subsidy for Returnee Peacekeepers.' And each member is paid according to pay

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[608] General Staff of the Armed Forces. *FDRE Ministry of Defense: International Peacekeeping Operation Performance Guide.* January 2016. Addis Ababa.

[609] United Nations. "Deployment and Reimbursement." https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/deployment-and-reimbursement, Accessed on 21 January 2020.

scale of AU, for AMISOM ($822 per soldier, per month)[610] or for UN missions (US$1,428[611] per soldier per month as of 1 July 2019, police and civilian personnel paid from each peacekeeping operation budget) and the rank of the peacekeeper at home (the temporary rank used in mission area will not be used for payment) and based on the payment manual of MOD. For civilians deployed in a mission, their payment is also based on their professions before deployment standardized with equivalent military rank.

Out of the total reimbursement from AU or UN, the payment given to men and women in uniform is 40% for Senior Officers and 35% for Junior Officers and Senior Non-commissioned Officers and 30% Non-commissioned Officers and Private. However, since 2012 the payment modality is changed, as is seen in the following table.

	Military Rank	Payment %
1	Major – Colonel	50%
2	Sergeant – First Sergeant	44%
3	Staff Sergeant Major – Chief Warrant Officer	47%
4	Private – Corporal	40%

Table 6.17 ENDF Reimbursement Policy since 2012

Ministry of Defense handles the money for other internal matters, mainly the money transfer to the Defense Forces' Foundation, which builds houses for the members of ENDF and other developments in the military.[612]

The salaries of military personnel deployed as a contingent continue to be paid to themselves or to their family member, and their food allowance will stop. On the other hand, military personnel are deployed as a military observer, staff officer, sector commander, force commander, liaison

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[610] Williams, Paul D. "Paying for AMISOM: Are Politics and Bureaucracy Undermining the AU's Largest Peace Operation?" January 11, 2017. https://theglobalobservatory.org/2017/01/amisom-african-union-peacekeeping-financing/, Accessed on 06 February 2018.

[611] A rate of reimbursement of $1,332 per person per month came into effect on 1 July 2014 and continued until 30 June 2016. The rate increased to $1,365 per person per month from 1 July 2016, and increased to $1,410 from 1 July 2017 and $1,428 per soldier per month as of 1 July 2019.

[612] Interview with Interview with Colonel Elias Seyoum, Head of Peace and Security Research Division at EIPSTI, 10 June 2019. Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

officer, and officers and professionals are paid directly by AU or UN, both their salaries and food allowances halt until return.

The issue of reimbursement in Ethiopian peacekeeping operations history has its own challenges. The first strain took place in 1974 when all four battalions which were deployed in ONUC complained about not getting the appropriate reimbursement for their deployment.[613] The second one arose in 2005 by the battalion led by Br. General Kemal Gelichu which were deployed in Liberia. The battalion blocked the highway to the North of the capital Addis Ababa, at Fiche town, because of the payment reduction.

Generally, there is no uniform policy between states on the payment of UN reimbursement for the deployed troops. For example, the South African Army will stop the troops' salary deployed to peacekeeping because they will get full payment of UN reimbursement. The Kenyan Defense Force will give both the regular salary and 100% of the UN reimbursement, previously retaining $200 for administrative costs.[614] In 2018, the governments of Burundi and Uganda retain $200 of the $1,028 monthly allowance and Djibouti's government keeps $328.

6.5 Summery and Partial Conclusion

This chapter covers the first part of the analysis of the dissertation. It covers generations of Ethiopian peacekeeping, trends, the hegemonic peacekeeping of Ethiopia in Somalia, and capabilities of Ethiopian peace support operations, including a brief discussion on reimbursement. Below are the main points covered by this chapter.

Since the 1950's about more than 120,000 Ethiopian peacekeepers have been deployed to peacekeeping operations worldwide and mainly in Africa; this by itself has a tremendous influence on the psychology and military tradition of men and women in uniform. Since 2010, about 12,000 uniformed personnel rotate every year and der UN and AU flag.

For this dissertation, the method of classification for Ethiopian peacekeeping generation is based on the experience of the three Ethiopian regimes; the Imperial regime from 1930-1974, the Tran-

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[613] Techane, Gesit. *The Former Army:1935-1991 [Amharic]* (*Yeqedmow Tor: 1927-1983).* Ababa: Z. A Publishing. 2006 351 - 355

[614] Interview with Colonel Robert K. Kitur, Defense Attaché in Embassy of the Republic of Kenya, Ethiopia, 30 May, 2019, Embassy of the Republic of Kenya, Addis Ababa

sitional Government of Ethiopia from 1991-1995, and the government of Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia from 1996 up to now. It asses the motive, the nature of the armed forces, and the focus area of deployment. Based on the three criteria mentioned, Ethiopian peacekeeping is divided into four generations of operations. The following table summarizes the generation of Ethiopian peacekeeping.

Generation	Key features
1st Generation, The Imperial Army: Conviction to Collective Security	The Imperial Army was deployed to peacekeeping mission because of Emperor Haile Selassie I's conviction towards UN and collective security. (1950 - 1967) Ethiopia's first two missions participated in during this time were the US-led United Nations Command in Korea and in United Nations Operation in the Congo.
2nd Generation, Rebels Solidarity	The EPRDF's rebel army, three years after defeating the government and control power, wanted to support similar rebel group RPF also with conviction to halt the civilian massacre in Rwanda. (1994 – 1995).
3rd Generation, ENDF Engagement in 'African Solution for African Problems'	After the formation of the national army, the government, driven by the principle 'African Solution for African Problems,' engaged in peacekeeping missions in Burundi, Liberia, Sudan, Côte d'Ivoire, and the Central African Republic. (2003 - 2010)
4th Generation, The Peacekeeper Army	Since 2011, it can be affirmed that the Ethiopian army has become a peacekeeper army with long experience and the establishment of peacekeeping training facilities and the formation of the main peacekeeping department at the MOD shows the coming of a new period when ENDF transformed to the peacekeeper army.

Table 6.18 Summary of the Taxonomy of Ethiopian Generation of Peacekeeping

It is based on the historical analysis of Ethiopian generations of peace operations, from Korea to AMISOM. The chapter has proven that Ethiopian peacekeeping participation is getting more focused on Ethiopia's regional security. The first-generation missions were far from Ethiopian national security, where the fourth generation mission deployments are almost 100% in its im-

mediate national security areas of its next-door neighbors. These trends show that Ethiopia was a real international actor, where its interest extends well beyond the regional and the African continent; however, the current peacekeeping trends focus primarily on immediate neighbors. In addition to this, the current Ethiopian contribution, 7,499 personnel to UN peacekeeping missions, is with Protection of Civilian (POC) mandates which are based on the Kigali Principles.

Hegemonic peacekeeping' is a situation in which a powerful state with vital global or regional interests is able to deploy a preponderance of troops in a bid to manage a conflict and is able to convince other states to accept its leadership of the mission. Based on this definition, Ethiopia is undoubtedly the hegemonic state in the Horn of Africa, especially concerning its role in Somalia. This can be proven by the Ethiopian first unilateral action in Somalia aimed to remove the Islamic insurgent, Al-Ittihad Al-Islamiya (AIAI) in 1995. Then in 1998, Ethiopia launched a second military intervention at the time of the Ethio-Eritrean war, following Eritrea's effort–in collaboration with a Baidoa-based Somali warlord Hussein Aideed. The third intervention was in 2006, against the threat from the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) and in support of the Somali Transitional Federal Government. Lastly, Ethiopia joined AMISOM in 2014, simultaneously deploying troops outside the AMISOM command to support its troops under AMISOM.

CHAPTER 7 – THE NEXUS OF NATIONAL SECURITY, FOREIGN POLICY, MILITARY POWER, AND PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS DEPLOYMENT OF ETHIOPIA

"Peacekeeping works in some situations, but it very often needs other ingredients. Peacekeeping is not the aspirin of international security."

Jean-Marie Guehenno

"When States decide to use force to deal with broader threats to international peace and security, there is no substitute for the unique legitimacy provided by the United Nations."

Kofi Annan

This chapter discusses five primary analyses of this dissertation. First, it discusses four main Ethiopian geopolitical interests and security risks. Second, it discusses Ethiopia's next-door peace support operations which is one of its foreign policy and national security strategies. Third, it forwards six rationales of Ethiopian participation in peacekeeping missions. The fourth one analyzes Ethiopian hegemony in the Horn of Africa region.

7.1 Ethiopian Geopolitical Interest and Security Risks

This dissertation identifies four levels of Ethiopian geopolitical interest and security risk responsiveness vis-à-vis peace support operation deployment. Ethiopia's first and immediate geopolitical interest and security risks are its neighboring countries or the IGAD region and African Countries, which are in AU and Ethiopia's Pan-Africa commitment come second. Thirdly, we find the Red Sea Region, which is vital trade root and the nearest access to the sea for Ethiopia; and forth, the Global focus, which is a commitment to collective international security and national prestige. These four Ethiopian geopolitical interest and security risk responsiveness vis-à-vis its peace support operation deployment are described in Figure 8.1.

7.1.1 Neighboring Countries/ the IGAD Region: Immediate National Security

Ethiopia's three vulnerabilities that emanate from its immediate neighbors are: first and foremost, spillover effects of both conflict and refugees from failed states of Somalia, South Sudan, and Eritrea; second, the geographical factor, Ethiopia's lack of sea access or being a landlocked

state that makes it dependent on using the ports of its neighbors. The third one is the concentration of the world's greatest powers military base in its most important trade route and port, Djibouti. The conflict spillover effect from failed States, mainly from South Sudan, Eritrea, and Somalia, is Ethiopia's principal foreign policy concern.

Figure 7.1 Ethiopian Geopolitical Interest and Security Risk Responsiveness vis-à-vis Peace Support Operation Deployment.

The four dashed oval rings represent Ethiopia's four geopolitical interests: neighboring countries, African countries, the Red Sea region, and the global arena. The yellow rectangles where the four geopolitical fields are written represent troops' size to be deployed in a given peacekeeping mission in that particular field.

7.1.1.1 Failed State Neighbors

The main problem with failed states is they 'fundamentally lack the capacity to fulfill obligations of sovereignty, such as monitoring and governing their territories to prevent different actors there from launching unauthorized attacks on neighbors or more generally spreading disorder across

230

their borders.' [615] For example, in Somalia, starting from the overthrowing of the Siad Barre regime, Islamist insurgency attacks have extended in neighboring states to Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda. (Ethiopian experience with these Islamist groups was discussed in Section 6.2). Also, in the case of South Sudan, kidnapping and cattle raiding are common in the bordering Gambella regional state of Ethiopia. This is in addition to the refugee influx and the South Sudanese government, which is in civil war since 2013, was not able to do anything.

Mehari T. Maru, has noted the following on how the Ethiopian government emphasizes in its neighboring states regional organization IGAD:

> Although active in all these multilateral platforms, in practice, Ethiopia is more heavily involved in IGAD than the others, and it is the challenges and opportunities peculiar to the IGAD region that have an immediate impact on the internal and regional challenges [Ethiopia] faces. Thus, IGAD increasingly dominates government thinking. Ethiopia's political leaders, diplomats, experts, and armed forces have played a critical part in all major IGAD activities.[616]

Thus, Ethiopia's approach to the Horn of Africa regional security has been primarily influenced by minimizing its vulnerabilities and immediate national security threats that its national role in peacekeeping emanates from, and this role has become the defining paradigm for its foreign policy engagement.

7.1.1.2 Landlockedness

With the Eritrean secession in 1991 and with the 1998-2000 Ethio-Eritrean war and border stalemate,[617] Ethiopia lost its Red Sea ports of Massawa and Assab. This left Ethiopia landlocked, and thus, in need of positive relations with its most essential neighbors with a port, namely Djibouti, Somaliland or Somalia, Kenya, and Sudan. Having a stable government in

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[615] Beyene, Abdeta D. and Seyoum Mesfin. The Practicalities of Living with Failed States. *The American Academy of Arts & Sciences*. 147/1. Winter 2018.

[616] Maru, Mehari T. *A Regional Power in the Making: Ethiopian Diplomacy in the Horn of Africa.* Occasional Paper 261. South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA). June 2017.

[617] After the appointment of a new Prime Minister in Ethiopia, Abiy Ahmed (Ph.D.) in April 2018, and his call for peace, the two countries signed a Joint Declaration on Peace and Friendship in July 9th, 2018 in Eritrean capital, Asmara and an Agreement on Peace, Friendship and Comprehensive Cooperation in September 16th, 2018 in Saudi Arabia. This will be a beginning of a new chapter in the complicated relationship between the two states. (Sigatu, Kaleab T. No Peace No War: Ethiopian-Eritrean Conflict. *Academic and Applied Research in Military and Public Management Science (AARMS)*. 18/1, 2019. 91

these countries is crucial in order to use their ports. Brendon J. Cannon explains the vulnerability of a land lock state and how the security of the neighboring transit state matters, as follows:

> Also, the fact that trade from a landlocked country must pass through a sovereign transit country in order to access international shipping markets creates a serious political vulnerability on the former. If a landlocked country and its transit neighbor are in conflict, either military or diplomatic, the transit neighbor can block borders, implement regulatory changes that impede trade, or simply increase tariffs. Even when there is no direct conflict, landlocked countries are extremely vulnerable to the political vagaries of their transit neighbors.[618]

In this regard, besides paying attention to the region's security, Ethiopia goes furthermore in buying the share of the Berbera port in Somaliland to reduce its dependency on Djibouti's port.

7.1.1.3 Foreign Military Bases in the Horn of Africa

The Horn of Africa has become one of the most militarized regions in the World. Currently, there are fifteen states with operational military bases, one under construction and two with possible existing military facilities, in Djibouti, Eritrea, Kenya, Somalia, and Somaliland. In addition to that, there is a high military naval presence in the nearby waters of the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, and Strait of Bab al-Mandab.

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[618] Cannon, Brendon J. Ethiopia, Berbera Port and the Shifting Balance of Power in the Horn of Africa. *Rising Powers Quarterly*. Volume 2, Issue 4, 2017. 10.

No.	Horn of Africa States	The Foreign States with a Military Base in the Horn Region
1	Djibouti	US, France, China, Saudi Arabia, Japan, Germany, Spain, and Italy
2	Eritrea	Iran, Israel, and Russia
3	Ethiopia	-
4	Kenya	UK and US
5	Somaliland	UAE
6	Somalia	Turkey, the US, and the UK
7	Sudan	Turkey and Russia
8	South Sudan	*US presence*
9	Uganda	*US presence*

Table 7.1 Foreign Military Bases in the Horn of Africa

The militarization of Ethiopian neighbors is another vital security threat for Ethiopia. The presence of Gulf powers can lead to the expansion of fundamentalism in the region. Similarly, there is the danger of exporting Iran vs. the Saudi Arabian camp rivalry to the region as it occurred in Yemen and exporting Qatar vs. Saudi Arabian camp contention. These are threats to Ethiopia's foreign policy interest in the region. Moreover, regarding acquiring dependable port access, the expansion of foreign military bases presents a colossal challenge. Generally, this will defy Ethiopia's hegemony and dominant role in the Horn of Africa.

These three vulnerabilities of Ethiopia: being surrounded by failed neighboring states, its landlockednss, and the presence of many foreign military bases in the region s will determine Ethiopia's foreign policy area of interest and action radius of military deployment or force projection as it is described in Figure 7.1.

Map 7.1 Foreign Military presence in the Horn of Africa Region[619] (CTF = Combined Task Force; EUNAVFOR = European Union Naval Force; EUTM-S = European Union Training Mission in Somalia.)

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[619] Source: Melvin, N. J. 'The new external security politics of the Horn of Africa region'. *SIPRI Insights on Peace and Security*. No. 2019/2, Apr. 2019.

8.1.2 African Countries: AU and Pan-African Commitment

Ethiopia is a founding member of OAU and later AU and the seat for the Organization. One of the few standard policies of all the past three regimes in the nation's modern political history is a commitment to AU and Pan-Africanism (See Section 5.2.1). The late Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, in his speech at the OAU meeting in Lome, Togo, in 1998, said:

> In respective of government rules in Ethiopia, Ethiopia has always been committed to African independence and liberation. Who trained Mandela? Emporer Haile Selassie, the reactionary, trained Mandela, the revolutionary. Mandela was trained in Ethiopia. Who supported Mugabe in his fight against Rhodesia? Mengistu! Internally Mengistu was a butcher. But on the issue of Africa, Mengistu was as sold as Haile Selassie was. Ethiopia's commitment to Africa has not varied with governments. You could have Emperor Haile Selassie, you could have Mengistu, and you could have a different government; it didn't matter. Every Ethiopian knows how it feels to be alone. We were alone at the table of Europeans during the League of Nations, and we know what happens to us there. Now we are not alone; we have fifty-three African countries. And therefore, every Ethiopian could not but understand the meaning of African unity.[620]

Taking this into account, when the notion of 'African solutions to African problems' initiative which trace its root to the discourse of Salim Ahmed Salim, Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1997, who addressed the Chiefs of Defense Staff of Member States of the OAU as follows:

> The OAU Member States can no longer afford to stand aloof and expect the International Community to care more for our problems than we do, or indeed to find solutions to those problems which, in many instances, have been of our own making. The simple truth that we must confront today is that the world does not owe us a living, and we must remain at the forefront of efforts to act and act speedily to prevent conflicts from getting out of control.[621]

Later, AU, in 2002, established the Peace and Security Council (PSC). Though OAU established a mechanism to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts in Africa at the 1993 Summit in Cairo, it showed the weakness of OAU's conflict prevention and management after the 1994 Rwandan

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[620] HahuDaily Ethiopia. *Meles Zenawi in Togo Lome about AU Headquarter.* youtube.com. 29 Jan 2016. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DL4ogpyzVa8, Accessed on 24 February 2020.

[621]Address by Salim Ahmed Salim, then Secretary-General of the OAU, at the Second Meeting of the Chiefs of Defense Staff of Member States of the OAU Central Organ, Harare, October 25,1997. Cited in Malan, Mark. "Africa: Building Institutions on the Run".In Daniel, Donald C. et al. *Peace Operations: Trends, Progress, and Prospects.* Georgetown University Press: Washington, D.C, 2008. 90.

tragedy.[622] On the other hand, the PSC is a standing organ of the AU with core functions to conduct early warning and preventive diplomacy, facilitate peace-making, establish peace-support operations and, in certain circumstances, recommend intervention in the Member States to promote peace security, and stability.[623]

With the PSC mechanism, AU started peacekeeping missions in Africa. The first mission wholly initiated, planned, and executed by AU members in 2003 was deployed to Burundi which was referred as African Union Mission in Burundi (AMIB).[624] In 2004, the UN Security Council decided to establish UN Peace Operations in Burundi (ONUB), and AMIB troops were incorporated into the ONUB.[625] Likewise, after the Darfur crisis in Sudan, AU set up a peacekeeping operation in 2004, African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS). By 2007 AU/UN Hybrid operation in Darfur (UNAMID) was established by the Security Council and incorporated AMIS personnel.[626] Furthermore, AMISOM was created by the African Union's Peace and Security Council on 19th January 2007 with the approval of the United Nations. These trends of assuming the responsibility of securing peace and ensuring stability on the African continent by African states is the idea of African solutions for African problems, which is taken earnestly by Ethiopia where it contributed peacekeepers for all mentioned operations.

7.1.3 The Red Sea Region

The Red Sea is a significant waterway for international trade, which lies between the Arabian Peninsula of western Asia and northeast of Africa, the Horn of Africa. Currently, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, and Yemen have costs of the Red Sea. Before the independence of Eritrea, 1006 km of the Red Sea coast, lies entirely in Ethiopia. In the south, there is the Bab-el-Mandeb strait, which connects the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden, located between Yemen,

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[622]Murithi, Tim. "The African Union's … 72.

[623] The African Union Commission. "Peace and Security Council (PSC)".AU. 2017.
https://au.int/web/en/organs/psc, Accessed on 23 January 2017.

[624]Murithi, Tim. "The African Union's …75.

[625]Ibid. 76

[626]Security Council. "Security Council Authoriseds deployment of United Nations African Union 'Hybrid' peace opratiosn in Bid to resolve Darfur Conflict". Press Release. SC/9089 31 July 2007.
http://www.un.org/press/en/2007/sc9089.doc.htm, Accessed on 22 January 2017.

Djibouti, and Eritrea, and further in the south, the Gulf of Aden situated between Somalia and Yemen.

Throughout history, the Red Sea has been the primary entry point to the Horn of Africa for the Portuguese, the Ottoman, the colonial powers of French, Britain, and Italy, and after the WWII Soviet Union and the United States and recently the Gulf nations and China. These powers also have been trying to put the Red Sea region under their sphere of influence. Thus, this region is vital for the states of the region and for the foreign powers as well. The ports of the Sudan, Eritrea, Djibouti, and Somalia, as discussed in Section 7.1.1 have a strong appeal for foreign powers for security and economic reasons.

Roberto Aliboni describes the importance of the Red Sea as follows:

> A mere glance at a map of the Middle East gives an indication of the paramount strategic importance of the Red Sea. Lying as it does between two continents, Africa and Asia, between the Middle East and the Far East, as well as between Europe and Asia, the Red Sea is at the heart of an area that has seen the birth of civilizations and religions and which constitutes a link between two worlds and two civilizations. The geopolitical position of the Red Sea is of special importance: bordering the eastern coast of Africa and the western coast of the Arabian peninsula, it is a vital route for the transportation of oil through Bab el-Mandeb in the south to the Suez Canal in the north.[627]

[627] Aliboni, Roberto. *The Red Sea Region: Local Actors and the Superpowers.* Sydney: Croom Helm. 1985. ix.

Map 7.2 Read Sea, Bab-el-Mandeb, the Gulf of Aden, and the Horn of Africa[628]

One of the most geographically strategic countries in the Red Sea region is Yemen. Yemen is geographically and historically very proximate to the Horn of Africa. It is separated by the Red Sea and its closest point to the Horn, which is with Eritrea, is less than 100 km.[629] Besides this, Yemen has political relations with the states of the region; for example, Yemen was involved in a two-day war with Eritrea over the Hanish Islands; it has played the role of mediation between Eritrea and Sudan in 1994 and the warring Somali factions. On the other hand, Yemen was as-

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[628] Source: Einstein, Norman. *Map showing the location of the Gulf of Aden, located between Yemen and Somalia. Nearby bodies of water include the Indian Ocean, Red Sea, Arabian Sea, and the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait.* https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Gulf_of_Aden_map.png, 29 January 2009. Accesses on 01 July 2020.

[629] Abdellaoui, Jamila El 'Yemen: Part of the Problem, Part of the Solution'. 28 April 2010. https://reliefweb.int/report/eritrea/yemen-part-problem-part-solution, Accessed 12 February 2019.

sisted by Eritrean President Afwerki when tensions increased following the unification of North and South Yemen.[630]

Most importantly, in 2002, Yemen, Ethiopia and Sudan initiated trilateral cooperation, the Sana'a Forum for Cooperation, which later (Somalia and Djibouti joined in 2004 and 2010, respectively. The Forum focuse on trade and regional security. The Forum 'aims to protect the coasts of the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea through the maintenance of peace, security, and stability in the region.'[631]

Thus, some scholars argue 'Yemen is more a part of the Horn than often acknowledged and policy-makers.'[632] Mulugeta G. Berhe also suggests 'Yemen, Libya, and Egypt are no less involved in the issues and processes of the region and certainly have an impact on power balances and developments.'[633] Even in the Cold War history of the region, according to General Mohamed Nur Galal, a former deputy Defense minister of Somalia, 'in early 1977, Fidel Castro brought together the leaders of Somalia, Ethiopia, and Southern Yemen at the meeting in Aden in March 1977, and suggested to create Greater Socialist Federal State in the region, an Ethiopian-Somali-Yemeni Socialist Federation. The merger would create a strategic alliance that would control the Red Sea, Suez Canal, the Arabian Gulf, and the Indian Ocean.'[634] Though Castro's initiative did not work, the security of the region is tied with Yemen. Yemen has been in civil war since 2014. The war in Yemen has also been a significant security challenge for the Horn of Africa. Michael Horton describes how firearms from Yemen fueling Conflicts in the Horn of Africa as follows:

> Arms trafficking via the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea has a long history. However, the wars in Yemen and the vast number of arms and materiel provided by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have ushered in a golden age for regional arms traffickers. The flow of weapons and material from Yemen to the Horn of Africa has increased

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[630] Ibid.

[631] Sudan Tribune. 'Ethiopia's Prime Minister says Sanaa Forum is open to all'. 31 December 2008. https://sudantribune.com/spip.php?article29729, Accessed on 20 January 2019.

[632] Abdellaoui, Jamila El 'Yemen: Part of the Problem, Part of the Solution'. 28 April 2010. https://reliefweb.int/report/eritrea/yemen-part-problem-part-solution, Accessed 12 February 2019.

[633] Berhe, Mulugeta G. Regional Peace and Security Co-Operation Under the Intergovernmental Authority on Development: Development and Challenges. *Eastern Africa Social Science Research Review*, Volume 30, Number 1, January 2014. 108.

[634] Maruf, Harun. 'Fidel Castro Left Mark on Somalia, Horn of Africa'. 26 November 2016. https://www.voanews.com/africa/fidel-castro-left-mark-somalia-horn-africa, Accessed on 02 March 2019.

over the last three years… At the Bab al-Mandeb strait, only 20 miles of water separate Yemen and Djibouti. Skiffs equipped with powerful outboard engines can cross from Yemen to Eritrea and Djibouti in hours in favorable weather. Larger vessels sailing from Yemen take only days to reach the extensive and thinly populated coasts of Puntland and Somalia. It is these desolate and largely uncontrolled coastlines that make the region ideal for arms traffickers and the illicit networks they operate within.[635]

Moreover, states of the region have been involved in the conflict. For example, Eritrea agreed to provide land, airspace and allegedly sent 400 soldiers to Yemen's war.[636] Sudanese troops also have been deployed since 2015 against the Houthi movement, though it reduced the number of troops it has in Yemen from a peak of 15,000 to 5,000 in 2019.[637]

Concerning Ethiopian interest in the Red Sea, the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Ethiopian Defense Forces, General Berhanu Julla, said in 2019, 'We must show our influence around the sea. Different countries are coming from far and creating influences on the sea. We are a great nation with over 100 million people. There is no reason Ethiopia remains landlocked.'[638] Similarly, Tekeda Alemu, former state minister of foreign affairs and permanent representative of Ethiopia to the United Nations from January 2011 until September 2018, stressed Ethiopia's attentiveness to the Red Sea region as follows:

> The Red Sea region will continue to be a challenge for the countries of the Horn of Africa, and though we are not a Red Sea littoral country, for Ethiopia as well. There is no doubt that matters have changed in the region, and the Red Sea is becoming a magnet, pulling toward the Horn of Africa's diverse interests making the geopolitical situation there dicey. This is a worrying development that Ethiopia cannot afford to observe with disinterest.[639]

Also, the revised FRDE Foreign Policy draft white paper says the following on the importance of the Red Sea region:

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[635] Horton, Michael. 'Arms from Yemen will Fuel Conflict in the Horn of Africa'. https://jamestown.org/program/arms-from-yemen-will-fuel-conflict-in-the-horn-of-africa/, Accessed on 20 March 2020.

[636] Berhane, Samson. Scramble for the Horn. *Ethiopian Business Review.* Vol. 7. No. 67. October 16 – November 15 2018. 15.

[637] Abdelaziz, Khalid. *Sudan says it has reduced troops in Yemen to 5,000.* 8 December 2019. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-sudan-politics-idUSKBN1YC0H4, Accessed on 20 January 2020.

[638] Buta, Idris. Abiy Ahmed's Ethiopia: Bandwagon or Hegemony? January 31, 2019. https://thenewturkey.org/abiy-ahmeds-ethiopia-bandwagon-or-hegemony, Accessed on 20 November 2019.

[639] Alemu, Tekeda. 'The conundrum of present Ethiopian foreign policy—in search of a roadmap for Ethiopia's Foreign and National Security Policy and Strategy'. *CDRC DIGEST.* Vol. 4 No. 1, January 2019.

Due to its geographic proximity, cultural, religious, and historical connections, this region has an impact on Ethiopia's peace, political and social affairs. Moreover, the region is where resource-rich and oil-producing countries that can immensely contribute to economic integration, investment, and the expansion of trade and investment. With regards to peace and security and foreign affairs, the ongoing conflicts in the Middle Eastern countries have posed a great challenge to the region Ethiopia is situated in. Considering both the influence the Middle East countries have and their respective policies towards the Red sea area, Ethiopia should confirm that its strong relationship with the Middle Eastern countries is conducted in a manner that ensures its lasting interest. Ensuring its benefits on the Red sea is a matter of survival for Ethiopia. Since Ethiopia pursues a direct interest in the Red sea, it will play its role in coordination with the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, and the Horn of Africa region countries.[640]

Because of internal political instability in Ethiopia since 2016, Ethiopia's role in the region and its role in the civil war in Yemen appears to be ignored. However, Ethiopia managed to send a staff officer to Hodeidah Agreement (UNMHA), which is a political mission overseeing Yemen's peace agreement.

7.1.4 Global: Commitment to International Collective Security and National Prestige

Ethiopia joined the League of Nations as the first African nation based on two pillars of its national interest: collective security and national prestige, as discussed in Section 5.2.1. Similarly, Peacekeeping has become an indispensable part of Ethiopia's foreign and military policy for the last twenty-six years. Its growing involvement in peacekeeping operations in the region makes the government look for its hegemonic position in African and global politics and enhance its national image.

Apart from the old peacekeeping missions in Korea and Congo, Ethiopia only contributed to one remote operation since the mid-1990s, the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), which was established in 2004. However, Ethiopia sent its officers after 2010 when the UN increased the overall force levels to support Haiti's immediate recovery, reconstruction, and stability efforts because of the earthquake, which resulted in more than 220,000 deaths including 96 UN peacekeepers.

Ethiopia became the temporary member of the UN Security Council for the third time – after twenty-six years of absence – without opposition in June 2016. In the campaign to the UNSC

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[640] *The Revised FRDE Foreign Relations Daft Policy Document.* Addis Ababa. May 2019

seat, the then Ethiopian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Tedros Adhanom, stated during the African Union's 26th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government that Ethiopia's desire to be a member of the Security Council emanates from 'a strong and real belief that our solid record of continued contribution to the maintenance of international peace and security puts us in a well-placed position to shoulder the responsibility.'[641] He also stressed that historically, 'Ethiopia has always responded to UN calls for collective action on international peace and security. Since the inception of the UN, Ethiopia has deployed over 100,000 military and police personnel through UN peacekeeping missions worldwide.'[642]

7.2 Ethiopian Next-door Peace Support Operation as a Foreign Policy and National Security Strategy

Troop contribution from the next-door neighbor is one of the concerns that scholars give attention to. Paul D. Williams and Thong Nguyen argue about next-door neighbors T/PCCs as follows:

> … the decision calculus of next-door neighbors, as a distinct category of potential T/PCCs, would be influenced more heavily by security, political, and potentially normative considerations than that of more distant states. In Africa, where the majority of UN peacekeepers have been deployed since 1990, this is captured by the popular adage about the imperative of helping to put out a fire in your neighbor's house. This embodies a security imperative to prevent the fire from spreading and burning your own house, a political imperative to maintain good relations with your neighbors, and a moral imperative to help a neighbor and fellow Africans in trouble.[643]

On the other hand, in 1998, Jocelyn Coulon argues as it is more for economic gain as follows:

> The financial and military benefits of participation in peacekeeping missions have led many countries of the Third World and the former East bloc to offer their services to the UN on a massive scale. … The civilian and military planners of the peacekeeping operations in New York and in the various missions throughout the world are not exactly delighted with the eagerness of these countries to offer their services to the UN. But no official wants to say this openly, and the UN must accept the soldiers provided. Moreover, UN rule calls for an equitable geographic distribution of member countries when mis-

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[641] Mesle, A. "Africa: Ethiopia's UNSC Seat - Reinvigorating UN's Role in Addressing Global Challenges" Allafrica. 8 July 2016.http://allafrica.com/stories/201607111176.html, Accessed on 22 March, 2017.

[642]Ibid.

[643] Williams, Paul D. and Thong Nguyen, "Neighborhood Dynamics in UN Peacekeeping Operations, 1990–2017," New York: International Peace Institute, April 2018. https://www.ipinst.org/2018/04/neighborhood-dynamics-in-un-peacekeeping-operations, Accessed on 28 January 2019.

sions are formed. (An exception to this rule is the Cyprus mission, where, at the request of the local government, 'troops of color' were excluded.) (Karl Th. Birgisson, 'United Nations Peacekeeping Forces in Cyprus,' in Durch, ed., The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping, 227.) The planners' misgivings have nothing to do with the skin color of the soldiers but rather with their training and discipline, the equipment with which they are supplied, and their professionalism. [644]

Also, in 1958, UN's second secretary-general, Dag Hammarskjold, considering the geopolitics in the context of the Cold War, forwarded his concern of avoiding neighboring states to deploy their military in neighboring host state as follows:

> In order to limit the scope of a possible difference of opinion, the United Nations in recent operations has followed two principles: not to include units from any of the permanent members of the Security Council; and not to include units from any country which, because of its geographical position or for other reasons, might be considered as possibly having a special interest in the situation which has called for the operation.[645]

However, because of familiarity of the next-door neighbor to the conflict, the cultural similarity, and geographical proximity, which has the advantage of lower cost and instant response whenever a conflict brakes out (as Ethiopia in the case of UNISFA), it seems UN 'breaks with a long-standing principle of not allowing a country to engage in a peace support operation in a neighboring country.'[646] Hence, it has become clear that 'no regional support or interest in intervening many operations would fail, because conflicts usually, if not always, have a regional dimension and are embedded historically in cross-border dynamics.'[647]

In the case of Ethiopia, its geopolitical location in the Horn of Africa makes it vulnerable because of civil wars, failed states, and the risk of spillover conflicts and refugees. Thus, in order to protect its national interest, Ethiopia needs to keep the peace of its neighbors for its own interest.

The current Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed Ali, emphasizing the importance of focusing on foreign relations with the next-door neighbors said:

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[644] Coulon, Jocelyn. *Soldiers of Diplomacy: The United Nations, Peacekeeping, and the New World Order.* (English Translation by Phyllis Aronoff and Howard Scott) Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1998. 39.

[645] Quoted in Williams, Paul D. and Thong Nguyen, "Neighborhood Dynamics in UN Peacekeeping Operations, 1990–2017," New York: International Peace Institute, April 2018. https://www.ipinst.org/2018/04/neighborhood-dynamics-in-un-peacekeeping-operations, Accessed on 28 January 2019.

[646] Fejerskov, Adam M. et al. "African Peace Operations and the Power of Regional Interests," Danish Institute for International Studies, November 2017. Available at www.diis.dk/en/research/african-peace-operations-and-the-power-of-regional-interests, Accessed on 29 January 2019.

[647] Ibid.

Establishing and enhancing a relation, which is based on cooperation, with our neighboring countries will be the prime focus of our foreign relations. With regard to neighboring countries, we should follow the old [Ethiopian] sayings, "A cactus that grows next to a conkerberry wipes all its days," or "A ficus tree planted next to a water spring flourishes all the time." A country with neighbors who failed to ensure their peace and lack internal stability cannot ensure lasting and reliable peace and stability. It is known that the interrelation between Ethiopian people, amongst themselves, and their relation with people in the region dates back to the formation of the modern nation-state. A well-defined and integrated outline should be put in place so that our foreign relations would reinforce these routes of communication, and our diplomacy would scale up existing economic and social interactions.

Our relation with our neighbors should get the prime focus of the relations we have with others. We should exert more efforts on our relations with our neighbors, particularly in the areas of peace and security, where a number of gaps and pending issues were witnessed.

Our relation with our neighbors should be strengthened in two directions. The first one is that we can scale up our relation by strengthening IGAD and making them pay attention to IGAD. In addition, Ethiopia should work on creating comprehensive bilateral diplomatic relations with the neighboring countries.

…the problem our relation with our neighbors frequently faces is a negative attitude that emanates from the siege mentality. Both the siege mentality and being suspicious against our neighbors do have a psychological contribution to defending our sovereignty. However, suppose we set our relation beyond conspiracy and hearsay. In that case, we will be able to not only create the foundation that will enable us to grow together but also add up our resources that we spend suspecting each other and resolve our problems easily.

It is essential to do away with a relationship based on insecurity and create a partnership centered on economic cooperation, harmony, and unification. It is also vital to ensure regional peace by putting an end to squabbles on "sheltering," "training," and "arming" each other's armed opposition forces. In addition to enhancing our role in the region, we should also consider the Arab countries as neighbors and lasting partners, not as our historic enemies. Our foreign relations should be conducted by maintaining not-alignment between contradictory forces and interests and by strengthening friendship.[648]

The revised FRDE Foreign Relations Daft Policy Document states that:

The Horn of Africa region incorporates countries of the region that are geographically adjacent to each other that are interlinked by history, culture, language, and above all, geographic and people to people relations.

The state of these countries is interlinked with Ethiopia greatly. Through its age-old history, Ethiopia has long-standing relations with most of its neighbors.

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[648] Ali, Abiy A. *Medemer.* Addis Ababa: Tsehai Publishers. 2019. 257-260

Despite the geographic differences, the Horn of Africa countries enjoy a high degree of similarities in the economic sector and practice. Not only most of the economy is dependent on agriculture and mining, but it is also of the lowest productivity. Though the countries are endowed with huge development potential, their peoples are lingering in poverty. On the contrary, it is possible to collectively develop by using and exploiting – their national resources that may facilitate their development. Their young population is the main resource and capital of the countries of the region. Ethiopia believes that its relations with the Horn of Africa countries are commendable and stronger. Therefore, Ethiopia's foreign affairs policy attaches special attention to neighboring countries. [649]

Ethiopia's peacekeeping operations in its next-door neighbors can also be analyzed based on Berouk Mesfin's 'classical problem-solving techniques: define the problem, propose solutions, test the solutions and implement the best one'[650] adopted to the Ethiopian next-door peace support operations. The Ethiopian process of national security planning and practical activity towards its three neighboring states has been mainly deploying its peacekeeping troops, as elaborated in the table below.

Functions of National Security	Somalia	Sudan	South Sudan
Defining the vital national interest that has to be safeguarded	- Export of Agricultural goods - Ethnic Somali's live both in Somalia and in Ethiopia	- Oil Import - Import and Export of Agricultural goods	- Oil Import - Minimizing migration - Illicit arms trade
Identifying threats for the National Interest	- Islamists and Irredentists coming to power in Mogadishu	- Civil War in Sudan - Alliance with Egypt against Ethiopia's GER Dam over the Nile	- Civil War
Selecting strategic actions with the available elements of national power can be mobilized by the state.	- Supporting the Federal government with sending its troops to fight Al-Shabaab (Unilateral intervention)	- PM involved (2019-2020) - Deploying its troops to UNAMID in Darfur	- Abyei - Deploying its troops to UNMISS and CTSAMM

[649] *The Revised FRDE Foreign Relations Daft Policy Document.* Addis Ababa. May 2019

[650] Mesfin, Berouk. *The Role of Military Power in Ethiopia's National Security (1974-1991).* A Thesis submitted to the School of Graduate Studies of Addis Ababa University. In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts in International Relations. Addis Ababa, June 2002.

	- Deploying its troops with AMISOM	- Deploying its troops to UNISFA	- Involve in IGAD mediation

Table 7.2 The Three Ethiopian National Security Functions towards the three countries Ethiopian peacekeeping troops deployed.

7.3 Rationales of Ethiopian Peace Support Operations

The issue of providing peacekeepers has been a central topic on the UN table for a long time. In 2009 the UN revealed that:

> The necessary military capabilities are increasingly scarce in the face of rising global demand. New peacekeeping tasks require high numbers of police and civilian specialists, experts that are in limited supply both at home and abroad…. And there is no sign that the need for peacekeeping will diminish.[651]

Also, earlier, in 2001, the UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon admitted, 'securing the required resources and troops [for UN peacekeeping] has consumed much of my energy. I have been begging leaders to make resources available to us.'[652]

On the other hand, states have their own agenda and interest in contributing to UN missions. Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams pointed out five reasons why states contribute to UN peacekeeping: political, economic, security, institutional, and normative reasons. Politically, peacekeeping contribution enhances the nation's status on security issues, or it can strengthen a country's bid for an elected seat in the UN Security Council.[653] Economically, national governments may use UN compensation payments to support their national budget, and individuals who participated in the mission can benefit from UN monthly payment of soldiers.[654] The security benefit would be usually for the reason that 'peace operations being more likely to receive contributions from states in the immediate neighbourhood or region than those further afield.' Neighbouring states are likely to contribute to containing armed conflicts that might affect

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[651] UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, *A New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping* (New York: United Nations, July 2009), p. ii.

[652] Ban Ki-moon cited in Bellamy, Alex J. and Paul D. Williams. Broadening the Base of United Nations Troop- and Police-Contributing Countries. *Providing for Peacekeeping.* No. 1. International Peace Institute. August 2012.

[653] Bellamy, Alex J. and Paul D. Williams. *Broadening the Base of United Nations Troop- and Police-Contributing Countries. Providing for Peacekeeping NO.1.* New York: International Peace Institute, August 2012.

[654] Bellamy, Alex J. and Paul D. Williams. *Broadening the Base of United Nations Troop- and Police-Contributing Countries. Providing for Peacekeeping NO.1.* New York: International Peace Institute, August 2012.

them.[655] The institutional reason is that the mission provides invaluable overseas experience for the country's armed forces.[656] Lastly, the normative reason is that UN peacekeeping promotes the greater good for all and serves as proof of 'good international citizenship.'[657] Generally, it can be said 'UN peacekeeping support became automatic and unquestioned because it involved few costs in blood and treasure and produced power, prestige, peace, and pride on the cheap.'[658]

Regarding Ethiopia, though there are plenty of reasons why Ethiopia sends its troops to UN and AU peace operations, below four main rationales are identified.

7.3.1 National Security

Participation in peacekeeping operations in the Ethiopian context can be considered as a vehicle for its national security strategy. Ethiopia is located in a region known for civil wars and state failures. Most of the problems are transnational as social and economic problems in one country would have intended and unintended spillover effects on neighbouring countries.[659] The fact that, out of six states with which Ethiopia shares borders, with the exception of Kenya and Djibouti, either Ethiopia was in conflict with (Eritrea and Somalia) or there were interstate armed conflicts. In Somalia, Sudan, and South Sudan UN deployed troops because of intrastate conflicts and interstate in case of Abyei. This left Ethiopia without any other option rather that sending its troops to UN peacekeeping operations to the troubled neighbouring states in order to its own security.

The post-1991 collapse of the government in Somalia, which resulted in the civil war and the rise of radical Islamists in the country, has been a significant security threat in the region. The Sudanese civil war, which resulted in the breakaway of South Sudan, still has not brought peace since

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[655] Ibid.

[656] Findlay, Trevor cited in Bellamy, Alex J. and Paul D. Williams. *Broadening the Base of United Nations Troop- and Police-Contributing Countries. Providing for Peacekeeping NO.1.* New York: International Peace Institute, August 2012. 5.

[657] Bellamy and Williams. *Broadening the Base of United Nations Troop- and Police-Contributing Countries.* 5.

[658] Jakobsen, Peter Viggo. "Denmark and UN Peacekeeping: Glorious past, dim future." International Peacekeeping. Vol. 23, No. 5, 741-761, 2016. 747-748.

[659] Berhe, Mulugeta G. "Economic Integration as a Peacebuilding Strategy in the Horn of Africa with Particular Focus on Ethiopia and Its Four Neighbors". *Journal of African-centered Solutions in Peace and Security* Vol.1 (1) August 2016. 63.

the division between South Sudan's leadership led to a new civil war in the country. In addition to this, Sudan and South Sudan still have not finished the demarcation of their borders because of the oil-rich Abyei region claimed by both states.

Thus, Ethiopia responded to all four aforementioned calamities through AU and UN peacekeeping missions. Security threats, thanks to spill-over effects, come from communities living on both sides of the borders, namely pastoral communities, human traffickers, and in the form of illegal movement of migrants, illicit trade, and organized crime such as drug trafficking. They represent major security threats along the whole Ethiopian border region.[660]

In addition, scholars found evidence that rebellions are contagious; in other words, a rebellion significantly increases the risk of internal upheaval in a neighbouring country.[661] An ongoing conflict in neighbouring states may decrease the price of arms and increase their availability, making it relatively accessible to rebel groups to mobilize insurgencies.[662] This is most likely along 'poorly defined borders of Ethiopia.'[663] Since 2017, there has been an attempt by armed groups to attack the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam – set to become the biggest hydropower dam in Africa – located only 15 km from the Sudanese border. The Sudanese government handed over some of the rebels who fled after the Ethiopian security forces killed 13 of them.[664]

In the case of South Sudan's conflict, Ethiopia was mainly concerned about the dynamics around its western Gambella regional state. The sudden influx of Nuer refugees into Gambella changes the demographic balance between the Anuak and the Nuer creating tension between the two ethnic groups. Moreover, when more than 1,000 gunmen from South Sudan have killed 28 people and kidnapped 43 children in the Gambella region of Ethiopia, bordering South Sudan at the beginning of March 2017, the South Sudanese government which is in civil war since 2013, was not in a position to do anything. For the second time, the occurrence of such incidents, where

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[660] Ibid. 75.

[661] Collier and Hoeffler cited in Sesay, Fatmata L. "Conflict in Neighboring (Developing) Countries: Direct and Indirect Effects on Economic Growth". *Tiger Working Paper Series* No. 68. Warsaw, November 2004. www.tiger.edu.pl/publikacje/TWPNo68.pdf, Accessed on 10 February 2017.

[662] Ibid.

[663] Mulugeta, GebrehiwotBerhe. "Economic Integration as a Peacebuilding Strategy in the Horn of Africa".75.

[664] Gaffey, Conor. "Ethiopia and Eretria trade accusations over grand dam 'attack'." Newsweek. 3 February 2017 http://europe.newsweek.com/ethiopia-dam-nile-eritrea-562895?rm=eu, Accessed on 23 January 2017.

more than 200 people died and about 160 children were kidnapped,[665] demonstrates that violence in South Sudan could spill over into neighbors.[666]

With the availability of small arms, cattle raiding, and child abductions have become more frequent and fatal. Over the years, insurgent groups among the Murle have killed more civilians, rustled more cattle, and abducted more children, primarily from communities that are not well protected, such as the Anyuaa and Jikany-Nuer of Ethiopia. These make sending peacekeeping troops to neighbouring states to help to create a strong and functioning government not a matter of altruism but a matter of national security.

7.3.2 Political Influence

The political influence can be image building, national prestige, and diplomatic leverage. The current Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed said the following about Ethiopian international role and peacekeeping deployment:

> The role it is playing for the peace and security of the Horn of Africa region and the African continent is a manifestation of Ethiopia's determination to this cause. The peacekeeping work we carried out in Somalia, Sudan, Rwanda, and Burundi is enormous. Our Defense force is a highly disciplined army that efficiently discharges its peacekeeping missions. The role Ethiopia is playing in mediating countries is also considerable. Countries that are either pursuing their interests in the Horn of Africa or observing the ongoing political developments in the region can clearly witness the role Ethiopia is playing in the region. Thus, Ethiopia's outstanding role in keeping peace in the Horn of Africa is one of the reasons why Ethiopia is enjoying an ever-increasing influence in the region.[667]

Bellamy and Williams, in their argument for the political rationale of states' involvement in UN peacekeeping note, states are mostly interested in 'contributing to certain easier, 'safer' UN missions.[668] However, in the case of Ethiopia, though its participation highly contributed to regional order, almost all the missions ENDF has been undertaking are far from 'safe.'

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[665] Aljazeera. "Ethiopia attack: 200 people dead, 100 children missing". 18 April 2016. http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/04/ethiopia-attack-200-people-dead-100-children-missing-160418045025770.html, Accessed on 23 January 2017.

[666] Aljazeera. "Ethiopia reports deadly raid by gunmen from South Sudan". 15 March2017. http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/03/ethiopia-reports-deadly-raid-gunmen-south-sudan-170315130515870.html, Accessed on 23 January 2017.

[667] Ali, Abiy Ahmed. *Medemer.* Addis Ababa: Tsehay Publishers. 2019. 252.

[668] Bellamy, Alex J. and Paul D. Williams. Broadening the Base of United Nations Troop- and Police-Contributing Countries. *Providing for Peacekeeping.* No. 1. International Peace Institute. August 2012.

7.3.3 Economic Gain

There are two means of economic gain for Ethiopia. The first one is a direct economic gain of UN reimbursement for troop-contributing member states for providing equipment, personnel, and support services to military or police contingents;[669] and indirect economic gain because of a peaceful region that attracts foreign investment and harness regional trade and development.

One of the incentives which the governments provide for foreign investment besides low-tariffs and cheap labour is security. Li Yifan, China's ambassador to Ethiopia, said, 'Ethiopia's government and its military have managed to keep peace and stability in this country … that is the basis of any meaningful economic activity. Without that, I do not think the investors will come over here.'[670] Security in the region is also essential. In order to sustain this growth, in the words of Haile A. Amdemichael:

> Peace in Ethiopia alone was not considered to be enough for the development of the country. Over time it has become increasingly obvious that it's not only the stability of the neighboring states but also regional security disturbances directly that affect the process of development in Ethiopia.[671]

However, Ethiopia's trade with its neighbours is small; it is not insignificant; for example, in 2018, Ethiopian export was 30.15% to Djibouti, 26.99% to Somalia, and 14.45% to Sudan; and its import was 13.76% from Sudan and 11.94% from Kenya. In 2016 24.04% to Sudan, 21.85% to Djibouti, and 16.55% to Kenya; and its import in 2016 was 24.11% from Sudan and 7.22% from Kenya.[672] Thus, negative spillover to neighbouring nations is likely to occur from disruptions of trade, heightened risk perceptions by would-be investors in the region, severance of in-

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[669] United Nations. *How we are Funded.* https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/how-we-are-funded, Accessed on 26 December 2019.

[670] Davison, William. "In the Fastest-Growing African Economy, Government is the Fuel". Bloomberg. 5 February 2016. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-02-05/in-the-fastest-growing-african-economy-government-is-the-fuel, Accessed on 23 January 2017.

[671] Amdemichael, Haile A. "East African Crisis Response: Shaping Ethiopian Peace for Better Participation in Future Peace Operations." Thesis Presented for Masters of Science in Defense Analysis. Monterey: Naval Postgraduate School, 2006. 45-46.

[672] Workman, Daniel. Ethiopia's Top Trading Partner. http://www.worldstopexports.com/ethiopias-top-trading-partners/. Accessed on 12 December 2018.

put supply lines, collateral damage from nearby battles, and resources spent to assist refugees.[673] Ethiopia sheltered 742,700 refugees in mid-2016, which made it the biggest host country after Turkey, Pakistan, and Lebanon.[674]

The effects of civil wars are not only felt in the countries where they are fought but also in neighbouring countries and beyond.[675] Conflict in one country does not only reduce the economic growth of its neighbours but also significantly affects other growth-enhancing variables.[676] Unless Ethiopia tries to help neighbouring countries to achieve peace, the spillover effects of conflict will hinder its ongoing economic growth. It seems, at this point and time, unless there is peace in all countries in the region, there is a slim prospect of economic integration and a prosperous future. This makes Ethiopia's focus on peacekeeping the right thing to do.

On the other hand, peacekeeping deployment provides economic gains for the soldiers who participate in missions. In ENDF, being deployed for a peacekeeping mission become an important carrier goal for a soldier and an officer.[677] The UN monthly US $ 1,428 per soldier as of 1 July 2019, even with its government deduction (as discussed in Section 6.4), is incomparable to a salary. (See the following table for the salary of ENDF)

Rank	Net Salary (ETB)/per Month	USD
Private	2000 Birr	51 $
Lance-Corporal	2,679 ''	69 ''
Corporal	2,826 ''	72 ''
Sergeant	3,254 ''	83 ''

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[673] Murdoch and Sandler cited in Sesay, Fatmata Lovetta. "Conflict in Neighbouring (Developing) Countries: Direct and Indirect Effects on Economic Growth". *Tiger Working Paper Series* No. 68. Warsaw, November 2004.www.tiger.edu.pl/publikacje/TWPNo68.pdf, Accessed on 10 February 2017.

[674]UNHCR "Poorer countries host most of the forcibly displaced, report shows." 27 February 2017. http://www.unhcr.org/news/latest/2017/2/58b001ab4/poorer-countries-host-forcibly-displaced-report.html, Accessed on 22 March 22, 2017.

[675]Sesay, Fatmata Lovetta. "Conflict in Neighbouring (Developing) Countries: Direct and Indirect Effects on Economic Growth". *Tiger Working Paper Series* No. 68. Warsaw, November 2004.www.tiger.edu.pl/publikacje/TWPNo68.pdf, Accessed on 10 February 2017.

[676]Ibid. Anonymous10 June 2019 Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

[677] Interview with Anonymous Military Officer 11 June 2019, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

Master Sergeant	3,254 ''	83 ''
First Sergeant	3,624 ''	93 ''
Staff Sergeant Major	3,831 ''	98 ''
Junior Warrant Officer	4,309 ''	110 ''
Second-Lieutenant	3,341 ''	85 ''
Lieutenant	3,354 ''	86 ''
Capitan	3,851 ''	99 ''
Major	4,411 ''	113 ''
Lieutenant-Colonel	4,925 ''	126 ''
Colonel	5,800 ''	148 ''
Brigadier-General	6,948 ''	177 ''
Major-General	7,691 ''	196 ''
Lieutenant-General	7,979 ''	204 ''

Table 7.3 Salary Scale of ENDF [678]

7.3.4 Historical Legacy and Conviction to Collective Security

As it is discussed in Section 6.1.1, Ethiopia deployed its troops to the US-led peacekeeping mission in Korea based on two main intentions. The first one is because of the historical legacy of the League of Nations' failure to defend Ethiopia from the Italian aggression in 1936, though, Article 10 of the Covenant of the League of Nations sates "The Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League." Ethiopia demanded the League to punish Italy for invading it borders, so that the punishment would halt Italy's conquest of the country. However, the League failed to do so. Emperor Haile Selassie I, in his speech of June 1936 at the League of Nations, expressed both Ethiopian commitment and trust to the collective security and also its frustration on the contemporary international system as follows:

> … Apart from the Kingdom of the Lord, there is not on this earth any nation that is superior to any other. Should it happen that a strong Government finds it may with impunity destroy a weak people, then the hour strikes for that weak people to appeal to the League

[678] Source: Desalegn, Temesgen. Yerabew Serawit. (The Hangry Army) *Fitih Megazin*. Vol. 1. No. 28. May 2019. 5.

of Nations to give its judgment in all freedom? God and history will remember your judgment.

I ask the fifty-two nations, who have given the Ethiopian people a promise to help them in their resistance to the aggressor, what are they willing to do for Ethiopia? And the great Powers who have promised the guarantee of collective security to small States on whom weighs the threat that they may one day suffer the fate of Ethiopia, I ask what measures do you intend to take?

Representatives of the World I have come to Geneva to discharge in your midst the most painful of the duties of the head of a State. What reply shall I have to take back to my people?"[679]

This historical incident has been an important landmark in Ethiopian history and a significant motivation in the Ethiopian army deployment in Korea and Congo at the time of the Emperor. Retelling the 1936 episode, the current Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has the following to say:

The fact that Ethiopia, despite voicing its concern about Italy's invasion during Emperor Haileselassie's regime, did not succeed in securing the attention of the international community, was an incident that had given us a lesson that our belief on the possibility of designing a foreign policy based on trust on international organizations would not take us far. However, this incident did not force us to fully give up hope on the idea of multilateralism and abandon the direction of cooperation. Ethiopia is a country that survived by promoting a relation based on fairness and cooperation and by resisting a relation that is established on the force. [680]

This shows, despite the historical experience, Ethiopian leaders are still optimistic about international organizations and collective security. Moreover, the newly drafted Ethiopian Foreign Policy further goes by including a section on 'Ethiopian Peace Support Operations' as follows:

Ethiopia believes that states' common peace and security will be ensured when nations work together. Until now, Ethiopia effectively conveyed its international duties and expectations in peacekeeping operations in Korea, Congo, Liberia, Somalia, Burundi, South Sudan, Sudan, and Abyei. Ethiopia does not interfere in other countries' internal affairs and will work efficiently and impartially in its peacekeeping missions if called upon. The peacekeeping forces will be able to carry out its mission efficiently, be praised for its ethics and commitment, and will continue to be a bulwark for our country.[681]

[679] Haile Selassie I. "Speech by the His Majesty Haile Selassie I, Emperor of Ethiopia, at the Assembly of the League of Nations, at the Session of June–July 1936." dl.wdl.org. https://dl.wdl.org/11602/service/11602.pdf, Accessed on 20 June 2019.

[680] Ali, Abiy A. *Medemer.* 252

[681] *Revised FDRE's Foreign Policy: Draft.* Addis Ababa. May 2019. 14.

The inclusion of peacekeeping in its foreign policy white paper shows how Ethiopia took its global peacekeeping role very seriously.

In relation to this, the same historical parallelism can be drawn with Rwanda. Paul Kagame, President of Rwanda, on his remark at the International Conference on the Protection of Civilians and on the endorsement of the 'Kigali Principle,' stated 'the international community's decision to walk away from a genocide in progress in 1994 was not only a disgrace but a disaster that had to be reckoned with.'[682] This tragic historical incident in Rwanda made the Rwandan government sheer conviction to peacekeeping. In turn, this led to the emergence of the 'Kigali Principle,' sponsored by the Rwanda government, which includes the principles of 'to be prepared to use force to protect civilians' and 'not to hesitate to take action to protect civilians.' Rwanda has also became one of the top peacekeeping contributors, and it was the first county to send peacekeepers to Darfur, seeing 'similarity to 1994 and felt a moral obligation to act.'[683]

Furthermore, the early Ethiopian victory over the Italian colonial army in 1896, gave a unique historical legacy to Ethiopia, as the only independent African state with its own government and state structure. This led to a special collective behavior in its foreign policy and military orientation. Also, the freedom inspired other African states and black people around the world. The Ethiopian peacekeeping operations can be considered as an extension of credence in fighting for those who are beleaguered. Emperor Haile Selassie I affirmed that 'people who love freedom and who are trying to fight for their freedom should be respected and helped.'[684] This statement is still a core value in all Ethiopian regimes' foreign policy and military conviction.

7.3.5 Criticisms on Ethiopian Peacekeeping Operations

The foremost criticism against Ethiopian peacekeeping engagements comes from Ethiopia's involvement in Somalia. Ethiopia has been accused of having destabilizing ambitions in Soma-

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[682] Civilianprotection.rw. "Report of the High-Level International Conference on the Protection of Civilians. Kigali, Rwanda." Civilianprotection.rw. 28-29 May 2015. http://civilianprotection.rw/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/REPORT_PoC_conference_Long-version.pdf. Accessed on 08 February 2019.

[683] Firsing, Scott. "Thinking through the role of Africa's militaries in peacekeeping: the cases of Nigeria, Ethiopia and Rwanda." *South African Journal of International Affairs,* 21/1. 2014. 50.

[684] Techane, Gesit. *The Former Army:1935-1991 [Amharic]* (*Yeqedmow Tor: 1927-1983).* Addis Ababa: Z. A Publishing. 2006 142 – 143. 55.

lia.[685] As it is discussed in section 6.2 Ethiopian has been engaged in a series of military incursions in Somalia. Several literatures on the Ethio-Somalia relations, refer Ethiopia's involvement in Somalia as 'invasion' intended on sole interest of Ethiopia than bringing peace in Somalia. For instance Napoleon A. Bamfo described it staggeringly "Ethiopia's invasion of Somalia in late 2006 may go down in history as one of the most daring if not imprudent strategic decision any African government has made on its neighbor."[686] Cedric Barnes and Harun Hassan described it as a "genuine multilateral concern to support the reconstruction and rehabilitation of Somalia has been hijacked by unilateral actions of other international actors especially Ethiopia and the United States following their own foreign policy agendas."[687]

Mohamed H. Ingiriis argue that "Ethiopian intervention did not end the protracted political conflict in Somalia but has, quite to the contrary, exacerbated it."[688]Afyare Abdi Elmi and Abdullahi Barise made a strong accusation claiming, "Ethiopia, a powerful and well-positioned state, is a hostile neighbor that aims to maintain a weak and divided Somalia…. Ethiopia is an important actor in blocking peace-building efforts in Somalia."[689] They even arguing further by stating "Ethiopia is one of the colonial powers that partitioned Somalia into five parts."[690]

Additionally, there are other disapprovals of Ethiopia's involvement in Somalia. For example, Robe wise argues that the 2006 Ethiopian military operation against ICU led to the rise of al-Shabaab. "The small, youth militia arm of a relatively moderate Islamist organization … al-Shabaab was radicalized and brought to prominence as a popular Islamist guerilla movement by Ethiopia's invasion."[691] Furthermore, according to Paul D. Williams it is Ethiopia that installed

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[685] IISS. *The Military Balance 2014: The Annual Assessment of Global Military Capabilities and Defense Economics*. London: Routledge, 2014. 418.

[686] Bamfo, Napoleon A. "Ethiopia's invasion of Somalia in 2006: Motives and lessons learned." *African Journal of Political Science and International Relations*, 4/2, 2010. 055-065.

[687] Barnes, Cedric and Harun Hassan. The Rise and fall of Mogadishu's Islamic Courts. *Journal of Eastern African Studies*, 1/2, 2007. 151-160. 51.

[688] Ingiriis, Mohamed H. From Al-Itihaad to Al-Shabaab: how the Ethiopian intervention and the 'War on Terror' exacerbated the conflict in Somalia. Third World Quarterly, 39/11, 2018, 2033-2052. 2035.

[689] Elmi, Afyare A. and Abdullahi Barise. "The Somali Conflict: Root causes, obstacles, and peace-building strategies" *African Security Review* 15/1. 2006.42.

[690] Ibid. 39.

[691] Wise Robe. "Al Shabaab" 15 July 2011. https://www.csis.org/analysis/al-shabaab. Accessed on 11 December 2019.

the TFG government in Somalia[692] with the leadership of Abdullahi Yusuf "under Ethiopian patronage."[693]

On the other hand, it is the hypothesis of this dissertation that Ethiopia utilized the international cooperation potentials through international and regional organizations and in its own unilateral engagement. And peacekeeping has been used as input in this regard not only in Somalia but also in South Sudan and Sudan. Ethiopia used peacekeeping and international cooperation to meet its own peace and security needs by reducing threats and securing its hegemonic role in the region.

7.4 Ethiopia as a Regional Hegemon and Regional Power in the Horn of Africa.

In the generous words of Idris Buta, Ethiopian can be described as:

> Never succumbed to foreign aggression and shines as a beacon of independence in Africa and beyond. In the Horn of Africa, Ethiopia commands a clear hegemonic power status with over 80% of the population and 58.5% of the land of the region, the strongest armed forces in Sub Saharan Africa and one of the fastest-growing economies in the world. With a respected role as a security provider and a peacemaker in the IGAD region.[694]

Furthermore, evaluating Ethiopia based on Daniel Flemes, four regional power criteria's;[695] first in terms of formulation of the claim to leadership: Ethiopia, especially under the let Meles Zenawi's premiership, played a leadership role in the Horn of Africa region and to the whole African continent. Meles has become Africa's most outspoken leader on climate change and represented Africa at G8 and G20 summits.[696] He represented the continent in the consecutive climate change conferences held in Copenhagen, Cancun, and Durban.[697] The President of the Pan-

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[692] Williams, Paul D. *Fighting for Peace in Somalia: A History and Analysis of the African Union Mission (AMISOM), 2007-2017.* Oxford. Oxford University Press. 2018. 31

[693] Cornwell, Richard. "Short Commentary on Somalia: *Plus ça change...*?" Situation Report, ISS. 19 January 2005. https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/136889/050119SOMALIA.PDF. Accessed on 11 December 2019.

[694] Buta, Idris. Abiy Ahmed's Ethiopia: Bandwagon or Hegemony? January 31, 2019. https://thenewturkey.org/abiy-ahmeds-ethiopia-bandwagon-or-hegemony, Accessed on 20 November 2019.

[695] Flemes, Daniel. *Conceptualizing Regional Power in International Relations: Lessons from the South African Case.* Working Paper No. 53, German Institute of Global and Area Studies, Hamburg. 2007.

[696] Malone, Barry. *Ethiopia PM: world not serious on climate change.* 12 November 2009. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-africa-meles/ethiopia-pm-world-not-serious-on-climate-change-idUSTRE5AB3FT20091112, Accessed on 17 January 2020.

[697] African Business Magazine. *Meles Zenawi, Africa's intellectual giant.* 16 August 2013. https://africanbusinessmagazine.com/uncategorised/meles-zenawi-africa-s-intellectual-giant/, Accessed on 17 January 2020.

African Parliament, Bethel Amadi, said, 'Meles was able to enhance a clear vision on how Africa should plan for the next millennium in terms of infrastructure and human capital development, peace and security, agriculture and food security, environmental protection, and in terms of our relations with the international communities. His contribution was immense.'[698]

Moreover, Meles pushed African states to reject the neoliberal policy and to adopt a democratic developmental state. This was based on Meles Zenawi's unpublished master's dissertation, African Development: Dead Ends and New Beginnings.[699] He was also 'in the forefront of those who took the initiative to establish and implement the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD).'[700]

The regional leadership charisma also reflected with the current Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, who was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for 2019 'for his efforts to achieve peace and international cooperation, and in particular for his decisive initiative to resolve the border conflict with neighboring Eritrea.'[701] He also has bold views of uniting the Horn of African states.[702] He was attempting a regional integration for security and common position in international relations through two tripartite summits with Somalian and Eritrean leaders with Joint Declaration Agreement on Comprehensive Cooperation signed in September 2019 at Asmara. Also hosted another trilateral summit with leaders of Sudan and Djibouti in Ethiopia in the same year. [703]

Moreover, his mediations between 'Eritrea and Djibouti, Eritrea and Somalia, Somalia and Kenya, and pushed the various factions in South Sudan to give peace a chance.'[704] Similarly he me-

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[698] Ibid.

[699] De Waal. Alex, The Theory and Practice of Melez Zenawi. Review Article. *African Affairs*, 112/446, 148–155

[700] Meleszenawi.com. Remembering Meles Zenawi, the Prime Minister of Ethiopia (1955 - 2012) November 3, 2012. http://www.meleszenawi.com/nepad-to-maintain-meles-zenawis-philosophies-within-the-partnership/, Accessed on 17 January 2020.

[701] The Nobel Prize. *The Nobel Peace Prize for 2019.* 11 October 2019. https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/2019/press-release/, Accessed on 17 January 2020.

[702] Daily #Ethiopia News. *BREAKING Abiy Ahmed's Speech on Somalia & Ethiopia Unity | Africa Unity | United Africa.* 17 Jun 2018. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FBorE2SfMLA. Accessed on 17 January 2020.

[703] Buta, Idris. Abiy Ahmed's Ethiopia: Bandwagon or Hegemony? January 31, 2019. https://thenewturkey.org/abiy-ahmeds-ethiopia-bandwagon-or-hegemony, Accessed on 20 November 2019.

[704] Halakhe, Abdullahi B. Abiy's Efforts to Unify Ethiopia could Lead to its Disintegration. 7 December 2020. https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2020/12/7/abiys-efforts-to-unify-ethiopia-could-lead-to-its-disintegration, Accessed on 17 January 2020.

diated Sudan's military rulers and civilian opposition after Omar al-Bashir was removed from power in 2019.[705] Besides, as is discussed in Section 5.2.3, Ethiopia has played an important leadership role at the UN Security Council in peace and security of the African continent in relation to AU and peacekeeping.

Christopher Clapham points out Ethiopia's leadership role and hegemonic character as follows:

> For so long as a single state at the heart of the region has a population vastly greater than that of its other states combined, together with an effective government and economy likewise far more important than those of its neighbors, a powerful military, and alliance both in the continent and beyond it, that state is necessarily the critical element on which the structure of regional relations depends. … Historically, in a comparative perspective, the presence of a large and powerful state at the center of a region has been every bit as likely to prove a destabilizing element as a stabilizing one. Such states, like the United States in the Americas, imperial and Soviet Russia in central Europe and Asia, or China in East Asia, readily acquire a hegemonic or even imperialist attitude towards their neighbors that arouses intense resentment. Ethiopia provides a classic case of such attitudes indeed. [706]

Secondly, in terms of possession of the necessary power resources: Ethiopia has more than 112 million people (2019), the second-most populous nation in Africa after Nigeria, and the fastest growing economy in the region.[707] Ethiopia also has a strategic location in the Horn of Africa region, and it has a strong battle-hardened military, with the experience of conventional and guerrilla warfare, including long experience in peace support missions in the region.

Thirdly, in the employment of foreign policy instruments, besides the major role of its military, which is the hypothesis of the dissertation, Ethiopia has a dynamic economic potential, with the enormous potential of hydroelectric power which enabled it to export electricity to Djibouti and Sudan. There is a plan to begin power export to Kenya and its southern neighbors, Tanzania, and

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[705] Abdelaziz, Khalid. *Ethiopia attempts to mediate Sudan crisis after bloodshed. June* 7, 2019. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-sudan-politics/ethiopia-pm-abiy-in-sudan-to-meet-with-chief-of-military-council-idUSKCN1T80OS, Accessed on 17 January 2020.

[706] Clapham, Christopher. *The Horn of Africa: State formation and Decay.* Hurst & Company: London, 2017. 179 - 180.

[707] The World Bank. *The World Bank in Ethiopia.* October 13, 2020. https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/ethiopia/overview, Accessed on 17 January 2020.

Rwanda.[708] In addition, an agreement has been signed to further connect to Yemen through Djibouti's underwater sea cable.[709] Also, a plan to export hydroelectric power further to Egypt and negotiation has started with Somaliland and South Sudan.

Forth, acceptance of the third state's leadership role can be manifested clearly in Ethiopia's role in IGAD and its intervention in Somalia. Ethiopia intervened in Somalia in 2006 against the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) in support of the Transitional Federal Government, which was approved by IGAD. On the other hand, Eritrea started supporting UIC. Because of this pretext, Ethiopia's proposed sanction on Eritrea was implemented and supported by IGAD states and approved by AU and UN until 2018.[710] It is also Ethiopia that pushed the Security Council to lift the sanctions.[711] Though Kenya is economically an important power in the region, because of Ethiopia's military and diplomatic role in Somalia and against Eritrea, Ethiopia has been playing a prominent role.[712] James Jeffrey quotes one US diplomat in 2018 as follows:

> Ethiopia plays an important role in the regional stability as the largest contributor to UN peacekeeping missions globally and host to one of the world's largest refugee populations. With a growing population of over 100 million, Ethiopia also represents tremendous untapped economic potential. The reform process launched by Prime Minister Abiy opens the door for further progress and collaboration in all of these areas, not least because democracy and good governance are powerful factors in building political stability and economic prosperity. Far from drifting away from Ethiopia, the US is moving closer as we see a clear alignment in our priorities.[713]

Ethiopia's role in the Horn of Africa can be very similar to how Daniel Flemes describes regional power. Flemes describes the role of regional power as follows:

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[708] Maasho, Aaron. *Ethiopia plans power exports to neighbors.* June 29, 2011. https://www.reuters.com/article/ozatp-ethiopia-electricity-20110629-idAFJOE75S0GR20110629, Accessed on 17 January 2020.

[709] Ibid.

[710] United Nations News. *Eritrea sanctions lifted amid growing rapprochement with Ethiopia: Security Council.* 14 November 2018. https://www.un.org/africarenewal/news/eritrea-sanctions-lifted-amid-growing-rapprochement-ethiopia-security-council, Accessed on 17 January 2020.

[711] Ibid.

[712] Gebrewold, Belachew. Legitimate Regional Powers? A Failed Test for Ethiopia, Nigeria, and South Africa. *African Security.* 7:1–23, 2014. 17.

[713] Jeffrey, James. US-Ethiopia relationship changing amid Horn of Africa power struggle. November 08, 2018 https://www.pri.org/stories/2018-11-08/us-ethiopia-relationship-changing-amid-horn-africa-power-struggle, Accessed on 17 January 2020.

Regional powers are expected to play the role of regional peacemakers and policies as well as taking on the role of moral authority. They have the responsibility for keeping their backyard neat and orderly, sometimes with a measure of support by great powers. Furthermore, regional powers seem to be expected to support and promote acceptable rules and norms in terms of which regional politics and relations are conducted.[714]

Herbst,[715] Rudincova,[716] Gebrewold,[717] and Clapham,[718] argue that Ethiopia is clearly a regional power, a hegemon, and a dominant country in the Horn of Africa. First, it has a population of more than 110 million, the largest in the region, and second in Africa; secondly, it has the strongest and well-experienced military in the region; thirdly, it has the fastest growing economy in the region. Moreover, it has abundant natural resources and hydroelectric power that can stretch beyond the Horn of Africa. Also, historically it has a dominant role in the continent since the time of Emperor Haile Sellassie I. The Emperor, in a speech at the opening Houses of Parliament, on the 2nd November 1964, said: 'We consider this signal honor (the location of the OAU. headquarters in Addis Ababa) both a recognition of Ethiopia's glorious history as a proud and free nation, as well as a challenge to the continuation of her present role of dignified leadership in the new history of the continent.'[719]

Jeffrey Herbst claims South Africa, Nigeria, Ethiopia, and DRC are Sub-African regional hegemons:

Indeed, it is striking that Africa's largest countries, with the exception of South Africa, are more likely to be discussed as destinations for peacekeepers than benign hegemons leading to disinterested interventions. DRC has been the destination for a variety of interveners for several years now, and both Nigeria and Ethiopia, given the centrifugal pressures they are experiencing, are routinely discussed as possible failed states. Indeed, far

[714] Flemes, Daniel. *Conceptualizing Regional Power in International Relations: Lessons from the South African Case.* Working Paper No. 53, German Institute of Global and Area Studies, Hamburg. 2007.

[715] Herbst, Jeffrey. African Peacekeepers and State Failure. In Robert I. Rotberg (ed.), *Peacekeeping and Peace-enforcement in Africa: Methods of Conflict Prevention.* Cambridge and Washington DC: World Peace Foundation and Brookings Institution Press, 2000. 26.

[716] Rudincova, Kateřina. "Ethiopian Foreign Policy in the Horn of Africa: Informal Relations with Somaliland and their Possible Future Development." *Politeja* No. 42, *African Studies,* 2016.

[717] Gebrewold, Belachew. Legitimate Regional Powers? A Failed Test for Ethiopia, Nigeria, and South Africa. African Security, 7:1–23, 2014. 17.

[718] Clapham, C. "Peace in the Horn of Africa." In Richmond, O. P. (ed). *The Palgrave Handbook of Disciplinary and Regional Approaches to Peace.* New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 2016. 327.

[719] Prys, Miriam. Hegemony, Domination, Detachment: Differences in Regional Powerhood. *International Studies Review.* Vol. 12, No. 4, December 2010. 491.

from size being correlated with power as has traditionally been the case in the international relations literature, it appears that a significant size, within the African context, is a relatively good predictor of poor state performance. It is telling that of the African countries participating in the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI), only Ethiopia is among the largest African countries that would normally be thought of as natural interveners.[720]

Comparing the population and the military capability of the region, as shown in Table 8.4, Ethiopia has the largest population, constituting 40% of the total population of the region. It also has the second-largest GDP and the third-largest military expenditure. Though the Ethiopian government officially does not reveal the total number of its army, according to different sources, Ethiopia has the second-largest military in the region after Eritrea and the strongest military in the region. Also, Ethiopia has the largest foreign deployment in peacekeeping in the region.

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[720] Herbst, Jeffrey. African Peacekeepers and State Failure. In Robert I. Rotberg (ed.), *Peacekeeping and Peace-enforcement in Africa: Methods of Conflict Prevention.* Cambridge and Washington DC: World Peace Foundation and Brookings Institution Press, 2000. 26.

Country	Popltn	GDP	Def bdgt	Military Capability							
				Active	Army	Navy	Air Force	Genda-rmerie	Para-military	Reserve	Peacekeeping Deployment
Djibouti	884,017	3.17bn	n.k	10,450	8,000	200	250	2,000	2,650		AMISOM 1,872; MI-NURSO 2 obs
Eritrea	5,970,646	2.11bn	n.k	201,750	200,000	1,400	350	-	-	120,000	-
Ethiopia[721]	108,386,391	91.2bn	518m	139,000	135,000	1000	3000	-	-	70,000	AMISOM 4,323; UNMISS 2,122; UNAMID 1,684; UNIS-FA 4,368;
Kenya	48,397,527	98.6bn	1.23bn	24,100	20,000	1,600	2,500	-	5,000	-	MINUSCA 7; MO-NUSCO 7; UNIFIL 1 MINUSMA 8; AMISOM 4,046; UNMISS 11; UNAMID 89;
Somalia[722]	11,259,029	4.96bn	n.k	19,800	19,800	-	-	-	-	-	-
South Sudan	10,204,581	3.68bn	70.1m	185,000	185,000	-	-	-	-	-	-
Sudan	43,120,843	30.9bn	n.k	104,300	100,000	1,300	3,000	-	20,000	85,000	Yemen: *Operation Restoring Hope* 950
Uganda	42,169,690	30.7bn	547m	45,000	45,000	-	-	-	1,400	10,000	AMISOM 6,022; UNSOM 530; UNMISS 2

Table 7.4 Military Capability of Horn of Africa states and Peace Operations Deployments as of 2019.[723]

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[721] The data of Ethiopian navy and reserve force is from Anonymous ENDF senior officer, 11 June 2019, Addis Ababa.

[722] Two territories where the Somalian government has no effective control, Somaliland has 12,500 Army, 600 Coast Guard, and Puntland has 3,000 Army, 1,000 Maritime Police Force. (IISS. *The Military Balance 2019: The Annual Assessment of Global Military Capabilities and Defense Economics*. London: Routledge, 2019.)

[723] Source: IISS. *The Military Balance 2019: The Annual Assessment of Global Military Capabilities and Defense Economics*. London: Routledge, 2019.

Jason Mosley said, 'Ethiopia remains the center of gravity in the Horn of Africa, and increasingly an influential player in the evolving Red Sea regional security—and, eventually, economic—landscape.'[724] Tekeda Alemu further goes by saying, 'Ethiopia could become a formidable force for peace, security, and stability in the Horn of Africa, and in Africa in general.'[725] In the same fashion, Dustin Dehéz's asserts about the Ethiopian hegemonial character as follows:

> Interestingly, where more traditional hegemons, such as the United Kingdom, India, or the United States, differ from current regional hegemons in Sub-Sahara Africa most, is that the rise of hegemons was historically accompanied by a consolidation of their internal political dynamics. Industrialization, nationalism, the growth of national redistributive policies all went hand in hand with the state's capability to project power beyond its borders and the expansion of its hegemonic potential. I argue that large African states, such as Ethiopia, have been able to act as regional hegemons, despite their dysfunctional redistributive state system and the inherent lack of domestic consolidation in both the political and economic realm and in terms of ethnic composition.[726]

Though Ethiopia has the above-mentioned hegemonic characters and advantage Dustin Dehéz, point out two key weakness of Ethiopia as follows:

> Ethiopia's lack of internal consolidation and its inability to formulate a coherent and comprehensive framework for an ethnically inclusive state is a huge constraint for its hegemonic aspirations. This inability has left the state vulnerable in a regional environment, where it has been common practice for decades to exploit ethnic divisions to counterbalance the power of neighboring countries.[727] [Also]… its Christian Orthodox legacy makes it impossible to claim a hegemonic position among its Arab neighbors, and its Southern neighbors rather turn to the South or to Central Africa than following Ethiopian leadership.[728]

Some literatures on the Horn of Africa discuses Kenya and Ethiopia are competing for regional influence in the region.[729] Terence McNamee, argue Kenya is East Africa's strongest interna-

[724] Mosley, Jason. Ethiopia's Transition: Implications for the Horn of Africa and Red Sea Region. *SIPRI Insights on Peace and Security.* No. 2020/5, March 2020

[725] Alemu, Tekeda. 'The conundrum of present Ethiopian foreign policy—in search of a roadmap for Ethiopia's Foreign and National Security Policy and Strategy'. *CDRC DIGEST.* Vol. 4 No. 1, January 2019.

[726] Dehéz, Dustin. *Ethiopia – A Hegemon in the Horn of Africa Region.* BISA Annual Conference, Exeter, December 2008. http://www.open.ac.uk/socialsciences/bisa-africa/confpapers/Dehez-exeter-08.pdf, Accessed on 23 February 2020.

[727] Ibid.

[728] Ibid.

[729] Mulat, Yonas K. "A Rising Regional Power: Making Sense of Ethiopia's Influence in the Horn of Africa." A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science. Florida International University. 2020.

tional trade and investment link; a transport, logistics, tourism, banking and services hub. [730] Then he portrayed Kenya as "a less clear-cut regional power than either Nigeria or South Africa."[731] According to Gatama J. Gichini, Kenya is a 'potential hegemon' in the region especially economically, however, "Ethiopia pose a threat to Kenya's hegemonic aspirations."[732] Similarly Lee M. Mugamibi argue that "Kenya has the resources necessary to become a regional hegemon."[733]

Therefore, the fact that Kenya is an economic hub of the region gives Kenya strong leverage in the region. However, Kenya is not robust in its activity in IGAD region and Africa comparing to Ethiopia. Moreover, as described in Table 8.4 Ethiopia's population is more than half of Kenya's, 108 million and 48 million respectively. In terms of military force, Ethiopia's active forces is more than five times higher than that of Kenya, 139,000 and 24,100 respectively. Though, the reality is that Kenya has still a vibrant economy than Ethiopia.

Finally, it worth to conclude with the words of Christopher Clapham.

> The key to stability in the Horn rests, as always, with Ethiopia. In a region with such massive internal power disparities, hegemonic stability is the only kind on offer, and this requires a minimum that Ethiopia remains reasonably stable internally and that it is capable of articulating a wider regional project that promises mutual benefits rather than the prospect of mere domination to its neighbors.[734]

7.5 Summery and Partial Conclusion

This chapter deals with four key subjects of the dissertation. First, the Ethiopian geopolitical interest and security risks vis-à-vis peace support operation magnitude of deployment; second, the

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[730] McNamee, Terence. "What if Africa's Regional Powers Did Better?" 10 October 2016 https://www.kas.de/en/web/auslandsinformationen/artikel/detail/-/content/was-waere-wenn-afrikas-regionalmaechte-erfolgreicher-waeren-. Accessed on 03 January 2020.

[731] Ibid.

[732] Gichini, Gatama J. "Kenya's Emerging Global Profile: Between aspirations and prospects." Mini Dissertation, Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the Degree of Masters in Diplomatic Studies in the Faculty of Humanities at the University of Pretoria. 2018.

[733] Mugamibi, Lee M. "Hegemony and Regional Stability in Africa: A Critical analysis of Kenya, Nigeria and South Africa as Regional Hegemons." A Research Project Submitted in Partial Fulfilment of the Degree of Master of Arts in International Studies. Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies. 2015.

[734] Clapham, Christopher. *The Horn of Africa: State formation and Decay.* Hurst & Company: London, 2017. 186.

analysis of Ethiopia's next-door peace support operations; third, the rationales of Ethiopian peacekeeping deployment; and fourth, the argument for Ethiopian hegemony in the region.

Ethiopia has four geopolitical interests and security risks that it must deal with. The first geopolitical interest and security risk is its neighborhood, the Horn of Africa or the IGAD region, which is an immediate national security concern. Because of the three main reasons, Ethiopia needs to give priority to this region. The first one is the existence of failed states in this region, second, Ethiopia's landlockedness and its dependence on its neighbors, as this it leads to high economic and geographical vulnerability, and third the presence of numerous foreign military bases in the region.

The second Ethiopian geopolitical interest is the African continent because of its Pan-African commitment, which has been its historical legacy. Third, the Red Sea region is a significant waterway for international trade, especially for oil, which is a strategic resource which is identified by many nations as a national (fundamental) interest; and the nearest water body for Ethiopia that has paramount economic and security value for its economic and national security. Lastly, its global concern emanated from its commitment to collective international security and national prestige.

Scholars argue that being a peacekeeper in next-door neighbors can be influenced more heavily by security, political, and potentially normative considerations than that of more distant states. Ethiopia's main peacekeeping focus on its next-door neighbors, beside the advantage of the familiarity of the next-door neighbor conflict and cultural similarity and geographical proximity, has the advantage of lower cost and in responding in a short time span when a conflict brakes out. On the other hand, Ethiopia's, geopolitical location in the Horn of Africa makes it vulnerable because of civil wars, failed states and the risk of spillover conflicts and refugees from the region. Thus, in order to protect its national interest, Ethiopia needs to keep the peace of its neighbors for its own interest. As a country with neighbors who failed to ensure peace and who lack internal stability, it cannot ensure lasting and reliable peace and stability. Participation in peacekeeping operations in the Ethiopia's context can be considered as a vehicle for its national security strategy. Furthermore, Ethiopia used its peacekeeping deployment as political influence in the region and economic gain for its troops.

Ethiopia's peacekeeping operations in its next-door neighbors can also be analyzed and adopted to the Ethiopian next-door peace support operations. As described in Table 8.2, based on Berouk Mesfin's classical problem-solving techniques to: define the problem, propose solutions, test the solutions and implement the best one; the Ethiopian process of national security planning and practical activity towards its three neighboring states (Somalia, South Sudan and Sudan) has been mainly in deploying its peacekeeping troops. First by defining the vital national interest that needs to be safeguarded and then identifying threats for the national interest in that country and selecting strategic actions with the available elements of national power that can be mobilized by the state, which is primarily deploying its peacekeeping troops.

The general rationales of Ethiopian peacekeeping are four. The first one is national security, which is related to reasons for deploying troops in next-door neighbours, in the case of Ethiopia the ongoing conflict in neighbouring states of Somalia, South Sudan and Sudan which may led to vulnerabilities like arms smuggling, human trafficking, illegal movement of migrants, illicit trade, and organized crime such as drug trafficking. Secondly Ethiopia will gain political influence by building its image and national prestige, as an international responsible state and it can be also used as diplomatic leverage. Third, economic gain, first direct payment from UN reimbursement for equipment, personnel, and support services to military or police contingents; and indirect economic gain because of a peaceful region that attracts foreign investment and harness regional trade and development that can be achieved by stabilizing the region trough peacekeeping.

Lastly the historical legacy and conviction to collective security, that derived from the failure of the League of Nations to defend Ethiopia from the Italian aggression in 1936, while both Italy and Ethiopia were member states. Another historical legacy is the early Ethiopian victory over the Italian colonial army in 1896, which gave Ethiopia a special collective behavior in its foreign policy and military orientation. Also, this independence inspired other African states and black people around the world. The Ethiopian peacekeeping operations can be considered as an extension of credence in fighting for those who are beleaguered. Emperor Haile Selassie I, stated 'people who love freedom and who are trying to fight for their freedom should be respected and helped.' This statement is still a core value in all Ethiopian regimes' foreign policy and military conviction.

Ethiopia commands a clear hegemonic power status in the Horn of Africa; this is due to its being the most populous state in the region, having strongest armed forces and having the fastest-growing economy. In addition to this, Ethiopia manifests the four characteristics of regional hegemon: first, it claims its responsibility in areas of security and the region and continental level on issues of Pan-Africa and climate change in its modern political history; secondly, it has the necessary, demographic, economic, and military power resource to influence its region, third it has been employing an essential foreign policy instrument, its military power through vast peace support operation in the region, lastly more or less Ethiopia is recognized in its leadership role by the states of the region and beyond.

CHAPTER 8 – SURVEY RESULTS AND ANALYSIS OF MEMBERS OF ENDF OUTLOOK ON ETHIOPIAN PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS

"If you wish to experience peace, provide peace for another." Dalai Lama

"Peace is not something you wish for, it's something you make." Robert Fulghum

8.1 Introduction

This brief quantitative chapter is a supplementary chapter of Chapter 7. A survey was done for a total of 420 men and women in uniform. There are 14 survey questions, which are divided into three parts based on the essence of the questions. The first part from question 1 up to question 5 covers general personal information for all 420 ENDF members including a brief analysis for each questions. The second part, from survey question 6 up to question number 11 are general mission information questions, and the third part, from survey question 12 up to 14 deals with the outlook on Ethiopia peacekeeping deployment, and personal motivation. Finally analysis of the survey by cross referencing some of the questions. Three key figurative analysis were given based on the total survey questions. Mainly referencing the ranks of the respondents (private solders, NOCs, junior officers, and senior officers) to peacekeeping deployment, outlook on Ethiopia peacekeeping deployment, and personal motivation.

8.2 Survey Questions Results

8.2.1 General Personal Information of Total 420 ENDF Peacekeepers

Question 1 – Military Rank

From the survey's total 420 participants, the highest number of respondents are 71 Sergeants and the second highest rank is Major, with 45 respondents. The list number of respondents are from rank of Staff Sergeant Major and Command Sergeant Major, six and nine respondents respectively.

Question 2 – Sex

From the survey's total participants, 88.3% are male, and 11.7% are female. This is due to low involvement of women in ENDF. Though the Ministry of Defence does not release any data about the female members of ENDF, according to one study on ENDF, the national defense forces guidelines allow up to ten percent (10%) of female representation.[735] This is also reflected in the peacekeeping deployment. When ENDF organized under the post 1991 government, most of female fighters of EPRDF were forced to demobilize and forced to leave the army in 1995. Thus, because of low new enlistment of women in the army, their number is still insignificant. However, the new army document released in 2018 states the need for proper women's representation ENDF.[736]

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[735] Gebremichael, Seble. "Women in Peacekeeping Missions in Africa: The Case of the Ethiopian Army deployed in Abyei (Sudan / South Sudan border)". 23 January 2019. https://lamenparle.hypotheses.org/978#_ftn2. Accessed on 20 December 2019.

[736] FDRE Prime Minster Office. *FDRE Defence Forces Building Strategy.* Addis Ababa. 2018. 77.

Question 3 – Age

From the survey's total participants, 19.52% are from age 18-29; 51.9% from 30-40, 25.95% from 40-50; and 2.61% above 50 years old. From this figure it can be deduce that most of the respondents are from 30 to 40 years of age. This means most of them served at least 12 years in the army if they are 30 years of old, and served for 22 years if they are 40 years of age; because the enlisting age in ENDF is 18 years. This is also reflected in survey question number 4, which indicates 47.14% of the respondents served more than 15 years and 30.23% served 10-15 years. It is also important to note that according to the Stastista.com data, in 2018, 40.7% of Ethiopian population is from age 0 – 14; 55.72% from age 15 – 64; and 3.5% are 65 years and older.[737]

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[737] Statista "Ethiopia: Age structure from 2010 to 2020" https://www.statista.com/statistics/455134/age-structure-in-ethiopia/. Accessed on 19 January 2019.

Question 4 – Educational Level

From the survey's total participants, 1.19% have a Master's degree, 14.04% finished their bachelor degree, 24.76% got a diploma, 49.28% finished high school, 9.04% finished their primary education, and 1.66% has no formal education but read and write.

Though academic qualification is needed to join the army, which is 18 years of age and at least got the Ethiopian General Secondary Education Certificate, which is awarded after completing the 10th grade and took the Ethiopian General Secondary Leaving Certificate Examination (EGSLCE). However, 10.7% present of the respondents did not have the official qualification.[738]

This is due to two main reasons. The first reason, during the Ethiopia-Eritrean war in 1998-2000 the ENDF was recruiting anyone 18 years of age and above without any academic benchmarks to join the army. Those who joined the army by then stayed in the army without any academic improvement and continued as NOC. The second reason is the enlisting criteria in some regions and zones of Ethiopia gets lower because of lack of educated residents, for example in Benishangul-Gumuz, Gambela, Afar, and Somali regional states and some zones of the Southern Ethiopian

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[738] Recruitment criteria to be enlisted to the regular army: (1) Accept the FDRE Constitution and fully committed to serving it; Not member of any political party; Not a former member of the ENDF, the police force, and regional special forces, Not Convicted criminal or civil cases, Ethiopian Citizen; Height 1.60m for men and 1.55m for women; Weight for men 50-75 for women 45-66 kg; 18-22 years old; Willing to undergo a health examination; Accepted by the community for good behavior; Free from all forms of addiction; Complete 10th grade.

Nations, Nationalities and Peoples regional state. In the same way, those who join from these areas stayed in the army without any academic improvement and continued as NOC.

However, it has been the culture in ENDF to give a free opportunity for the armed forces to continue their academic studies in government and private universities. Also, several junior and senior officers will go abroad for higher education in Staff Colleges and War Colleges and civilian universities mainly in India, China, Russia, France and United States to peruse their studies.

Moreover, ENDF opened its Defence University in 1997. It has been graduating junior officers in fields of health and engineering. Besides Defence Staff and Command College and Defence War College who teaches senior officers and general officers respectively, ENDF has 17 educational institutions like Air Force Academy, Navy Basic Seamen Training Center, and General Mulugeta Buli Vocational College etc. To join the Navy and Engineering and Health Sciences applicants who have completed 12th grade and above.

Question 5 – Service Year

From the survey's total participants, 47.14% served more than 15 years, 30.23% 10-15 years, 18.57% 5-10 years, and 4.04% served less than five years before deployment the peacekeeping mission. This shows priority is given for those with more service year than the new recruits to the army.

8.2.2 General Mission Information

Question 6 – Mission Area (Returned or About to Deploy)

From the survey's total participants, 33.57% were deployed in Darfur, 29.28% in Abyei, 20.23% in South Sudan, 15% in Somalia, 3.56% in Liberia, and 0.47% in Burundi. Except Burundi and Liberia, where both Ethiopian peacekeeping deployments were in 2003, all the rest of peace-keeping deployments are ongoing. This is the main reason for small number of respondents who were deployed in Burundi and Liberia. As it is described in Table 6.14, the highest number of ENDF deployments are in Somalia and Abyei more than 30,418 and 23,930 respectively.

Question 7 – Number of Deployment

273

From the survey's total participants, 70.95% of officers were deployed for the first time, 27.14% were deployed two times, and 1.9% were deployed three times to a peacekeeping mission.

Another important finding concerning number of deployment is out of 114 respondents who deployed to peacekeeping mission for second time only 2 female officers (one captain and one major) deployed for second time and no female respondent deployed for third time. The main reason for this because female officers are mostly will be occupied in family responsibilities, mainly caring for children. Thus it is almost impossible they will depart from the household for longer period of time repeatedly.

Concerning the 1.9% of the total respondents, which are eight in number, all of them served in the army for more than 15 years and five of them are Non-commissioned Officers and three of them are Senior Officers. All five Non-commissioned Officers are skilled in mechanical and technical fields besides serving for the longer years in the army.

Question 8 – Places of deployment of 122 troops who were deployed for the second and third times.

From the survey's total 420 participants, 29.04 % were deployed for the second and third time. Out of which, 55.73% were deployed to Darfur, and 29.5% were deployed to Liberia for the second or third time. The peacekeeping mission in Darfur was created in 2006 though Ethiopia start sending troops in 2008 and the mission in Liberia started in 2003 and Ethiopia send its troops in the same year. The others were deployed in Abyei, Somalia, South Sudan, Rwanda, and Burundi.

Question 9 – If you have to go on a mission for the second time, where do you want to be deployed? (210 returnees)

From the survey of a total of 210 returnees from peacekeeping missions, the first choice to go back again is to Abyei, 33%; the second choice is South Sudan, 27%; the third choice is Darfur 17%, of the ENDF officers. 11% of the officers are willing to be deployed anywhere and the rest of them are willing to be deployed in Mali, DRC and outside Africa. It can be deduced that from the mission areas Ethiopia is deploying its troops, Abyei is the most preferred mission among Ethiopian officers, and Somalia is the least preferred.

The main reason the peacekeeping mission in Abyei is the first choice for most respondents, which is also likely for most Ethiopian troops is the presence of exclusive Ethiopian contingent deployment in Abyei. Because all the contingents are Ethiopians, the troops from Ethiopians to feel at home. In addition to that all Force Commanders are Ethiopians from the beginning of the mission.

On the other hand, AMISOM in Somalia is a peace enforcement or warfighting mission, as one of its three strategic objectives is to 'reduce the threat posed by Al-Shabaab and other armed opposition groups'. This mission has been with a high risk of fatality which costed a life of many Ethiopian and other contributing states troops. Besides, because it is an African Union mission, it has less reimbursement than the United Nations mission in Abyei, as discussed in Section 6.3.2.

Question 10 - Are you are willing to go on a peacekeeping mission again? *(200 returnees from mission, five returnees Staff Officers, and five returnees Military Observers)*

From the survey of a total of 210 returnees from peacekeeping missions, the most significant number of officers, 89% are willing to go to peacekeeping missions again. Only 11% are not willing to go to peacekeeping mission over again. This result strengthen the arguments discussed in Section 8.3, where Ethiopian national security concern, the need to maintain Ethiopia's political influence both regionally and internationally, economical gain for the deployed troops and the historical legacy of Ethiopian army and its conviction for collective security highly drive the the ENDF to be deployed in peacekeeping missions.

Question 11 – What are the main difficulties in Mission Area?

From the survey of a total of 210 returnees from peacekeeping missions, one of the most significant challenges is language, which is 55%. Other challenges are the weather condition 24%, rebel groups in the mission area 15%, and challenges in the local community constituted 6%. From this it can be deduced that English language has been a great challenge for Ethiopian troops. This also resulted in the existence of few Ethiopian army officers in strategic level posts in AU and UN peacekeeping missions and also in their Headquarters.

8.2.3 Outlook on Ethiopian National Peacekeeping and Personal Motivation

The major focus the survey chapter is to answer the research question of the dissertation, "What is the outlook of the Ethiopian armed forces on Ethiopia's peacekeeping participation?"; Question number 13 describe the figure about the research question. Question number 14 and 15 answers the personal motivation for peacekeeping deployment and the interest of the respondents to be deployed outside the Horn of Africa region respectively. The latter two survey questions are included because they can relate with the major enquiry of the outlook on Ethiopian national motivation for peacekeeping deployment.

Question 12 – Why do you think is the reason of the Ethiopian Government to send its troops to Peace Support Operations?

From the survey's total participants, the two most common answers to why Ethiopia deploy peacekeeping troops are: because the mission will indirectly protect Ethiopia from terrorists in neighboring states and prevent conflicts from spillover to Ethiopia, 55% and help people con-

flict areas 30%. This survey result also support the hypothesis and document analyses on the rationales for Ethiopian peacekeeping operations. The foremost reason be for its own national security; that is halting a threat from the Somalian terrorist group Al-Shabaab and conflict spillover from South Sudan and Sudan.

Another important point that needs to be raised here is though the respondents gave attention on the financial motive of the Ethiopian government or the MoD, the financial gain from peacekeeping deployment of both personnel and equipment is tremendous. Moreover, peacekeeping deployment and its reimbursement after deployment used as an attraction for the youth to join the army and stay in the army for a longer period. As the document 'the Nature of Army Building and Direction of Implementation' indicates, "Although thousands of young people join the army each year in training, at the same time thousands fled from the army. This situation affected our capacity development and our goal of achieving a safe level of preparedness has created a tendency for us to continue to be understaffed, especially in terms of manpower." [739] Thus, though it is not an official stance of ENDF or MoD, deploying troops to peacekeeping mission will keep new recruits to stay in the army in hoping they will be deployed that they can get substantial amount of money.

Question 13 – Personal Motivation for Deployment

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
[739] Armed Forces General Staff Directorate. "The Nature of Army Building and Direction of Implementation." Addis Ababa. 2017. 65-66.

From the survey's total participants, more than half of the officers (60%) assert their motivation for peacekeeping deployment is to help peoples of neighboring countries in conflict; 30% said because it is one of their military duty, and 10% motivated by more payment of peacekeeping deployment. From this result it can be deduce that, as a result of prodigious amount of indoctrination of the army, that Ethiopian peacekeeping deployments are to help maintain or restore peace and security mainly in Ethiopian regional sphere of influence and to tackle direct and indirect threats to Ethiopian national security. However, as indicated in Section 7.3.3 and especially as Table 7.3 shows due to a smaller amount salary of ENDF, money from peacekeeping deployment is also a motivation for troops.

Question 14 – How is your interest in participating in mission areas outside the Horn of Africa regions like the Democratic Republic of Congo and Mali?

From the survey's total participants, it can be deduced that more than half of the respondents (55%), are not interested in being deployed in peacekeeping missions outside the Horn of Africa region, 18% has very low interest, 37% low interest. Only 23% of the respondents has very high and high interest in deploying outside Horn of Africa.

The lack of interest in deploying outside the Horn of Africa region corresponds with the majority of the respondents' (60%) personal motivation for peacekeeping deployment, that is "to help peoples of neighboring countries in conflict" (See figure for survey question number 14). More-

over from strategical point of view there is less likely Ethiopian troops to be deployed in Franco-phone Mali and DRC.

However, the current strengthening of Ethio-France relations after the visit of Ethiopia's Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed to France in October 2018 and the French President Emmanuel Macron to Ethiopia on in March 2019. And the cooperation in military fields give some hint on Ethiopia might involve in French security interest in Mali, which might lead to Ethiopian deployment of peacekeepers. The leaders agreed on France's support of building the newly established navy and a loan of 100 million euros.

8.3 Analysis

Besides brief explanations under each question figures, three notable findings can be deduced from the survey questions results by cross referencing the question: peacekeeping deployment for military rank; outlook on Ethiopian national peacekeeping deployments for military rank; and personal motivation for military rank. These will provide an insights on Ethiopian troops' peacekeeping deployment and their personal motivation and their outlook on the national peacekeeping deployment rationale.

8.3.1 Peacekeeping Deployment and Military Rank

Figure 8.1 Comparison of Military Rank for Peacekeeping Deployment

An initial prominent observation from this survey is nearly 75% of troops Ethiopia deployed to peacekeeping missions are non-commissioned officers and junior officers. This confirm ENDF's concentration on deploying a significant number of contingents with the rank of Junior Officers

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and less. It is both AU and UN policy that staff officers, military experts, Liaison officers, military observers and military advisers are all senior officers or General officers. As it is indicated in Section 6.4 (See Figure 6.1, Figure 6.2, and Figure 6.3) for example in 2017 Ethiopia deployed to UN 8,321 contingents but 100 military experts and 118 staff officers.

The primary reason for this the nature of the peacekeeping mission Ethiopia deploy its peacekeeping troops. For example all UN peacekeeping missions in Abyei, South Sudan, and Darfur cover a large area of deployment need a large number of troops on the ground. UNISFA's mandate under the UN Security Council Resolution 1990 was to monitor the ceasefire and the demilitarization of Abyei, protect civilians, provide demining assistance, facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid, strengthen the capacity of the Abyei Police Service, and provide security for oil infrastructure. All the mandates need significant man power. The strength mandated was 5,326 military personnel and 50 police personnel. As of December 2013, the mission has 4,102 military personnel, 17 police officers and 129 military observers. In this mission Ethiopia contributes 3,956 troops.

UNMISS was mandated under UN Security Council Resolution 1996 to support the government of South Sudan in the consolidation of peace and security, including conflict prevention, mitigation and resolution, an in protection of civilians. The mission's initial authorization was 7,000 military personnel and 900 police personnel. In 2019 Ethiopia deployed 2,091 Contingent Troops, 17 Experts on Mission, 20 Police, and 30 Staff Officers.

UNAMID was mandated under UN Security Resolution 1769 to protect civilians, without prejudice to the responsibility of the Government of Sudan, protect its personnel and facilities and ensure the freedom of movement of its own personnel and humanitarian workers, and support the early and effective implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement. The missions authorized strength was 19,555 military personnel and 4,690 police officers. In 2009 Ethiopia contributed 6 experts on Mission, 821 contingent troops, 19 police, and 5 staff Officers.

8.3.2 Outlook on Ethiopian National Peacekeeping Deployments and Military Rank

The single important finding from the survey questions is the outlooks of the armed forces on Ethiopian peacekeeping operations. The outlooks of the respondents (See Question 13) were organized on their ranks as Privates, Non-commissioned officers, Junior Officers and Senior Of-

ficers. Four choices were forwarded that can define Ethiopian national motivation for peacekeeping deployment.

The key finding from this survey is for all four groups of the greater number of respondents (See Figure 8.2) consider the Ethiopian government participation in peacekeeping missions because its interest of indirectly protecting Ethiopia from terrorists in neighboring states and to prevent conflicts from spillover to Ethiopia. For majority private soldiers (56.3%), for most non-commissioned officers (62.0%) and senior officers (66.3%) the Ethiopian national interest in participation of peacekeeping is for indirectly protecting Ethiopia from terrorists in neighboring states and to prevent conflicts from spillover to Ethiopia. This reaffirm the argument on Section 7.3.1 the national security rationales of Ethiopia's peacekeeping deployment.

Figure 8.2 Comparison of Outlook on Ethiopian National Peacekeeping Deployments for Military Rank

8.3.3 Personal Motivation and Military Rank

Peacekeeping deployment become an organizational culture of ENDF. As indicated in Section 6.1.4 especially after 2011 thousands of Ethiopian troops has been deployed in UN and AU missions. More than 116,709 Ethiopian peacekeepers were deployed across the world (See Table 6.16), and Ethiopia has more than half a century experience of peacekeeping operations.

In the organizational tradition of ENDF peacekeeping deployment is both in voluntary bases and by order. If the MoD requested/ordered a contingent or staffs to peacekeeping missions to a particular department/corps/division, the particular department/corps/division must respond to the demand of the MoD with its available man-power. However, it is also voluntary because individual officer/private soldier has a right to request not to be deployed for peacekeeping mission abroad.

Figure 8.3 Comparison of Personal Motivation for Military Rank

Thus, personal motivation is a vital issue that needs to be studied. Motivation can be defined as "an individual's degree of willingness to exert and maintain an effort toward organizational goals."[740] Motivation is influenced by a complex set of professional, social, and economic factors that includes strong career development, adequate compensation, and satisfactory working and living conditions.[741] The personal motivation for deployment to peacekeeping missions is also correspond with the national/organization culture of Ethiopian military, economic motivation of

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[740] Aning, Kwesi and Joseph Siegle. "Assessing Attitudes of the Next Generation of African Security Sector Professionals" May 2019. Africa Center for Strategic Studies. Research Paper No. 7. https://africacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/ARB07EN-Assessing-Attitudes-of-the-Next-Generation-of-African-Security-Sector-Professionals.pdf Accessed on 12 June 2019.

[741] Ibid.

the individual officer/private soldier. Therefore, as showed in Question number 14, three options were given to the respondents and in Figure 8.3 the answers are compared with the military ranks of the respondents.

The survey responses reveal that private soldiers and senior officers are more motivated for the economic benefit of peacekeeping deployment. Especially the vast majority of senior officers (80.4%) interested in the payment. This is because mainly senior officers want to acquire some kind of benefit before their retirement age[742], which is 52 or before they leave the army. Moreover, senior officers are mostly deployed as Staff Officer or Observer with a high amount of daily allowance and benefit which can have a significant impact when they get back home. On the other hand, for private soldiers money the economic benefit is considered as an important motivation because of their low salary. Helping people in neighboring countries in conflict is also important motivation for private soldiers with 42%.

Another important result of the survey is large number non-commissioned (77.7%) and junior officers (63.3%) are motivated in helping people in neighboring countries in conflict. Form this it can be deducted that the both sections of the army are more in to the major focus of the government and ENDF.

8.4 Summery and Partial Conclusion

This chapter covers the supplementary part of the analysis of the dissertation, Chapter 7. It give an overview information on the troops and tries to answer the research question of the dissertation, "What is the outlook of the Ethiopian armed forces on Ethiopia's peacekeeping participation?".

An initial prominent observation from this survey is nearly 75% of troops Ethiopia deployed to peacekeeping missions are non-commissioned officers and junior officers. This confirm ENDF's focus on deploying a significant number of contingents with the rank of Junior Officers and less. It is know that staff officers, military experts, Liaison officers, military observers and military advisers are all senior officers or General officers.

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[742] Retirement age for private is 45, for junior officer and non-commission officers 48, and for general officers 55. (Defense Forces Proclamation No.1100 /2019. Page 10861)

The second important result of the survey is the gender balance. Out of the total respondents, 88.3% are male, and 11.7% are female. This is due to low involvement of women in ENDF. This is due to the national defense forces guidelines allow up to ten percent (10%) of female representation. Which is also reflected in the peacekeeping deployment. However, the new army document released in 2018 states the need for proper women's representation ENDF.[743]

From the survey's total participants, 1.19% have a Master's degree, 14.04% finished their bachelor degree, 24.76% got a diploma, 49.28% finished high school, 9.04% finished their primary education, and 1.66% has no formal education but read and write. This is due to two main reasons. The first reason, during the Ethiopia-Eritrean war in 1998-2000 the ENDF was recruiting anyone 18 years of age and above without any academic benchmarks to join the army. The second reason is the enlisting criteria in some regions and zones of Ethiopia gets lower because of lack of educated residents, for example in Benishangul-Gumuz, Gambela, Afar, and Somali regional states and some zones of the Southern Ethiopian Nations, Nationalities and Peoples regional state.

The third important disclosure from the qualitative survey is from the total of 210 returnees from peacekeeping missions, the first choice to go back again is to Abyei, 33%; the second choice is South Sudan, 27%; the third choice is Darfur 17%, of the ENDF officers. 11% of the officers are willing to be deployed anywhere and the rest of them are willing to be deployed in Mali, DRC and outside Africa. The main reason the peacekeeping mission in Abyei is the first choice for most respondents, which is also likely for most Ethiopian troops is the presence of exclusive Ethiopian contingent deployment in Abyei. Because all the contingents are Ethiopians, the troops from Ethiopians to feel at home. In addition to that all Force Commanders are Ethiopians from the beginning of the mission. On the other hand, AMISOM in Somalia is a peace enforcement or warfighting mission, and because it is an African Union mission, it has less reimbursement than the United Nations mission in Abyei.

The fourth observation from the survey is, the two most common answers to why Ethiopia deploy peacekeeping troops are: because the mission will indirectly protect Ethiopia from terrorists in neighboring states and prevent conflicts from spillover to Ethiopia, 55% and help people con-

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[743] FDRE Prime Minster Office. *FDRE Defence Forces Building Strategy.* Addis Ababa. 2018. 77.

flict areas 30%. This survey result also support the hypothesis and document analyses on the rationales for Ethiopian peacekeeping operations. The foremost reason be for its own national security; that is halting a threat from the Somalian terrorist group Al-Shabaab and conflict spillover from South Sudan and Sudan.

In relation with this, an important observation is, from the survey's total participants, more than half of the officers (60%) assert their personal motivation for peacekeeping deployment is to help peoples of neighboring countries in conflict; 30% said because it is one of their military duty, and 10% motivated by more payment of peacekeeping deployment.

On the other hand, based on their ranks, private soldiers and senior officers are more motivated for the economic benefit of peacekeeping deployment. Especially the vast majority of senior officers (80.4%) interested in the payment. And large number non-commissioned (77.7%) and junior officers (63.3%) are motivated in helping people in neighboring countries in conflict. Form this it can be deducted that the both sections of the army are more in to the major focus of the government and ENDF.

CHAPTER 9 – CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The long-awaited world peace did not arrive … One of the most important tasks of states and associations is to guarantee security and sovereignty and to ensure the conditions for development. The force still has a place in the advocacy toolbox. A force that is able to respond quickly and flexibly to changes in the security environment and changing circumstances in its equipment, organization, and procedures.

Colonel Dr. Boldizsar Gabor

"It is collective security: it is the very existence of the League of Nations. It is the confidence that each state is to place in international treaties. It is the value of promises made to small States that their integrity and their independence shall be respected and ensured."

Emperor Haile Sellassie I of Ethiopia (1936)

"War can only be abolished through war, and in order to get rid of the gun, it is necessary to take up the gun." Mao Zedong

9.1 Conclusion

* Foreign policy and military power are the two most important functions of a state to pursue its national interest outside its national territory. Peacekeeping is where a state's foreign policy and its military capability adjoin. This means that any state's interest or decision to deploy its military or police personnel to a UN or any other regional organization's mission is based on its foreign policy and national interest in addition to its military power capacity.

* Ethiopian foreign policy, mainly since the formation of its modern government structure, has been oriented towards supporting the notion of international organizations, collective security, and peacekeeping operation and supporting those who are in tyranny. This is manifested throughout its history of being the first African nation to be the founding member of the League of Nations and also one of the founding members of the United Nations. It was also the only African nation to send its troops to South Korea when it faced invasion from the North in 1950. Ethiopia also supported anti-colonial and antiapartheid liberation movements in other African states and in South Africa. These military and foreign policy traditions have continued until today.

* The Horn of Africa region, which is composed of nine states that are members of the regional bloc, IGAD, can be considered as the regional complex that reflects an interlinked regional security complex. The most common security dynamics in the region are: spillovers of domestic conflicts, mainly refugee flows, expulsions of foreigners, and civil wars and intervention by neighbours in domestic turbulence. Also, the region is known for the high presence of UN and AU military support operations. There is currently a presence of peace support missions in Darfur, Sudan; Abyei Sudan–South Sudan border. In the past, there were missions in Somalia, in the Ethiopia-Eritrea border, in the Uganda-Rwanda border, and in Sudan. From the first UN mission in the region in 1992 until 2019, there were 21 multinational peace support operations by AU, EU, IGAD, NATO and UN.

* Besides all these peace support missions in the region, the Horn of Africa has become one of the world's most militarized regions. Currently, there are fifteen states with operational military bases, one under construction and two with possible existing military facilities, in Djibouti, Eritrea, Kenya, Somalia, and Somaliland. Furthermore, there is a high military naval presence in the nearby waters of the Red Sea, Gulf of Eden, and Strait of Bab al-Mandab.

* The dissertation classified Ethiopian peacekeeping generation based in particular the sending regime's motive, the nature of the armed forces, and the focus area of deployment. Three types of Ethiopian governments were identified; first, the Imperial regime of Emperor Haile Selassie I from 1930-1974, second, the Transitional Government of Ethiopia led by President Meles Zenawi from 1991-1995, and third, the government of Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia from 1996 up to now, led by PM Meles Zenawi (1996-2012) PM HaileMariam Desalegn (2012-2018) and PM Abiy Ahmed (2018-). Ethiopia did not deploy peacekeeping troops at the time of the military government of Colonel Mengistu HaileMariam from 1974-1991. Based on these three criteria, Ethiopian peacekeeping is divided into four generations of operations.

* The first generation of peacekeeping is the Imperial Army (1950 - 1967) which is based on the conviction to the collective security of Emporer Haile Selassie I. The second generation is the EPRDF's Rebel Army sent to Rwanda by the Transitional Government of Ethiopia. This is characterized as Rebels Solidarity (1994 – 1995) because both the governments of Ethiopia and Rwanda at the time were rebel armies. The third generation of peacekeeping is after the formation of the national army, ENDF Engagement in 'African Solution for African

Problems' (2003 - 2010), where Ethiopia gave focus for peacekeeping deployment in Africa. The fourth-generation peacekeeping is when the Ethiopia army become the Peacekeeper Army (Since 2011) after the MoD of Ethiopia institutionalize peacekeeping as one of its departments and establish a peace support training centre.

* Participation in peacekeeping operations in the Ethiopian context can be considered as a vehicle for its national security strategy. Besides, Ethiopia used its peacekeeping deployment as political influence in the region and economic gain for its troops. In addition to this, the historical tradition and conviction to collective security is among Ethiopia's rationales where it took peacekeeping as its "national mandate" to protect civilians. Moreover, Ethiopia commands a clear hegemonic power status in the Horn of Africa; due to its being the most populous state in the region, strongest armed forces with the fastest-growing economies.

* Because of Ethiopian independence and the history of freedom from colonialism, there is special collective behavior in its foreign policy and military orientation. The Adowa victory against the Italian colonial invasion is seen as the embodiment of African militancy and heroism. In addition to the Ethiopian military victory against the colonial power. Its red, yellow (gold), and green colored flag symbolizes freedom and Pan-Africanism. It inspired the flags of other African nations and other Black movements in the Americas.

* Ethiopia is deploying thousands of its troops in all current AU and UN peacekeeping missions: UNAMID in Sudan, Darfur, UNMISS, in South Sudan (UNISFA), in Abyei, and AMISOM in Somalia. Since 2015 – 2019, Ethiopia has been the top overall troop contributor to UN peacekeeping missions. Adding its AU peacekeeping and its unilateral involvement in Somalia, it is the second country in the world next to the US with foreign deployed troops. UNISFA is a unique type of peacekeeping operation since the beginning of UN peacekeeping in 1948 because 100% of the contingent troops are from Ethiopia

* The history of Ethiopia's involvement in peacekeeping operations shows that its interest extends well beyond the regional and the African continent. However, the current peacekeeping trends focused primarily on immediate neighbors.

* Ethiopia currently contributes the most personnel to UN peacekeeping missions with Protection of Civilian (POC) mandates. Ethiopia, Rwanda, and Bangladesh are the top three con-

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tributors of uniformed personnel to UN peacekeeping operations with the protection of civilians mandates as of April 2019, which is based on the Kigali Principles.

* A foreign policy consists of two elements: national objectives to be achieved and the means for achieving them, while military power is the key machinery of government against internal and external security threats. The Military apparatus is also vital in the formulation and implementation of foreign policy and in the functioning of the state in the international system. The same is true for Ethiopian foreign policy and military power in the Ethiopian peace support operation in the Horn of Africa until 2019.

* Scholars argue, being a peacekeeper in next-door neighbours can be influenced more heavily by security, political, and potentially normative considerations than that of more distant states. Ethiopian main peacekeeping focus on its next-door neighbours beside the advantage of the familiarity of the next-door neighbour conflict and cultural similarity and geographical proximity, has the advantage of lower cost and responding in a short time span when a conflict brakes out. Ethiopia's geopolitical location in the Horn of Africa makes it vulnerable because of civil wars, failed states and the risk of spillover conflicts and refugees. Thus, in order to protect its national interest, Ethiopia needs to keep the peace of its neighbours for its own interest.

* The dissertation identified four levels of Ethiopian geopolitical interest and security risk responsiveness vis-à-vis peace support operation deployment. The first and immediate geopolitical interest and security risk for Ethiopia are its neighbouring countries or the IGAD region; secondly, African Countries, which is AU and Ethiopia's Pan-Africa commitment; thirdly, the Red Sea Region, which is a vital trade root and the nearest access to the sea for Ethiopia; and forth, the Global focus, which is a commitment to collective international security and national prestige.

* The dissertation identified that Ethiopia's approach to the Horn of Africa regional security has been primarily influenced by minimizing its vulnerabilities and its immediate national security threats where its national role in peacekeeping emanates from, and this role has become the defining paradigm for its foreign policy engagement.

* Ethiopia is a key player in the Horn of Africa, and despite the recent internal conflict, its peace support operations have been crucial for maintaining stability in the region. Its role is

aided by its military's strength and active participation in regional peace and security operations; its capacity and willingness to combat terrorism; a Pan-Africanist legacy; and its effective utilization of multilateral platforms. These will keep its regional hegemony and visibility.

* Many peace operations in the Horn of Africa show how complex the composition of the human terrain is (language, ethnicity, religion) and how complex the roots of conflicts are (history, traditions, beliefs and beliefs, behaviour, individual and group consciousness and memory, development, wars, occupation, colonisation, interests, values). These many conflicts require a lot of effort and Ethiopia is at the forefront of this. Ethiopia acts for security on an individual, regional, and global level based on its historical (independence), value (the only country that was not a colony), interest (living space, security, stability, development), and size (largest in the region).

* Based on the result from the qualitative survey nearly 75% of troops Ethiopia deployed to peacekeeping missions are non-commissioned officers and junior officers. This confirm ENDF's focus on deploying a significant number of contingents with the rank of Junior Officers and less. It is know that staff officers, military experts, Liaison officers, military observers and military advisers are all senior officers or General officers.

* Based on the result from the qualitative survey, from the total of 210 returnees from peacekeeping missions, the first choice to go back again is to Abyei, 33%; the second choice is South Sudan, 27%; the third choice is Darfur 17%, of the ENDF officers. 11% of the officers are willing to be deployed anywhere and the rest of them are willing to be deployed in Mali, DRC and outside Africa. The main reason the peacekeeping mission in Abyei is the first choice for most respondents, which is also likely for most Ethiopian troops is the presence of exclusive Ethiopian contingent deployment in Abyei. Because all the contingents are Ethiopians, the troops from Ethiopians to feel at home. In addition to that all Force Commanders are Ethiopians from the beginning of the mission. On the other hand, AMISOM in Somalia is a peace enforcement

or warfighting mission, and because it is an African Union mission, it has less reimbursement than the United Nations mission in Abyei.

* Based on the result from the qualitative survey, the two most common answers to why Ethiopia deploy peacekeeping troops are: because the mission will indirectly protect Ethiopia from terrorists in neighbouring states and prevent conflicts from spillover to Ethiopia, 55% and help people conflict areas 30%. This survey result also support the hypothesis and document analyses on the rationales for Ethiopian peacekeeping operations. The foremost reason be for its own national security; that is halting a threat from the Somalian terrorist group Al-Shabaab and conflict spill over from South Sudan and Sudan. In relation with this, an important observation is, from the survey's total participants, more than half of the officers (60%) assert their personal motivation for peacekeeping deployment is to help peoples of neighbouring countries in conflict; 30% said because it is one of their military duty, and 10% motivated by more payment of peacekeeping deployment.

9.2 New Scientific Results

1. The post-1991 Ethiopian government has been using its military power capability or show of force and force presence through peacekeeping operations. One of the major features of Ethiopian peacekeeping is its disposition to deploy its troops for protection of civilians (POC) missions and focusing on peacekeeping deployment in its next-door neighbours.

2. I identified four-generation peace operations, thus providing an opportunity to define a clear framework in the study of Ethiopia's peacekeeping history and its rationales. The first generation of peacekeeping is the Imperial Army (1950 – 1967) deployment in two missions: in the US-led United Nations Command in Korea and in United Nations Operation in the Congo. The second generation is the EPRDF's Rebel Army sent to Rwanda by the Transitional Government of Ethiopia, characterized as Rebels Solidarity (1994 – 1995). The third generation of peacekeeping is after the formation of the national army, ENDF engagement in 'African Solution for African Problems' (2003 – 2010). The fourth-generation peacekeeping is when the Ethiopia army become the Peacekeeper Army Since 2011.

3. I created the concept of peace operation strategy analysis based on the four levels of Ethiopian geopolitical interest and security risk responsiveness vis-à-vis peace support operation deployment. The first and immediate geopolitical interest and national security risks are its neighbouring countries or the IGAD region; secondly, African Countries, which form AU and Ethiopia's Pan-Africa commitment, thirdly, the Red Sea Region, which is a vital trade root and the nearest access to the sea for Ethiopia, and is a significant waterway for international trade and including the most crucial state in the area, Yemen, forth, the Global focus, which is a commitment to collective international security and national prestige.

4. Based on the theory of Buzan, I defined the Horn of Africa as a security complex. The Horn of Africa displays many of the features of a Regional Security Complex based on its security dynamics and high levels of security interdependence. Security dynamics in the region are spillovers of domestic dynamics, refugee flows due to the common conflicts trends in the region: intrastate conflicts/ethnic conflict, interstate conflicts, religious fundamentalism, and violence, change in living space, supporting neighbouring state rebels or neighbours in domestic turbulence which affect all states of the Horn of Africa.

5. Three Ethiopian National Security Functions towards the three next-door states that Ethiopian peacekeeping troops were deployed are summarized in the following table.

Functions of National Security	Somalia	Sudan	South Sudan
Defining the vital national interest that has to be safeguarded	- Export of Agricultural goods - Ethnic Somali's live both in Somalia and in Ethiopia	- Oil Import - Import and Export of Agricultural goods	- Oil Import - Minimizing migration - Illicit arms trade
Identifying threats for the National Interest	- Islamists and Irredentists coming to power in Mogadishu	- Civil War in Sudan - Alliance with Egypt against Ethiopia's GER Dam over the Nile	- Civil War
Selecting strategic actions with the available elements of national power can be mobilized by the state.	- Supporting the Federal government with sending its troops to fight Al-Shabaab (Unilateral intervention) - Deploying its troops with AMISOM	- PM involved (2019-2020) - Deploying its troops to UNAMID in Darfur - Deploying its troops to UNISFA	- Abyei - Deploying its troops to UNMISS and CTSAMM - Involve in IGAD mediation

Table 8.2 The Three Ethiopian National Security Functions towards the three countries Ethiopian peacekeeping troops deployed.

9.4 Recommendations

∗ Though Ethiopia has a long and wide peacekeeping experience deploying thousands of military and police personnel throughout its history, there is no white paper or strategic policy on peace support operation acquired from its experience – which can be useful for regional and international organizations for their peace support operation. Thus, it is recommended the Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Foreign Affairs work on this. Developing such a strategy will support the diplomats and military officers in their operational and tactical levels towards achieving the desired goal.

∗ Based on the analysis of this dissertation, Ethiopian geopolitical interest, and security risk responsiveness vis-à-vis peace support operation deployment, Ethiopia should be involved more in Yemen and focus on the security issues in Yemen, which is a part of the Horn more often than acknowledged by policymakers. It has also a strong historical, cultural, and strategical relations with the states of the region. Furthermore, Ethiopia should increase its involvement and influence on the Red Sea according to its own fundamental security requirement.

∗ It is unlikely that Ethiopia will abandon its long-held foreign policy and military tradition of peacekeeping. It is also the recommendation of this dissertation that Ethiopia remains in its involvement in the peacekeeping operations. And to keep its influence, it will need to increase its capability and, especially, its leadership role in the UN peacekeeping operations and offer effective designs about peacekeeping and peace enforcement and peacebuilding in its region and beyond.

∗ Ethiopia needs to develop its military, police, and civilian capability for supplying UN peace support operation demands. For example, the UN listed its nine critical shortages: in mobility - strategic airlift, utility and tactical helicopters, infantry with high mobility vehicles; enablers - engineers, logistics and transportation units; information-Gathering - observation/surveillance, including high resolution; night operations capability; data management

and analysis; formed police units - specialized in public order management, including crowd control; specialized police - including trainers, organizational reform experts, and investigators; civilian specialists - including in security sector reform, judicial and prisons management; strategic planners - military, police, and civilian; female military, police and senior Civilian personnel; and Francophone staff officers and police - for four French language missions.[744]

* Compared with Ethiopia, the latecomer, Rwanda has a strong record of active engagement with peace operations strategy, doctrine, and practice. For example, it contributes 'the Kigali protocol,' and this dissertation recommends that Ethiopia follow the same trend beyond mare contribution of personnel.

* The focus areas of this dissertation, the Horn of Africa security complex, and Ethiopia's peace support operation in the region which is related to the root causes of conflict, complex human train, and protection of national interest and values can give a lesson to Hungarian Defence Forces and NATO. The dissertation contributes to the AU/UN and other unilateral and multilateral actors response to African crisis management. When conflict arise in a given state it is important to work together with the relevant regional states to enhance peacekeeping capabilities and to get the advantage of both military capability, geographical proximity, and familiarity of the complexities of conflicts that have a regional implication.

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[744] UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, *A New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping.* New York: United Nations, July 2009. 27.

Postscript

Since January 2020, there has been a political, diplomatic and security shakeups that have occurred in Ethiopia after this dissertation was completed. Two major points are briefly discussed below which are directly related with the dissertation's study area.

∗ Ethiopian Internal Security Crunches

An act of treason took place on 4th November 2020 when TPLF[745] attacked the Northern Command of the ENDF, TPLF claiming it was a preemptive attack against the federal forces, as the federal government was planning an attack on the TPLF leadership in Tigray, the northern state of Ethiopia, which is a strong hold of the party. The attack was orchestrated by retired and functioning ENDF high level military officers who were loyal to TPLF both in Addis Ababa and Tigray and the political leadership of TPLF.

This forced the federal government to launch a 'law enforcement operation' against the military officers who deserted from ENDF and the Special Forces of the TPLF government in Tigray who openly wage war on the federal government. The military operation led to the death of the top TPLF leader and the former foreign minister of Ethiopia Seyoum Mesfin and other senior leaders, and imprisonment of other deserted military officers and political leaders of TPLF. This crisis also affected Ethiopia's peacekeeping operations and ENDF's reputation, as members of a contingent of Ethiopian peacekeepers in South Sudan, who are originally from TPLF controlled Tigray region, refused to return to Ethiopia, remaining to look for an asylum. Moreover, recently France suspends military cooperation with Ethiopia over Tigray conflict.

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[745] As discussed in chapter 5 TPLF is a political party which controlled power in 1991 by forming a coalition of parties under the umbrella of ethnic coalition EPRDF. In December 2019 when EPRDF transformed itself in to countrywide party bringing together nine ethnic parties in to a single party, Prosperity Party, TPLF refused to join the merger. When Ethiopian general election was postponed to 2021 due to COVID 19 by the decision of FDRE's House of Federation, TPLF refused the decision and piloted its own election in Tigray, where it won almost all the seats of the regional parliament. This led to a fierce verbal conflict with the Federal government ultimately led to the horrendous act of November 4.

∗ Diplomatic Crisis between Ethiopia and Sudan

The relationship between Ethiopia and Sudan started to deteriorate when Sudan openly opposed the filling on GERD, which it initially more or less supported. It seems Sudan is caught between the competing interests of Egypt and Ethiopia. However, recently after the Ethiopian crises in the north begun and after Ethiopia announced the second feeling of the dam, Sudan unambiguously toke the side of Egypt and it started to confront Ethiopia diplomatically and militarily. Sudan's claim over the ownership of Benishangul-Gumuz regional state in western Ethiopia bordering Sudan, where GERD is located, was strongly condemned by Ethiopia. Furthermore, the crises escalated when Ethiopia accused Sudan's armed forces of crossing 40 kilometers into its fertile border lands in its Amhara region in the north, and occupying the land, taking the advantage of Ethiopia's forces being preoccupied with the Tigray conflict and leaving the border area. Sudan denies the claim that its army had been redeployed in the border, and did not go beyond the Sudanese territory.

These crises strongly affected Ethiopian peacekeeping operations and ENDF reputation, as Sudanese government demanded the withdrawal of Ethiopian Peacekeeping troops from Abyei region. In April 2021, Sudan's foreign minister Mariam al-Mahdi avowed that because of Ethiopia's 'unacceptable intransigence' in the talks over the GERD and its decision to proceed with the second phase of the filling of its dam; and since the Ethiopian troops are massing on the eastern borders of Sudan, it is not conceivable for Ethiopian forces deployed in the strategic depth of Sudan.[746]

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[746] Arab News. "Sudan demands expulsion of Ethiopians from Abyei UN peacekeeping forces" 07 April 2021. https://www.arabnews.com/node/1838971/middle-east. Accessed on 20 June 2021.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND GLOSSARY

ACDEG	African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance
ACERWC	African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child
ACHPR	African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights
AEC	African Economic Community
AfCHPR	African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights
AFISMA	African-led International Support Mission in Mali
AIAI	Al Ittihad Al Islamiya
AMIB	African Mission in Burundi
AMIS	African Union Mission in Sudan
AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
ANDM	Amhara National Democratic Movement
APRM	African Peer Review Mechanism
APSA	African Peace and Security Architecture
ASF	African Standby Force
AU HIP	AU High-Level Implementation Panel
AU	African Union
AUABC	AU Advisory Board on Corruption
AUC	African Union Commission
AUCIL	AU Commission on International Law
AUTSTG	African Union Technical Support Team to Gambia
CEWS	Continental Early Warning System
CJTF– HOA	Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa
CLB	Continental Logistics Base
CMF	Combined Maritime Forces.
COE	Contingent Owned Equipment
CTF	Combined Task Force
CTSAMM	Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring Mechanism in South Sudan

Derg	Provisional Military Administration Council
DPKO	Department for Peacekeeping Operations
DPO	Department of Peace Operations
DPPA	Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
EASBRIG	Eastern Africa Standby Brigade
EASF	East African Standby Force
ECOSOCC	Economic, Social & Cultural Council
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
ENDF	Ethiopian National Defense Forces
EPLF	Eritrean People's Liberation Front
EPRDF	Ethiopian People Revolutionary Democratic Front
EU	European Union
EU NAVFOR Somalia	European Union Naval Force Somalia (Operation Atalanta)
EUCAP Somalia	EU Regional Maritime Capacity Building for the Horn of Africa and the Western Indian Ocean
EUTM Somalia	EU Training Mission in Somalia
FDRE	Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia
FOC	Full Operational Capability
G5 Sahel	Group of Five Sahel States
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
LAPSSET	Lamu Port-South Sudan-Ethiopia-Transport
LRA	Lord's Resistance Army
MAES	African Union Electoral and Security Assistance Mission to the Comoros
MARCOM	Allied Maritime Command
MIOC	African Union Military Observer Mission in the Comoros
MISCA	Central African Republic the African Union-led International Support Mission to the Central African Republic
MoD	Ministry of Defense

MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MSCHOA	Maritime Security Centre – Horn of Africa
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OAU	Organization of African Union
ONLF	Ogaden National Liberation Front
OPDO	Oromo Peoples' Democratic Organization
PAP	Pan-African Parliament
PLANELMs	Planning Elements
POC	Protection of Civilian
PRC	Permanent Representatives Committee
PSC	Peace & Security Council
PSOD	African Union Commission's Peace Support Operations Division
R2P	Responsibility to Protect
RCI-LRA	Regional Cooperation Initiative for the Elimination of the Lord's Resistance Army
RECs	Regional Economic Communities
RECs/RMs	Regional Economic Communities/Regional Mechanisms
RLDs	Regional Logistics Depots
RPF	Rwandese Patriotic Front
RTF	African Union-Led Regional Task Force
SEPDM	Southern Ethiopian People's Democratic Movement
SFG	Somalia Federal Government
SMSC	Supreme Military Strategic Committee
SNA	Somali Police Force
SPLM/A	Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army
SPF	Somali National Army
STCs	Specialized Technical Committees
TCC	Troop Contributing Countries
TFG	Somalian Transitional Federal Government

TPLF	Tigray Liberation Front
UN	United Nations
UNAMID	AU–UN Mission in Darfur
UNAMIS	United Nations Advance Mission in Sudan
UNC	United Nations Command
UNDPKO	United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operation
UNISFA	UN Interim Security Force for Abyei
UNMID	African Union-United Nations Mission in Darfur
UNMIS	United Nations Mission in Sudan
UNPOS	United Nations Political Office for Somalia
UNSOM	United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia
UNSOS	United Nations Support Office in Somalia
USSR	United Soviet Socialist Republic
WFP	World Food Programme
WIO	Western Indian Ocean

APPENDIXES

APPENDIX 1. SIPRI'S MULTILATERAL PEACE OPERATIONS THAT WERE ACTIVE AS OF MAY 2019 [747]

No.	UN **United Nations**	No.	EU **European Union**		No.	OSCE **Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe**	No.	AU **African Union**
1	MINUJUSTH UN Mission for Justice Support in Haiti, 2017 M-0 | P-1005 | C-157	1	EUAM Iraq EU Advisory Mission in Support of Security Sector Reform in Iraq, 2017 M-0 | P-8 | C-21		1	OMIK *OSCE Mission in Kosovo, 1999* **M-0 | P-0 | C-84**	1	**AMISOM** AU Mission in Somalia, 2007 **M-20161 | P-662 | C-66**
2	MINURSO UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara, 1991 M-224 | P-1 | C-75	2	EUAM Ukraine EU Advisory Mission for Civilian Security Sector Reform Ukraine, 2014 M-0 | P-44 | C-98		2	OSCE Centre in Ashgabat* *OSCE Centre in Ashgabat, 1999* **M-0 | P-0 | C-5**	2	AU Observer Mission in Burundi 2015 **M-8 | P-0 | C-37**

[747] Source: SIPRI. *SIPRI Map of Multilateral Peace Operations, 2019.* https://www.sipri.org/publications/2019/sipri-map-multilateral-peace-operations-2019, Accessed on 20 July 2019.

M-Military | P-police | C-International Civilian; All figures are estimates of the actual number international personnel deployed as of 31 Dec. 2018, unless otherwise noted. The fgures do not include national civilian staff; * Not a multilateral peace operation according to the definition applied by SIPRI; ** Figures are as of 31 Dec. 2017; *** The JF-G5S is headquartered in Mali and operates in three distinct geographical sectors along and across the borders of Mali and Mauritania (West); Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger (Central); and Chad and Niger

No.	UN Mission	No.	EU Mission	No.	OSCE Mission	No.	AU / NATO
3	**MINUSCA** UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic, 2014 M-11628 | P-2049 | C-607	3	EUBAM Libya EU Border Assistance Mission in Libya, 2013 M-0 | P-7 | C-35	3	OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina *1995* **M-0 | P-0 | C-33**	3	**MISAC** AU Mission for the Central African Republic and Central Africa, 2014 **M-0 | P-0 | C-9****
4	MINUSMA UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali, 2013 M-12811 | P-1761 | C-743	4	EUBAM Rafah EU Border Assistance Mission for the Rafah Crossing Point, 2005 M-0 | P-1 | C-8	4	OSCE Mission to Moldova *1993* **M-0 | P-0 | C-10**	4	**MISAHEL** AU Mission for Mali and the Sahel, 2013 **M-0 | P-0 | C-11****
5	MONUSCO UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC, 2010 M-15851 | P-1362 | C-833	5	EUCAP Sahel Mali EU CSDP Mission in Mali, 2015 M-0 | P-40 | C-71	5	OSCE Mission to Montenegro* *2006* **M-0 | P-0 | C-7**	No.	**NATO** **North Atlantic Treaty Organization**
6	UNDOF UN Disengagement Observer Force, 1974 M-939 | P-0 | C-49	6	EUCAP Sahel Niger EU CSDP Mission in Niger, 2012 M-0 | P-35 | C-80	6	OSCE Mission to Serbia *2001* **M-0 | P-0 | C-21**	1	**KFOR** NATO Kosovo Force, 1999 M-3642 | P-0 | C-0
7	UNFICYP UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus, 1964 M-804 | P-68 | C-37	7	EUCAP Somalia* EU Maritime Security Capacity Building Mission in Somalia, 2012 M-0 | P-86 | C-4	7	OSCE Mission to Skopje 1992 M-0 | P-0 | C-35	2	**NMI** NATO Mission Iraq, 2018 M-580 | P-0 | C-0 (as authorized)
8	UNIFIL UN Interim Force in Lebanon, 1978 M-10317 | P-0 | C-239	8	EUFOR ALTHEA EU Military Operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2004	8	OSCE Observer Mission at the Russian Checkpoints Gukovo	3	**RSM** Resolute Support Mission, 2015 M-16910 | P-0 | C-0

							No.	
				M-560 | P-0 | C-17		and Donetsk 2014 M-0 | P-0 | C-21		
9	UNISFA UN Interim Security Force for Abyei, 2011 M-4545 | P-41 | C-136	9	EULEX Kosovo EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo, 2008 M-0 | P-166 | C-124	9	OSCE PRCiO OSCE Personal Representative of the Chairperson-in-Offce for the Conflict Dealt with by the Minsk Conference, 1995 M-0 | P-0 | C-6	**No.**	**ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States**
10	UNMIK UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, 1999 M-8 | P-10 | C-93	10	EUMM Georgia EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia, 2008 M-0 | P-0 | C-201	10	OSCE Presence in Albania 1997 M-0 | P-0 | C-19	1	**ECOMIB** ECOWAS Mission in Guinea-Bissau, 2012 **M-396 | P-146 | C-0**
11	UNMISS UN Mission in South Sudan, 2011 M-14904 | P-1778 | C-895	11	EUNAVFOR MED/ Operation Sophia* EU Naval Force Mediterranean/Operation Sophia, 2015 M-246 | P-0 | C-2	11	OSCE Programme Offce in Bishkek* OSCE Programme Offce in Bishkek M-0 | P-0 | C-10	2	ECOMIG ECOWAS Mission in The Gambia, 2017 **M-875 | P-125 | C-0**
12	UNMOGIP UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan, 1951 M-44 | P-0 | C-23	12	EUNAVFOR Somalia/ Operation Atalanta* EU Naval Force Somalia/Operation Atalanta, 2008 M-251 | P-0 | C-0	12	OSCE Programme Offce in Dushanbe* OSCE Programme Offce in Dushanbe M-0 | P-0 | C-22	**No.**	**LCBC Lake Chad Basin Commission**
13	UNTSO UN Truce Supervision Organization, 1948	13	EUPOL COPPS EU Police Mission for the Palestinian Territories, 2005	13	OSCE Programme Offce in Nur-Sultan* 1998	1	**MNJTF*** Multinational Joint Task Force, 2015

	M-142 | P-0 | C-77		M-0 | P-20 | C-39			M-0 | P-0 | C-6		**M-10752 | P-0 | C-20****
No.	**UN/AU** **United Nations/African Union**	14	EUTM Mali EU Training Mission Mali, 2013 M-640 | P-0 | C-52		14	OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Ukraine* 1999 M-0 | P-0 | C-4	No.	**G5 Sahel** **Group of Five for the Sahel**
1	UNAMID AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur, 2007 M-6045 | P-2296 | C-630	15	EUTM RCA EU Training Mission in the Central African Republic, 2016 M-166 | P-0 | C-1		15	OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Uzbekistan* 2000 M-0 | P-0 | C-3	1	**JF-G5S*** Joint Force of the G5 Sahel, 2017 5000 (as authorized)***
No.	**United Nations Special Political Missions**	16	EUTM Somalia EU Training Mission Somalia, 2010 M-128 | P-0 | C-10		16	OSCE SMM OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine, 2014 M-0 | P-0 | C-893	No.	**IGAD** **Intergovernmental Authority on Development**
1	UNAMA UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, 2002 M-1 | P-0 | C-280	No.	**Ad hoc** **Ad hoc coalitions** **of states**				1	**CTSAMVM** Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring and Verifcation Mechanism, 2015 **M-0 | P-0 | C-114**
2	UNAMI UN Assistance Mission in Iraq, 2003 M-241 | P-0 | C-306	1	**IMT** International Monitoring Team, 2004 **M-19 | P-3 | C-6**				No.	**OAS** **Organization of American States**
3	UNIOGBIS UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau, 2010	2	JCC/JPKF Joint Control Commission/Joint Peacekeeping Forces, 1992				1	MAPP/OEA OAS Mission to Support the Peace Process in Colombia, 2004

	M-1 | P-12 | C-62		**M-1120 | P-0 | C-0**				**M-0 | P-0 | C-28**
4	UNMHA UN Mission to Support the Hodeidah Agreement, 2019 M-2 | P-5 | C-. .	3	**MFO** Multinational Force and Observers, 1982 **M-1117 | P-0 | C-111**				
		4	**NNSC** Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, 1953 **M-10 | P-0 | C-0**				
		5	**OHR** Office of the High Representative, 1995 **M-0 | P-0 | C-12**				

APPENDIX 2. PRE-DEPLOYMENT QUESTIONNAIRE FOR A MEMBERS OF ENDF CONTINGENT FORCES

For Contingents who are on Standby for Mission

My name is Kaleab Tadesse Sigatu, and I am currently doing my Ph.D. dissertation research on the Ethiopian National Defense Forces' role in peacekeeping in the Horn of Africa; in Abyei, Darfur, Somalia, and South Sudan. The main purpose of this questioner is to study the experience of ENDF contingents who are on standby for a mission at Hurso Peacekeeping Training School.

For the better achievement of the study, I would kindly ask you to answer the following questions. To keep the anonymity of the person who fills this questioner, there is no need to write a name. The purpose of this questioner will be only for academic purposes; thus, please feel free to answer what you believe a correct answer. Thank you for your time.

Part I – General Information – Please write your rank and mark the 'X' sign on the given space for accurate information about yourself.

1. Rank _____

2. Sex

    i. Male _____   ii. Female _____

3. Age

    i. 18 – 29 _____   iii. 40 – 50 _____

    ii. 30 – 40 _____   iv. More than 50 _____

4. Educational Level

    i. No Formal Education ___   iv. Diploma _____

    ii. Primery Education _____ v. Degree _____

    iii. Secondary 'High School__ vi. Masters _____

5. Service time at ENDF

    i. Less than 5 Years ____   ii. 5 to 10 Years ____

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iii. 10 to 15 Years _____   iv. More 15 Years _____

Part II – General Mission Information – Please write your rank and mark the 'X' sign on the given space for accurate information about yourself.

6. In which place are you going to be deployed?

    i. Abyei, UNISFA ____   iii. Somalia, AMISOM _____

    ii. Darfur, UNAMID _____   iv. South Sudan, UNAMISS _

7. For how many times are you deployed to a peacekeeping mission?

    i. For the 1st time _____   iii. For the 3rd time _____

    ii. For the 2nd time _____

8. Did you go on a peacekeeping mission before? If so, where and when?

    i. Place _____ Time _____

    ii. Place _____ Time _____

9. Why did you want to part of the ENDF peacekeeping mission? (Personal Motivation) *(It is possible to mark more than one answer)*

    i. To help people in neighbouring states in conflict

    ii. Because it is my military duty

    iii. Because there is high reimbursement

    iv. If there is other reason _____

10. Why do you think the Ethiopian government sends its troops to a peacekeeping mission? (Circle *on your answers) (It is possible to mark more than one answer)*

    i. To make its troops get supplementary reimbursement

    ii. To help peoples in conflict, ridden states

    iii. To protect Ethiopia indirectly from Terrorists and spill over conflicts

    iv. It is the duty of the Ethiopian government as a member of the UN and International Community

Part III - Mark the ' X' sign on the given space at your accurate judgment.

No.	Question	Very High	High	Medium	Low	Very Low
11	How willing would you be if you are deployed in places far from the Horn of Africa, like in Congo and Mali?					

APPENDIX 3. POST-DEPLOYMENT QUESTIONNAIRE FOR A MEMBERS OF ENDF CONTINGENT FORCES

For Contingents who are returned from deployment.

My name is Kaleab Tadesse Sigatu, and I am currently doing my Ph.D. dissertation research on the Ethiopian National Defense Forces' role in peacekeeping in the Horn of Africa; in Abyei, Darfur, Somalia, and South Sudan. The main purpose of this questioner is to study the experience of ENDF contingents who are on standby for a mission at Hurso Peacekeeping Training School.

For the better achievement of the study, I would kindly ask you to answer the following questions. To keep the anonymity of the person who fills this questioner, there is no need to write a name. The purpose of this questioner will be only for academic purposes; thus, please feel free to answer what you believe a correct answer. Thank you for your time.

Part I – General Information – Please write your rank and mark the 'X' sign on the given space for accurate information about yourself.

1.   Rank _____

2.   Sex

      i. Male _____   ii. Female _____

3.   Age

      i. 18 – 29 ____   iii. 40 – 50 _____

      ii. 30 – 40 _____   iv. More than 50___

4.   Educational Status

      i. No formal Education ___   iv. Diploma _____

      ii. Primeray Education ____   v. Degree   ____

      iii. Secondary Education ___   vi. Masters__

5.   Service year in the ENDF

      i. Less than 5 Years ___   ii. 5 – 10 Years ___

iii. 10 – 15 Years __   iv. More than 15 Years ____

Part II – Questions concerning peacekeeping missions: Please mark the 'X' sign on the given space for accurate information about yourself.

6. For how many times you were deployed to peacekeeping mission?

     i. 1st time _____   iii. 3rd time_____

     ii. 2nd time ____

7. Did you participate in a peacekeeping mission before? If so, where and when?

     i. Place _____ Time _____

     ii. Place _____ Time _____

8. From which mission area did you get back?

     i. Abyei, UNISFA ____   iii. Somalia, AMISOM ____

     ii. Darfur, UNAMID ____   iv. South Sudan, UNAMISS ____

9. Are you willing to be deployed for a peacekeeping mission again?

     i. Yes, I am ____

     ii. No, I am Not ____

10. If you are willing to be deployed in PKO again, in which mission are you willing to go?

     i. Abyei, UNISFA _____   iv. South Sudan, UNAMISS _

     ii. Darfur, UNAMID _____   v. If there is any other place, you are interested in being deployed for UN peacekeeping _____

     iii. Somalia, AMISOM ____

11. What was your main reason for interest to be deployed in peacekeeping mission? *(Possible to answer more than one)*

     i. To help people in neighbouring states in conflict

     ii. Because it is my military duty

     iii. Because there is high reimbursement

iv. If there is other reason _____

12.   What do you think the Ethiopian government is willing to send members of ENDF to PKO around the world?

    i. To make its troops get supplementary reimbursement

    ii. To help peoples in conflict, ridden states

    iii. To protect Ethiopia indirectly from Terrorists and spill over conflicts

    iv. It is the duty of the Ethiopian government as a member of the UN and International Community

Part III - Mark the' X' sign on the given space at your accurate judgment.

No.	Question	Very High	High	Medium	Low	Very Low
13	How willing would you be if you are deployed in places far from the Horn of Africa, like in Congo and Mali?					

APPENDIX 4. POST-DEPLOYMENT QUESTIONNAIRE FOR A MEMBERS OF ENDF STAFF OFFICERS AND MILITARY OBSERVES

For Staff Officers and Experts returned from deployment

My name is Kaleab Tadesse Sigatu, and I am currently doing my Ph.D. dissertation research on Ethiopian National Defense Forces' role in peacekeeping in the Horn of Africa; in Abyei, Darfur, Somalia, and South Sudan. The main purpose of this questioner is to study the experience of ENDF officers who were deployed at Staff and Experts in AU and UN PKOs.

For the better achievement of the study, I would kindly ask you to answer the following questions. To keep the anonymity of the person who fills this questioner, there is no need to write a name. The purpose of this questioner will be only for academic purposes; thus, please feel free to answer what you believe a correct answer. Thank you for your time.

Part I – General Information – Please write your rank and mark the 'X' sign on the given space for accurate information about yourself.

1. Military Rank at the time of Deployment _____

2. Sex

   i. Male _____   ii. Female_____

3. Age

   i. 18 – 29 _____   iv. 50 – 60 _____

   ii. 30 – 40 _____   v. Above 60 _____

   iii. 40 – 50 _____

4. Educational Status

   i. No formal Education __   iv. Diploma ___

   ii. Primeray Education ___   v. Degree   ___

   iii. Secondary Education ___   vi. Masters ____

5. Service year in the ENDF

   i. Less than 5 Years _____   ii. 5 – 10 Years ____

iii. 10 – 15 Years _____   iv. More than 15 Years _____

Part II – Questions concerning peacekeeping missions: Please mark the 'X' sign on the given space for accurate information about yourself.

6. For how many times you were deployed to peacekeeping mission?

    v. 1st time _____   vii. 3rd time_____

    vi. 2nd time ____

7. Did you participate in a peacekeeping mission before? If so, where and when?

    viii. Place _____ Time _____

    ix. Place _____ Time _____

8. From which mission area did you get back?

Country of Deployment	Type of Deployment		
	Staff Officer	**Expert**	**Other**
Rwanda			
Burundi			
Liberia			
Haiti			
Cote d'Ivoire			
Chad			
South Sudan			
Darfur, Sudan			
Abyei			
AMISOM, Somalia			
Mali			
Other			

9. Are you willing to be deployed for a peacekeeping mission again?

    iii. Yes, I am ____

    iv. No, I am Not ____

10. If you are willing to be deployed in PKO again, in which mission are you willing to go?

   i. Abyei, UNISFA _____

   ii. Darfur, UNAMID _____

   iii. Somalia, AMISOM ____

   iv. South Sudan, UNAMISS _

   v. If there is any other place, you are interested in being deployed for UN peacekeeping _____

11. What was your main reason for interest to be deployed in peacekeeping mission? *(Possible to answer more than one)*

   i. To help people in neighbouring states in conflict

   ii. Because it is my military duty

   iii. Because there is high reimbursement

   iv. If there is other reason _____

12. What do you think the Ethiopian government is willing to send members of ENDF to PKO around the world?

   i. To make its troops get supplementary reimbursement

   ii. To help peoples in conflict, ridden states

   iii. To protect Ethiopia indirectly from Terrorists and spill over conflicts

   iv. It is the duty of the Ethiopian government as a member of the UN and International Community

Part III - Mark the' X' sign on the given space at your accurate judgment.

No.	Question	Very High	High	Medium	Low	Very Low
13	How willing would you be if you are deployed in places far from the Horn of Africa, like in Congo and Mali?					

APPENDIX 5. LIST OF KEY INFORMANTS

No.	Name	Position	Date	Place
FDRE's The Hours of Peoples Representative Parliament				
1	Tesfaye Dhaba Waqjira	Foreign, Defense and Security Affairs Standing Committee Chairman[748]	03 August 2019	Bishoftu (Debre Zeit), Ethiopia
African Diplomats				
2	Colonel Robert K. Kitur	Defense Attaché in Embassy of the Republic of Kenya, Ethiopia	30 May 2019	Embassy of the Republic of Kenya, Addis Ababa
3	Major General Sam Kiwanuka	Defense Attaché in Embassy of the Republic of Uganda, Ethiopia	07 June 2019	Embassy of the Republic of Uganda, Addis Ababa
4	El Ghassim Wane	∗ Former Director African Union Commission Peace and Security Department ∗ Former Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operation United Nations ∗ Former African Union Chief of Staff	07 June 2019	Bishoftu (Debre Zeit), Ethiopia
Ethiopian Diplomats at FDRE's MOFA				
5	Dawit Yiriga	∗ Former FDRE's Political Coordinator of the Permanent Mission to the African Union in Addis Ababa ∗ Former Minister Counsellor at Perma-	26 August 2019	Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

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[748] 'Foreign Relation and Peace Affairs' is the new name of the Standing Committee.

		nent Mission to the United Nations in New York. * Currently Director-General for International Organization in MOFA		
6	Henok Seyum	Junior Diplomat in MOFA	07 June 2019	Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
7	Helina Dinku	Ethiopian Diplomat in FDRE' Embassy in Rome	13 December 2018	Rome, Italy
FDRE's Federal Police Commission				
8	Commander Tegegne Agajiet Deferesha	Head of Peacekeeping Department	03 October 2020	Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
9	Anonymous	Sergeant, Federal Police Commission (Retired)	24 February 2020	Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
10	Anonymous	Sergeant, Federal Police Commission (Retired)	25 February 2020	Burayu, Ethiopia
ENDF Peacekeeping Coordination Center (PCC) International Peace Support Training Institute (EIPSTI)				
11	Anonymous	ENDF Peacekeeping Main Department	11 June 2019.	Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
13	Colonel Elias Seyoum	Head of Peace and Security Research Division at EIPSTI	10 June 2019.	Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
14	Brigadier General Habtamu Tilahun	Commander of EIPSTI	11 November 2019.	Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
15	Colonel Tamrat Andarge	Head of Training Division at EIPSTI	11 November 2019.	Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
16	Colonel Milkesa Regasa	Commandant, Hurso Peacekeeping	01 October 2019.	Hurso, Somali Regional State,

		Traning School		Ethiopia
17	Colonel Alemayehu Abera	Deputy Commandant and Head of Traning at Hurso Peacekeeping Training School	01 October 2019.	Hurso, Somali Regional State, Ethiopia

APPENDIX 6. LIST OF PUBLICATIONS BY THE RESEARCHER

Book Chapter

1. **'Ethiopian Participation in UN Peacekeeping Operations since 1991'** In Janos Besenyo and Viktor Marsai. (Eds.) *The Dynamics of Conflicts in Africa in the Early 21st Century.* Budapest, 2018. 201-224. https://akfi-dl.uni-nke.hu/pdf/webPDFDynamicsofConflictsinAfrica.pdf

Articles

2. **'No Peace No War: Ethiopian-Eritrean Conflict.'** *Academic and Applied Research in Military and Public Management Science (AARMS).* Volume 18, Issue 1, 2019. 79 – 91. https://folyoiratok.uni-nke.hu/document/nkeszolgaltato-uni-nke-hu/AARMS201901.pdf

3. **'Asymmetric Warfare against the Islamic Militant Group Al-Shabaab in Somalia– The Ethiopian Experience.'** In Almos Peter Kiss (Ed.) *Asymmetric Warfare: Conflict of the Past, the Present, and the Future.* Conference Proceeding. Hungarian Defence Forces General Staff Scientific Research Centre, in cooperation with the National University of Public Service. Budapest, 9-10 November 2016. 235 – 247. http://hvktkh.hm.gov.hu/kiadvanyok/dokumentumok/asymmetricwar.pdf

4. **'Conflict over the Nile: The GERD Project and its Implication in the security of the Horn of Africa.'** 2019. Budapest. Accepted for publication by project "Africa in the globalized world" Ludovika Research Group, supported by the National University of Public Service under the priority project KÖFOP-2.1.2-VEKOP-15-2016-00001 entitled „Public Service Development Establishing Good Governance" Led by Dr. Viktor Marsai.

5. **'The Role of regional actors in the South Sudan Conflict.'** Accepted for publication by project "Africa in the globalized world" Ludovika Research Group, supported by the National University of Public Service under the priority project KÖFOP-2.1.2- VEKOP-15-2016-00001 entitled„ Public Service Development Establishing Good Governance" Led by Dr. Viktor Marsai.

6. **'UNISFA: Conflict over Abyei and the Exclusive Ethiopian Peacekeeping Mission.'** 2019. Budapest. Accepted for publication by the project titled "Rural Security" under the commission of the National University of Public Service under the priority project KÖFOP-2.1.2- VEKOP-15- 2016-00001 titled „Public Service Development Establishing Good Governance" in the Ludovika Workshop led by Professor Dr. Tivadar Szilagyi

7. **'Conflict among Border Communities the Case between Ethiopia and Kenya and Ethiopia and South Sudan.'** 2019. Budapest. Accepted for publication by the project titled "Rural Security" under the commission of the National University of Public Service under the priority project KÖFOP-2.1.2-VEKOP- 15- 2016-00001 titled „Public Service Development Establishing Good Governance" in the Ludovika Workshop led by Professor Dr. Tivadar Szilagyi

Monograph

8. **'Rural Security-Lesson Learnt Form Horn of Africa–Ethiopia: Conflicts Caused by Changed Living Space.'** December 2018. Budapest. Accepted for publication by the project titled "Rural Security" under the commission of the National University of Public Service under the priority project KÖFOP-2.1.2-VEKOP-15- 2016-00001 titled „Public Service Development Establishing Good Governance" in the Ludovika Workshop led by Professor Dr. Tivadar Szilagyi.

Book

9. **'Constitution in Ethiopia form Kibire Negest to EPRDF'** ሕገ መንግስት በኢትዮጵያ፦ ከፍትሐ ነገስት እስከ ኢፌዴሪ [Bilingual Book - Amharic and English] Mega Publishing & Distribution Pvt. Ltd. Co., Addis Ababa, 2019.

APPENDIX 7. LIST OF SCIENTIFIC LECTURES BY THE RESEARCHER

1. **„Asymmetric Warfare with the Islamic Militant Group Al-Shabaab in Somalia: The Ethiopian Experience"** In "International Conference by The Science Department of the Hungarian Defence Force General Staff, in cooperation with NUPS." Stefania Palace, Budapest, 9-10 November 2016

2. **„The Role of Ethiopia in the Regional Security Complex of the Horn of Africa"** In „The Dynamics of African Conflicts in the Early 21st Century – Two Steps Further, one Step Back?" Ludovika Campus, Budapest, October 5, 2017

3. **„Regional Influences and Somali Security: Ethiopia's Role in Somalia"** In „Secured without Security? The political economy of peace enforcement of the Federal Government of Somalia Achievements and constraints between regional influences and domestic struggles." Rome, Italy, September 26th, 2017

4. **„Military Power as Foreign Policy Instrument: Ethiopian Peacekeeping Role in the Horn of Africa"** In „20th International Conference of Ethiopian Studies (ICES20), 'Regional and Global Ethiopia: Interconnections and Identities'" Mekele University, Mekele, Ethiopia 1-5 October 2018

5. **„Constitutions in Ethiopian History: Reflection on Important Historical Landmarks"** In „20th International Conference of Ethiopian Studies (ICES20), 'Regional and Global Ethiopia: Interconnections and Identities'" Mekele University, Mekele, Ethiopia 1-5 October 2018

6. **„Conflict over the Nile – The Involvement of China and the United States"** In "The Jagiellonian Conference on Security in Asia, Africa, and Europe: The Impact of Rivalry between China, Russia, and United States on Security Dynamics in Asia, Maghreb, and Europe. Krakov, Poland, 22–23 November 2018

7. **„Peacekeeping the Horn: AU and UN Peacekeeping Missions in the Horn of Africa."** In „War Studies University: International Expert Seminar on the Horn of Africa" Warsow, Poland, 4th December 2018

8. **„Terrorism in the Horn of Africa: threats and Ethiopian responses"** International Conference Organized by www.migraciokutato.hu „Terrorism 3.0 — Current Security Challenges and Prospects." Budapest, Hungary, 5-6 December 2019

9. **„Building a National Army in Multi-Ethnic States: The Case of Ethiopia."** In "VIVA AFRICA 2019, 11th International Conference on African Studies. „Multiple Entanglements in African Politics" November 28−29, 2019 / Olomouc / Czech Republic.

10. **„Ethiopia in Transition: The Case of the Security Sector."** In "30 Years of Freedom - Farewell to Communism in Hungary Local and Global Lessons,". Organized by the Embassy of Hungary to Ethiopia, the Ethiopian Civil Service University (Addis Ababa, ETH), the National University of Public Service (Budapest, HU), and the University of Pecs (Pecs, HU). 25 October 2019